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Summary: 
The contemporary market model of democracy has led to the political and economic 
exclusion of popular sectors. Its adoption by both Left- and Right-parties has fostered a 
widening legitimacy crisis for democracy as it exists today. As such, the central concerns of 
this project are to identify how and why an alternative model that simultaneously boosts the 
political and social citizenship of popular sectors may emerge, develop, and sustain itself. A 
theoretical framework is advanced, detailing how the changing relative power of a Left-led 
state, the organised popular base, economic elites, and international (f)actors facilitate, 
shape and limit  opportunities for democratisation. The framework is applied to the cases of 
Bolivia and Venezuela where radical-substantive democratisation experiments were 
undertaken since the turn of the millennium. The lesson from the two cases is that 
substantive democratisation that extends social and economic citizenship, thereby 
challenging entrenched elite interests, will foster an economic-elite destabilisation backlash. 
Progressive governments in both cases faced tensions between adhering to the popular 
mandate to boost political and economic inclusion on the one hand, and working within the 
confines of a national, regional and global environment dominated by the forces of capital 
on the other. A second and related tension thus emerged between strict adherence to the 
liberal democratic separation of state powers, and centralisation of power in the office of 
the executive to overcome elite barriers to the democratisation processes. While the 
presidents argued that centralised power would be used in a progressive manner to block 
elite destabilisation efforts while simultaneously opening new avenues for direct 
participation from below, over time the power imbalance between the political leadership 
and the organised base led to a fractured relationship between these two groups. In some 
xiii 
 
scenarios, the base faced co-optation if they worked too closely with the state, while in 
others, retaining an autonomous critical stance toward the government fostered state-led 
divide-and-conquer tactics of formerly powerful popular organisations. The emergence of a 
“dual power” of two lefts whereby the Left-government entered into confrontation with the 
popular base greatly weakened the democratisation process, allowing elite and 
transnational forces to take advantage. 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Crises of democracy: How did 
we get here and where to next? 
1. Introduction: 
At one level democracy is always in crisis…there has never been a period in the evolution 
of representative democracy when someone somewhere has not declared democracy to 
be in crisis. What is unusual in the current conjuncture is the degree of consensus 
underpinning the analysis. In the past those shrieking “fire!” tended to be in a minority – 
oddball figures, radicals, zealots. Today, it would be easier to assemble those who didn't 
think something fundamental was amiss than those who did (Tormey 2014: 2). 
There is growing recognition, both in academic literature and popular commentary, across 
the political spectrum from Liberals, Conservatives to Marxists, that the contemporary 
dominant model of democracy “is in the doldrums” (Tormey 2014: 2). Evidence of the 
malaise of democracy can be seen in the high levels of citizen disaffection with politics 
(Campus and Andre 2014), the lack of political literacy amongst the citizenry (Rapeli 2013), 
low levels of satisfaction and trust in governments and politicians (Hay and Stoker 2009; 
Warren 2009) and declining political party membership (Whitley 2009). Indeed, since the 
1970s, there has been increasing disillusionment with politicians, political parties and 
political institutions across the developed world (Pharr, Dalton, and Putnam 2000). It 
appears that this disaffection does not lead to apathy, but rather to increasingly critical 
evaluations of government (Warren 2002: 681). Since the 2008 global economic crash, trust 
and confidence in politicians and politics has diminished further and the democratic deficit – 
the gap between public aspirations for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Norris 
2011) – has widened. As Pateman (2012: 15) summarises, “in Western countries popular 
2 
 
confidence in old-established institutions is fading, voters are disaffected, trust in 
government is declining and a very wide gap has opened up between citizens and 
governments and political elites more generally”. 
This thesis aims to identify what underlies this malaise, as well as how to respond to it. I 
suggest that at the root of this malaise is weak citizenship in its civil, political and social 
forms (Marshall 1950). Indeed, I suggest that declining citizenship quality is both a cause and 
consequence of this democratic crisis, and that this faltering citizenship is directly related to 
the advancement of “market democracy” (Kohl 2006) – that is, an extremely thin model of 
liberal democracy guided by neoliberal principles.  
In the “developed” world, neoliberal policies of deregulation, privatisation, austerity, and 
corporate trade have led to living standards declining precipitously as citizens “have lost 
their jobs. They have lost their pensions. They have lost much of the safety net that used to 
make their losses less frightening” (Klein 2016). At the same time, politics has become the 
“preserve of a professional office-seeking class” (Wright 2016), while the increasing power 
of non-elected actors such as transnational corporations, international financial institutions, 
central banks, or regulatory bodies (Crouch 2004; Vibert 2007) and the development of 
complex governance arrangements that evade accountability and transparency (Runciman 
2013 as noted in Ecran and Gagnon 2014: 1) have left the average citizen in a weakened 
position to defend their well-being.  
In an era of footloose capital and migration and where citizens are left defenceless 
against the ravages of the free market, the utter failure on the part of ostensibly Left parties 
to offer any sort of alternative to this neoliberal doctrine (Klein 2016) have raised concerns 
in the “advanced” West. The lack of free choice in the political market due to policy 
3 
 
convergence around the tenets of neoliberalism and the sense that politicians are “there 
only for the taking” allows the far-right to make gains by appealing to the sense of 
frustration of vulnerable citizens (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015: 598). If this moment of deep 
discontent is to be used constructively, then we must begin to engage seriously in efforts to 
move beyond market democracy.  
Responding to the above concerns, this study seeks to address what such an alternative 
model of democracy might look like, how it might emerge, and what would shape its 
development and sustainability. Given that democracy is an essentially contested concept 
(Collier et al. 2006: 212), it is important to begin by identifying what the term implies in this 
project. The democratisation literature identifies hundreds of democracies “with adjectives” 
(Collier and Levitsky 1997: 2), for example minimal, electoral, maximal, delegative, 
participatory, and so forth. This project, following Beetham (1992: 40), posits that in reality 
there should only be one conception of democracy, that is, “a mode of decision-making 
about collectively binding rules and policies over which people exercise control”. Disputes 
and differing adjectives placed in front of democracy are really about how much democracy 
is desirable or practicable (Ibid). As such democracy may be understood as existing on a 
continuum of “how much democracy exists in reality”, with thin market-liberal 
understandings at one extreme, and thicker participatory, substantive understandings at the 
other. The key variable along the democracy continuum is the quality of citizenship in its 
civil, political, and social forms. Democratisation, then, entails moving toward the 
substantive, participative end of the spectrum, while de-democratisation signifies a move 
toward the market-liberal end of the continuum. While to date democratisation theory has 
tended to adopt a normative bias toward processes in the the West, given the crisis of 
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democracy facing the “developed” democracies today, this thesis seeks to engage in a 
discussion of what can be learned from the “developing” democracies of Latin America and 
their efforts to move toward the participative-substantive end of the democracy scale.  
The chapter proceeds by firstly discussing the concept of citizenship. Next, to 
comprehend how the “developed” democracies have reached the current malaise and to 
take lessons from past mistakes and successes, I trace the development of democracy 
through its liberal and then social democratic stages, before describing the emergence of 
market democracy. By comprehending the issues in our current model we can then begin to 
evaluate alternatives that would boost citizenship quality. As such, “thick” conceptions of 
democracy – substantive, participative, and deliberative – are evaluated. The chapter then 
calls for a break from the Euro- and US-centric focus of democratisation theory, suggesting 
instead that the so-called developed democracies should look to the recent experiments in 
Left-led Latin America. Similar to the current moment in the “developed” democracies, the 
application of market democracy in Latin America fostered a citizenship crisis in the 1980s 
and 1990s. However, around the turn of the millennium, the region witnessed the 
emergence of experiments that have sought to challenge market democracy and develop a 
“post-neoliberal” model that boosts citizenship. As such, the chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of Latin American democratisation so as to draw lessons for democratic theory in 
general regarding how to move beyond the confines of market democracy, and thereby 
overcome the crisis of democracy. However, it is important to highlight that the processes 
have varied greatly across distinct cases in Latin America, ranging from moderate to more 
radical processes. Indeed, there is also variation within the cases found within the more 
radical spectrum of Latin American democratisation experiments, with some processes led 
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from above by vanguardist-type leaders, while others have emerged from, and been 
influenced by, popular forces from below. As such, the chapter finishes with a call for the 
development of a theoretical framework capable of accounting for such variations and 
explaining their impacts on democratisation processes. 
2. Conceptions of Citizenship: 
Grugel and Bishop (2014: 10) argue that “the institutions of governments and the state 
more broadly can only be fully democratic when they enjoy popular legitimacy and 
represent the political community, meaning that it is difficult to separate democratic 
government from the concept of citizenship”. Citizenship has different interpretations, but 
the most accepted, although not uncontested, conception is that of TH Marshall (1950).  
Marshall (Ibid.: 148) outlines three elements of citizenship; civil, political, and social. The 
civil elements is composed of “the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the 
person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude 
valid contracts, and the right to justice” (Ibid.). The institutions most closely associated with 
civil rights are the courts of justice. The political element of citizenship implies the right to 
participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political 
authority or as an elector of the member of such a body. The institutions associated with 
political citizenship are parliament and councils of local government. By the social element, 
Marshall means “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized 
being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Ibid.: 149). The educational 
system and social services are the institutions most closely associated with the social 
element. As Marshall highlights, there is no universal guiding principle that determines the 
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level of rights and duties “but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create 
an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards 
which aspiration can be directed” (Ibid.: 150). Marshall was a liberal thinker who did not 
argue for the elimination of inequalities, but rather for a reduction in the risks associated 
with capitalism for the poorest citizens via welfare provision (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 2). 
Marshall’s central analytical structure of civil, political and social citizenship remains a 
central reference for most discussions on the subject, and here I adopt it as a means to 
explore competing conceptions of what citizenship should entail. 
The liberal emphasis on individual rights, equality, and due process of law,  
communitarian ideas of belonging, and the civic republican focus on processes of 
deliberation, collective action and responsibility have been the focus of much of 
contemporary discussions on citizenship (for example Mouffe 1992; Isin and Wood 1999; 
Heater 1999). Central to these discussions “is the need to conceptualise citizenship as both 
a status, which accords a range of rights and obligations and an active practice” (Jones and 
Gaventa 2002: 5). As Lister (1997:41) argues, “to be a citizen in the legal and sociological 
sense means to enjoy the rights of citizenship necessary for agency and social and political 
participation. To act as a citizen involves fulfilling the potential of that status”. Citizenship, if 
understood as requiring participation to be effective, can therefore be understood as “the 
direct intervention of citizens in public activities, and the accountability of the state and 
other responsible institutions to citizens” (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 7). 
If participation is considered a key component of citizenship, the spaces of 
participation – that is the physical and social arenas where participation takes place – 
require analysis. Cornwall and Gaventa (2001:5) highlight that discussions must focus on 
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how to extend the traditional places and mechanisms for citizen participation, such as the 
ballot box, toward developing institutions and processes that allow for more active and 
inclusive participation. Cornwall and Gaventa (2001: 8) call for new spaces and strategies to 
construct citizen participation, “ones in which participation shifts from the ‘users and 
choosers’ approach to one concerned with how citizens ‘make and shape’ policies which 
affect their lives”.  
This brief discussion suggests that citizenship is not an uncontested term, and that in fact 
the quality of actually existing citizenship is dependent on the underlying dominant model of 
democracy. Therefore, in order to contextualise the emergence and development of the 
contemporary crisis of democracy, as well as to identify what may be required to overcome 
it, it is necessary to evaluate the ideological groundings and the citizenship regimes of the 
various democratic models hegemonic during the lead up to the current conjuncture. As 
such, a brief review of liberal and social democracy followed by neoliberal-influenced 
models of democracy is offered. 
3. “Thin” conceptions of Democracy:  
3.1 Liberal democracy: 
Writing in the 1940s, and fearing that “excessive” participation of the demos would result in 
another Bolshevik revolution or the mass rallies that heralded the rise of Nazi Germany 
(Held 2006: 142), Joseph Schumpeter advocated a minimalist conception of democracy. For 
Schumpeter (1942), democracy meant a method, that is, an institutional arrangement “for 
arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions by vesting in certain 
individuals the power to decide on all matters as a consequence of their successful pursuit 
of the people’s vote” (Held 2006: 142). Schumpeterian democracy, heavily influenced by 
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Weber, reduces politics to an elite process, “whereby democracy does not mean and cannot 
mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the term ‘people’ and ‘rule’. 
Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the 
men who are to rule them” (Schumpeter 1976: 270). This elitism sought to “narrow the 
scope of political participation” and advanced the idea that to “make democratic decision-
making rational” required limiting it to elites, with the role of the masses limited to choosing 
between those elites (Avritzer 2002: 15). 
Broadly following the minimalist, Schumpeterian tradition, pluralist theorists such as 
Robert Dahl (1973) accept that the distinguishing feature between democracies and non-
democracies are the methods in which political leaders are selected (Nef and Reiter 2009: 
34; Held 2006: 158). Dahl suggested using the term “polyarchy” to differentiate between 
actually existing democracies and democracy as a political ideal since he recognised that 
there were conditions for democracy which many “democracies” did not actually meet 
(Grugel and Bishop 2014: 29). Polyarchies are premised on a combination of elected 
government and civil liberties, with the aim being to ensure access to the political system 
for various groups in society (Ibid.), which Dahl (1989) acknowledges requires a minimum 
level of substantive equality. The core institutions are the election of government officials, 
free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right of all citizens to run for public office, 
freedom of expression, access to information from sources other than official sources, and 
associational autonomy with the right to form independent organisations including political 
parties and interest groups (Dahl 1989: 221). The state’s role in polyarchy is thus to facilitate 
the trade-off and appeasement of demands of relatively small groups of elites (Held 2006: 
161). While institutions matter in polyarchies, their functioning depends on an unspoken 
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“consensus on the rules of procedure; consensus on the range of policy options; and 
consensus on the legitimate scope of political activity” (Held 1996: 207). As Held (2006: 162) 
notes, pluralists believe that “‘democracy’ does not seem to require a high level of active 
involvement from all citizens” and “can work quite well without it”. Dahl’s concept of 
polyarchy “gradually became the basis for describing the empirical characteristics of liberal 
democracy since the 1970s” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 29). 
3.2 Social democracy: 
While liberal democracy centred on elected governments and civil liberties, a more 
substantive model, social democracy, emerged from discussion amongst the Left regarding 
the challenges facing the socialist movement in the last decade of the nineteenth century 
(Berman 2010: 24). Political theorist and historian Eduard Bernstein’s call for an 
evolutionary, democratic struggle to build socialism laid the groundwork for social 
democracy (Berman 2014: 8). Bernstein argued that the capitalist system had become far 
more flexible since Marx and Engel’s time (Berman 2010: 25). As such, “instead of waiting 
until capitalism collapsed for socialism to emerge…he favoured trying to actively reform the 
existing system” (Berman 2014: 9) so as to address concrete social needs (Berman 2010: 
25).  
Following World War 1, there was a shift amongst many on the Left who began to reject 
the “twin pillars of orthodox Marxism – class struggle and historical materialism” and 
instead “openly embrace their antithesis – cross-class cooperation and the primacy of 
politics” (Berman 2014: 10). The focus on class struggle “suffered a critical blow with the 
outbreak of the war. Socialist parties across the continent abandoned their suspicion of 
bourgeois parties and institutions and threw their support behind the states they had 
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hitherto pledged to destroy” (Ibid.). Furthermore, in the post-war era the democratic wave 
that spread across much of Europe “confronted socialists with unprecedented opportunities 
for participation in bourgeois governments. Given a chance to help form or even lead 
democratic administrations, many were forced to recognize the uncomfortable truth that 
workers alone could never deliver an electoral majority and that cooperation with non-
proletarians was the price of political power” (Ibid.). In addition, the war highlighted the 
power of nationalism to mobilise immense numbers of people, and with populist right-wing 
movements tapping into such sentiments “many socialists worried that clinging to orthodox 
Marxism’s emphasis on class conflict and proletarian exclusivity would prevent them from 
responding to the needs of ordinary citizens and thus cause them to lose ground to 
competitors” (Ibid). 
As Berman (2014: 11) delineates, historical materialism was “dealt a critical blow by the 
war and its aftermath. The pivotal position occupied by socialist parties in many newly 
democratized countries after the Great War made it increasingly difficult to avoid the 
question of how political power could contribute to socialist transformation, and the 
subsequent onset of the Great Depression made submission to economic forces tantamount 
to political suicide”. With millions of disaffected people ready to be “claimed by any political 
movement promising to tame markets” orthodox Marxism’s emphasis on letting “economic 
forces be the drivers of history meant that here too it ceded ground to activist groups on 
the right” (Ibid.).  
In this scenario, budding social democrats proposed that the state could and should be 
used to tame the capitalist system, thereby championing a “real ‘third’ way between classic 
liberalism and Soviet communism, based on a belief that political forces could triumph over 
economic ones” (Berman 2010: 26). As such, attention centred on developing a “viable 
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policy agenda based on cross-class appeals and a ‘people’s party’ approach together with a 
commitment to using the state to control markets” (Berman 2014: 14). After 1945, the 
“state became generally understood to be the guardian of society rather than the economy” 
with social imperatives often trumping economic ones as Keynesianism and the welfare 
state come to dominate in Western Europe (Berman 2014: 16). Both of these were 
significant because they rejected the view that markets operated best when left 
unhindered, and instead called for state intervention in economic affairs (Berman 2014: 17).  
Following World War II, Europeans understood that social divisions and laissez-faire 
capitalism had the potential to lead to political disaster if left unattended, and as a result, 
social democratic policies were adopted not only by main-stream Left parties, but centre-
right ones too (Berman 2010: 27). On these foundations, democracy was consolidated and 
prosperity built (Ibid.). However, while social democratic policies were clearly effective, the 
very success of the post-war order led many leftists to forget that reforms, while important, 
were only stepping stones toward “taming and domesticating the capitalist beast” (Berman 
2010: 27). 
In the 1990s, a new wave of “Third Way”1 thinkers and leaders emerged. Anthony 
Giddens, much like former British Labour Party leader Tony Blair, identified the 1990s Third 
Way as “modernised social democracy” (Giddens 1998, 1999). Such a view was based on the 
New Progessivism - adopted by Bill Clinton -  which depicted the Third Way as an alternative 
to the “liberal impulse to defend the bureaucratic status quo and the conservative bid to 
simply dismantle government” (Progressive Foundation 1996).  The core values of this Third 
Way are “equal opportunity, mutual responsibility, and self-governing citizens and 
communities” (Progressive Foundation 1996:27; see also Stuart White’s 1998 discussion of 
                                                          
1
 It is important to emphasise that the 1990s “Third Way” thinkers differed substantially in their 
understandings of social democracy from the third way thinking of the interwar years. 
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the Third Way). As Pierson notes (2001: 128-130), the Third Way of the 1990s “appears to 
owe little to what has passed” for earlier social democratic thought and has been attacked 
by many who see it as a mask to hide the fact that the new politics of the centre-left will 
mean a continuation of neoliberalism (which is discussed in the next section), and that the 
advocacy of “progressive competitiveness” offers little more than a “kinder road to hell”. 
 Berman (2010: 27) states that over the final decades of the twentieth century, the 
Left’s lack of deep thinking on long-term strategies to achieve substantial change allowed 
the Right to take the mantle of ideological dominance. In the period before the 1970s, a 
growing neoliberal movement “had been organizing and thinking carefully about what it 
viewed as the drawbacks of the post-war order. When a crisis emerged, therefore, this 
movement had at the ready a powerful explanation of the West’s problems and a ready-
made set of solutions for them” (Ibid.). It is to this neoliberal movement that I now turn. 
3.3 The origins of neoliberal thought: 
Democracy was said to face a crisis in the 1970s, one that arose from “an internal change to 
the conventional practices of democracy occurring within the state itself” (Ecran and 
Gagnon 2014: 7). Habermas (1975) stated that a crisis of late-capitalism was at the root of 
the 1970s crisis of democracy; as the state’s administrative political apparatus struggled to 
deal with the economic crisis of capitalism, there was a withdrawal of people and their 
support (via popular exit or protest) for core democratic institutions such as parties, 
parliaments and governments (Merkel 2015).  Habermas (1975) describes this situation 
where citizens do not feel represented by the core institutions of democracy as a legitimacy 
crisis.  
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From a more conservative position, Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975) wrote a 
highly influential report, The Crisis of Democracy, for the Trilateral Commission - a 
“multinational organisation founded by bankers, entrepreneurs, and private citizens in 1973 
to foster cooperation between international states” (Merkel 2015). The report begins with a 
question: “Is political democracy, as it exists today, a viable form of government?” (Crozier et 
al. 1975: 2). Unlike Habermas (1975) who spoke of an exogenously created crisis of 
democracy, Crozier et al. (1975) describe an endogenously created crisis (particularly in the 
US, Western Europe, and Japan). They state that democracy itself had created its own crisis 
by fostering an overload of demands for increased participation, higher social security 
payments and a wider social security net, and better economic welfare. Citizens were said to 
be demanding “too much democracy” than the state could deliver, while the erosion of 
authority and governability in contemporary societies was due to “over-participation”. As 
such the report states that the “crisis” of democracy was a result of “the over-
permissiveness of democracy itself” (Merkel 2015). 
As Nef and Reiter (2009: 80) discuss, the liberal-democratic model that had served the 
wealthy classes for over a century was no longer fit for purpose; a new model of “conflict 
management, legitimation and enforcement, and above all elite accumulation appeared 
necessary”.  Crozier et al.’s (1975) report presented the challenge of how to reconcile 
democratic politics (built on the premise of equality), with market economics (which is 
centred on the opposite: unrestricted private accumulation, which leads to monopoly) (Nef 
and Reiter 2009: 138). In order to liberate the democratic state and respond to the financial 
crisis of the times, Crozier et al. (1975) ultimately called for a move away from Keynesianism, 
and a move toward van Hayek's and Friedman’s neoliberal economics (Merkel 2015).  
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Emerging from a critique of the social democratic model that developed in the post-war 
period, and with ideological origins in the liberal Weber-Schumpeter-Dahl model of 
democracy (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015: 598), neoliberalism is a political doctrine that 
reinforces a minimalist vision of the public sphere and democracy (della Porta 2013). 
Neoliberals, also known as the New Right, believe that both political and economic life 
should be a matter of individual freedom and initiative, where free market society with a 
minimal state is the goal (see Hayek 1960, 1976; Nozick 1974). Nozick (1974: 325), building 
on the work of Locke and Mill, argues that the only justifiable political institutions are those 
that promote the maintenance of individual rights, whereby rights signify legitimate spheres 
of action for an individual that may not be crossed “without another’s consent”. Nozick 
(1974) argues for a minimal state, as a more extensive state would “violate the rights of 
individuals” by forcing them to do certain things (Held 2006: 202). The state’s role according 
to Nozick is to act as a “protective agency” against force, theft, fraud, and violation of 
contracts (Held 2006: 203). 
Another prominent New Right theorist and thinker, Friedrich Hayek (1978: 152-62) saw 
fundamental issues with “mass democracies” regarding the propensity for arbitrary and 
oppressive majority rule, and the progressive replacement of the rule of the majority by the 
rule of its agents (Held 2006: 203). Hayek used these two concerns to appeal for the 
restoration of a liberal order, what Held calls “legal democracy” (Ibid.). Hayek believes that 
the demos must be constrained in its actions by general rules as there can be no guarantee 
that what it demands will be good and wise (Ibid.). For Hayek, “liberalism is a doctrine about 
what the law ought to be, democracy a doctrine about the manner of determining what the 
law ought to be” (1960: 103). The New Right seek to advance “liberalism” over “democracy” 
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by limiting the democratic use of state power (Held 2006: 201). As long as there are rules to 
constrain the actions of majorities and governments, the individual is said to be free from 
coercive power, but without such constraints, democracy could be in fundamental conflict 
with liberty (Ibid.: 204).  
3.4 Neoliberalism and Liberal Democracy: Market Democracy: 
The above description of the New Right’s conceptions of democracy, the state, and the 
citizen in many ways resembles that of earlier liberal thinkers Schumpeter and Dahl. 
However, “behind these rhetorics there is another layer of discourse facilitating the 
dismantling of liberal democratic institutions and practices” (Brown 2003: 52); a neoliberal 
rationality, that, “while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on 
the economy; it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and 
social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player” (Ibid.: 40). The 
subjugation of liberal democracy to the neoliberal rational has fostered a “market 
democracy” (Kohl 2006: 304) in which the state’s role is to guarantee the protection of the 
interests of transnational capital, irrespective of whether such interests run contrary to 
those of domestic citizens. Market democracy ideology “eviscerates nonmarket morality and 
thus erodes the root of democracy in principle at the same time that it raises the status of 
profit and expediency as the criteria for policy making” (Brown 2003: 52). A corollary to this 
market rationality has been the weakening of the nation state. These two features of 
neoliberalism have a drastic effect on the quality of democracy by narrowing what is 
considered the concern of the political realm, eroding citizenship rights, and weakening 
popular participation in decision-making. 
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Democracy in the neoliberal era has become a technocratic affair (Rancière 2006). For 
example, Ayers and Saad Filho (2015: 598) have described the replacement of elected 
officials by non-party technocrats to respond to the financial global crisis as “coups d’état 
under a democratic veneer” (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015: 598), which raise concerns “about 
the meaning and vitality of political democracy under neoliberalism” (Ibid.). Meanwhile, 
political parties today comprise “a self-reproducing inner elite, remote from its mass 
movement, but nested squarely within a number of corporations, which will in turn fund the 
opinion polling, policy-advice and vote-gathering services” (Crouch 2004: 74) in exchange for 
political influence (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015: 604).  As Ayers and Saad-Filho (2015: 604) 
highlight, 
Individuals are regularly invited to make a token visit to the polling booths, where 
they consume the freedom to vote by registering their preferences in much the same 
way as they express their identities by choosing soft drinks, clothes, schools and 
hospitals. Meanwhile, the substantive choices about the nature of social provision, 
the structure of employment and the distribution of income are made elsewhere. 
Market democracy “explicitly isolates the political from the socioeconomic sphere and 
restricts democracy to the political sphere. And even then, it limits democratic participation 
to voting in elections” (Robinson, 2006: 100).  
At the heart of the neoliberal project is, firstly, the creation of a state stripped of the 
“excessive” involvement both in the economy and in the provision of opportunities (Held 
2006: 201). Secondly, neoliberalism fosters the commodification of society, that is the buying 
and selling in the marketplace, of elements previously conceived of as rights such as 
education, health, housing, welfare, and water (Sader 2011: 132). The extension of 
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economic rationality to formerly non-economic spheres and institutions prescribes the 
citizen-subject of a neoliberal order (Brown 2003: 42). Neoliberalism equates moral 
responsibility with rational action, whereby the “the rationally calculating individual bears 
full responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no matter how severe the 
constraints on this action—for example, lack of skills, education, and child care in a period of 
high unemployment and limited welfare benefits” (Ibid.). As a consequence, “the neoliberal 
citizen is one who strategises for her- or himself among various social, political, and 
economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organise these options” (Ibid.: 
43). Rather than the state guaranteeing quality citizenship, “subjects” are treated as 
individual entrepreneurs in every aspect of life, responsible for their own well-being, and 
citizenship is reduced to success in this entrepreneurship (Lemke 2001: 201). 
Neoliberalism produces “negative individualism” (Castel 2003) whereby “individuals 
are urged to act as independent contractors who maximise their efficiency while 
simultaneously deprived of the social conditions which make it possible for subjects to act in 
an autonomous manner or follow the rules of utilitarian rationality” (Balibar 2008: 531). 
When social rights or welfare are dismantled to the point of “social insecurity”, many 
vulnerable members of society “find themselves in a double bind situation where they are at 
the same time interpellated as political subjects and internally excluded from the possibility 
of active political participation” (Ibid.: 536). Political rights degenerate and the substance of 
citizenship, “particularly the reciprocal relationship between obligations for the governed 
and accountability of the governing, becomes virtual, if not simply denied” (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, the ideology of self-responsibility “deprives the citizens of their 
collective capacities” to influence political decisions (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015: 608). This 
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focus on creating individual entrepreneurs limits the possibility of social unrest transforming 
the social order because any prospective social issue is interpreted as a private concern 
(Bauman 1991: 189). Neoliberalism should thus be understood as both a cause and 
consequence of “the fragmentation and weakening of popular collective actors who are 
integral to any radical democratic alternative” (Roberts 1998: 12). While fragmentation of 
collective actors such as unions weakens the possibility of participation, so too does the 
social exclusion that neoliberalism fosters. As Pearce (2004: 485) states, “social exclusions 
and discriminations impede the participation that is needed to generate the effective 
demand for change in the political arena that would then address those exclusions and 
discriminations”.  
The weakening of the state and the marketisation of society is not simply the result 
of domestic decision-making by national governments or conservative elites. Globalisation 
based on market democracy has produced a shift in power from the nation state to 
international governmental organisations (IGOs) (della Porta 2013: 24) that has drastically 
weakened the ability of nation states to respond to their citizens’ demands. The 
international financial institutions (IFIs) have enforced structural adjustment on 
governments applying for financial aid. IMF loans have been linked to country promises to 
apply liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and fiscal reform (O’Brian, Goetz, Scholte, 
and Williams 2000: 162). Since the late 1970s, the WB has moved from financing 
development projects to supporting structural adjustment in an attempt to reorganise 
domestic economies. By the end of the 1990s, half of the world’s population, and over two-
thirds of its countries were subject to the influence of these two Washington-based 
institutions (Pieper and Taylor 1998; della Porta 2013: 27). Meanwhile, monetarist economic 
policies have been taken out of public debate, and are enshrined in binding supranational 
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treaties, while the extent of policy is confined within “acceptable” limits set by transnational 
trading agreements, central banking mechanisms and bureaucratic expertise (Nef and Reiter 
2009: 139). As Ayers and Saad-Filho (2015: 606) summarise, “neoliberalism has 
circumscribed political democracy through the incremental exclusion of key economic 
matters from legitimate debate and the concentration of worldwide policy-making capacity 
in Wall Street and Washington, DC, leaving only matters of relatively minor importance 
open for debate”.  
3.5 Market democracy and the “crisis of too little democracy”: 
The depoliticisation of politics resulting from the adoption of market democracy, and its 
embrace by political parties on both the Right and the Left, has meant that democracy has 
become “devalued” as a political currency (Munck 2005: 60). In fact, this thesis suggests that 
the neoliberal response to the 1970s “crisis of too much democracy” has in fact engendered 
a contemporary crisis of too little democracy. The neoliberal drive to allow the market 
subsume responsibilities previously held by the state has had a drastic impact on the quality 
of democracy by eroding what is today considered the concern of politics, by commodifying 
citizenship, and by blocking the likelihood of popular influence over decision-making. Issues 
of poverty and inequality are withdrawn from the public (political) arena, and are considered 
as issues of technical or philanthropic management, where the aim is simply to create 
conditions for survival (Dagnino 2005: 19). Citizenship has been stripped to its bare bones 
whereby the provision of social and economic inclusion are no longer considered to be 
duties of the state, while the utter lack of space for real political participation and the 
capitulation of contestatory Left-wing parties to neoliberal rationality has left the popular 
sectors unprotected against the rapacious “free” market. Ultimately the outcome of this 
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crisis of citizenship is a sense of futility and the belief amongst popular sectors that 
democracy and the political system is a game that is fixed from above to support the 
agendas of the economic and political elite. 
The crisis of democracy and the very “triumph” of neoliberalism therefore demands 
the need for collective action against it (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2015: 608). The Left must 
challenge the market model of democracy with an alternative vision, “one that rejects homo 
œconomicus as the norm of the human and rejects this norm’s correlative formations of 
economy, society, state, and (non)morality” (Brown 2003: 59). As such, a discussion of 
“thick” models of democracy is now offered. 
4. “Thick” Conceptions of Democracy: 
Responding to Brown’s (2003: 59) calls to challenge neoliberalism with an alternative vision, 
it is pertinent to evaluate alternative models of democracy that foster “thick” citizenship in 
its civil, political and social forms. While liberals see democracy as a set of rules, procedures 
and institutions, “thick theorists” on the other hand see democracy both as a process that 
must be continually reproduced, a “way of regulating power relations in such a way as to 
maximise the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to 
participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which affect society” (Kaldor 
and Vejvoda 1997: 67). Such conceptions focus on the redistribution of power, and, by 
implication, understands democratisation as power redistribution (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 
9). As Balibar (2008: 526) notes, “democracy, understood in a radical manner, is not the 
name of a political regime but only the name of a process which we could call tautologically 
the democratisation of democracy itself”. As such, democracy should be understood as the 
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name of a struggle, or collection of struggles, for the democratisation of democracy, 
whereby the goal is the preservation of, or advancement of, rights (Ibid.).  
4.1 Substantive, Participatory, and Deliberative Democracy: 
Fung and Wright (2003: 5) state that democracy should facilitate the active involvement of 
the citizenry, reach political consensus through dialogue, devise and implement public 
policies that foster a productive economy and a healthy society, and ensure that all citizens 
benefit from the nation’s wealth. Such ideals are held by scholars coming from the 
participatory school of democracy such as Carole Pateman (1970) and C. B. Macpherson 
(1977). These theorists “see the essence of democracy in a society that nurtures concern for 
collective problems and in a knowledgeable citizenry capable of self-development and 
carrying a sense of political efficacy” (Monaghan 2012: 286). Pateman (1985: 71) questions 
the assumptions of liberal theory that individuals are “free and equal”. For Macpherson 
(1977) issues of unequal power relations between groups and individuals must be 
accounted for in any analysis of democracy. Pateman (1985: 173) also questions the liberal 
conception of a separation between civil society and the state. Like many neo-Marxists, she 
does not believe that the state is an impartial, independent power; rather it is seen to be 
inescapably locked into the maintenance and reproduction of inequalities2. If the state is 
neither separate nor impartial with respect to society, then participatory theorists believe 
that citizens will not be treated as free and equal (Held 2006: 210). As such, elections are 
seen as insufficient mechanisms to ensure the accountability of political elites.  
Participatory theorists thus call for the democratisation of the state “by making 
parliament, state bureaucracies, and political parties more open and accountable, while 
                                                          
2
 For more detailed discussion of the class bias of the state, see the works of Miliband (1969) and Poulantzas 
(1969). 
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new forms of struggle at the local level must ensure that society, as well as the state, is 
subject to procedures which ensure accountability” (Held 2006: 211). While the problems of 
coordination of large-scale communities are considerable, Macpherson (1977) argued for 
transformation based upon a combination of competitive parties and organisations of direct 
democracy. He acknowledges that there will always be varying interests around which 
parties will develop, and thus only inter-party competition guarantees a minimum 
responsiveness of government to people at all levels below (Held 2006: 211). However, the 
party system should be reorganised on less hierarchical principles where political elites 
become more responsible to the personnel of the organisation they represent. 
A combination of the central institutions of liberal democracy – competitive parties, 
political representatives, and periodic elections – are unavoidable elements of participatory 
democracy. A central concern however, is how institutions of representative democracy and 
participatory democracy should be combined. Critical theory provides the “public sphere” as 
a response. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Habermas 
describes the public sphere as, first of all, “a realm of our social life in which something 
approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox 1974: 49). 
Public opinion is understood to refer to “the tasks of criticism and control which a public 
body of citizens informally -and, in periodic elections, formally as well- practices vis-d-vis the 
ruling structure organised in the form of a state” (Ibid.). In this space, “individuals interact 
with one another, debate the actions taken by the political authorities, argue about the 
moral acceptability of private relations of domination, and make claims against the state” 
(Avritzer 2002: 40). The Habermasian idea of the public sphere also seeks to broaden the 
public domain, and politicise new issues by allowing previously excluded discussions back 
onto the agenda (Avritzer 2002: 41). Thus, the public sphere should be egalitarian not only 
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because it allows for free participation, but also because it allows new issues to enter the 
political debate (Benhabib 1992; Avritzer 2002: 41). 
Ideally, the public sphere would allow for all citizens who could be affected by a policy to 
have a right to deliberate on it (Benhabib, 1996; Chambers, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Freeman, 
2000; Young, 1999). As Bonham (1996: 6) states, “a legitimate political system should foster 
deliberation and, thus, increase the chances of arriving at correct (or valid, fair or true) 
decisions”. Offe and Preus (1991: 167) concur, arguing that the central challenge for 
democracy today surrounds “the introduction of procedures that put a premium upon the 
formulation of carefully considered, consistent, situationally abstract, socially validated and 
justifiable preferences”. As Manin expounds, “it is … necessary to alter radically the 
perspective common to liberal theories and democratic thought: the source of legitimacy is 
not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, 
deliberation itself” (1987: 351ff). 
While deliberation in a public sphere represents a highly democratic method of reaching 
a decision, the public sphere, in the Habermasian sense, faces a serious critique. Habermas 
suggests that the public sphere will influence the political system via a transfer of influence, 
via public opinion (1995: 371). When public opinion is communicated to the political system, 
parliamentary debates, and thus law-making, are said to be influenced (Ibid.). Clearly then, 
Habermas does not believe that the role of the public sphere is to produce decisions, but 
rather to simply influence administrative decisions (Avritzer 2002: 49). As such, power 
holders in the political sphere may refuse to implement this public consensus and accept 
legitimacy problems; thus, “Habermasian theory falls short of providing an alternative way 
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of reconnecting reason and will because, regardless of the rationality of the results of public 
debate, it is left to power-holders to decide whether to incorporate them into policy” (Ibid.). 
The sharp division between civil society and the state in the Habermasian conception of 
the public sphere eventuates in “public opinion” that is simply a “critical commentary on 
authorised decision-making that transpires elsewhere” (Fraser 1990: 75). Separating civil-
society from the state in such a manner fosters “weak publics” whose ““deliberative 
practice consists exclusively in opinion-formation and does not also encompass decision-
making” (Ibid.). Deliberation in the public sphere should therefore be tied to a framework 
that “both facilitates public discussion among equal citizens by providing favourable 
conditions for expression, association and discussion, and ties the authorisation to exercise 
public power— and the exercise itself— to such a discussion by establishing a framework 
ensuring the responsiveness and the accountability of political power to it” (Cohen and 
Sabel 1997: 320).  
Discussing the Brazilian efforts to foster participatory budgeting (which entails 
elements of direct, participatory and deliberative concepts of democratic engagement), de 
Sousa Santos (2010: 199) states that “our concrete experience tells us that participatory 
forms of democracy advance when the relationship between social movement and 
progressive party forms a virtuous circle”. De Sousa Santos continues, noting that while 
demands for increased voice in decision-making certainly originated from below in Brazil, 
without the support of the progressive Workers Party such demands would likely have gone 
unheard.   An ideologically committed political leadership coupled with an active civil society 
committed to defending participatory democracy is thus crucial (Fung 2011). Both 
conditions must exist, for  
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If state imperatives and defining movement interests cannot be reconciled, then 
entry into the state means co-optation and being bought off cheaply, a poor 
exchange for the loss of democratic vitality of the public sphere. If the two can be 
reconciled, entry into the state is a much better bargain, from the point of view of 
democracy as a whole as well as the instrumental interests of the actors involved 
(Dryzek 2000: 5). 
Participatory, deliberative democracy faces several challenges. Firstly, public 
deliberation faces an issue of how to “scale up”; given that decisions taken at the national 
level have a direct consequence on the well-being of citizens, public deliberation must 
address not only local issues, but also regional and national concerns (Hartz-Karp and Briand 
2009: 134). There may be a trade-off here, however, as “deliberation depends on 
participants with sufficient knowledge and interest about the substantive issues under 
consideration” (Cohen and Fung 2004: 27). Relatedly, Sartori (1987) suggests that if 
participation means taking part in person in deliberating public policy, it must be limited to 
small groups with a maximum size of a few thousand. Przerwowski (2010) concurs as he 
believes that equality and effectiveness are incompatible, and as such participatory 
democracy is not feasible at the national scale.  
Furthermore, deliberative-participative models must ensure that there is no 
manipulation in the democratic process. Power rooted in money, prestige, tradition or 
violence can distort democratic dialogue (Nef and Reiter 2009: 53). There is also an issue 
surrounding the ability of some interest groups to organise and dominate other groups due 
to holding better resources, leading to the advancement of one group’s interests over 
others (Ibid.). If people have no real power to influence decisions, they will desist from 
participating. Such issues of power must therefore be managed if participatory and 
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deliberative conceptions are to boost the quality of democracy. Citizens therefore require 
social resources as well as political resources and procedural and institutional opportunities 
to affect policy (Johnson 2009: 680).   
Roberts (1998) suggests that robust democratisation involves two components; a 
deepening and an extending. The logic of deepening democracy refers to the participatory-
deliberative theories outlined above and involves “intensifying popular sovereignty in the 
political sphere, that is, moving from hierarchical forms of elitist or bureaucratic control to 
forms of popular self-determination by means of more direct participation in the decision 
making process or more effective mechanisms for holding elected representatives and 
public officials accountable to their constituents” (Roberts 1998: 30). Extending democracy 
meanwhile “pertains to the scope or domain of the social units and collective issues to 
which democratic norms are applied; that is, it refers to efforts to extend the democratic 
norms and procedures of collective self-determination from the formal sphere of state 
institutions to new spheres of social and economic relationships” (Ibid.). Extending 
democracy is important because “social and economic inequality can easily be translated 
into concentrations of power in the political sphere that skew the articulation of popular 
interests and block the exercise of popular sovereignty” (Ibid.: 29). Such a perspective 
suggests that “social equity is not a substantive outcome that is external to the functioning 
of democratic procedures but a prerequisite for equal access and unbiased democratic 
contestation and thus a vital indicator of procedural fairness” (Ibid.: 30). This socialist 
understanding therefore envisions democracy as a transformative project that addresses 
the social and economic inequalities of society (Smilde n.d.). Figure 1 “represent the space 
in which democratic expansion or contraction occurs in both political and socioeconomic 
domains” (Roberts 1998: 30). 
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Figure 1: A model for deepening and extending democracy: Taken from Roberts (1998: 31) 
   
5. Removing the Blinkers: Lessons from “developing” democracies: 
To date, democratic models and theories on how to democratise have principally emanated 
from the West. However, given the contemporary crisis of, and the hegemonic status of, 
market democracy in the “developed” world, it is necessary to move beyond the Euro- and 
US-centric tendencies evident in much of the academic theorizing, and open a debate 
regarding what the “developed” can learn from the “developing” world.  
Contemporary Latin America may offer some light on how to respond to the democratic 
crisis. Much like the so-called “developed” democracies today, Latin America experienced a 
crisis of market democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. In both cases, the application of 
neoliberal economic policies combined with an elite-led, thin, liberal model of democracy 
led to state retrenchment and a marketisation of society. Neoliberal doctrine became 
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hegemonic across the political spectrum – that is, both Right and erstwhile Left parties 
accepted the underlying superiority of the market vis-à-vis the state for making decisions. 
Just as in the “developed” democracies today, in Latin America there was a common 
perception that democracy had been hijacked by unelected actors such as the IMF, World 
Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (Cannon 2009: 157). The political agenda in both 
cases narrowed, and technocratic decision-making took precedence with small governments 
tasked with controlling inflation and protecting private property rights the norm. Political 
and social institutions in both cases were designed to protect and promote free-market 
capitalism, the benefits of which would supposedly trickle-down to benefit all of society. In 
such a scenario, the concerns of the most vulnerable citizens were neglected, and 
privatisation, low levels of public expenditure, regressive taxation, trade liberalisation and 
labour flexibilisation became entrenched. Much like in Europe and the US today, the 
imposition of market democracy in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s gutted political 
and social citizenship of its content. Unsurprisingly, the result in both regions was a crisis of 
democracy with extremely high levels of dissatisfaction with politics and low levels of trust 
in governments and politicians. Ultimately, the model of democracy itself was/is seen to be 
ineffective in responding to the citizen needs. 
The crisis of democracy in the contemporary “developed” democracies, in the absence 
of an alternative democratic proposal by the Left3, has led to increased support for right-
wing populists who play on the fears of popular sectors. However, unlike in the West where 
the Left has failed to respond to the needs of its ostensible core support base – the popular 
and working class sectors - in Latin America since the turn of the millennium there have 
been several experiments that have sought to build a post-neoliberal model of democracy 
                                                          
3
 Spain and Greece are the exceptions here where Left-wing political parties did emerge at the national scale. 
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that boosts popular sector citizenship via a deepening and extending of democracy. Latin 
America appears to be “ahead of the curve” in terms of where to draw lessons for 
democratic theory as it is the only region in the world where there have been concerted 
efforts to respond to the crisis that market democracy fosters. By examining closely the 
development of these democratic experiments we can identify the pitfalls and opportunities 
that exist and ultimately advance democratic theory by re-imagining an alternative to the 
current hegemonic model which has clearly lost legitimacy across the developed world. 
Without such a boost to theorising, it appears that belief in the capacity of democracy, as 
well as ostensibly Left-wing parties, to deliver just and fair societies is destined to ossify in 
the long shadow of neoliberalism. 
6. Democratisation in Latin America: 
Following a crisis of democracy in the final decades of the twentieth century, a series of 
elections brought Left and Left-of-centre leaders to power across much of Latin America in a 
“pink-tide” that dramatically transformed the political landscape.  To comprehend how and 
why this pink-tide emerged - and to highlight the similarities and differences in the origins 
and symptoms of, and responses to, the crisis of democracy faced in the “developed” 
democracies today - this sector begins with a brief review of Latin American democracy 
from the 1930s to the 1970s, followed by a discussion of the transition to liberal democracy 
and neoliberalism after authoritarian rule. The impact of this twin transition on the role of 
the state, and the subsequent outcomes on the quality of democracy and citizenship are 
then discussed, before outlining how popular protests brought new-Left leaders to state 
power. An analysis of Left governments’ attempts to deliver a post-neoliberal scenario is 
offered, highlighting the fundamental challenges that exist, not only to Latin American 
experiments, but to any effort to build an alternative to market democracy.  
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6.1 Latin American democracy, authoritarianism, and re-democratisation: 1930-1980: 
Following the failure of laissez-faire capitalism during the great crisis of the 1930s, Latin 
America adopted Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), a form of national populism that 
was the region’s version of the Keynesian welfare state and social democracy of the 
developed world (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Silva 2009: 20). This national-populist model 
“applied a wide array of mechanisms to protect individuals and communities from the full 
force of the market” (Silva 2009: 21). ISI features in urban areas included increased formal 
sector employment, much of it in the public sector, with labour rights and benefits; and 
expanded public health, education, housing, and subsidies for basic consumption which 
protected the popular sector and middle classes from the excesses of the market (Ibid.). In 
rural areas, while ISI fell short of its promises to the peasant sector, it did create “legally 
protected organisational capacity, a legal framework to struggle for rural labour and land 
tenure rights, and subsidised credit to partially insulate that sector from markets” (Ibid.). 
State subsidies for transportation and energy costs benefitted both urban and rural 
populations (Ibid.). As Silva (Ibid.) notes, “all of these mechanisms were integral parts of the 
social compacts on which people depended to maintain their livelihood”. 
However, for all its efforts to “spearhead industrialisation with inclusion of the 
popular sectors, the national-populist development model suffered from serious problems” 
(Silva 2009: 22). Social inclusion reached an expanding middle-class and the labour 
aristocracy who were protected by unions in the formal sector and who were connected to 
labour parties (Ibid.). However, the heavy bias toward urban areas (Prebisch 1971) meant 
that a growing mass of city and rural marginalised poor “laboured under much more 
exploitative conditions” (Silva 2009: 22). Meanwhile, states lacked capacity to coordinate 
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and implement ambitious development plans (Ibid.). It is important to note however, that 
while ISI had many flaws, it had fostered a strengthening of the Left, who demanded greater 
social rights. Indeed, social conflict “intensified in the 1960s and 1970s, in protest at policies 
that effectively meant that import-substituting states invested in infrastructure and 
supported economic growth but failed to engage in an effective redistribution of income. 
The result was a series of bitter class struggles” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009: 5).  
Unlike Europe after the Second World War, where elites gradually came to be 
convinced of the importance above all of “preserving social peace and internalizing the 
principles of political equality, welfare, and social inclusion in order to maintain it, a similar 
break with traditions of elitism and extreme privilege could not be engineered in Latin 
America” (Grugel 2009: 29). As a result, in countries where a strengthening working class 
increased pressure for social reform, the “result was not inclusion but dictatorship” (Ibid.). 
However, these military regimes faced increasing pressure to democratise in the 1980s due 
to changing international attitudes toward authoritarianism, the fallout from the 1982 debt 
crisis which was blamed on incumbent military leadership, and increasing social and civic 
opposition from the Catholic church, human rights groups, neighbourhood associations, and 
unions (Grugel 2009: 30; Grugel and Bishop 2014: 231).  
The challenge of building democracies “was complicated by the legacies of erratic 
economic programs implemented during the years of authoritarian rule and profound 
economic recession that swept across the region from the late 1970s” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 
2009: 5). ISI policies failed to control the effects of the debt crisis, and as hyperinflation 
spiralled, the economic crisis was translated into a crisis of the political order “understood 
as the failure of the state to regulate social relations, the loss of the political system’s 
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capacity to represent its citizens, and as a threat to political stability posed by mass street 
protests against economic crisis” (Panizza 2009: 23). The financial crisis was used as a 
justification to drive forward the liberalisation agenda (Grugel, Riggirozzi and Thirkell-White, 
2008: 502) while the political crisis in the region added to the converging belief amongst 
business, international aid agencies, financial institutions, and governing elites that the 
institutions developed under ISI needed to be removed, thus eradicating the social and 
political roots of the crisis (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Taylor 2009).  
6.2 Neoliberalism in Latin America: 
The crisis of ISI and authoritarianism “unleashed the twin processes of free-market 
economic reforms and democratisation that were attempts to construct a contemporary 
version of market society” whereby economic relations are reorganised on “neoclassical 
principles” coupled with the restructuring of “political and social institutions to support 
free-market capitalism” (Silva 2009: 23). A regional model of “elite-led democracy which 
deliberately eschewed traditional social welfare models in favour of a liberal order that 
demanded conformity with the market” was introduced (Grugel 2009: 31). A conservative 
status quo emerged in the region, and the agenda of democratisation was limited to the 
“restoration, or in some cases the establishment, of electoral competition between elites, 
organised into political parties, alongside efforts to guarantee civil liberties, uphold the rule 
of law and – in some cases – a pledge to ‘do something’ for the very poor through the 
introduction of workfare schemes or social programs targeted at the very poor” (Ibid.: 31-2). 
The principle goal of neoliberalism was to reform the relationship between the state and 
the market; as such the reforms associated with the Washington Consensus - the standard 
reform package advocated by the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury called for 
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privatisation; cuts to public expenditure, infrastructure and pro-poor public services; tight 
fiscal discipline; regressive taxation; market-driven competitive exchange and interest rates; 
trade liberalisation policies such as a uniform tariff; increased protection for private 
property; and reform of the labour market  (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009: 6). 
Neoliberal reforms were generally adopted in two distinct phases; the first stage was 
intended to stabilise the economy and curb inflationary pressures, while the second phase 
was a longer, more complex reform process that in theory would “change the cultures and 
practices of states and lead to a more productive economy” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009.: 7). 
The state was “clouded in shame” while the market was promoted as modern and desirable 
(Grugel 2009: 33), the “sole route for the Latin American dream: the inclusion into the First 
World” (Dagnino 2005: 19). State cutbacks and switching to the market as the driver of the 
economy settled into the new orthodoxy in Latin America, with financial assistance and 
policy support from the IFIs conditional on the adoption of “good” policies  (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi 2009: 6, 12). 
 The liberal democratic model in Latin America “entailed small government 
structured to support the neoliberal economic and social agenda, especially the protection 
of private property rights” (Silva 2009: 25). Consensus amongst political elites regarding the 
need for neoliberal reforms meant that “redistributive issues and a larger role for the state 
in economic and social development were simply off the table” (Ibid.). Security for private 
property rights however, especially against nationalisation, and monetary stability received 
first priority (Ibid.). Finance ministries and central banks were given greater institutional 
capacity, while other economic line ministers and agencies became subordinate to them 
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(Ibid.). Privatisation and deregulation gutted the public sector, while funding to state 
institutions other than finance and banking were slashed (Ibid.). 
 Elite convergence on “free market policies in the 1990s gave salience to a neoliberal 
ideology that posited that all decisions in a society, and not only economic ones, are best 
left to markets or made subservient to market forces” (Munck 2015: 369). The neoliberal 
marketisation of society linked “citizenship in the new democracies not to the state via 
redistribution, as in social democracies, but to the market” (Grugel 2009: 35). The state, 
weakened via decentralisation and privatisation, “progressively withdraws from its role as 
guarantor of rights” while “the market is offered as a surrogate site for citizenship” where to 
be a citizen signifies “individual integration into the market, as a consumer and as a 
producer” (Dagnino 2005: 19). Ideas of developing a Latin American version of full-
employment and a welfare state were abandoned, while sharp reductions in government 
spending on health, education, and pension plans, along with eradication of subsidies that 
had supported incomes of middle and popular sectors (Silva 2009: 24) left citizens isolated 
and unable to protect themselves from the ravages of the market. 
While citizenship for the poor was all but eradicated, second stage reforms 
concentrated economic, social, and political capital in the hands of a reduced number of 
business groups, local and transnational, who enjoyed privileged access to government in 
return for providing governments with finance, investment and legitimacy (Grugel 2009: 
36). Meanwhile, reforms to labour laws that emphasised flexible-labour and privatisation of 
state companies weakened unions (Silva 2009: 24), making it difficult for organised labour to 
oppose the new political economy (Grugel 2009: 35).  
Even as liberal democracies were being consolidated, subaltern social groups were 
increasingly suffering from political exclusion; liberal democracy “stripped them of 
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institutional channels to press their demands in both the executive and legislative branches 
of the state, thus effectively cutting them out of the policy-making process” (Silva 2009: 28). 
This pattern of isolating executive decisions from popular debate became the modus 
operandi of Latin American “democracies”. Regional governments became increasingly 
“delegative” (O’Donnell 1994) where “behind-the-scenes negotiations” between elites 
fostered a “highly centralised process of decision-making” (Grindle 2000: 6). Hence, while 
democratic institutions may have been stable, there was little capacity for vertical control 
over government by the electorate or civil society, while horizontal accountability via other 
democratic institutions was weak (Grugel 2009: 35). In sum, the introduction of Washington 
Consensus neoliberal reforms “and governments’ often pig-headed commitment to them—
reduced significantly the access ordinary people enjoyed to a variety of social, economic and 
political resources, many of which are central to the exercising of democratic voice” (Ibid.). 
The above description shows how a combination of liberal democracy under the 
guidance of a neoliberal mentality has eroded the quality of democracy in Latin America, 
which in many ways resembles the situation in the developed Western democracies. 
Neoliberalism and technocratic democracy dismantled the citizenship gains that had been 
won during the ISI period (1930-1970), foreshadowing the more gradual erosion of social 
democracy in Europe. State retrenchment and a move toward market-mentality narrowed 
the scope of politics, eroded citizenship, and reduced popular influence in the decision-
making process in both the West and Latin America. Contemporary “developed” democracy 
resembles the shallow democracy of Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s where 
representative institutions are weak, technocratic decision making marginalises citizen input 
leading to unaccountable leaders who ignore electoral mandates, and growing social 
inequality mocks the formal political equality of democratic citizenship (Roberts 1998: 1).  
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The attempt to marketise citizenship has been actively resisted in Latin America with 
periodic eruptions of social protest. By the turn of the new millennium, “many regional 
governments were struggling to contain deep-seated social conflicts and political tensions 
which are the result of almost two decades of state retrenchment, pauperisation and 
lacklustre citizenship” (Grugel 2009: 26). The de-legitimation of traditional conservative 
parties who had advocated and overseen the adoption of neoliberal policies combined with 
the explosion of mass popular protests calling for greater political and economic inclusion 
paved the way for the election of progressive governments across much of the region on 
mandates to deepen and extend democracy.  
6.3 Social upheaval and the election of the new-Left in Latin America: 
Latin Americans rapidly realised that the “work of building democracy had not been 
completed through democratic transitions. Moreover, they gave bite to the rather generic 
statements about building democracy by asking the question: ‘Which democracy?’” (Munck 
2015: 369). Social rejection of neoliberalism and the marketisation of democracy can be 
traced back to the 1989 protests and riots in Venezuela and Argentina (Grugel 2009: 37). A 
wave of protests swept the region over the following years. These popular uprisings 
represent a continuation in the “conflict between civil and political society over what 
constitutes representative government [that] can be traced back to the . . . transition to 
democracy” (Peruzzotti 2006: 229). The dispute around the meaning of democratic 
participatory citizenship, and the efforts to confront the reduction and displacement of its 
significance under neoliberalism, constitutes the essence of political debate in Latin America 
today (Dagnino 2005: 22). 
Protests represented a struggle for re-incorporation whereby excluded segments of 
society sought to (re)connect with state institutions so as “to recover - or for the first time 
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gain – access to rights and benefits that the state has failed or ceased to secure or provide” 
(Rossi 2015: 3). Mobilisation originated from a wide-range of actors. Organisations rooted in 
cultural, identity, and class politics (such as indigenous peoples, unemployed, landless, 
pensioners, and neighbourhood associations amongst others) linked together, demanding 
greater political, social, cultural, and economic inclusion and equality which market 
democracy had failed to deliver (Silva 2009: 1). Protests acted as a tool for popular sectors 
to “form a bridge between the state as it actually is and the state as it should be” (Rossi 
2015: 3), challenging market democracy and demanding a new social contract whereby 
states guarantee the rights of their citizens (Grugel 2009: 40).  
Focusing on subsistence rights and the loss of social citizenship, popular 
organisations linked the social and economic crisis of the Washington Consensus with the 
model of democracy itself (Peruzzotti 2006; Grugel 2009: 40). In all of the protests, 
assemblies and neighbourhood councils across Latin America, there was a “desire to move 
beyond the liberal framework of participation” (Arditi 2008: 66). In the end “it was the 
association of neoliberalism with ruling class politics and the difficulty of reconciling 
neoliberal policies with popular expectations of a new era of democratic politics” (Grugel 
and Riggirozzi 2012:5) that led to popular uprisings. 
From 1998 onwards, a wave of progressive governments promising “greater 
inclusion and policies to stimulate growth and promote human development” were elected 
across much of the region (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 5) (see table 2). These governments 
were accompanied by “popular calls for a different kind of political leadership, demands 
that ordinary people have more access to the state and better welfare provision and 
mobilisation for policies of cultural recognition and a strengthening of communal and 
indigenous rights (in Bolivia and Ecuador especially)” (Ibid: 7). The arrival of the progressive 
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governments has (re-)opened a debate regarding the scale and purpose of state 
intervention in the market, democratic and governance reform, the coverage and content of 
welfare programs, equality - especially in terms of wealth and income-, as well as regional 
and international policy stances (Lievesley and Ludlum 2009:5 ; Wylde 2012: 15). These 
policy initiatives and changes have in their totality been described as post-neoliberal, 
meaning that elements of the previous export-led growth model are retained, whilst 
introducing new mechanisms for social inclusion and welfare (Heidrich and Tussie 2009; 
Wylde 2012; Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012; Yates and Bakker 2014). 
TABLE OF LEFT PRESIDENTIAL VICTORIES 1998-2015 
Country Party President Year Elected (re-elected) 
Venezuela Fifth Republic Movement/United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) 
Gran Polo Patriótico (GPP) 
Hugo Chávez 
Nicolás Maduro 
1998; re-elected in 2000, 2006, 
2012 
2013 
Chile Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh), 
Concertación 
Ricardo Lagos  
Michelle Bachelet 
2000 
2006, 2013 
Dominican Republic Dominican Revolutionary Party 
(PRD) 
Hipólito Mejía 2000 
Brazil Worker’s Party (PT) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva  
Dilma Rousseff 
2002; re-elected in 2006 
2010; re-elected in 2014 
Argentina Justicialista Party (PJ) 
Frente Para la Victoria 
Néstor Kirchner  
Cristina  
Fernández de Kirchner 
2003 
2007; re-elected in 2011 
Uruguay Broad Front (FA) Tabaré Vázquez  
José Mujica 
2004; 2014 
2009 
Panama New Fatherland Martín Torrijos 2004 
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6.4 Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: 
Post-neoliberalism embodies a “different conceptualisation of the state from that which 
reigned in the high period of neoliberalism, based on a view that states have a moral 
responsibility to respect and deliver the inalienable (that is, non-market dependent) rights 
of their citizens, alongside growth” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 3). Politically, “post-
neoliberalism is a reaction against what came to be seen as excessive marketisation at the 
end of the twentieth century and the elitist and technocratic democracies that accompanied 
market reforms” (Ibid.). Post-neoliberalism should be understood as a call for a "new form 
of social contract between the state and people” (Wylde, 2011: 436) and “the construction 
of a social consensus that is respectful of the demands of growth and business interests and 
sensitive to the challenges of poverty and citizenship” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 4). While 
“the institutional forms and procedures of democracy increasingly may be in place” in Latin 
America, post-neoliberalism represents a response to the critical challenge of “how to 
Bolivia Movement toward Socialism (MAS) Evo Morales 2005; re-elected in 2009, 2014 
Nicaragua Sandinista National Liberal Front 
(FSLN) 
Daniel Ortega 2006; re-elected in 2012 
Ecuador PAIS Alliance Rafael Correa 2006; re-elected in 2009, 2013 
Paraguay Patriotic Alliance for Change Fernando Lugo 2008 
Guatemala National Unity of Hope (UNE) Álvaro Colom 2007 
El Salvador Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) 
Mauricio Funes 
Salvador Sánchez Cerén 
2009 
2014 
Peru Gana Perú Ollanta Humala Tasso 2011 
Costa Rica Citizens’ Action Party (PAC) Luis Gullermo Solís 2014 
Table 2: Source: Adapted from Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 2), Mc Nulty (2014: 4), and Munck (2015:367) 
40 
 
deepen their inclusiveness and substance, especially in terms of how citizens engage within 
democratic spaces to create more just and equitable states and societies” (Gaventa 2006: 
8). As Peruzzotti (2006: 209) notes, post-neoliberalism is part of the unfinished debate over 
what constitutes a transition to democracy. 
Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012: 2) outline what they see as two mutually re-enforcing pillars 
of post-neoliberalism: a) a set of political goals that seek to “reclaim” the authority of the 
state so as to generate a “new social consensus and approach to welfare” and b) economic 
policies that aim to “rebuild” state capacity to “manage the market and the export economy 
in ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social needs and citizenship 
demands”. The post-neoliberal citizenship agenda and the growth strategy complement 
each other, whereby the rebuilding of the state represents a “profoundly political intention 
to ‘make the state public’ and ensure that it is better able to defend the public interest” 
(Ibid.: 15). The post-neoliberal project also seeks to revive citizenship via a “new politics of 
participation and alliances across sociocultural sectors and groups” with a deepening of 
democracy by “establishing greater autonomy (autonomía) and self-governance 
(autogestión) through processes of cultural self-determination at a variety of scales” (Yates 
and Bakker 2014: 3, 9). Rather than seeing individuals as producers and consumers in the 
market, post-neoliberalism proposes to extend democracy by fostering collective rights and 
solidarities that “aspire to achieve universal social citizenship [representing a] fundamental 
rethinking of state-society relations, to a greater or lesser extent according to the case” 
(Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg 2010: 4).  
However, post-neoliberal governments have tended to be pragmatic where the 
economy is concerned, working within the liberalised global economic system. In this sense, 
while differences exist between neoliberal and post-neoliberal growth strategies, they 
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should not be understood as opposing strategies (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 6). The “post-” 
in post-neoliberalism principally represents differences in “government attitudes to the 
poor and discourses of citizenship rather than economic management as such” (Ibid.).  
Post-neoliberal projects have varied in terms of how, and to what extent, they have 
challenged market democracy. While conservative scholars such as Jorge Castañeda (2006) 
have attempted to divide the post-neoliberal turn into a “good”, moderate Left (Brazil, 
Chile, Uruguay) and a “bad” populist Left (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Argentina to a 
lesser extent), such crude dichotomies fail to understand the nuanced differences amongst 
cases. Rather, I suggest that the post-neoliberal governments may be evaluated along a 
citizenship continuum, with each case varying in how they have sought to transform political 
and economic inclusion of erstwhile excluded sectors.  
In the post-neoliberal cases of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, while centre-Left governments 
succeeded in delivering some socio-economic benefits to their citizens, they tended not to 
challenge the model of liberal democracy (Munck 2015: 379). Indeed, in “making the model 
of liberal democracy its own, the centre-left severely limited its ability to deliver on the left’s 
traditional aspiration to address the economic conditions of participation and contain the 
transformation of economic power into political power” (Ibid.). As such, while liberal 
democracy may have been strengthened by Left governments in these cases, there has been 
a failure to transform the preferences of electoral majorities into public policy (Garretón 
2012; Munck 2015: 379).  
In the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, there have been attempts to build an 
alternative to liberal democracy, thereby meriting greater investigation (Munck 2015: 379). 
There have been efforts to refashion state institutions accompanied by constituent 
assemblies to re-write constitutions and “a search for a closer, more direct relationship 
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between the executive and the ‘people’” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 5). Such processes 
have led to contrasting analyses as to whether or not these cases should be considered as 
examples of de-democratisation or democratisation.  
For some analysts, the cases are simply populist experiments which damage democracy 
(Castañeda 2006) via the construction of “hyper-plebiscitary” presidencies (Conaghan 2008). 
Such analyses resonate with Juan Linz’ (1990) discussion of the “perils of presidetialism”.  
Linz highlights how, in presidential systems, both the executive and the legislative branch 
may claim democratic legitimacy as they derive their power from the votes of the public in 
elections. However, if a divergence of opinions emerges between the office of the president 
and the legislative, conflict may “erupt dramatically” (Linz 1990: 53). In a presidential system 
(as opposed to parliamentary) Linz (Ibid.: 56) states that presidents may believe that they 
possess independent authority and a popular mandate, and thus find legislative opposition 
to their policies irksome. Indeed, Linz (Ibid.: 61) flags that the “plebiscitarian component 
implicit in the president's authority is likely to make the obstacles and opposition he 
encounters seem particularly annoying. In his frustration he may be tempted to define his 
policies as reflections of the popular will and those of his opponents as the selfish designs of 
narrow interests”. Linz continues, stating that the “doleful potential for displays of cold 
indifference, disrespect, or even downright hostility toward the opposition is not to be 
scanted”. Where these perils are not avoided, and a “hyper-presidential” system develops, 
the superiority of the executive is emphasised while there is excessive use of unilateral 
mechanisms to adopt decisions (Nino 1996; Llanos and Nolte 2016). As Rose-Ackerman et al. 
(2011: 247) state, in a hyper-presidential system, “presidents who are challenged use the 
rhetoric of separation of powers to defend their actions and argue against the imposition of 
checks and balances by the other branches and institutions”. The concerns of scholars such 
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as Castañeda (2006) and Conaghan (2008) is that the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela have become “hyper-presidential” systems that threaten the very stability of 
democracy.  
While liberal scholars have decried the “hyper-presidential” nature of the “radical” Left 
cases, as Munck (2015: 373) notes, progressive governments in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela see “the various mechanisms proposed by advocates of liberal democracy to limit 
the power of elected authorities as limits on democracy itself” and they therefore struggle 
to re-found politics through “constitutional change with popular participation” (ibid.). While 
not rejecting some of representative democracy’s  core principles, such as free and fair 
elections, transparency and accountability (Duffy 2015: 1744), the national governments 
have sought to profoundly transform pre-existing political regimes and liberal modes of 
democracy (Wolff 2013: 33). This more radical Left have emphasised how entrenched 
political elites and regional powers have blocked programs for change, and hence argued for 
a strong president, who relies on “plebiscitarian appeals for popular support” so as to 
“counter the bias toward the status quo” (Munck 2015: 374). In this regard, the “radical”-
Left leaders and their support base ultimately challenge Linz’ (1990) notion of the “perils of 
presidentialism” and his concern regarding the stability of democracy by detailing how 
stable democracy does not automatically equate with a quality democracy. For popular 
sectors “stable” democracies had become an incubator for the maintenance of political and 
economic exclusion, and hence a new conception of democratic inclusion was required, 
even if this entailed challenging the boundaries of liberal democratic norms (Munck 2015). 
The efforts to move away from market democracy in Latin America and build a model 
that boosts the quality of citizenship faced several challenges. These challenges are not 
country-specific – that is, they are challenges that any attempt to construct a post-
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neoliberal democracy is likely to face. Latin American democratisation experiments 
witnessed extraordinary efforts by economic elites, supported by – and sometimes equating 
to the same thing – the far-right to destabilise processes which they believe harm their 
interests. In Argentina and Brazil pro-neoliberal presidents returned to power following 
virulent smear campaigns in the Right-controlled media against Leftists Cristina Kirchner and 
Dilma Rousseff, with the “questionable impeachment process” (Cannon and Brown 2017: 
618) of the latter highlighting the lengths elites will go to prevent any challenge to the 
hegemony of neoliberalism. In Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela economic elites and the far-
right also sought to destabilize Left-wing presidents via threats of cessation and autonomy, 
media campaigns, and “economic warfare”.  
 A further challenge to building a post-neoliberal model of democracy is the 
continued reliance on the international market for economic survival; given that the rules of 
the game are set by international financial institutions and powerful governments who seek 
to push market democracy as the panacea to all development concerns, introducing an 
alternative model of democracy that seeks to protect citizens from the free-market and that 
challenges the hegemony of liberal democracy faces powerful external barriers. In Latin 
American experiments, Left- governments have found themselves “squeezed between 
popular demands, articulated by key social movements for greater participation and 
improved living conditions, and global demands for pro-market orthodoxy and protection of 
the interests of capital” (Cannon and Kirby 2012: 202). In the context of a market liberal 
global order, and with powerful liberal regional actors, the “scope for real clashes of interest 
and values” is large (Heidrich and Tussie 2009: 52). 
 The above discussion of the challenges to efforts to construct a post-neoliberal 
democracy suggest that to understand how an alternative to market democracy may 
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emerge and sustain itself, and to explain variations in outcomes of such processes, a flexible 
and adaptable theoretical framework is required. As such, in the next chapter a theoretical 
framework is advanced that seeks to account for how the relative power of the Left-led 
state, the organised popular base, economic elites, and transnational (f)actors may 
influence the direction and outcomes of the process. Furthermore, given that different 
processes have different origins, the framework seeks to account for if and how such 
variance influences the pathways of democratisation process.  
Looking forward, chapter 3 details the methodological issues of the project regarding 
case-selection, variables and indicators, data-collection methods and ethical requirements. 
In chapter 4, a rich historical account of the emergence and development of Bolivia’s post-
neoliberal process is offered, highlighting how the relative balance of power between the 
new-left government, popular-societal actors, economic elites, and international (f)actors 
influenced the process. To gain a more nuanced understanding of the successes and issues 
of Bolivia’s process, as well as the outcomes to date and the challenges going forward, 
Chapter 5 offers an in-depth analysis of the experiences of urban popular groups in the city 
of El Alto.  In chapter 6, the focus turns to the Venezuelan case. The power framework 
(which is developed in the following chapter) is used to guide a historical analysis of the 
emergence and development of the post-neoliberal process. Chapter 7 then offers an 
analysis of the issues and challenges of constructing a radical-substantive democracy based 
on the perspectives of urban residents in two of Caracas’ most emblematic popular 
neighbourhoods, El 23 de Enero and Petare. In chapter 8, the outcomes and experiences of 
the Bolivian and Venezuelan experiments to move beyond the confines of market 
democracy are compared and contrasted. Briefly summarising, analyses suggests that where 
there is a long tradition of popular sector organising and mobilisation, co-ordinated protests 
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against exclusion are likely to emerge that bring a progressive leader to power who shares a 
tight link with, and is answerable to, social movements. Conversely, where there is a weak 
tradition of organising, ad hoc protests are more likely, and a more vanguard-type leader is 
likely to emerge and direct the process from above. The impact of these varied origins 
become more apparent over the course of the democratisation process as a power struggle 
between the government, popular sectors, elites, and transnational (f)actors emerges. In 
general, progressive leaders’ efforts to redistribute economic resources fosters an elite 
backlash, and the more substantive the effort to engage in socio-economic redistribution, 
the greater the economic-elite backlash is likely to be. What is more, the greater the power 
of elites, the greater the pressure on progressive leaders to centralise power in the 
executive so as to bypass elite obstacles to reform and to overcome elite-led destabilisation 
efforts. Meanwhile, where popular sectors are powerful, they will push the government to 
radicalise the process. Furthermore, where transnational power over domestic government 
is high, democratisation processes are likely to follow a more moderate path. Ultimately, 
unless progressive governments can limit the power of economic elites and transnational 
forces, they are likely to find themselves at the centre of a tug-of-war between popular 
demands for change and elite demands for maintenance of the status quo, with 
confrontations between the popular base and the progressive government a likely outcome. 
Such confrontations may act as stepping stones toward a rejuvenation of the process, but 
conversely they may also open the door for Right-wing political actors to take advantage. I 
turn now to a discussion of existing democratisation frameworks before outlining the new 
theoretical framework for post-neoliberal processes that seek to simultaneously deepen 
and extend democracy. 
47 
 
Chapter 2: Toward a radical-substantive 
democratisation framework: 
1. Traditional Democratisation Frameworks: 
An analytic framework is required to comprehend how an alternative to market democracy 
that boosts the quality of citizenship may emerge, develop, and sustain itself. Grugel and 
Bishop (2014: 74) highlight three distinct traditional frameworks that can be found in the 
literature. Firstly, there is modernisation theory “which has tended to focus on how 
economic development both produces democratisation and helps to sustain it (Ibid.). 
Secondly, historical sociology, also known as structuralism, “seeks to explain how 
democratisation emerges out of class conflict and the changing relations between different 
classes and the state” (Ibid.). Thirdly, transition theory, also known as agency theory, which 
emerged later than modernisation or historical sociological theories, focuses on “elite 
interactions in negotiating democratic transitions” (Ibid.). While each of these theories offer 
some useful guidelines on how to assess democratisation, each in isolation fails to offer a 
coherent framework capable of explaining how and why a simultaneous deepening and 
extending of democracy that boosts citizenship quality may emerge and develop in today’s 
globalised world. As such, I now offer a review of the traditional frameworks to identify their 
strengths and weaknesses, before developing a framework capable of examining 
democratisation processes that seek to move beyond the confines of market democracy. 
1.1 Modernisation theory: 
Modernisation theory, developed primarily in the works of Lipset (1959) and Parsons (1951), 
suggests that modernity and capitalism are required for democracy to emerge, whereby 
economic growth is causally related with progress (Grugel 2002: 47). Lipset argued that 
48 
 
democracy is not a choice, but rather a natural consequence of economic modernisation; 
capitalism, it was argued, would create conditions for democracy through trickle down 
wealth, education, urbanisation and the emergence of an educated middle class that would 
reward moderate, democratic parties and penalise extremist groups (Grugel and Bishop 
2014: 76; Lipset1959: 78). 
Modernisation theory predicts that developing regions can achieve democracy if they 
can “replicate European original transitions to capitalism and enter the global system” 
(Grugel 2002: 47). There is an inherent assumption that interaction between European and 
non-European societies “leads the latter to assume the characteristics of the former” 
(Avritzer 2002: 59). Rostow (1952) argued that tradition and modernity are mutually 
exclusive concepts. Material progress and democracy were linked to modernity, where 
modernity was said to “broadly consist of urbanisation, industrialisation, secularisation, and 
eventually, democratisation” (Mahdavi 2011: 25). The framework of modernisation assumes 
a lineal, temporal process “whose point of departure (t1) is a non-modern institutional 
structure and whose arrival point (t2) is the consolidation of modern institutions. 
Modernisation takes place between (t1) and (t2). Industrialisation is the process connecting 
the two temporalities and cultural change is the product of industrialisation” (Avritzer 2002: 
59). 
Modernisation theory is however premised upon an inordinately simplistic lineal 
relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe, leading to an ahistorical, 
ethnocentric, overly structural understanding of democratisation (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 
77). While it is certainly true that democracy is more likely to remain stable under a 
developed economy, the causal correlation between capitalism and democratic 
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advancement is overstated. Moreover, modernisation theory follows the elitist tradition in 
viewing the masses as subordinate elements in the process of modernisation (Avritzer 2002: 
59). Local culture and traditions are ignored as a simple imitation of European institutions is 
assumed. 
Modernisation theory is unsuitable to appraise popularly driven processes of 
democratisation, in which democracy is understood, by progressive forces, in a far more 
substantial manner. Crucially, modernisation theory suggests that developing democracies 
follow the European model. But this is exactly how democracy has become delegitimised 
today; by following a model for democratisation that prioritises capitalism (in today’s world 
financialised capital), democracy under neoliberal guidance has eroded state protection of 
citizens, while forcing citizens to act as mere bystanders in decision-making processes.  
1.2 Structural Theories: 
Historical sociologists, also known as structuralists, identify power as a crucial factor 
influencing democratisation. Historical sociologists “trace the transformation of the state 
through class conflict over time, in order to explain how democracy – which they see as 
state transformation – has sometimes emerged” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 82). Building on 
the work of Barrington Moore (1966), Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) “view 
the political system of a particular country in relation to broader questions of social power” 
(Grugel and Bishop 2014: 82). Drawing on classical sociology and Marxism, Rueschemeyer et 
al. (1992) stress the impact of “three power structures”: relative class power, the state, and 
the impact of transnational structures. They posit that social class and class conflict are the 
starting point for an analysis of power and the state (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 84). 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) see democratisation as the imposition of reforms on a capitalist 
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state, not as an automatic outcome from the development of capitalist relations of 
production (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 84). Transnational structures of power that are 
“grounded in the international economy and the system of states” are said to impact the 
“balance of power within society, affect state-society relations, and constrain political 
decision-making” (Grugel 2002: 52.). 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) argue that capitalism encourages democracy because it 
“transforms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes (pro-
democratic forces) and weakening the landed upper class (anti-democratic force)” (1992: 
270). Urbanisation, factory production and new forms of communication and transportation 
created an unprecedented opportunity for working- and middle-class sectors to organise. 
Collective action via associations, unions, and parties is said to give subordinate classes 
power vis-à-vis other groups in society (Huber et al. 1997: 325). It is this in-built 
contradiction of capitalism that creates a more organised and dense urban working class 
allowing for a challenge to the capitalist state (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 5). Unlike classic 
Marxism, which sees the state as essentially anti-working class, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) 
see the state as a crucial institution which can be transformed by subordinate pressure into 
promoting the elements of democracy that working class sectors desire. 
Historical sociology has faced several critiques. Firstly, structuralists’ focus on the 
working class as the principle driver of social change has been challenged. As Collier (1999) 
argues, class action is not determined by a historical mission; rather, different classes may 
play different roles depending on the context.  Furthermore, the focus on class does not 
account for territorially based movements formed around identity (for example landless 
peasant and indigenous movements). What is more, given that working class power has 
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been decimated by neoliberal policies, a framework focusing primarily on organised labour 
as the driver of a post-neoliberal democracy would be too narrow to capture possibilities 
and realities. Secondly, agential theorists critique the narrow role afforded the individual in 
historical sociological accounts of democratisation. For example, Przeworski (1991: 96) 
states that in structuralist frameworks, outcomes were “uniquely determined by 
[macrosocietal] conditions, and history . . . [went] on without anyone ever doing anything”. 
Notwithstanding these critiques, insights from historical sociological analysis are 
particularly useful for understanding post-transition outcomes. Context-specific factors 
impacting democratisation processes are teased out and examined with the goal of 
explaining outcomes. By accentuating the in-built class antagonism in capitalist societies, 
historical sociology highlights that conflict is a normal part of democracy, and not, as 
theories built on elitist ideals suggest, a weakness (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 85). Such a view 
resonates with Chantal Mouffe’s (2000, 2005, 2013) notion of “agonistic pluralism” in which 
“confrontation, far from representing a danger for democracy, is in reality the very 
condition of its existence” (Mouffe 2014).  
1.3 Transition Theory: 
The 1980s Latin American transitions from authoritarianism had a drastic and profound 
effect on the theorisation of democratisation, “challenging all…presumptions about 
preconditions” (Karl 1990: 4). This theoretical turn “was due to the new practice of 
contemporary democratisation in which democracy evolved in countries without the 
presence of all the structural conditions required for democratic transition” (Mahdavi 2011: 
33). Theorists analysing the transitions from authoritarianism, also known as transitologists, 
had two principle concerns. They focused on the required conditions for transition from 
52 
 
authoritarianism to some form of democracy, as well as the conditions that could account 
for the durability of democracy (Munck, G. 2011: 334).  
Political liberalisation and the move toward democracy were understood as an elite 
driven process (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przerworski 1986; Stepan 1988). Political 
change was to be achieved through pacts between military and political elites outlining the 
rules of the game (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). Democratisation was 
understood as a “process, led by cost-benefit calculations on the part of key actors” 
(Cannon and Hume 2012: 4).  As Doh Sin summarises, democracy, for transitologists, “is no 
longer treated as a particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien 
soil; it is treated as a product that can be manufactured wherever there is democratic 
craftsmanship and the proper zeitgeist” (1994: 141). The goal of these agential approaches 
is to adapt “political institutions to their social environment in such a way that it becomes 
easier for competing groups to share power and institutionalise the sharing of power” 
(Vanhanen 1990: 165). Transitologists believe elections will broaden the democratic 
accountability of the state to its citizens and increase participation, thereby acting not just 
as a “foundation stone, but a key generator over time of further democratic reforms” 
(Carothers 2002: 8). 
The third wave of democratisation4 reached Latin America in the 1980s with the 
resumption of political competitions and elections in most countries (Huntington 1991). 
However, several destabilizing issues emerged. Non-democratic actors did not leave the 
political scene (O’Donnell 1992; Hagopian 1992); economic inequality increased (Przeworski 
                                                          
4
 The first wave originates with the American and French Revolutions and runs to the 1920s or 1930s, while the 
second wave refers to the post-World War II period until the mid 1960s or 1970s. For a full discussion, see 
Huntington (1991). 
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1995); there was deep political instability (Mainwaring and Scully 1995); and the political 
culture of the past persisted (Moisés 1995; Peruzzotti 1997). This lead transitologists “to 
assume two different positions regarding the type of ‘post-transition’ political regime 
emerging in Latin American societies” (Avritzer 2002: 32) – a consolidation position and 
“delegative democracy”. 
The consolidation argument retained much of the transitology approach (Gunther et al. 
1996).  Linz and Stepan (1996: 15) famously defined a consolidated democracy as “a political 
regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned 
incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town’”. However, as 
Avritzer (2002: 32) highlights, the most important element of this game is that “it is played 
exclusively by political actors and involves only one activity; power disputes between 
different political groups”. Secondly, Guillermo O’Donnell (1994, 1996) highlighted that 
particularism (patronage, nepotism, corruption) was widespread in the new Latin American 
democracies. He argued that these cases could not be considered as complete transitions to 
democracy, and rather should be seen as “delegative” democracies. In such a scenario, long-
term habits “such as low levels of accountability, privatisation of the state, and ineffective 
enforcement of citizenship persist as important trends shaping the political system” (Ibid.: 
33). In sum, “delegative democracy changes transition’s point of arrival” from that of a full 
democracy to “a durable semi-democratic relation between state and society” (Ibid.). 
Transition frameworks have shown how the micro-levels of democratisation are 
important. They highlight how “agency, negotiations, compromise and the politics of 
change” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 91) are decisive in initial stages of democratisation, 
emphasizing the importance of “institutionalizing uncertainty without threatening the 
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interests of those who can still reverse the process” (Przerworski 1986: 60). However, 
transition theory has faced several critiques. To begin, the very concept of “transition” has 
been held to be inherently teleological in its assumptions, with “a pronounced 
institutionalist and elctoralist bias in what was deemed to be the ultimate democratic end-
point” (Cannon and Hume 2012: 3). While elite-led transitions may lead to stable 
democracy, the quality of democracy may be severely restricted (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 
236) as there can be no guarantee that elections will transform the underlying political and 
economic inequalities in society (Przerworski 1995: 54). The focus on institutions and 
pluralism where elites are completely cut-off from the citizenry, and the lack of focus on 
quality-based outcomes of democracy, has been described as “feckless pluralism”, where 
political life is a “hollow, unproductive exercise” (Carothers 2002: 11). Furthermore, pact-
making allows economic elites to ensure they continue to have a “right” to exploit the 
majority of citizens (Karl 1990). Meanwhile, the role of popular organisations in 
democratisation processes is unaccounted for in transition theory despite the fact that 
throughout the history of democratisation, both in Latin America and beyond, mass 
mobilisation has played, and continues to play, a fundamental role (Arditi 2008; Baker 
1999). 
2. An Alternative framework for Radical-Substantive Democratisation: 
The classic frameworks for understanding democratisation were principally concerned with 
causation. However, given the contemporary woes of democracy, the challenge for 
democratisation studies today is to identify how an alternative to market democracy may 
emerge, develop, and leave a lasting legacy that boosts the quality of existing democracy 
and leads to a thick citizenship.  As such, the framework must assess how to “maximise 
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popular control by expanding opportunities for direct citizen input, oversight, and 
participation in the policy making process and by enhancing the accountability of elected 
representatives to their constituents” (Roberts 1998: 26). Secondly, the framework must 
account for how to extend “democratic values, norms and forms of participation into the 
social and economic realm” thereby fomenting a “transformative project of addressing 
social and economic inequalities” (Smilde n.d.).  A framework capable of understanding and 
explaining how, and why such complex processes may emerge, develop, and leave a long-
term democratic legacy is thus required. As such, I propose a framework that accounts for 
both structural and agential factors influencing democratisation, highlighting how both 
path-dependent and emergent variables impact on the development and outcomes of 
attempts to simultaneously deepen and expand democracy. Hence, I seek to offer a 
framework that is universal in terms of highlighting key variables that impact on all 
democratisation process that seek to move beyond the confines of market democracy, 
which at the same time retains the flexibility required to adapt to case-specific factors and 
histories.  
2.1 Combined structural and agential frameworks: 
Grugel and Bishop (2014) respond to Roberts (1998) calls to extend and deepen democracy, 
and follow a broad approach that combines elements of the structural and agential 
frameworks. Grugel and Bishop (2014: 96) understand democracies as “political systems 
comprising institutions that (should) translate citizens’ preferences into policy, have 
effective states that act to protect and deepen democratic rights, and count on a strong, 
participatory and critical civil society”. Ultimately, Grugel and Bishop (2014) call for a 
transformation of the state and society so as to deliver a better quality of democracy.  
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The state is central to democratisation in a number of ways. First, and above all, 
democratisation means building a democratic state, requiring institutional change (the form 
of the state), representative change (who has influence or control over state policies) and 
functional change (what the state does or the range of state responsibilities) (Grugel and 
Bishop 2014: 97). Building on the work of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Grugel and Bishop 
(2014: 135) outline that “democratisation occurs when subordinated social groups achieve 
sufficient access to the state so as to change the patterns of representation within it”. In 
such a view, democratisation essentially entails a struggle to extend rights and deepen 
citizenship, whereby the state no longer serves as an instrument to protect dominant elites 
(Ibid.). Any explanation of democratisation therefore must explore “the extent to which the 
public sphere is open to all and, second, the ways in which civil society, as a space for 
political action, challenges or reproduces authoritarian practices” (Ibid.: 136).  
State capacity plays a key role in democratisation; the ability of the state to implement 
goals, particularly in the face of opposition from powerful social groups, or in “the face of 
recalcitrant socio-economic circumstances” has a great influence on democratisation (Wylde 
2016: 327; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985: 9).  As Huber (1995: 167) outlines, 
there are several essential tasks that all states must carry out if they are to be considered 
functioning states. Firstly, the state must have the capacity to enforce the rule of law 
throughout the state’s entire territory and population. Secondly, the state must promote 
economic growth and development. Thirdly, the state must elicit voluntary compliance from 
the population over which the state claims control. Fourthly, the state must shape the 
allocation of societal resources.  
Huber (1995: 166) notes that state strength is related to “extractive capacity” and means 
that “incumbents can set and achieve goals” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 129). States require 
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effective infrastructural powers that penetrate “universally throughout civil-society, through 
which political elites can extract resources from, and provide services to, all subjects” (Mann 
2002: 2). (Fiscal) state capacity to raise revenue is essential for the delivery of public goods 
and redistribution (Cárdenas 2010: 2). Without efficient state infrastructure to tax and 
redistribute and intervene in society without coercion, full democratisation is unattainable 
(Mann 2002: 3.). States with minimal levels of technical capabilities will therefore crumble 
under popular pressure for economic and political inclusion (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 128). 
As Beasley-Murray et al. (2010: 6) highlight, “any progressive alternative in the task of state 
management must enhance its capacity to distribute resources, to oversee effective 
institutions, and to represent the citizenry democratically”.  
The exact nature of the state and societal transformation Grugel and Bishop (2014) 
advocate requires further analysis if we are to comprehend how it may emerge, how it may 
respond to the contemporary crisis of democracy, and how it may leave behind a lasting 
legacy on the quality of citizenship. Democratisation today must challenge market 
democracy by confronting the existing boundaries of what is defined as the political arena: 
“its participants, its institutions, its processes, its agenda and its scope” (Dagnino 2005: 1). 
As discussed in chapter 1, radical democratic theorists call for the development of a 
participatory, deliberative public sphere that allows for new issues and debates to emerge, 
while also calling for institutional links between society and the state so as to make 
participation and deliberation effective in terms of having actual impact on policy decision-
making processes (see for example Fraser 1990; Cohen and Sabel 1997; Avritzer 2002; Fung 
2011). Substantive theorists meanwhile outline that extending democracy is important 
because social and economic inequality can easily be translated into concentrations of 
power in the political sphere, thereby inhibiting the formation and realisation of popular 
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demands (Roberts 1998: 29). Indeed, such theorists believe that democracy cannot be 
deepened in the midst of radical social and economic inequality, and suggest that 
“improving the lot of the poor will increase their human and social capital and eventually 
lead them to have more political voice” (Smilde n.d).  
While deepening and extending democracy would certainly offer a response to 
Dagnino's (2005:1) call (see previous paragraph) to challenge the neoliberal conception of 
democracy in terms of who participates, what the institutional features of democracy are, 
how decisions are made, and what the range of decisions open to public consultation is, we 
are still none the wiser as to what actually influences whether such democratisation occurs. 
I suggest that we must examine power in society if we wish to comprehend how and why 
democratic deepening and extending processes emerge, how they develop, and what their 
lasting legacy is likely to be. 
2.2 Power and Democratisation: A Theoretical Process Tracing Framework: 
The central concerns of this project are to identify how and why an alternative to market 
democracy that simultaneously seeks to deepen and extend democracy may emerge, and to 
identify the factors that influence the development and legacy of such a democratisation 
process. Ultimately, the aim is to examine democratisation processes that deliver an 
institutionalised deepening and extending of democracy, whereby deepening refers to 
increasing the capacity of formerly excluded popular sectors of society to influence state 
decision-making processes, while extending refers to the embedding of social rights. To this 
end, it is necessary to identify cases that have experimented in simultaneous deepening and 
extending of democracy. While one could attempt to evaluate the success to deepen or 
extend by simply looking at outcomes of democratisation processes, such an evaluation 
would fail to explain why outcomes occur. Rather, one must understand that 
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democratisation is a complex process that varies from case to case due to multiple factors. 
Analysis must be cognisant that differing origins of processes are likely to be key factors in 
explaining outcomes. However, we must not fall into a similar trap as the modernisation 
theorists who assume a linear path to some pre-determined democratic outcome given a 
set of pre-existing conditions. Rather, we must identify if and how factors present at the 
origin of the democratisation process feedback onto the process, influencing its pathways, 
while simultaneously accounting for multiple factors that emerge along the way and cause 
the process to spring forward, reverse, or change course altogether. To respond to such 
needs, this study suggests employing a theory-guided process tracing method (TGPT). 
Aminzade (1993: 108) states that to understand a complex process, researchers must 
provide “theoretically explicit narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequences of 
events constituting the process” of interest. If narratives are built on theory, they “allow us 
to capture the unfolding of social action over time in a manner sensitive to the order in 
which events occur” (Ibid.). Aminzande continues, stating that “by making the theories that 
underpin our narratives more explicit, we avoid the danger of burying our explanatory 
principles in engaging stories. By comparing sequences, we can determine whether there 
are typical sequences across [cases] . . . and can explore the causes and consequences of 
different sequence patterns” (Ibid.). Falleti (2006: 5) states that such theory-guided process-
tracing (TGPT) methods explain “the outcomes of interest by going back in time and 
identifying the key events, processes, or decisions that link the hypothesised cause or 
causes with the outcomes”. Researchers should therefore start with a set of hypotheses, 
and apply TGPT methods to specify the mechanisms that link causes and effects (Ibid.). As 
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George and Bennet (2005) and Hall (2003) (both cited in Falleti 2006) highlight, the TGPT 
method firstly permits  
The study of complex causal relationships such as those characterised by multiple 
causality, feedback loops, path dependencies, tipping points, and complex 
interaction effects. Second, it can lead to the formulation of new theories or 
hypotheses on the causal mechanisms that connect correlated phenomena. Third, 
TGPT in structured, focused comparisons (i.e., measuring the same causal 
mechanisms and outcomes in the same way across each case) permits the testing of 
hypotheses and theories. Finally, the TGPT method can reveal how endogenous 
changes affect the evolution of our variables of interests. For all these reasons, the 
careful application of TGPT to generate and test hypotheses will continue to advance 
our knowledge about complex causality phenomena in comparative politics (Falleti 
2006: 7). 
Falleti (2006) emphasises that the TGPT method should be differentiated from methods 
used in many comparative historical studies (see for example Rueschemeyer et al.’s 1992 
macrosociological study on the origins of democracy); such studies require the evaluation of 
fairly long periods of time, and Falleti (2006: 21) notes that nonstructural causal 
mechanisms become hard to uncover, whereby agential action may even be excluded from 
analysis. Furthermore, in comparative historical methods “sequential analysis becomes 
quasi-synonymous with the timing of different processes or variables in relation to each 
other…rather than with the ordering of events within a process” (Falleti 2010: 21). Thus, 
“arguments that claim to be sequential are often narratives that connect independent, 
intervening, and dependent variables or processes (just as static methodologies would do), 
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except that the independent and intervening phenomena are temporally antecedent to the 
outcome of interest. As such, these explanations do not analyse the interactions or feedback 
effects among the component events of a process” (Ibid.). As Mahoney (2000: 537) 
expounds, “the tension between path-dependent arguments and more commonplace 
causal arguments in historical sociology hinges significantly on the temporal location of 
initial conditions in a sequence”. Hence, it is crucial that analysts “develop objective criteria 
for determining what temporal point should represent the ‘initial’ or ‘starting’ conditions of 
a sequence” (Ibid.). 
Analysts must identify hypothetical causal mechanisms that describe the relationships or 
actions among the units of analysis. As Falleti and Lynch (2009: 5) note, “mechanisms tell us 
how things happen”. I follow Falleti and Lynch (2006) who diverge from Mahoney (2001: 
580) when he states that a causal mechanism is “an entity that – when activated – 
generates an outcome of interest”. Such a definition implies a deterministic understanding 
of mechanisms, such that once the mechanism operates, it “will always produce the 
outcome of interest” (Ibid.). Conversely, Falleti and Lynch (2006: 5) see mechanisms as 
“portable concepts distinct from the variables attached to particular cases” that can 
“operate in different contexts”. Given that mechanisms interact with the contexts in which 
they operate, outcomes of processes cannot be pre-determined simply by knowing the type 
of mechanism that is at work (Ibid.). As Goertz (1994: 28) states, “context plays a radically 
different role than that played by cause and effect; context does not cause X or Y but affects 
how they interact”.  
While a TGPT framework must detail the point at which a process begins, Collier and 
Collier (1991) describe how a theoretical model should examine the “antecedent 
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conditions” which may “be part of the causal chain in a theoretical explanation… when they 
differentiate units undergoing” processes of change (Roberts 2015: 48). That is, a 
framework must account for conditioning causes that, while not generating the actual 
processes under investigation, may weigh directly on their dynamics and thus influence 
their trajectory and lead to divergent outcomes amongst cases under comparison (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, once a process has begun, sequences may take several forms. Pierson (1992, 
1993, 1996) has shown that “once adopted, policies have effects on future politics that, as 
time goes by, make it increasingly difficult to stray from the policy trajectory originally 
taken. One main reason for this is that policies create their own constituencies who defend 
the gained policy terrain and continue building on those reforms to maintain and advance 
benefits derived from them” (Falleti 2010: 16). Such analysis resonates with Mahoney’s 
(2000: 508) description of self-reinforcing sequences characterised by the formation and 
long-term reproduction of a given institutional pattern. However, Mahoney (Ibid.: 526-7) 
suggests that  a reactive sequence may also develop. Reactive sequences “may reinforce 
some outcomes, producing linear legacies of institutional continuity, but they may corrode 
or destabilise others and generate a legacy of ongoing institutional change or fluidity” 
(Roberts 2015: 45). 
So, how might such a TGPT model look like for democratisation processes that seek to 
boost citizenship in its civil, political, and social spheres and overcome the political and 
economic exclusion fostered by market democracy by simultaneously deepening and 
expanding democracy? We must identify what is the key starting point of the process, as 
well as outlining the antecedent conditions that may feedback onto the process and 
influence the trajectory of the sequences. Given that this study seeks to examine 
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democratisation processes that aim to build a post-neoliberal alternative to market 
democracy, the election to state power of a Left party that promises to deepen and extend 
democracy is considered to be the “point of inflection”. This term in many way resembles 
the notion of a “critical juncture” advanced by Collier and Collier (1991), and expanded on 
by Mahoney (2000, 2001, 2001a) and Capoccia and Keleman (2007). A critical juncture “may 
be defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in 
different…units of analysis and which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies” (Collier 
and Collier 1991: 29). Critical junctures are “characterised by high levels of uncertainty and 
political contingency” (Roberts 2015: 43). A critical juncture contains three components; 
“the claim that a significant change occurred within each case, the claim that this change 
took place in distinct ways in different cases, and the explanatory hypothesis about its 
consequences” (Collier and Collier 1991: 30).  
However, it is necessary to distinguish my term, a “point of inflection”, from a “critical 
juncture” due to the central role of “key actor choice points” (Mahoney 2001: 6) in critical 
juncture frameworks. Critical junctures require that agential forces face a clear fork in the 
road, whereby the “range of plausible choices available to powerful political actors expands 
substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are 
potentially much more momentous” (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 343). While the process I 
describe here resembles many of the critical juncture criteria, it does not contain a “fork in 
the road” moment where agents face a choice between divergent paths. As such I use the 
term “point of inflection” to differentiate from “critical junctures”. 
 The election of a Left party is considered to be a point of inflection in a post-neoliberal 
democratisation process for two reasons. Firstly, it offers the possibility of opening a period 
of substantive and radical democratisation that would be highly unlikely to occur under a 
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Right-wing party. Secondly, without access to state resources for a Left-wing party, a radical 
transformation of society would not be feasible. While identifying a point of inflection 
appears straight forward, it is necessary to outline a theoretical process capable of 
explaining how the point of inflection emerged and how the aftermath sequencing 
developed.  
Roberts (1998) identified that if attempts to deepen democracy are accompanied by 
efforts to extend democracy, a strong reaction from economic elites5 who seek to defend 
their privileges is likely. As such, a core component of the TGPT must account for how these 
elite reactions influence and feedback onto the democratisation process. If elite opposition 
and destabilisation efforts to extending democracy to the socio-economic sphere are 
inevitable, then the issue emerges as to whether or not a strict adherence to liberal 
democratic separation of state powers is compatible with a simultaneous effort to overhaul 
the existing distribution of wealth in society. Indeed, progressive leaders may feel that to 
adhere to their mandate to engage in socio-economic redistribution, a centralisation of 
power in the office of the executive is required. It is essential to highlight here that the 
extent to which such centralisation of power is possible, and how exactly it may occur, 
would be greatly influenced by the institutional context in which the process occurs. A 
centralisation of power would be far more likely in a presidential system compared to a 
parliamentary system (Linz 1990). Should a centralisation of power in the executive occur, 
fundamental issues regarding attempts to move beyond market democracy and build a 
post-neoliberal model emerge. 
                                                          
5
 For the remainder of this section, the term “elites” refers to domestic business and economic agents who 
control such vast resources that they have structural power to influence government policy agenda setting. 
This is to differentiate the term “elites” from political elites who may in fact be part of the sitting Left 
governments. 
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While each individual case will be different, I outline a general theoretical framework of 
how a post-neoliberal democracy may emerge and develop. Following an extended period 
of economic and political exclusion resulting from the application of market democracy, 
mass protests demanding change will emerge (without such protest it is inconceivable that a 
post-neoliberal democratisation process that seeks to change the status quo could emerge); 
following protests, a new-Left party or leader with a clear mandate to boost citizenship is 
elected; once the new government seeks to boost social citizenship by extending 
democracy, thereby threatening elite interests, there will be a backlash by elites6; in 
response to this backlash, the progressive government will face a dilemma - moderate their 
efforts to overhaul wealth distribution in society, or bend the liberal separation of powers 
and use centralised executive power to resist destabilisation and push forward with socio-
economic reform. If this second path is chosen whereby executive power is boosted, a 
balancing act between centralisation so as to counteract elite opposition, while 
simultaneously fostering popular grassroots involvement in decision-making processes 
emerges. Within the centralisation path, a range of scenarios may emerge; at one end 
centralisation could be “progressive”, that is, the executive makes use of its power to 
override elite opposition – though perhaps inhibiting the civil and political rights of elites 
and the parties that represent them – in order to ensure that democratic extending occurs, 
while at the same time, crucially, popular sectors are guaranteed access to policy-making 
channels so as to ensure bottom-up control of the process. In such a scenario, the risks of 
centralising power are somewhat counterbalanced by a simultaneous deepening of 
                                                          
6
 The ideological hue of the progressive government will likely influence the extent of efforts to extend 
democracy. More “radical” political leaders will push for a more fundamental overhaul of the distribution of 
resources, which in turn will likely foster a more aggressive response from economic elites. As such, the 
context-specific ideology of the progressive leaders and the extent of the challenge to the status quo they 
pose will influence elite resistance and the subsequent democratization process.  
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democracy for popular sectors. Conversely, centralisation to overcome elite opposition to 
extending democracy may set in motion a reactive sequence whereby centralisation 
becomes “despotic”. In such a scenario, popular sectors would be excluded from decision-
making channels, while the executive would use extensive powers to entrench itself in 
power irrespective of electoral results or popular demands for change. In such a scenario, 
and without the counterbalance of popular control, “despotic” centralisation may tend 
toward full-blown authoritarianism.  
Focusing on those cases where boosting executive power is a possibility, I suggest that 
the theoretical framework must account for how the power of the Left-government, 
popular society, economic elites, and the international sphere influence the 
democratisation process and subsequent outcomes. As discussed shortly, to comprehend 
how each of these four sectors influences outcomes, we must evaluate the relational power 
between them, that is, how they interact with and influence each other. However, in 
general, increased popular societal power should boost the quality of democratic deepening 
and extending, control centralisation, and increase the long-term legacy of the process. 
Powerful economic elites will foster a weakened democratic deepening and extending, a 
strong government desire to centralise, and a limited democratic legacy. Strong Left-
government power meanwhile can have both a positive and negative impact on democratic 
outcomes. If the government is strong, democratic extending is likely. Deepening and 
centralisation may be increased or decreased depending on how popular societal power and 
elite power influences the government. Strong government in conjunction with a strong 
popular society tends toward democratic deepening, restricted centralisation, and a lasting 
legacy. However, powerful economic elites in the absence of a powerful popular society is 
likely to foster despotic centralisation and a weak legacy. Government-international 
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relations must be included in analysis because, as historical sociologists Rueschemeyer et al. 
(1992) outline, transnational structures of power based in the international economy 
influence the domestic balance of power between state and society and impact upon the 
range of policy choices available to government. How international (f)actors impact on 
democratic outcomes depends not only on their power vis-à-vis the Left government, but 
also on their underlying ideological tendencies. In sum, the actual impact on democratic 
outcomes will depend on the relational balance of power between key actors and 
institutions in each specific case. 
In addition to the relational analysis of power, the framework must also account for 
the antecedent conditions that may influence the democratisation process, both in its early 
and more advanced stages of development. For the proposed framework to be more 
universally applicable, it would need to account for path-dependency issues of presidential 
versus parliamentary political systems. However, the focus here and for the remainder of 
the thesis is on those cases where centralization of power in the executive is possible, as 
these cases may shed the greatest light on the complexities and difficulties of engaging in 
radical-substantive democratization today. As such, the framework and following analysis is 
most applicable to presidential systems7. Before discussing the variable antecedent 
conditions, it is important to note how one feature of neoliberal reform – decentralisation 
policies – has influenced the possibility of a challenge to market democracy emerging. As 
Falleti (2010) outlines, following the demise of import substitution industrialisation (ISI), 
Latin America systematically engaged in decentralisation policies, that is, “a set of policies, 
electoral reforms, or constitutional reforms that transferred responsibilities, resources, or 
                                                          
7
 However, as Malamud (2001) highlights, centralisation of power versus diffusion of power should not simply 
be read as a mirror of presidential versus parliamentary systems. While institutions matter, the degree of 
centralisation of power is also determined by political practices and informal institutionalisation (O’Donnell 
1996). 
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authority from higher to lower levels of government” (Ibid.: 6). As Roberts (2015) 
demonstrates, without decentralisation from central government to regional and municipal 
state spheres, spaces for new parties, many of them Left-parties, would not have existed. 
Without such spaces, it is questionable as to how the challenges to market-democracy could 
have emerged.  
Returning to the nature of varied antecedent conditions, the form of protest against 
political and economic exclusion, that is, whether it is well co-ordinated by powerful 
grassroots movements or whether it is a spontaneous ad-hoc eruption, will influence the 
type of leader that is elected at the moment of inflection, as well as their post-neoliberal 
mandate. Co-ordinated protests are more likely to foster an organic relationship whereby a 
new leader and party emerge as the political expression of organised groups in civil society 
(Roberts 1998: 75). In organic relationships there is, intentionally, a fuzzy line between the 
party and its constituent social organisations, and party leaders and members may come 
directly from the social movement. Given their origins in diverse forms of popular 
organisation, relationships between organic parties and society “tend to be more open, 
inclusive, and pluralistic in their organisational structure, with less hierarchical control and 
more political space for democratic participation at the grassroots” (Ibid.). As such, in 
organic relationships we would expect to see greater levels of democratic deepening and 
progressive centralisation. 
Conversely, in cases where protests are uncoordinated, but still on a mass scale, 
relations between popular protesters and the new leader and party will tend toward a 
vanguard relationship (Roberts 1998: 75). In such a scenario, a leader emerges 
independently of the unconnected protest movements but claims to represent their 
demands and concerns. Over time, in the vanguard relationship there is a tendency “for the 
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party to try to establish political control over diverse forms of social organisation and to 
shape collective action in conformance with the party’s political objectives” (Ibid.). As such, 
in vanguard relationships one would expect lower levels of democratic deepening and a 
greater tendency toward despotic centralisation compared to organic relationships. 
I also hypothesise that the history and scope of popular sector organising in the 
antecedent era may have a conditioning influence on the sequencing and legacy of the 
democratisation process. The legacy of the process will depend on ensuring that deepening 
and extending becomes institutionalised. Institutionalisation allows citizens to see 
progressive changes as rights, who will then mobilise to vote in support of their retention 
(Huber and Stephens 2012: 266).  Following elite opposition to efforts at extending, and the 
subsequent centralisation of power in the executive, I propose that cases with histories of 
co-ordinated mobilisation will be better positioned to ensure that centralisation remains 
“progressive”. In addition, in such cases popular sectors will be better prepared to hold the 
government to account and prevent any backsliding on social citizenship gains in response 
to elite demands. Conversely, in cases where popular society does not have a long history of 
organisation and mobilisation from which to draw lessons and inspiration from, I 
hypothesise that popular actors will be less capable of defending their hard-won citizenship 
gains from demands placed on the government by elite opposition. 
2.3 Understanding Power: 
In order to comprehend the TGPT framework we must analyse the capacity of the Left-
government, popular society, economic elites, and international (f)actors to achieve their 
goals, as well as the autonomy they have to pursue their objectives. Power is most 
commonly understood as the capacity to make others do what they otherwise would not, 
where one actor in a social relationship can carry out their will despite resistance (Weber 
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1968; Mann 2012; Silva 2009). This is known as “distributive” power, entailing a zero-sum 
game with a fixed amount of power distributed amongst opponents, whereby an increase in 
power for one side necessitates a decrease in power for the other (Mann 2012: 6; Silva 
2009: 33). However, Parsons (1960: 199-225) highlights that there is a second collective or 
relational dimension to power whereby a “social actor may transcend his or her limitations 
in a head-to-head conflict with a more powerful opponent by collaborating with others who 
have similar grievances and goals” (Silva 2009: 33). This forging of horizontal linkages allows 
actors to coordinate action, and establish coalitions and alliances (Ibid.). As such, the 
framework developed in this study adopts a relational approach to power “drawing 
attention to the fact that actors’ capabilities depend, in part, on those of others and that 
actors are enmeshed in distinctive and overlapping-power networks” (Silva 2009: 30). As 
such, analysis must examine how power relations between the government-elites, the 
government-popular society, and the government-international sphere interact and impact 
the democratisation process. 
a. Government-elite opposition relations: 
Post-neoliberal democratisation processes are likely to be heavily influenced by 
government-elite power relations; the capacity of a government to redistribute, how 
governments engage in redistribution, and how elites respond to such redistribution must 
be accounted for in explaining how, and to what extent, power becomes centralised in the 
executive. As such, it is necessary to evaluate what gives elite oppositional forces power 
over the radical governments, and, vice versa, what gives governments power to resist elite 
opposition demands to desist in democratic expansion. 
Mann (2012: 2) outlines a theory for understanding societies and their structures 
whereby the interrelations between four fundamental sources of social power - ideological, 
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economic, military, and political (IEMP) – determine the relative power of actors. Left 
governments and elite oppositional forces seek to control these four sources of power 
which “engender the structural bases and resource capabilities upon which social order and 
domination rest” (Silva 2009: 33).  
Political power refers to “the usefulness of centralised, institutionalised, and 
territorialised regulation of many aspects of social relations” (Mann 2012: 26). Political 
power refers primarily to the power of the state. State power has two elements. Firstly, 
there is despotic power of the state elite, which allows elites to take decisions without 
routine negotiation with civil society groups (Mann 1984; 2012). Secondly, states may have 
infrastructural power which allows them to penetrate society and implement decisions 
throughout its territories, whereby “political elites can extract resources from, and provide 
services to, all subjects” (Ibid.: 2). Examples of sources of political power that left 
governments and elite opposition vie for include control of the judiciary, executive and 
legislature, political parties and coalitions of parties, and municipal and local governments. 
Economic power depends on the “effective possession of economic resources” (Silva 
2009: 36). Sources of economic power include control of the banking and commerce 
sectors, taxation, business and investment ownership, and natural resource control. Groups 
who can monopolise control over production, distribution, exchange, and consumption 
strengthen their collective and distributive power in societies. For example, as Silva notes, 
“dominant class-based social groups use their economic power to defend their interests in 
profits and favorable investment conditions against both labor and the state” (2009: 37). 
Capital exploits the state’s reliance on it for critical investment and employment generation, 
thereby coercing the state to limit its intervention in the markets (Ibid.). Economic elites 
seek to use their sources of economic power to constrain progressive policies that would 
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transfer wealth to the poor, thereby limiting the possibility of extending democracy (Huber 
and Stephens 2012).  
Military power is a coercive power that relies on the use of force and arms, and the 
military and police elites who monopolise it can obtain collective and distributive power 
(Mann 2012: 26). While it could be argued that the military is controlled by the state, and 
should therefore fall under the heading of political power (Weber 1978), given the history of 
the military to act independently in some regions, for example in Latin America it is 
necessary to separate military from political power (Silva 2009: 38). Military power is not 
confined to armies; both Left governments and elite oppositional forces may use 
connections with gangs, paramilitaries and criminals to achieve their desired goals (Mann 
2006: 351). 
The final source of social power, ideological power, derives from “the capacity of ideas 
to shape policy options and principles of social organisation” (Silva 2009: 40).  Those who 
can monopolise a claim to meaning and knowledge wield great collective and distributive 
power. As Mann (2011: 173) argues, for an ideology to change social processes it “needs the 
existing ideologies to appear to be defeated and it has to offer an alternative and plausible 
interpretation, so it has to make sense to people…It’s a combination of the failure of the 
existing ideologies and an alternative which seems appropriate to the times and which uses 
elements of the present social structure yet emphasises them in a new way, which makes 
converts” (Ibid.: 173). Ideological power is increased where “innovative issue framing 
resonates with broader audiences and draws them in” (Silva 2009: 40). Sources of 
ideological power for the Left governments and elite opposition include - to varying degrees 
depending on the actual case - the domestic and foreign media, universities, and religious 
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institutions. Case study chapters will examine the wide asymmetries of influence in these 
sources of ideological power wielded by the Left governments and the economic elites.   
b.  State-popular society relations:  
Unequal power relations between society and state (where the state is dominant) will limit 
the agenda of politics, ruling out the possibility of direct citizen input to decision-making, or 
policies that address embedded inequality (Caputo 2011: 448). Hence, society must find a 
way to alter this balance of power. As noted above, weak social actors can forge collective 
power by collaborating with others who have similar goals, thereby helping them to 
overcome their limitations in one-on-one conflicts with more powerful actors (Parsons 
1960; Silva 2009; Mann 2012). By forging horizontal linkages, societal actors can coordinate 
action, and establish coalitions and alliances (Silva 2009: 33). The presence of a strongly 
organised and united civil society is more likely to generate pressure from below, and thus 
give power to society over state actors (Anria 2016: 463). Strongly organised civil societies 
are those with high organisational density (percentage of a geographical region’s population 
that are members of grassroots organisations), while united civil societies are those with an 
affinity of purpose, that is, “the ability to privilege common purpose over narrow 
organisational interests in order to agree on decisions affecting common interests” (Ibid.: 
464) . 
 If society (in the form of social or protest movements) wishes to increase its influence in 
decision-making processes and affect change in the policy-range offered by the state, then 
collective action must be one end of the spectrum of participatory engagement, where the 
other end is more formal and institutionalised (Pearce 2004: 503). As such, society must 
engage with the state-apparatus, and not just fight against it. The form that societal-party 
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relations take during attempts to deepen and extend democracy is thus a crucial variable 
influencing democratisation outcomes (Roberts 1998). 
c.  State-international relations:  
The “prevailing international, regional, and global context, the geostrategic location of the 
state and society in question, their relationship with global forces, and, also, the nature of 
democratisation of the very institutions of global governance and other private entities 
which wield power” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 103) may influence the democratisation 
processes. Given their conservative nature and support for market democracy, the capacity 
of the IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank to hold national governments to account may 
influence the freedom that Left-led states have to experiment with democratic deepening 
and extending. Walker and Williams (2010) note that increased political participation may 
lead to a radicalisation of demands from below on political leaders from the rank-and-file, 
thereby complicating governing elites’ attempts to compromise with international (f)actors. 
How the government manages this scenario where it is trapped between demands from 
below and above will significantly influence democratisation processes. 
2.4 Advancing democratisation theory: 
In summary, rather than privileging structures or agents, as many democracy frameworks 
do, the approach taken here is to marry the two “to achieve a more sophisticated synthesis, 
and a more nuanced understanding of how democratisation is produced by the interplay 
between them” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 101). As Mahoney (2001a: 11) states, “such a 
mutually constitutive approach to actors and institutions resonates well with many recent 
calls in the study of national political regime change for frameworks that go beyond 
voluntaristic and structural approaches”. Unlike overly agential approaches, the approach 
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adopted here avoids excessive emphasis on “contingency, crafting, and choice by 
highlighting the crucial role of structures and institutions in channelling long-term 
development” (Ibid.). However, “by emphasizing the role of actor choice in creating 
institutions and structures”, the approach followed here “avoids the tendency of some 
structuralist accounts to read human agency out of the analysis” (Ibid.). 
The framework advanced here not only identifies outcomes, but also explains variance 
in outcomes. Such a framework fills a gap in the literature regarding how a radical, 
substantive alternative to market democracy may emerge, develop, and sustain itself. 
However, though it may be appealing for social sciences to develop a single theory that can 
explain democratisation processes in all cases and all times, democratisation is too 
complicated a process to do so. As Tilly argues, it is difficult to forge one approach that 
alone can explain such a multi-faceted process, and questions of “how” and “why” 
democratisation does or does not occur “spring up at every step of our historical way” 
(2007: 49 as cited in Grugel and Bishop 2014: 101). However, the framework advanced here 
is adaptable and flexible, and the theoretical process detailed above may be transported 
from one site of analysis to another, which is crucial given that each case of democratisation 
will be different from others. 
3. Applying the Framework To Left-led Latin American Experiments: 
Turning to Latin America, in the more radical pink-tide cases such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela there have been attempts to simultaneously deepen and extend democracy. One 
of the principle critiques of the radical Left governments from liberal-democratic theorists 
has focused on the centralisation of power in the executive. As Hunt (2016: 443) notes, 
some authors contend that democracy is being weakened due to a focus on “power 
enhancement” in the presidency, thereby eroding horizontal accountability and fomenting 
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social and political polarisation (Madrid, Hunter, and Weyland 2010: 141-2). Indeed, Eaton 
(2013) states that the reversal of neoliberal decentralisation in the radical Left cases 
highlights how power has been centralised in the executive so as to diminish opposition 
power and increase presidential control of resources. However, as outlined earlier in section 
6.4 of chapter 1, Munck (2015: 373) notes that the radical Left challenged the liberal idea of 
the separation of powers because they felt that without a strong president it would be 
impossible to overcome elite opposition and implement ambitious attempts to re-found the 
political, economic, and social spheres (Escobar 2010). Furthermore, as Wolff (2013) 
discusses, these centralizing trends have been accompanied by “new relations with society 
through popular participation and the need to negotiate support from marginal social actors 
that had been excluded and underrepresented by previous governments” (Hunt 2016: 443; 
Wolff 2013). 
To comprehend the emergence, development, outcomes, and legacies of the democratic 
experiments in the “radical” pink tide cases, I now apply the TGPT framework detailed 
above. The point of inflection is the election of radical Left governments to state power, as it 
was with the election of these leaders that attempts at constructing an alternative model of 
democracy began in earnest. The antecedent conditions include the shift to neoliberalism 
and liberal democracy in the region and the subsequent weakening of citizenship followed 
by the eruption of mass popular protest. Roberts’ (2015) model expertly describes how in 
some pink tide cases the neoliberal “critical juncture” created the space for radical parties 
to emerge. He notes that where neoliberal “reforms that were imposed by labour-based 
populist or centre-left parties”, party systems were “de-aligned”, thereby “leaving 
opponents of the reform process without effective representation in established 
institutions”. In these cases, “societal claims were mobilised outside and against established 
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party systems, forcing traditional parties to share the political stage with new popular 
contenders – or to be eclipsed by them altogether….This pattern broke down and 
transformed national party systems, and it created opportunities for a more radical, extra-
systemic turn to the left that included sharper breaks with the market orthodoxy of previous 
rulers” (Roberts 2015: 5)8. 
It is crucial to highlight, however, that the radical outsider parties that emerged in Latin 
America are not identical. Silva (2009) examines in detail the waves of protest that emerged 
across the continent in response to the political and economic exclusion that resulted from 
the adoption of neoliberal policies. Some protest waves were led by organised labour 
movements and civil society groups, while others were disconnected, ad-hoc eruptions of 
anger that did not have a centralised guiding force. Where protests were coordinated by 
groups with long histories of mobilisation and horizontal linkages across society, a 
movement-Left party was elected to power, while in cases where popular society had a 
more limited history of organisation and where protests against the neoliberal 
marketisation of society were un-coordinated, a more top-down, vanguardist radical-Left 
party emerged (Levitsky and Roberts 2011: 13). These two hypothetical processes are 
outlined in figures 2 and 3 overleaf.  
                                                          
8
 It is pertinent here to remind the reader that the cases under discussion are presidential political systems. 
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The two processes outlined in figures 2 and 3 are hypothetical models that require 
concrete empirical testing. Bolivia and Venezuela are chosen as sites to test the models and 
examine the democratisation sequences that have emerged. Both Bolivia and Venezuela 
adopted neoliberal policies under the guidance of supposed labour-based parties; both 
experienced recurring cycles of anti-neoliberal protest (Silva 2009); both experienced party-
system collapse following such protest; following the election of a radical-outsider Left 
government, both established constituent assemblies; and in both cases they departed from 
liberal democratic principles and adopted heterodox economic policies (Silva 2017: 93). 
Despite these similarities, the two cases varied in terms of the origins of the Left turn; the 
election of Evo Morales in Bolivia at the head of the MAS party was the result of a bottom-
up party-movement process following well organised protests under a unifying anti-
neoliberal banner. In Venezuela, uncoordinated, ad hoc eruptions of anti-neoliberal 
sentiment created the space for Hugo Chávez’s election in Venezuela along a more 
vanguard party-society relationship. Furthermore, in Bolivia there is a long history of 
Marxist- and indigenous-inspired collective organisation and mobilisation vis-à-vis the state, 
while in Venezuela there is a more limited history of popular-sector organisation. 
Given that both cases have engaged in experiments that seek to simultaneously deepen 
and extend democracy, they offer ideal sites from which to draw lessons for democratic 
theory in general regarding how to move beyond the confines of market democracy. 
Considering the varied experiences of popular organising before the points of inflection, the 
cases also offer scope for comparison regarding if and how antecedent experiences of 
organising feedback onto the process at a later stage, influencing democratic outcomes 
(quality of deepening and extending, centralisation, and legacy). Furthermore, the varied 
nature of party-societal relations – organic in Bolivia and more vanguardist in Venezuela –
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allow for examination of how bottom-up experiences compare to more top-down 
experiments in building a post-neoliberal democracy.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
1. Introduction:  
Given the crisis of market democracy and the political and economic exclusion experienced 
by the popular sectors of society, it is pertinent to ask how an alternative model that 
simultaneously deepens and extends democracy may emerge and develop. As such, I seek 
to examine democratisation attempts that seek to move toward a post-neoliberal model. 
Rather than simply assessing the final outcomes of such processes, I wish to explain these 
outcomes so as to identify lessons for how to thicken the quality of democracy. Given the 
complex nature of such a democratisation process one must identify its origins before 
tracing its development over time, highlighting the multiple variables that influence the path 
taken and the ultimate outcomes in terms of a deepened, extended, and embedded post-
neoliberal model of democracy that thickens the quality of civil, political, and social rights, 
while also accounting for the issue of centralisation of power in the executive. To respond to 
these concerns, I examine democratisation processes in Latin America under the leadership 
of radical-Left governments via a theory-guided process tracing framework. 
 This chapter begins by detailing the process of case selection and the adoption of a 
paired comparison research design to examine the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela. Next, 
indicators for democratic deepening and extending, elite destabilisation, centralisation, and 
democratic legacy are delineated before identifying how to assess the relative power of the 
left-led state, organised popular society, economic elites, and transnational (f)actors. A 
discussion of data collection methods is then offered highlighting that secondary sources of 
data are triangulated with primary data gathered via interviews with key actors as well as 
participant observation and ethnographic analysis. Interviews were completed during two 
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field research trips to each case country in 2016 and 2017, and were bolstered by long-
distance and electronic interviews in 2017 and 2018.  
2. Theoretical Context: 
Democratisation, in this project, is considered to be a multi-facetted and open-ended 
process. That is, a variety of factors may emerge and impact the process, causing it to 
advance (democratise) or retreat (de-democratise) wherein the quality of actually existing 
citizenship is the variable in question. Given that this project seeks to comprehend how an 
alternative to market democracy that simultaneously deepens and expands democracy may 
emerge, develop and sustain itself, an interpretivist approach underpinned by a subjectivist 
ontology is adopted.  As such, rather than seeking general “rules”, the more critical 
approach of this project “seeks to question overly simple assumptions and to challenge 
deeply embedded but often unreflexive ideas about democracy” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 
102).  A critical approach to existing “developed” democracies is adopted. Such a view does 
not resonate with more positivist and economistic approaches to understanding 
democratisation, which ask narrow questions and use quantitative analysis of large datasets 
to hypothesise “the ways in which different causal factors produce particular kinds of 
democratic outcomes” (Grugel and Bishop 2014: 102). This type of empirical analysis tends 
to take questions surrounding the meaning of democracy as settled. Given that multiple 
factors emerge throughout the ongoing process of democratisation, quantitative analysis of 
cases exhibiting a given set of initial variables cannot offer a robust examination of varying 
democratic outcomes.  
 Furthermore, neither structures nor agents should be privileged in research design. 
As Grugel and Bishop (2014: 100) outline, “structures are important, and likewise our 
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perceptions of structures are too; but it is people, both within wider civil society and those 
driving the institutions of the state apparatus that make democracy”. Hence, structures and 
agents are influential in democratisation. Such an ontological position allows analysis to 
offer a nuanced understanding of how the interplay between structures and agents 
influences if and how substantive-participative democracies and social change may emerge. 
3. Research Design: Paired Comparison and Case Selection: 
Given the complex nature of processes to simultaneously deepen and extend democracy, a 
large-N type study is eschewed. Such a method is not apt for comprehending the case-
specific factors that must be accounted for in any examination that seeks to explain 
outcomes. Rather, a small-N method is employed. There are two options here, a single-case 
study and a paired-comparison. Tarrow (2010: 243) outlines the similarities of the two. First, 
both provide an “intimacy of analysis” that is rarely available to large-N studies; second, 
both methods insist on deep background knowledge of the countries being examined; and 
third, both facilitate “causal-process analysis” in contrast to “data-set observations” (Brady 
and Collier 2004: 277).  
 While there are similarities, paired-comparison does differ from single-case studies in 
several ways. Tarrow (2010: 244) notes that its distinctiveness can be understood via an 
analogy with experimental design strategies. He states that paired-comparison is similar to 
experimentation in its ability to compare the impact of a single variable on outcomes of 
interest, though not to the same extent given that an experimenter has the ability to 
randomly assign subjects to treatment and control groups. In this regard, all the pairing 
comparativist can do is “attempt to carefully match the confounding variables that they 
know about (but not the ones that do not come to mind)” (Ibid.). Also, given the small 
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number of cases used, it is not possible to control for more than a few factors. However, he 
(2010: 244) affirms that paired comparison “does have an analytical baseline, eliminating 
the possibility that the dependent variable can have occurred even in the absence of the 
independent variable, thus significantly increasing the inferential power of the design over 
the single-case study”. Secondly, paired comparison allows for dual-process tracing, thereby 
reducing the possibility that a “supposed determining variable is as critical as it might seem 
from a single-case study alone” (Ibid.).  
Given the advantages of paired comparison, one may ask why researchers should stop at 
comparing just two cases. Tarrow (2010: 246) believes that the move from single-case to 
paired comparison “offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical 
challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added”. When moving from one to 
two cases, we enter the “realm of hypothesis-generating comparative study” while also 
examining how common mechanisms are influenced by case-specific features; but as the 
number of cases is increased, “the leverage afforded by paired comparison becomes 
weaker, because the number of unmeasured variables increases” (Ibid.). As such, by keeping 
comparisons to a small-N, we avoid issues of “concept stretching” (Sartori 1970). Given the 
nature of the aims and questions of this study, a paired-comparison methodology is 
employed, thereby allowing for a “thick description” (Geertz 1973) that helps decipher the 
“meaning of behaviour and institutions to the actors involved” (Collier 1993: 110).  
The issue then arises as to how we should select cases for comparison. Mills’ (1843) 
method of similarity or difference offers guidance. These methods are termed most similar 
systems design (MSSD) or most different systems design (MDSD) (Pierce 2008: 58). In MSSD, 
common systemic characteristics are controlled for, whereas intersystemic differences are 
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viewed as explanatory variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 33; Tarrow 2010:234). MDSD 
use the logic of comparison in a reverse manner; cases are selected on the basis that they 
share a key independent variable, but differ greatly in terms of spurious and intervening 
variables (Burnham et al. 2008: 77). In both MSSD and MDSD, it is crucial to highlight that 
the dependent variable is irrelevant at the research design stage; cases should not be 
included or excluded on the basis of their values on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990).  
MSSD has been criticised because “the experimental variables cannot be singled out” 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970: 34). However, Gerring  (2006: 133-135) and others have 
pointed out that while it may be difficult to sort the specific variables that unite systems, 
MSSD can direct attention to the ways in which they differ. Meanwhile, in the exploratory 
phase of research, a second case can confirm a tentative finding from a single case (Ibid.: 
131). Besides, as Tarrow (2010: 235) notes, “some cases are inherently interesting because 
they take contrasting routes to similar outcomes”.  
MDSD is particularly prone to the “many variables, too few cases” criticism that small-N 
studies in general receive (Tarrow 2010: 235). This critique of comparative methods 
suggests that MDSD have a weak capacity to sort out rival explanations (Lijphart 1971). 
Lijphart (1971) suggests that to overcome this issue, we should use MSSD to identify 
comparable cases, that is, cases that are matched on many variables not crucial to the 
study, but that vary in terms of key independent variables, thereby assessing their influence 
more adequately. However, MDSD does have some advantages over MSSD. As McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: chapter 10) discuss, highlighting similar or identical processes in a 
variety of cases can “expand or limit the scope conditions of established research findings” 
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(Tarrow 2010: 235). Neither MSSD nor MDSD is inherently superior, and which method we 
chose depends on the issue under investigation (Ibid.). 
Considering the contemporary crisis of market democracy in the “developed” world, it is 
fundamental that democratic theorising begin to engage in discussion of how an alternative 
model that boosts the quality of citizenship may emerge, thereby re-invigorating both 
citizen conceptions of the political system in which they live, and democratic theory itself. 
As such, this study identifies cases in Latin America which experienced a similar democratic 
crisis in the past, but which, with the arrival of the pink tide of Left governments, began 
experimenting in delivering a “post-neoliberal” model that responds to citizen concerns 
regarding political and economic exclusion. By critically engaging with these experiments, 
crucial lessons for democratic theory can be uncovered. 
The post-neoliberal turn in Latin America was not homogenous. As Yates and Bakker 
(2014: 10) identify, “policy changes and institutional reforms have taken shape under 
different national regimes and according to different political ideologies in Latin America, all 
of which embody the tensions involved in attempting to overcome distinct neoliberal 
institutional heritages.”As such, it is necessary to identify which post-neoliberal cases offer 
the best site for analysis. Munck (2015: 384) suggests that analysis examining 
democratisation processes in the region should pay particular attention to the cases where 
progressive governments’ efforts have gone furthest to build an alternative to liberal 
democracy as these “are the cases where conflicts between government and opposition are 
most bitter” (Munck 2015: 384), hence offering the best cases from which to draw lessons. 
Following a MSSD, Bolivia and Venezuela were selected as the cases for comparison in 
this study as, firstly, they are representative of the radical end of the post-neoliberal 
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spectrum. Furthermore, the cases share many characteristics, making them viable sites in 
which to compare democratisation processes. Both cases are examples of presidential 
systems. In both cases, there have been attempts to simultaneously deepen and extend 
democracy, albeit to varying extents, following the election of outsider candidates to 
presidential office on the back of mass protests against the economic and political exclusion 
experienced by the popular sectors under market democracy. New constitutions were 
drafted in each country with the goal of boosting political and social citizenship. Liberal 
democracy is not eschewed in either case, but is challenged. Nationalisations and reliance 
on natural resource rents has been vital in both cases’ attempts to extend democracy. Both 
are active members in new regional alliances (such as the Alianza Bolivariana para los 
Pueblos de Nuestra América [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - ALBA] and 
the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas [Union of South American Nations – UNASUR]) that 
seek to offer alternatives to US dominated organisations (such as the Organisation of 
American States - OAS); both are overtly critical of US policy, in Latin America and beyond. 
In both cases, there has been opposition from entrenched economic elites who have seen 
their historical positions of power challenged. As a result of such opposition, both 
presidents have been accused of centralising power in the executive as they have sought to 
adhere to promises to raise the well-being of the most vulnerable members of society.  
There are however crucial differences between the two cases. Bolivia, unlike any other 
South American new-Left country, experienced a major social revolution in 1952, and as a 
result had a veteran, highly militant independent labour confederation (Silva 2009: 103). 
The majority-indigenous population is also important in comprehending the societal power 
in Bolivia. Issue framing “on ethnic identity was crucial in organising resistance” whereby 
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anti-neoliberal protests were “intertwined with claims for indigenous rights” (Ibid. 104-5). 
The mass protests against neoliberalism and market democracy in Bolivia were organised by 
powerful social and indigenous movements who had a long history of organisation 
(Balderacchi 2015: 5). While popular protests did erupt in Venezuela in response to the ills 
of neoliberalism, unlike in Bolivia, the protests were not directed by an organised, coherent 
social movement. Consequently, societal movements did not build associational and 
collective power by connecting disparate movements together under one umbrella (Silva 
2009: 195). As such, while Bolivia and Venezuela “show the interaction of mobilised social 
movements and a state committed to developing a participatory democracy” (Kirby 2013: 
105), the initial state-society relations differed. In the opening stages, Bolivia’s Left-turn 
followed “a classic mode of incorporation from below via a mass mobilisation party”, while 
Venezuela’s followed a “state-led incorporation on socialist concepts of popular power” 
(Silva 2017: 93). In order to more fully comprehend outcomes in both cases, it is important 
to evaluate whether such variance in the antecedent conditions and early phases of the 
democratisation process influenced the subsequent democratisation sequences. 
Furthermore, analysis seeks to evaluate whether cases that exhibit long histories of popular 
organisation have a greater capacity to inhibit centralisation of power in the executive as 
well as to defend democratic gains, thereby signifying a greater post-neoliberal legacy. 
While Bolivia and Venezuela are examined in this study, Munck (2015: 384) identifies 
that Ecuador and Nicaragua are also important cases in which to study the development of 
alternatives to liberal democracy. However, while Nicaragua has experimented with 
alternatives to liberal democracy, the process is less advanced than in Bolivia and 
Venezuela. Ecuador does offer an interesting case as there have been robust experiments in 
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deepening and extending democracy. However, it would be beyond the scope of this project 
to include a third in depth case study. Venezuela’s status as the longest standing, and in 
some regards most radical, of the new-Left countries gives it an important status in 
examining Latin American democratisation. Bolivia meanwhile exhibits crucial 
characteristics of a democratisation process that is driven from the bottom-up by a society 
that controls the government. While in Ecuador there were organised demands from the 
grassroots for a deepening and extending of democracy, President Rafael Correa retained 
power over the base, and as such could limit the extent of democratisation (Balderacchi 
2016). Ecuador straddles the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases in some regards; it had, like 
Bolivia, bottom-up protests demanding more democracy, while at the same time it had a 
state that dominated processes, like in Venezuela. As such, while it would be instructive to 
include Ecuador as a case study, the variance between the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases 
offers the most interesting comparison for generating lessons for democratisation.  
4. Research Methods: 
Bolivia and Venezuela offer instructive lessons for progressive forces, at both the state and 
societal level, who seek to develop an alternative to an elite controlled liberal, 
representative democracy underpinned by a neoliberal rationality. To date however, the 
majority of scholarly analysis on contemporary  Bolivia and Venezuela, and the Latin 
American region more generally, has evaluated the post-neoliberal era via a liberal lens (see 
for example Vargas Llosa 2009; Walker 2013: ch. 8; Weyland 2013). Other  conservative 
thinkers such as Álvaro Vargas Llosa suggest the Left governments have weakened 
democracy by using “populist” tactics that sacrifice liberal ideals of political democracy, the 
market-economy and individual rights (Vargas-Llosa, A. 2015). Part of this narrative suggests 
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that some states – most notably - Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador - may have become 
authoritarian regimes, which while holding elections, retain too much power in the state to 
allow for these to be sufficiently free and fair (Mazucca 2013: 109; Vargas Llosa 2009; 
Castañeda 2006). Their tendency to shore-up electoral support from informal sectors 
through redistribution of commodity incomes leads Mazzuca  to term these ‘radical’ Left 
leaders “rentier populists” (2013: 110). Such analysis is important, as the risks of deep-
centralisation of power in the executive are certainly real, and the consequences to 
democratic processes could be extremely harmful. However, this branch of analysis has 
failed to fully comprehend the radical experiments in deepening and extending democracy.  
The “overwhelming focus on populist tendencies of leaders in power tends to obscure 
the underlying political crises that existed before the new Left governments came to power, 
including the decline of traditional parties and the crisis of representation and legitimacy” 
(Hunt 2016: 444). By solely focusing on concentration of power in the executive, which is 
most certainly a crucial variable in any democratisation process, liberal critiques of post-
neoliberal democratisation have tended to obscure the “dynamics of change at the 
grassroots level” (Buxton 2011: xi), “thereby restricting the development of theory on the 
potential and limitations of alternative forms of democracy” (Duffy 2015: 1489). Such 
analyses miss the “contested nature of democracy” clearly evidenced in Latin America 
(Wolff 2013: 55). Analyses therefore should challenge “the universalist, modernising 
assumptions and democratic classifications of liberals…on the basis that they do not engage 
with or measure popular understandings of real existing democracy and its practice” 
(Buxton 2011: xvi). Embracing a broader understanding of democratisation and its outcomes 
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enables “academic theorising and evaluation to move beyond a simple dichotomy between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ democracy” (Duffy 2015: 1489).  
As both Jessop (2001) and Hunt (2016) note, the capacity of the state to deliver a 
deepened and extended democracy can “only be analysed in relation to the society to which 
it belongs. From this, a complete relational analysis must effectively incorporate the impact 
of civil society and social movements on the role and capacity of the state” (Hunt 2016: 438-
9). Both Hellinger (2011: 340) and Buxton (2011: xii) agree, stating that qualitative analysis 
focused on popular experiences of democratisation is required so as to take a “welcome 
break from the purportedly logical assumptions of economists and from the crude, elite-
focused mouldings of the populist school” (Buxton 2011: xiii). The framework adopted in 
this study allows for analysis that addresses such concerns and gaps in the literature by 
placing democratisation processes within wider structural frameworks, while retaining a 
focus on the experience of “ordinary” agents (Hellinger 2011: 340).  
While it is key to analyse state-society power relations and how they influence 
democratisation processes, the structural-agential approach requires a  more nuanced 
relational analysis of power between  actors if we are to comprehend how and why the 
cases have delivered varied results on the outcomes of interest, namely levels of democratic 
deepening, extending, centralisation, and embeddedness of change. Given the likely 
rejection by elites to government attempts to redistribute, as well as the likely efforts from 
international (f)actors such as hegemonic regional powers and regional blocs to influence 
democratic outcomes, the relative power between Left government, economic elites, and 
international (f)actors must be evaluated, in conjunction with state-popular society power 
relations. 
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5. Indentifying democratisation outcomes:  Deepening, extending, centralisation, and 
legacy: 
To assess whether Bolivian and Venezuelan processes have in fact deepened and extended 
democracy, it is necessary to ask if they have confronted neoliberal boundaries of what is 
defined as the political arena: “its participants, its institutions, its processes, its agenda and 
its scope (emphasis added)” (Dagnino 2005: 1). Firstly, the state must be transformed in an 
institutional (form of the state), representative (who influences state policies), and 
functional (range of state responsibilities) sense so that spaces for deliberative participation 
are opened to citizens, while socio-economic inclusion of popular sectors is boosted via 
increased state protection from the market.  
5.1 Deepening Democracy: 
To identify if democratic deepening has occurred, it is necessary to evaluate opportunity 
and agency; opportunity signifies formal and informal institutions such as laws, norms, and 
regulatory frameworks that foster or impede agency, and agency indicates the capacity of 
actors to make effective choices, that is, the capacity to transform choices into desired 
actions and outcomes (Alsop and Heinsohn 2005: 4). As such, we need to evaluate whether 
opportunities for direct citizen input, oversight, and participation in the policy making 
process have been boosted, and whether the accountability of elected officials to their 
constituents has increased (Roberts 1998: 26). In this study, I focus on the capacity of 
popular sectors to influence and oversee policy making that centres on issues of social 
citizenship such as housing, education, health, pensions, and land reform as it was in these 
areas where popular calls for change were most robust under market democracy (Silva 
2009). 
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Criteria that would suggest that such deepening has occurred include fora for public 
discussion on social policy that while autonomous – that is independent of state 
interference – also have an institutional link to state administrative agencies charged with 
developing and applying policy. These links are necessary for ideas and demands forged at 
the local societal level to be heard by the state, and for society to monitor and give feedback 
to state agents regarding the success or otherwise of a given policy. Re-call referendums 
whereby citizens can hold politicians to account if their performance does not match public 
expectations would indicate a more direct influence by society over the state. Furthermore, 
as Silva (2013: 55) notes, “appointments to government positions of leaders and 
intellectuals who are from or closely identified with the popular sectors in the government’s 
social coalition are also significant”.  
To measure the extent to which such indicators of democratic deepening exist, I begin 
with an analysis of the new Constitutions and the laws surrounding participation and 
citizenship. I also assess secondary statistics, produced by both governmental and non-
governmental agencies, regarding participation. Secondary data alone however cannot 
prove that new laws or government promises are actually put into practice. While 
quantitative data may suggest that there are greater numbers participating in state-
sponsored participatory organisations, for example, it cannot identify the quality of such 
participation, or the expectations and disappointments of engaging in participation. As such, 
it is necessary to triangulate secondary data with primary data from interviews and focus 
groups so as to gain a more nuanced understanding of the successes and failures of the 
experiments. 
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An affirmative response to the following questions during primary research may suggest 
that democratic deepening has occurred9; firstly, have participatory spaces emerged that 
allow for popular control over a range of issues, and do these issues resonate with popular 
concerns, as measured by the actual policy areas discussed by the public; secondly, do 
societal-bodies have control over decision-making processes, as measured by whether 
participants or state officials have final say on project approval or policy approval; thirdly, 
are the actual decision-making processes genuinely deliberative whereby decisions are 
based on open discussion rather than via non-deliberative forms such as strategic 
bargaining, hierarchical command, markets, or aggregate voting; fourthly, are citizens able 
to effectively monitor the implementation of their decisions and hold politicians to account, 
as measured by active citizen oversight of policy application and whether officials are open 
to recall elections; fifth, are participatory-deliberative spaces inclusive whereby political 
pluralism exists amongst participants in decision-making. It is thus important to identify who 
is invited to participate as well as who is involved in the formulation of propositions that 
institutions are then supposed to implement; and sixth, are decisions made through this 
process effectively translated into real action, as measured by actual state delivery of 
proposals advocated by the public.  
5.2 Extending Democracy: 
Extending democracy entails attempting to redress social and economic inequalities so as to 
prevent economic power from skewing the articulation of popular interests and blocking the 
exercise of popular sovereignty. Social equity is not simply a substantive outcome that is 
external to the functioning of democracy, but is also a prerequisite for equal access and 
                                                          
9
 Questions are adapted from Hetland (2014) and Fung and Wright (2003). 
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unbiased democratic contestation, and is thus a vital indicator of procedural fairness 
(Roberts 1998: 29-30). In particular,  the “factual existence of social rights such as access to 
information, education, food, and health care is of primordial importance to one’s ability to 
exercise civil and political rights” (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 5). Indeed, as “poverty and 
political underrepresentation are generally connected in multiple ways (see Fraser 1990, 
Bourdieu 2001), marginalised groups face the difficult task of introducing their visions and 
demands into state politics” (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 5). In this project, indicators of 
extending democracy include attempts by the state to decrease inequality and to boost the 
social and economic citizenship of popular sectors via state protection from the market in 
areas such as housing, health, education, pensions, and land reform.  
To measure whether such attempts to extend democracy have taken place, I assess the 
new constitutions and laws for providing social citizenship to citizens, as well as examining 
statistics regarding social spending as a proportion of GDP on specific areas targeted by 
government social policy. Statistical analyses of the effectiveness of such policies seek to 
examine changes in inequality and the quality of life of popular sectors. Furthermore, in 
order to assess the actual quality of the service delivered, and to identify if such services 
match popular needs and demands, and to assess how the delivery of such services has 
changed over time, requires triangulating secondary analysis with primary research of 
beneficiaries of such policies. As such interviews are carried out to measure whether 
democratic extending has in fact occurred, and to what extent it has achieved its goals.  
5.3 Elite destabilisation and Centralisation of power in the executive: 
One of the core concerns with processes that seek to simultaneously deepen and extend 
democracy is that economic elites will attempt to stifle redistribution, leading to 
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centralisation in the executive so as to overcome these obstacles. To identify if such elite 
destabilisation tactics did in fact occur, I combine secondary analysis of academic resources 
with primary data collection from key stakeholders such as local politicians, academics, and 
journalists.  Adapting the framework of Janda (1980) who examines the centralisation of 
power within a political party, evidence of the following variables would suggest 
centralisation in the executive has occurred; reductions or eliminations of separations of 
power between the branches of the state; rule by executive decree for extended periods of 
time outside of emergencies; selecting candidates for local political positions in a top-down 
process rather than via local processes that engage with popular civil-society groups; policy 
formulation decisions being taken by the executive rather than the agenda being set by local 
societal groups with the participation of local branches of the political party; the executive 
administers disciplinary procedures against members of its own party, parties included in 
coalitions, opposition parties, and civil society groups who critique government actions; and 
leadership being exercised by one individual who can personally commit the party/country 
to binding courses of action rather than being controlled by societal actors, members of 
party coalitions, or opposition parties (Janda 1980: 108). This centralisation of power may 
become problematic if it becomes despotic; despotic power “refers to the range of actions 
that the ruler and his staff are empowered to attempt to implement without routine, 
institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups” (Mann 2012: 169) or political 
opposition. If centralisation becomes despotic, the scope for popular social organisations to 
maintain their autonomy from the government and direct policy-making decisions will be 
reduced via co-optive practices. 
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To measure the extent of centralisation I examine secondary sources, both academic 
and media reports, that examine the above mentioned criteria. Secondary analysis is also 
triangulated with primary research. Interviews with popular sector civil society groups, local 
academics, opposition politicians, and politicians of the ruling party are completed so as to 
help gauge the level of centralisation of power in the executive. 
5.4 Legacy of processes: 
To comprehend the embedded nature and the legacy of post-neoliberal democratisation 
processes requires analysing the extent that democratic deepening and extending measures 
that boost the quality of citizenship have become institutionalised. Institutionalisation 
occurs where popular sectors have the capacity to hold a government to account, prevent 
centralisation becoming despotic, and ensure that spaces for bottom-up participation are 
established, while also ensuring that any advances to social citizenship are protected in the 
face of elite opposition to such changes. To identify whether such a scenario has in fact 
emerged requires triangulating secondary research which charts popular sector 
mobilisations – in terms of numbers competing, protest demands, and linkages between 
popular organisations – with primary analysis focused on identifying how popular sectors 
view the process of change in terms of successes, failures and “red-line” issues that will 
likely spark a new wave of mobilisation.  Furthermore, the development of a progressive 
political party that creates spaces for grassroots participation in and control over internal 
decision-making processes, and that is capable of competing electorally at a national level, 
would represent an institutionalised legacy. To identify if such a party exists, primary 
research with popular members of progressive parties is triangulated with secondary 
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research examining levels of electoral success for the party at local, regional and national 
levels. 
6. Historical process tracing and power: 
The TGPT framework outlined in chapter 2 calls for a historical analysis of the key events 
and moments where we saw changes and attempted changes in terms of deepening, 
extending or centralisation, as well as examination of elite backlashes to (attempted) 
redistribution, government responses to elite obstacles, and international interventions and 
changes in the international sphere. Furthermore, following the “point of inflection” where 
outsider-Left candidates are elected to presidential office, the TGPT framework calls for an 
analysis of the relative power relations between government, elites, organised popular 
society, and international (f)actors in order to understand how and why certain events and 
actions occurred, how they fed back on to the democratisation process, and how they 
impacted on democratic outcomes. 
6.1 Government-elite relations: 
In terms of government-elite power relations, I adapt Mann’s (2012) framework that 
examines how the interrelations between four fundamental sources of social power - 
ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) – determine the relative power of actors 
(1986: 2). As such, it is necessary to identify indicators for each source of power, and to 
detail how to identify which of these indicators were present, and how they influenced 
outcomes, at the key moments in the TGPT framework explaining the development of the 
post-neoliberal democratisation process. 
Indicators for political power include control/influence over the branches of central 
government, links to dominant political parties and coalitions, control of municipal and local 
governments, and influence over civil-society groups who actively support your 
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agenda/oppose your opposition’s agenda – such as trade unions, NGOs, student groups, and 
organisations that can mobilise public support for your agenda. Sources of economic power 
include control of the banking and commerce sectors, taxation, business and investment 
ownership, and natural resource control. Control over production, distribution, exchange, 
and consumption chains indicates that a group has economic power over rivals to influence 
outcomes. Indicators of military power include control over the armed forces, the police, 
and connections to gangs, paramilitary groups and criminals. Indicators of ideological 
sources of power include control over the media, the education system – in particular 
universities – and religious institutions. Other sources of ideological power include influence 
over NGOs final reports regarding issues of human rights, economic performance etcetera. 
The principle method used to identify whether government or economic elites have 
control over these sources of power at a given moment is analysis of secondary sources. In 
particular, I evaluate academic analysis and media reports of the key moments in the TGPT 
framework, identifying the power-balance between government and economic elites and 
then offer analysis as to how the relative power balance influenced the democratisation 
process. 
6.2 Government-society relations: 
The second relationship that the TGPT framework suggests influences democratisation 
processes is between government and popular societal groups. Popular groups can boost 
their power vis-à-vis the government by increasing associational and collective power 
(Parsons 1960; Silva 2009). Associational power refers to “organising along the lines of class, 
identity, or other specific interest” (Silva 2009: 38). Collective power “involves coordination 
among two or more organised social sectors, such as urban formal sector labour, peasants, 
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indigenous, the informal sector of labour, neighbourhood associations, and so on” (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Anria (2016: 463) suggests that societal power is boosted when popular civil 
society has a strong organisational density – that is, a high percentage of a locality’s 
population are members of popular grassroots organisations – and where disparate groups 
are united in their goals and objectives. In such scenarios, popular sectors capacity to 
mobilise and protest is boosted, thereby increasing their ability to hold the government to 
account. 
6.3 Government-international (f)actors relations: 
The final power relationship to examine is that between the government and international 
(f)actors. As Grugel and Bishop (2014: 98) highlight, globalisation fundamentally challenges 
the notion that democratisation is something which simply occurs in territorially bounded 
states. Pressures for a certain type of democratisation may be understood as “leverages” by 
the West and “linkages” to the West (Levitsky and Way 2005, 2007). While Levitsky and 
Way’s framework was designed to examine democratisation in the post-Cold War period, 
the conceptions of leverage and linkage by and to the West remain pertinent in Latin 
America’s experiments in building a post-neoliberal model of democracy.  
Western leverage describes a governments’ vulnerability to external pressure which 
may be exerted in “a variety of ways, including political conditionality and punitive 
sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and military intervention” (Levitsky and Way 2005: 21). 
Levitsky and Way outline several factors that influence the extent of Western leverage. 
Firstly, and most importantly, is the size and economic strength of a state; weak states with 
underdeveloped economies are more vulnerable to external pressure than those with 
substantial economic power. Secondly, Western leverage is reduced where a country has 
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economic, political or military support from an alternative power, be that at the regional 
level or beyond. 
Linkages meanwhile are defined as “the density of its ties to the United States, the 
EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions” (Levitsky and Way 2005: 22). Levitsky 
and Way identify several dimensions of linkages; “1) economic linkage, which includes 
credit, investment, and assistance, 2) geopolitical linkage, which includes ties to Western 
governments and Western-led alliances and organisations; 3) social linkage, which 
includes…migration and diaspora communities” (Ibid. 22-23). Greater linkages mean greater 
awareness in the West of challenges to the market model of democracy. Furthermore, 
greater media coverage and lobbying by NGOs ideologically aligned to market democracy 
increases the pressure on Western governments to interfere with domestic 
democratisation. 
To measure the extent of Western leverage and linkage, I begin by examining the 
extent of Bolivia and Venezuela’s reliance on the international financial institutions for 
economic aid. Given the pro-neoliberal stance and US domination of these institutions, 
heavy reliance is likely to increase pressure to curb attempts to build a post-neoliberal 
democracy. Secondly, economic strength and reliance on trade with the US is assessed. 
Again, given the neoliberal ideological stance of the US and their historical aggression 
towards Leftist movements in the Latin American region, it is likely that US leverage over 
Bolivia or Venezuela would prevent post-neoliberal democratisation from advancing. Finally, 
links between the two case countries and other global powers such as Russia and China are 
evaluated. Strong links would suggest a declining Western influence, thereby increasing the 
policy space to engage in democratisation that challenges market democracy. To identify 
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the extent of leverage and linkage and their impact on democratisation processes I examine 
existing academic literature and review newspaper reports from both pro-government and 
opposition sources. 
A further component to analyse when determining government-international 
relations is the membership of individual countries to regional organisations. Membership 
of such bodies requires signing up to a democratic charter. If countries are signees to 
organisations that call for market models of democracy, they are likely to face pressure from 
other members to desist from attempts to build a post-neoliberal model of democracy. On 
the other hand, membership in regional bodies that promote challenges to the market 
model of democracy acts as a counterweight to pressure from international (f)actors who 
decry challenges to market democracy as challenges to democracy itself.  
To examine how regional memberships influence democratisation processes, I firstly 
detail the membership status of Bolivia and Venezuela to various regional organisations that 
exist in Latin America, before examining the ideological stance of such organisations. To 
evaluate how regional bodies impact post-neoliberal democratisation processes I examine 
press releases from the organisations, as well as academic analysis and media reports.  
7. Primary Data collection: 
Primary data collection sought to offer a more detailed and nuanced examination of the key 
events identified in the TGPT post-neoliberal democratisation framework, helping to 
address some of the central concerns of this project. In terms of how the early relationship 
between Left governments and popular society influences democratisation, primary analysis 
allowed me to evaluate whether self-reinforcing or reactive sequences have developed such 
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that popular sectors’ influence over social policy formation and implementation has 
increased or decreased over time, as well as allowing for examination of the capacity of 
organised popular sectors to curb the centralisation of power in the executive. Indeed, 
primary research focused on the experience of popular actors allowed for a rich 
examination of the contemporary state of democracy.  
7.1 Fieldwork and identifying interviewees: 
To respond to the central concerns of this project, the empirical basis of my primary 
research was qualitative data gathered through direct interaction with organised popular 
society. The reason for this is simple; popular sectors have been the most consistently 
excluded group – both politically and economically – under market democracy and as such it 
has been these groups who have most actively called for democratic deepening and 
extending. Also, given the fact that radical Left governments have most actively engaged in 
fostering inclusion of the popular sectors, I based my study on these groups. Such popular 
actors are the key actors capable of stating whether or not extending and deepening have 
been achieved and to what extent changes have become embedded. As such, it was 
necessary to select research methods that allowed for the collection of emic rather than etic 
data, that is, data that arose in a natural, indigenous form rather than data that represented 
the researcher’s imposed view of the situation (Krippendorf 2004).  
As such, fieldwork was an essential component of data collection for this project. While 
the historical chapters may be developed by using secondary resources, it would not have 
been possible to gain nuanced answers to questions regarding the democratisation 
processes without face to face interactions with popular actors. As many interview 
respondents highlighted to me, they appreciated the fact that I had gone to their country, 
city, neighbourhood, organisation and home. Respondents emphasised that they had very 
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rarely been offered the opportunity to voice their opinions on the processes, and resented 
the fact that their experiences were often written about by media sources who had not 
actually sought the viewpoints of local popular actors. Indeed, interviewees were keen to 
engage in discussions with me about their experiences, but stated that under no 
circumstances would they have been willing to do so with journalists or researchers via 
long-distance electronic means as there was a strong belief that their views and experiences 
have been misreported by many sources. As such, one of the key strengths of this thesis is 
that it offers a space for popular voices who are often talked about, but rarely spoken with. 
As discussed below, by earning the trust of respondees that their views would not be 
misrepresented, the data gathered was representative of local actors’ actual lived 
experiences of the democratisation processes.  By triangulating the written accounts of 
other researchers – which are shaped by those who wrote them and whose voices they 
included – with first-hand data collection, the validity of this research is thus significantly 
boosted.  
7.2 Self-reflexivity as a researcher: 
It is crucial that I as the researcher engaged in self-reflexive analysis of my position as an 
“outsider” and how this impacted on the type of data garnered from fieldwork. The 
principle source of primary data stemmed from recorded, semi-structured interviews 
accompanied by more informal conversations and ethnographic observations. The 
methodological aim was to use “interview-data-as-a resource” (Seale 1998; Rapley 2004) 
whereby interview data reflects the interviewees’ reality outside the interview. Such an 
approach responds to both Hellinger (2011) and Buxton (2011) who critique the lack of 
analysis of Latin American democratisation from the perspective of everyday citizens. 
However, the data-as-resource approach to interviewing has been critiqued from some in 
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the constructionist traditions (for example Baruch 1981; Cuff 1993; Mishler 1991). As Rapley 
(2004: 16) states, this critique stems from highlighting that interviews are inherently 
interactional events where both parties equally monitor each other’s talk and gestures, and 
that the talk is locally and collaboratively produced. As such, it was crucial that I as the 
interviewer did not assume that interview-talk was only about the official topic of the 
interview; it may have been about the person producing themselves as an “adequate 
interviewee”, as a “specific type of person in relation to this specific topic” (Ibid.). Cognisance 
of such issues was required during all interviews to ensure that the interview does not 
reflect simply a social encounter between the interviewer and interviewee. Focusing on 
“interview-talk as locally and collaboratively produced does not deny that the talk is 
reflexively situated in the wider cultural arena” (Rapley 2004: 16). As Rapley (Ibid.) 
continues, “in this sense, interview-talk speaks to and emerges from the contemporary ways 
of understanding, experiencing, and talking about that specific interview topic. However, 
these ways of understanding, experiencing, and talking about the specific interview topic 
are contingent on the specific local interaction context and should be analysed, at least 
initially, from the circumstances of their production”.  
It was necessary therefore that I be cognisant of my positionality as a white European 
researcher who is examining polarising democratisation processes in Latin America. Given 
that I was an outsider who was seeking new knowledge, respondents may have sought to 
portray the democratisation processes in an overly-critical or supportive light, depending on 
their political ideology, direct links to or positions within a political party, or their lack of 
trust in me as a researcher. While bias relating to a respondent’s personal ideology is 
normal, and indeed can be beneficial to research once their own positionality is accounted 
for, reluctance to speak to an unknown outsider provides a significant challenge. While 
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opponents and proponents of the democratisation processes spoke freely with me when I 
asked questions that allowed them to offer responses that supported their political 
viewpoint, getting respondents to offer a more nuanced appraisal of both the successes and 
issues of processes required gaining the trust of the interviewee that I would not 
manipulate or misrepresent their critiques. To do so, I made multiple visits to sites of 
analyses, went to people’s homes for dinner, played football with respondents, walked 
around the barrios with locals, and participated in events with local actors. Furthermore, 
once I had been introduced by local actors who vouched for my integrity, new interviewees 
were increasingly willing to engage in discussions about the pros and cons of processes, 
thereby allowing for a more nuanced analysis of realities than would have been attainable 
had I not spent time in the field. Also, given that my wife is Venezuelan and is related to Alí 
Primera – a much-loved Venezuelan folk singer whose protest songs are adored by many of 
the people with whom I spoke, my status as an outsider was lessened. Indeed, my 
Venezuelan family are divided regarding their views on the process and informal 
conversations over the course of several years with them allowed me to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the underlying sentiment in the country. Moreover, having lived 
in Venezuela in 2012-13 and travelled extensively in both case countries, my personal 
knowledge of the culture and customs helped to break down barriers with interviewees. 
Furthermore, being an outsider was, in some cases advantageous. For some interviewees 
who wished to critique the process, speaking anonymously to an outsider who was not 
directly related to a local organisation or party offered a space for discussion which was not 
nornally available to them. There was no fear of reprisals for complaining about “their” 
government, organisation, party, or process and as such, they were more prepared to 
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engage in frank discussions than they would have done with fellow participants in the 
process.   
7.3 Sites of Analysis: 
In Venezuela, primary research focused on two core groups; popular urban organisations 
that came into existence after the election of Hugo Chávez, and organisations that had a 
history of organising around ideas of democratic deepening and extending that pre-date 
Chavez’s election. Analysis seeks to identify how both groups have viewed the successes and 
failures of the democratisation process, whether expectations have been met and what 
lessons they have garnered for how to drive the process forward. I spent three months living 
in Caracas in 2016. In Bolivia, primary research focused on urban popular groups with long 
histories of mobilisation calling for radical substantive democratisation. Analysis centred on 
groups who retain support for president Evo Morales, and on groups who initially supported 
the president but who no longer do so. I spent four months living in Bolivia in 2017. All four 
groups, two in Venezuela and two in Bolivia, are comprised of popular actors who support 
the building of a post-neoliberal democracy. However, variances in organisational history, as 
well as varying state-society relationships allow for both cross-case and internal 
comparisons. Analysis and comparison of data from these four distinct groups helps identify 
if the origins of the post-neoliberal process and the history of organisation are important in 
influencing the extent of deepening, expanding, centralisation and legacy. 
7.4 Generalisability and validity: 
It must be noted that carrying out such analysis cannot garner a complete understanding of 
the successes or failures to imbed a deepened and extended democracy. Each local 
experience is different, with different histories and differing power balances leading to 
differing outcomes As such, a complete generalizable systematisation of experiences is not 
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viable. This is the trade-off when selecting in depth small-N analysis over large N. However, 
a large-N study would be far less efficient, and indeed unsuccessful, in responding to the 
how and why questions regarding the emergence, development and legacy of a radical-
substantive democratisation process. In fact, given the nature of democratisation and the 
multiple factors that influence its development, seeking to offer simple generalizable “rules” 
for democratisation would run the risk of being overly teleological. Rather, this thesis seeks 
to offer a rich analysis drawn from actual experiences. This interpretivist approach eschews 
the normative, Euro-centric approach of earlier democratisation theorists and instead helps 
us to comprehend the process from the perspective of local popular citizens. Such an 
approach helps us to identify how multiple factors influence processes, and crucially, how a 
given context must be accounted for when seeking to comprehend complex 
democratisation processes.  However, this does not block the possibility of drawing lessons 
from the two cases; careful in-depth analysis of each case and of lived experiences does 
allow for comparison, helping us to tease out and develop a theoretical framework “that not 
only makes sense of the particular persons or situations studied, but also shows how the 
same process, in different situations, can lead to different results” (Becker 1990: 240). This 
does not suggest that “issues of sampling, representativeness and generalizability are 
unimportant…They are crucial whenever one wants to draw inferences from the actual 
persons, events, or activities observed to other persons, events, or situations, or to these at 
other times than when the observation was done” (Maxwell 1992: 293). As such, carefully 
selecting sites for field research and identifying interviewees that allow for generalizability 
to unobserved sites within each case country is key to boosting the validity of the study.  
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In Venezuela, data collection focused on two sites in the capital city of Caracas. Research 
focused on Caracas for several reasons. Firstly, 89 per cent of Venezuelans live in urban 
environments (World Bank Urban Population 2015), so focusing on the city of Caracas is not 
unrepresentative of the country in general. Secondly, there are emblematic neighbourhoods 
in Caracas that meet the criteria of having either recent, or historical experience in 
organising and interacting with the state to demand a deepened and extended democracy. 
Thirdly, Caracas was selected due to time and financial restrictions.  
The popular parroquia of Petare is located in the densely populated municipality of 
Sucre, eastern Caracas. It is comprised of several massive barrios with a population of 
372,616 (INE 2014). Petare is a sprawling zone that does not have a strong history of well 
organised, collective mobilisation. The site is representative of popular urban areas across 
the country due to its similar indicators for income, employment, education, and housing 
levels (INE 2014a). Petare also has many new popular movements and organisations that 
have emerged following the election of the outsider Left candidate to president, making it a 
good site to investigate so as to respond to the central concerns of this project outlined 
above. 
The second site of analysis in Venezuela, the popular zone of 23 de Enero, is located in 
the Libertador municipality in the Capital District of western Caracas. 23 de Enero has a 
population of 77,344 (INE 2014). The name 23 de Enero (23rd of January) references the 
date in 1958 when the Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez was overthrown. The 
barrio is seen by residents as the heart of Chavismo. The Hugo Chávez-led coup attempt of 
1992 was headquartered in the Cuartel de la Montaña building in 23 de Enero, while this 
same building now houses the mausoleum to Chávez.  23 de Enero has a long history of 
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popular protest and left-wing guerrilla urban warfare demanding that the state deliver 
services to the urban poor.  
A note of caution on the two principal sites of investigation must be sounded. Petare is 
located in an opposition-led municipality/state10 while 23 de Enero (Libertador) is 
government-led. While the principal comparison is between Venezuelan and Bolivian cases, 
I do offer some internal case-comparison too. As such, a critique of the research design may 
be levelled that differing results of the internal comparison will be due to the fact that one 
area was government-led, and the other opposition-led. While this must be taken into 
consideration, Venezuelan state-sponsored spaces for participation and the delivery of 
social citizenship are designed to bypass oppositional controlled sub-national levels of 
government. Indeed, the variance in political control in the two municipalities may add to 
the richness of the study, offering an extra layer to analysis, especially when one considers 
that the Sucre municipality was controlled by politicians of the ruling national Left-party in 
the early stages of the post-neoliberal democratisation process before opposition 
candidates won local elections.  
In Bolivia, analysis centred on the popular indigenous city of El Alto. While Evo Morales 
and his Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party emerged from a resistance movement of coca 
producers- the cocaleros - and relocated miners in the Chapare province (Anria 2013: 28), 
and actors and organisations based in this province make up the original core constituency 
of the MAS, this study does not focus on such actors. Analysis instead focused on the 
experience of urban El Alto for several reasons. The approach taken in this project seeks to 
follow a critical-progressive trajectory. That is, rather than simply offering a fawning support 
                                                          
10
 However, the opposition lost control of the state in October 2017 elections. 
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of the processes that is blinkered to any shortcomings, while avoiding the narrow-minded 
ideologically guided attacks on the processes that seek to delegitimise any attempt at 
building an alternative to market democracy, I seek to follow a path that supports and 
highlights efforts to build a truly post-neoliberal democracy, while critically evaluating the 
shortcomings of these processes. Given the nature of the relationship between the MAS, 
Morales, and the organic base, it was unlikely that primary analysis would have identified 
such honest critical evaluations of the post-neoliberal process, or that such actors would 
mobilise against the president if centralisation occurred. As such, analysis instead focused 
on the experiences of non-organic popular sectors in El Alto, the Ciudad Rebelde (Rebellious 
City) (Lazar 2006). 
El Alto is an extremely poor urban area that is a highly mobilised, self-organised, and 
politicised social space with a strong Aymara identity (Albó 2006; Lazar 2008 52-55; Anria 
2013: 29). It is Bolivia’s fastest growing city with a population of 848, 452 (INE Bolivia 2012). 
Movements in El Alto have been at the heart of anti-neoliberal protests and have a history 
of calling for democratic deepening and extending. Indeed attitudes in El Alto are perceived 
to be a barometer of the sentiment in the country as a whole, with the city setting the 
agenda for political demands of popular and indigenous sectors. Given the Alteños’ (people 
from El Alto) lack of organic ties to the MAS party, I sought to assess their experiences of 
post-neoliberal democratisation in terms of deepening and extending, as well as their 
capacity to prohibit centralisation in the executive. By comparing and contrasting the 
experiences and opinions of Alteños who continue to support the MAS and Morales with 
those who have desisted in doing so, a nuanced understanding of the strategies, successes, 
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failures, feedback loops, and legacies of Bolivia’s democratisation process under Left 
government can be garnered. 
7.5 Interviewing: 
Given the fact that democracy is an essentially contested concept, and that I sought to 
identify local perceptions of the development, or not, of an inclusive substantive 
democracy, interviews with open-ended questions that allow respondents freedom to detail 
their experiences were required. Each interview had guiding questions surrounding the 
issues of deepening, extending, centralisation, legacy and lessons learned, as well as issues 
relating to state-society power relations11.Respondents were prompted to give a personal 
review of the entire democratisation process as detailed in the TGPT framework. If 
respondents failed to touch upon the key subjects themselves, I asked more direct 
questions. In this way, I managed to allow freedom for respondents to express their true 
opinions, while at the same time guiding responses towards the central themes of 
investigation in my project. While the majority of primary research was focused on popular 
experiences in both case countries, I also completed interviews with opposition politicians, 
local academics, journalists, and government officials tasked with boosting political and 
economic inclusion. These interviews deliver a more rounded analysis and help to 
comprehend and explore issues that popular sector actors may not be able to respond to 
such as the state of government-elite relations and government-international relations, and 
how these influence democratisation processes and outcomes. 
                                                          
11
 See appendix 1 for sample questions, though the exact questions posed were adapted for each individual 
interviewee depending on their history of engagement with political processes, organisational affinities 
etcetera.  
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 Thirty to thirty-five interviews were completed in each case country. Interviews were 
carried out in Spanish which is essential as the vast majority of respondents did not speak 
English. Having lived in and travelled extensively in Latin America, and given that my wife is 
Venezuelan, my language skills were of sufficient quality to engage in such interviews. 
Respondents’ real names are used throughout, except in cases where interviewees sought 
to remain anonymous. A list of interviewees and their affiliations can be found in Appendix 
1. In order to identify potential interviewees in Venezuela, an academic who carried out 
research with popular sectors put me in touch with two contacts in Caracas. I began by 
meeting these two contacts for lunch. From discussions regarding my planned research, 
these contacts then put me in touch with a range of communal council and commune 
spokespeople. It was important to be introduced to such leaders, as they brought me to the 
actual sites of their councils/communes in barrios with extremely high levels of violence. 
Without such contacts, it would not have been feasible to gain access, both to the physical 
sites and to the local actors. Once I was introduced however, I was quickly welcomed by 
local actors and from there my contact list snowballed. In terms of sampling for 
interviewees in Venezuela, I sought to interact with long-term political activists as well as 
those whose engagement with politics was more recent. I met with both the elected 
spokespeople of communal councils and communes as well as regular members of the base. 
I interviewed a mixture of men and women. While interviews were predominantly carried 
out with popular actors in Petare and El 23 de Enero – some of whom have long histories of 
collective organisation and mobilisaation and others whose involvement only began in 
recent times, to further boost both the generalisability and the richness of the study, 
interviews with popular actors in the barrios of Antímano and Minas de Baruta were 
completed. Furthermore, to gain a more nuanced comprehension of realties in the country I 
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interviewed several opposition politicans, middle-class residents of Caracas, and academics 
who are critical of the process. 
 In Bolivia, to identify interviewees I contacted the UNITAS research institute in La Paz 
whose research focuses on urban development in Bolivia. Via UNITAS, I was provided a 
contact list with actors on opposing sides regarding their support for the government. 
Following meetings with these contacts, I was introduced personally to leading figures in 
local popular organisations in El Alto. Once I had been introduced, finding new contacts 
proved relatively easy as sources were keen to share their experiences with me. I was 
invited to meetings and protests where my contact list grew. In terms of internal validity, I 
gained access to key organisations that both support and critique the government and the 
process, thereby allowing for a rich analysis. I also interviewed politicians from the 
governing party and the principle opposition party, as well as a relatively new political party 
which ideologically straddles the line between the dominant parties. Furthermore, I 
interviewed numerous “regular” citizens as well as base members from four different 
popular organisations, thereby boosting the generalisability and validity of the research.  
7.6 Participant observation: 
While in both case countries efforts were made to capture a range of views via 
interviews with key actors, to boost the validity and generalisability, interview data was 
accompanied by participant observation so as to gain a better understanding of the context 
in which interviewees live. The processes in Bolivia and Venezuela are contentious, with 
polarisation between supporters and opponents of the governments prevalent. It is 
important therefore to analyse not just what people say, but also the underlying context in 
which they say it. For example, government supporters may be reticent to critique state 
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policies for fear that a foreign academic would misrepresent the reality on the ground. It is 
necessary therefore to evaluate what is not said, or how things are said. While this is a 
difficult task, ethnography does help us to understand such complex social processes 
(Baiocchi 2005) and overcome issues of reporting bias in interview.  
By spending extended periods of time with interviewees outside of the formal interview 
setting, I have sought to gain a deeper insight to their true opinions, thereby offering a more 
honest and robust analysis. Attending protests and organisation meetings, and being seen 
on a regular basis by local actors helped to establish my trustworthiness, as well as giving 
me an opportunity to observe how actors speak to each other in a natural setting. For 
example, I was asked to return multiple times to communes in Venezuela to witness how 
participatory democracy functioned in practice, as well as to take part in markets where 
locally grown food was distributed to local residents. In Bolivia, I was asked to join a six hour 
protest from El Alto to La Paz where I could engage in countless informal conversations with 
protesters helping me to gain a deeper comprehension of realities than would have been 
possible via formal interviews alone. By being “part” of the protest and taking photographs 
for the local organisations I was able to take note of the slogans and chants of protesters 
and to gain a better sense of the frustrations of some actors (as well as identify new 
interviewees). In both countries I was taken on tours of the locality, presenting me the 
opportunity to engage in informal discussions regarding the historical development of the 
sites. For example, in El Alto I was brought to the outskirts of the city for lunch with one 
interviewee’s family before we walked around the neighbourhood. This allowed me to 
witness first-hand the poverty levels in the city and the lack of development in terms of 
roadways and gas and water connections. While in El 23 de Enero in Venezuela I met a 
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woman selling cigarettes and newspapers from a kiosk. She brought me to a shrine she had 
set up for the deceased former president Hugo Chávez, stating that she goes there to thank 
Chávez every day for the gift of freedom he gave her. Such interactions help to comprehend 
just how Chávez was and is perceived as a saviour and saint by some sectors, which then 
helps to contextualise responses by popular actors during interviews. I was also invited to 
breakfasts, lunches and dinners with families in both case countries. Such interactions, 
including with the parents of interviewees, allowed me to gain a deeper insight into the 
historical grievances of the popular actors, thereby helping me to frame and contextualise 
the current moment. Taking public transport every day across the cities also allowed me to 
grasp the astonishing scale of inequality between the rich and poor in both countries. 
Engaging in informal conversations with bus drivers or metro passangers offered me further 
scope to grasp the general sentiment in both countries. By taking fieldnotes during all of the 
events mentioned above, I was able to hone my interview questions so as to try and capture 
more accurately the realities of the successes and issues with the democratisation 
processes. Finally, by maintaining contact with many people I met in the field, I have been 
able to keep up to date with daily realities, as well as ask for their opinions on my 
interpretation and presentation of the processes in each case, thereby boosting the validity 
of the research.  
8. Ethical issues: 
Before engaging in fieldwork and primary data collection, the project went through a 
rigourous ethical review procedure12. The principle concern centres on protecting the 
anonymity of interview respondents. Before each interview, I discussed the nature of the 
                                                          
12
 See appendix 2 for the completed ethical application form which highlights the rigorous evaluation of 
potential ethical issues in the study. Information on data collection and storage is also provided. 
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project, provided a project overview as well as an informed consent form13. Furthermore, in 
several instances I have chosen to anonymise quotes, even where respondents did not ask 
for anonymity. The reason for doing so was to protect the identity of interviewees who 
provided sensitive data, particularly regarding accusations of corruption. While cases of 
corruption are widely reported in newspapers in both case countries, I felt that it would be 
prudent not to reveal the names of those who discussed such issues. When meeting 
members of a communal council or any other organisation where there are group activities, 
I asked for the group leader to introduce me and to highlight that I was there to carry out 
research. I took field notes openly to reinforce that I was collecting data for research 
purposes.  
In the following chapters the above described framework and methodologies are 
applied to examine the post-neoliberal democratisation processes in Bolivia and Venezuela. 
Firstly, a historical chapter tracing the processes of each case is offered. Following the 
historical chapters, primary research-based chapters examine the national process from a 
local level, highlighting the nuances of the processes and their outcomes, as well as the 
likely legacies and future challenges for the post-neoliberal experiments. I turn now to the 
case of Bolivia. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 See appendix 2 for a copy of the informed consent form and the project overview form. 
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Chapter 4: Bolivian democratisation in 
historical context 
1. Overview 
Following the TGPT framework outlined in chapters 2 and 3, this chapter offers an historical 
overview that traces the emergence and development of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal process, 
weaving in an account of the relative power between the new-left government, popular-
societal actors, economic elites, and international (f)actors, and detailing how the interplay 
of these variables has profoundly influenced outcomes in terms of deepening and extending 
democracy, centralisation of power in the executive, and the legacy of the project. As such, 
the chapter examines the antecedent conditions, evaluating how the power of popular 
society influenced the point of inflection – that is, the election of Evo Morales as president - 
as well as identifying how such antecedent conditions have fed-back onto the process and 
influenced the sequencing in the aftermath periods. The chapter begins with an overview of 
the three waves of anti-neoliberal contention, culminating in the Gas Wars of 2003-2005, 
before examining the state of affairs at the 2005 election of Morales. Phase 1 of the post-
inflection sequence examines the 2006-09 period and the Constituent Assembly battle 
between the government, popular sectors, and conservative political and economic elites. 
Phase 2 of the post-inflection sequence accounts for the 2009-14 period during which 
government-elite relations softened while government-society relations became more 
fractious as some popular groups were included while others were side-lined.  The chapter 
finishes by introducing Phase 3 of the post-inflection sequence, examining the period from 
2015 to the present, highlighting and explaining the successes of the process to date, while 
outlining the issues and challenges that exist looking forward.  
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2. Introduction: 
Evo Morales’ 2005 election as president of Bolivia - the first indigenous president in the 
country’s history - marked the beginning of a process that has witnessed attempts to 
deepen and extend democracy and move beyond strict market democracy. Following 
election, Morales initiated a “process of profound political change” (Wolff 2013: 40) that has 
sought to overturn the political and economic exclusion experienced by the indigenous and 
popular sectors under the technocratic democracy of the neoliberal era (Riggirozzi 2010; 
Silva 2009). Changes include a restructuring of the political system via a constituent 
assembly, economic and social reforms, and new alliances in the international sphere. 
Opportunity and agency for popular sectors to influence decision-making have 
increased as liberal institutions of democracy have been boosted by the addition of 
experiments in direct and participatory democracy. The direct inclusion of citizens in the 
rewriting of the constitution, and its approval by national referendum in 2009, has 
witnessed the development of “fundamental changes in the form of the state” (Postero 
2010: 62) such as increased autonomy for indigenous nations and recognition of their 
cultures, languages, and customs (Ibid.). Furthermore, social-movement actors have been 
offered access to the state via appointments to ministry positions, while new spaces of 
participation have emerged that directly link the state to society and allow for societal 
overview of the policy-making process. However, while the Morales government presents 
itself as the “government of the social movements” (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 11), it is clear 
that some movements are included more than others, and that there has in fact been a 
centralisation of power in the executive combined with attempts to co-opt or side-line some 
societal actors that challenge Morales’ decisions. 
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In the economic sphere, Morales promised to break with neoliberalism and to boost the 
role of the state in the economy (Wolff 2013: 40). The partial nationalisation of the 
country’s gas resources and increased taxes on extracting firms has drastically increased 
state capacity to invest in schools, hospitals, roads, domestic gas connections and other 
infrastructure projects (Achtenberg 2016: 373). What is more, increased revenue from taxes 
and royalties on hydrocarbon extraction and exportation has fostered a rise in state 
spending on welfare programs for the country’s poor and indigenous populations in the 
fields of education and literacy, nutrition, and pensions (Postero 2010: 62). At the same time 
however, Morales’ attempts at extending democracy have been criticised for being too 
moderate and his failure to break with an economic model dominated by primary-
commodity extraction and exporting has left extensive power in the hands of domestic and 
transnational elites (Farthing 2017). 
In the international sphere, Bolivia has aligned itself with the Bolivarian movement in 
Venezuela and with the radical-Left governments more generally in Ecuador and Nicaragua, 
joining several regional organisations that seek to engender space for an alternative to US-
led calls for more market democracy, while Morales has vehemently opposed US 
imperialism in Bolivia and the region (Wolff 2013). At the same time however, Bolivia has 
remained an active member of the global capitalist economy, with natural gas and primary 
commodities remaining as the backbone of the economy. To comprehend the somewhat 
paradoxical process and outcomes, I now apply the TGPT framework examining power and 
the antecedent conditions, point of inflection, and aftermath sequences. 
3. Antecedent Conditions:  
3.1 The emergence of market democracy: 
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As Silva (2009: 104) states, the protest waves that erupted in response to market democracy 
and the subsequent election of Evo Morales must be understood against the backdrop of 
Bolivia’s 1952 revolution and the national-populist era that followed. Many of the key actors 
and institutions that would influence later democratisation moments emerged out of, and in 
response to this period such as the labour union - the militant, miner-led Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB; Bolivian Workers Central) (Silva 2009: 104). The Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR; National Revolutionary Movement) party also emerged from the 
1952 revolution, and in the 1950s and 1960s they built a nationalist populist state and 
fostered state-led development. The corporatist system that maintained the ISI period 
collapsed however and the MNR government headed by Víctor Paz Estenssoro was ousted 
in a coup and replaced with a populist military regime led by former vice-president René 
Barrientos and army-chief Alfredo Ovando Candía (Silva 2015: 132). This scenario “ironically, 
gave birth to the second and third major political parties of the 1980s and 1990s” (Silva 
2009: 105), the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR; Leftists Revolutionary 
Movement) formed in the early 1970s, and the Alianza Democrática Nacional (ADN; 
National Democratic Alliance) created by former dictator Hugo Banzer. During the 1978 
transition to democracy, the COB played a crucial role in helping the peasant movement to 
form a politically independent, unified campesino organisation, the Confederación Sindical 
Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos Bolivianos (CSUTCB; Unitary Syndical Confederation of 
Peasant Workers of Bolivia) (Silva 2009: 106) who represented highland peasants. 
A fragmented multiparty system emerged following the long period of military-
dominated rule (Silva 2009: 108) where the MNR, ADN and the MIR “shared power in 
various combinations for nearly twenty years” (Crabtree 2013: 277) in what was known as 
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the “democrácia pactada” (“pacted-democracy”) (de la Torre: 2013 33). As Anria (2016a: 
101) summarises, “large segments of the populace were underrepresented. In particular, 
the overlapping classes of peasants and indigenous Bolivians (perhaps three-fifths of the 
country) had little weight in political and economic decision making”.  
Beginning in the 1980s, market-oriented reform was imposed by historically populist 
(MNR), conservative (AND), and crucially, even leftist parties (MIR) that had campaigned 
against neoliberal orthodoxy (Anria 2016a). This fostered a sense of “bait-and switch” 
politics (Anria 2016a: 101), “providing an example of neoliberal convergence par excellence” 
(Roberts 2014: 274). The “imposition of the New Economic Policy by ‘shock treatment’ 
caused profound economic and political exclusion of the popular sectors, deeply 
threatening their livelihood and leaving them without defences within established political 
institutions”14 (Silva 2009: 109). Excessive use of presidential decrees, scant legislative 
debate, and a lack of consideration for the “interests, demands and priorities of subordinate 
social groups” (Anria 2016a: 101) and the “promiscuous powersharing” (Slater and Simmons 
2013) delegitimised the democratic model. Indeed, as de la Torre (2013: 33) states, “by the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, the political system was widely regarded as clientelist, 
corrupt, and in need of renewal”.  
3.2 Anti-neoliberal mobilisation and the building of collective and associational power: 
Protests against neoliberalism and pacted-democracy proceeded in three waves. First, from 
1985-93, urban labour in cooperation with largely indigenous peasantry “mobilised 
significant associational and collective power” (Silva 2009: 112) against the New Economic 
                                                          
14
 See Silva 2009 chapter 5 for an excellent discussion on the adoption of neoliberalism by multiple presidents, 
as well as the economic consequences on Bolivia’s popular sectors. 
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Policy, with the COB and other unions organizing massive strikes, while the CSUTCB 
announced peasant roadblocks to support urban strikers (Ibid.). However, the capacity of 
organised labour to challenge market democracy was debilitated by the neoliberal reforms 
as informalisation and public sector downsizing atomised the labour movement, including 
the COB “whose militancy and political strength had challenged many a government since 
its foundation” (Silva 2009: 109; Webber 2011: 24). In this scenario the CSUTCB, led by 
militant coca-growers came to play a leadership role in organizing anti-neoliberal protest 
(Silva 2015: 137). Framing protest against the Bolivian state and US imperialism around coca 
policies allowed for an intertwining of cultural, identity and economic motivations which 
became a key feature of future anti-neoliberal organizing (Silva 2009: 115). Furthermore, 
the coca growers’ successes highlighted how “successful organisation (as measured by 
capacity to mobilise and to force negotiation) had shifted from the factory and the mine…to 
territorially based forms” (Ibid.). As Silva (Ibid.) continues, while in the 1980s and 1990s 
“coca-grower mobilisation was mainly a regional phenomenon…it was an incubator for 
transformations in popular sector associational and collective power that blossomed in the 
second and third waves of anti-neoliberal contention”. 
A second wave of contention erupted during de Lozada’s first presidency (1993-97), 
with the CSUTCB organizing protests such as the March for Life, Coca, and National 
Sovereignty in 1995 (Silva 2015: 138). The framing of the protests highlighted how 
neoliberal “commodification destroyed the economic, social and cultural conditions that 
supported life” (Silva 2009: 122). This represented a shift from the language of class struggle 
and attracted various social groups and identities (Ibid.). Authorities faced protests from 
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multiple sectors in both rural and urban settings with teachers, the COB, and Chapare coca 
growers resisting neoliberal reforms. 
It is important to note that neoliberal decentralisation policies opened new spaces of 
participation at the local level (Hunt 2016: 442; Gray Molina 2003). The Popular 
Participation Law of 1994 (LPP) fostered decentralisation via the establishment of 
municipalities “along with direct elections for mayors and municipal councils empowered to 
make authoritative decisions and to administer revenue” (Silva 2009: 116). The LPP helped 
to foster the gradual inclusion of popular groups in organised politics, and popular 
movement candidates began to fill municipal councils (Anria 2016a: 101). The LPP also 
encouraged some poor and indigenous groups to take on the idea that liberal institutions 
could be transformed to meet their needs, and one response was the formation of the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism; MAS) (Postero 2010: 62; Madrid 
2011) which would go on to play a key role in Bolivia’s post-neoliberal democratisation 
process.  
A third wave of protest erupted during the presidencies of Banzer (1997-02) and de 
Lozada (2002-3) with heightened levels of collective and associational power (Silva 2009: 
123-4). Following a water privatisation scheme in 2000 in Cochabamba brokered by the 
government and the Bechtel corporation which “caused a 400 percent increase in the cost 
of water in local communities, a series of ‘wars’ broke out” (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 
269) between the government and organised popular forces. Law 2029 which allowed for 
privatisation of water distribution was rushed through Congress without discussion, 
publicity, or consultation with affected groups (Silva 2009: 125; Crabtree 2005: 20-21). The 
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political and economic exclusion “of social groups adversely affected by privatisation drove 
mobilisation” (Silva 2009: 125). 
Citizens of Cochabamba “launched a mass protest against Aguas del Tunari, 
a…subsidiary of the US Bechtel corporation” by “organizing themselves into a powerful 
social movement, the Coordinating Committee in Defence of Water and Life” (Morales 
2012: 56). Beginning with protests in December 1999, “15,000 irate citizens kicked off the 
Cochabamba Water War”; the following February, a two-day street war left 175 injured; in 
April, “over 30,000 protesters shut down the city and forced the government to declare 
martial law as demonstrations spread to…La Paz and El Alto” (Ibid.). 
It is important to note that popular protest movements began to forge links with 
political parties during the Cochabamba Water War, particularly the MAS, as the “historic 
roots of the MAS are in the coca-growing zone of Chapare”, Cochabamba (Webber 2011: 
58). Following the crash in tin prices and privatisation of the mining industry, tens of 
thousands of jobless miners migrated, with many moving to Chapare to begin a new life as 
small-holding cocalero peasants (Ibid.). Given the militant Marxist history of the miners, 
when the government, at the behest of the US, launched the “War on Drugs”, the cocaleros 
quickly began organizing resistance (Ibid.) eventually forging a social movement party called 
Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (ASP) (Madrid 2011; Anria 2013). By 1998 
however, “disputes between the three main indigenous leaders in the country – Felipe 
Quispe, Alejo Véliz, and Evo Morales - …led to the eventual disintegration of the ASP” 
(Webber 2011: 60). Two new parties emerged, one led by Quispe, and, most importantly for 
Bolivia’s post-neoliberal democratisation process, the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía 
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de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, IPSP) led by Evo 
Morales (Ibid.).  
Morales, had – and today maintains - tight links with the cocaleros having risen through 
the ranks of the cocalero peasant unions in the El Chapare region, becoming secretary 
general of the Six Federations of the Tropics of Cochabamba – a coordinated council of coca 
growers unions – in 1988 (Webber 2011: 62). The IPSP appealed to a broad, inter-ethnic, 
and cross-regional social base (Ibid.) based around ideas of self-representation (Anria 2013: 
27; García Linera et al. 2004). Due to legal technicalities, the IPSP was required to change its 
name, assuming the moniker of the defunct Movimiento al Socialismo (Webber 2011: 60). 
The Water War established a platform on which the MAS launched itself from a regional 
to a national party. The decentralisation laws of the mid-1990s created the space at 
municipal levels for the MAS to compete electorally (Anria 2013: 26), and in the 1999 
municipal elections the MAS won 3.27 percent of the national vote, ten mayoralties, and 
seventy-nine municipal council seats (Webber 2011: 60). The MAS used the context of the 
Water War to adopt a “plural popular” (Albro 2005) “strategy of coalition building, in which 
indigenous issues became the framing plank for successful political articulation” (Anria 
2013: 27). This strategy became apparent in the 2002 presidential elections. 
3.3 2002 Elections: 
In the 2002 election campaign, the MAS “framed its politics in indigenist terms that made it 
popular with ethnic Quechua and Aymara” groups (Silva 2009: 133). The MAS “eschewed 
exclusionary language and repeatedly emphasised that the party was open to all people” 
(Madrid 2011: 245). As a result it brought together labour, peasant, and lowland indigenous 
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movements which helped generate moderate success at the municipal level (Goodale 2013: 
32). Furthermore, the MAS sought to include left-leaning and nationalist intellectuals as well 
as urban indigenous and nonindigenous classes (Anria 2013: 27). Crucially however, 
expansion of their support base via electoral mobilisation was accompanied by support of 
social protests, allowing the MAS “to forge a strikingly heterogeneous coalition that would 
challenge the established political class, the status quo, and neoliberalism” (Ibid.). In this 
scenario, Evo Morales and the MAS placed second with 20.9 percent of the vote to Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR’S 22.5 (Webber 2011: 63). As Anria (2013: 27) notes, 
“although the MAS did not win the presidency in the 2002 elections, it placed 27 deputies in 
the lower chamber and thus became a powerful political agent”. 
3.4 Anti-neoliberal protest: 2003-05: 
In October 2003, indigenous residents of El Alto, the satellite city above La Paz, “mounted 
massive demonstrations after the neoliberal president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada unveiled 
plans to give concessions to transnational corporations to pipe natural gas from the eastern 
lowlands to Chilean ports for export to the United States” (Postero 2010: 61). The “terms of 
the concession to foreign capital, framed as a giveaway, turned the issue into a symbol of 
the popular sector’s exclusion from market society” (Silva 2009: 134-5), and the wave of 
protests that engulfed the country became known as the 2003 Gas War. As Silva (2009: 135) 
highlights, during the Gas War “transformations in the associational and collective power of 
the social groups challenging neoliberalism that had been taking place in recent years came 
to a head, endowing them with unprecedented force”.  
In conjunction with events in El Alto, a series of peasant roadblocks in the town of 
Warisata organised by Felipe Quispe and the CSUTCB held a tourist bus convoy hostage, 
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with Quispe calling for the liberation of imprisoned comrades, redress for peasant-related 
issues, as well as changes to natural gas policy (Silva 2009: 139). The government sent the 
army in on a “rescue” mission to free the tourists on September 20th, culminating in the 
deaths of six peasants and one soldier (Lazar 2006: 184). The “news that the military had 
killed civilians while assisting foreign tourists reinforced a view that the Sánchez de Lozada 
administration did not put the interests of the Bolivian people first” (Arbona 2008: 37), and 
further marches and protests erupted. 
The government ordered the military to break up protests and marches, with troops 
killing scores of civilians (Postero 2010: 61) in what came to be known as Black October. The 
repression backfired, with mass protests erupting across the country calling for the 
president’s resignation, with “columns of miners and protesters from Oruro and Potosí, coca 
growers from Chapare, and peasants from the highlands” converging in La Paz (Silva 2009: 
142). Demonstrators from El Alto and working class neighbourhoods of La Paz were 
accompanied by intellectuals, middle-class personalities, NGO leaders, human rights 
advocates, and politicians, while waves of protests of tens and hundreds of thousands 
rocked the country (Ibid.). A set of demands emerged, calling for the ouster of the president 
and his neoliberal model, as well as the nationalisation of gas (Spronk and Webber 2007: 
36). With an estimated 500,000 people in the streets (Hylton 2003), “Sánchez de Lozada and 
his closest supporters fled the country for exile in the United States on October 17”, with 
vice-president Carlos Mesa taking over (Spronk and Webber 2007: 36). 
During Mesa’s presidency, “Bolivia was characterised by a deepening political 
polarisation along the axes of class, race, and region” (Webber 2010: 52). As Webber (2010: 
52) describes, two social blocs emerged. Firstly, a left-indigenous bloc comprised 
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predominantly of “indigenous urban proletarian and peasant forces” rooted “primarily in 
the most heavily indigenous departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, and 
Chuquisaca, was solidified on the basis of a similar alliance as in the…gas war in 2003 that 
led to the overthrow of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada” (Ibid.). The demands of the 
bloc were known as the October Agenda,  
because they were essentially carried over from the unfulfilled promise of the October 
2003 gas war. They included the nationalisation of natural gas, the convocation of a 
revolutionary constituent assembly, the resignation of Carlos Mesa, liberation from 
internally colonial race relations, nationalisation of and worker control of natural 
resources and strategic industries, and a radical redistribution of land and wealth 
(Webber 2010: 52).  
 The second bloc that consolidated between October 2003 and June 2005 “was an 
eastern-bourgeois bloc led by the regional bourgeoisies of the hydrocarbons-rich 
departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz and their allies in Beni and Pando” (Webber 2010: 52) 
known as the media luna15. The bloc was represented by the Pro Santa Cruz Committee 
which was comprised of  the Agricultural Chamber of Eastern Bolivia, the Federation of 
Ranchers of Santa Cruz, and the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Service, and Tourism of 
Santa Cruz (CAINCO) (Spronk  and Webber 2007: 37). As Spronk and Webber (2007: 37) 
highlight, “the Spanish oil giant Repsol-YPF, Brazilian state-owned Petrobras, and Enron are 
members of CAINCO’s board of directors”. The Santa Cruz agro-industrial, petroleum, and 
financial elites, who were the most influential proponents of the neoliberal model, had 
                                                          
15
 The term “media luna”, or “Half Moon”, refers to the crescent shape formed by the boundaries of the 
departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija, where the most conservative sectors of the political and 
economic elite opposition are located. 
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enjoyed direct access to the central state via the MNR, AND, and MIR parties (Webber 2010: 
59). In response to the October Agenda of 2003, this bloc advanced the January Agenda of 
2005 calling for greater “departmental autonomy, regional control over natural resources, 
department control over most tax revenue, departmental authority over all policies except 
defence, currency, tariffs, and foreign relations, ‘free-market’ capitalism, openness to 
foreign direct investment, racism, and state repression of left-indigenous protesters” (Ibid.).
 Until March 2005, Mesa managed to appease both the radical conservative elites of 
the media luna as well as radical popular actors; he “promoted the reform of hydrocarbons 
and the convocation of a constituent assembly while simultaneously emptying the reform of 
its meaningful popular content and delaying the convocation indefinitely” (Webber 2010: 
55).  
In July 2004, the referendum on the future of hydrocarbon management did not adhere 
to the October Agenda demands which advocated a full nationalisation, but rather acted  as 
a way of legitimating Mesa’s limited project of reform focused on increasing taxes and 
royalties to 50 percent of transnational petroleum company’s profits (Webber 2010: 55; 
Orgaz García 2005; Tapia 2005: 96). While the referendum passed the popular vote, Mesa’s 
“neoliberal reformism was insufficiently generous in its concessions to the October Agenda 
to secure the support of the left-indigenous bloc, which began to assert once again the 
necessity of fundamental structural solutions to the problems of racism, poverty, inequality, 
class exploitation, and imperialism” (Webber 2010: 57).  Mesa faced “ongoing mobilisations 
and road blockades in January, February, March, May, and June of 2005, many focused on 
formulating a new hydrocarbons law that would wrest more control and profit away from 
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the transnational petroleum companies and confer them on the Bolivian state” (Spronk  and 
Webber 2007: 37). 
However, as the traditional economic elites increased their pressure on Mesa to avoid 
capitulating to the October Agenda demands, and with the TNCs, IMF, and US embassy 
allying behind the domestic elites, Mesa dropped any pretence of supporting popular 
demands and realigned with the elites of the media luna (Webber 2010: 54). In response 
however, hundreds of thousands of protesters took over the streets of La Paz and El Alto, 
forcing Mesa to resign (Webber and Spronk 2007: 38; Webber 2010: 67) paving the way for 
new elections in 2005. Indeed, the Gas Wars ultimately completed what the Cochabamba 
Water War had started, transforming “demands from local, regional, or union-specific 
grievances…to national-level demands centred on sovereignty, state control of natural 
resources, pro-formal sector employment and worker’s rights policies, agrarian reform, 
demilitarisation of the drug war, and calls for a constituent assembly” (Silva 2009: 138). 
However, while popular power from below had succeeded in removing two sitting 
neoliberal presidents, the Mesa presidency foreshadowed future power struggles between 
the state, radical popular social organisations, the traditional elite, and transnational actors 
which would impact the path and outcomes of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal democratisation 
process. 
4. The Point of Inflection: 2005 Presidential Elections: 
The December 2005 presidential elections “were defined by the utter exhaustion of the 
traditional neoliberal parties…that had ruled the country through various coalitional 
governments since 1985” (Webber 2011: 44). Disenchantment with the performance of 
liberal democracy coupled with market-oriented policies was growing (Madrid 2011: 239). 
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The convergence around structural adjustment policies by populist (MNR) and centre-left 
(MIR) parties “encouraged dissent to be channelled into extra-systemic forms of social and 
electoral protest”, convulsing the national party system (Roberts 2014: 126). By 2004, only 
23.4 percent of the population reported confidence in the traditional parties (Seligson, 
Moreno, Morales, and Blum 2004: 102). The prolonged tension created the space for 
political outsiders to compete (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 3). The MAS filled the void 
created by the decline of the traditional parties, wooing “the support of disaffected voters 
with steadfast opposition to the government’s policies and its strong nationalist and anti-
establishment rhetoric” (Madrid 2011: 244). In this setting, Morales and the MAS easily won 
the 2005 elections in the first round with 53.7 percent of the vote to 28.6 percent for former 
president Quiroga and PODEMOS (Poder Democrático y Social; Democratic and Social 
Power), “a coalition of conservative parties and wealthy notables mainly from the eastern 
lowlands” (Silva 2009: 143). The MAS won a 72-seat majority in the 130-seat lower house 
(Anria 2016a: 102), with PODEMOS a close second, while the senate was almost evenly split 
between the two (Silva 2009: 143).  
 Fundamentally, Evo Morales was elected on a mandate of deepening and extending 
democracy by overcoming the political and economic exclusion experienced under market 
democracy. As Silva (2009: 143) summarises, the election “was a mandate to restore a 
measure of national economic and political autonomy, to open political participation and 
power to heretofore marginalised leftist and other popular sector leaders, and to protect 
the overwhelmingly poor and indigent mestizo and indigenous popular sectors from the 
ravages of the market”.  
4.1 State-society power relations at the point of inflection: 
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The MAS “was born as a party of the social movements with a strong rural base” (Silva 2013: 
59). It represents a hybrid organisation that straddles the line between party and 
movement; movements tend to challenge the state, whereas parties are participants in 
state institutions (Anria 2013: 22). The genesis of the party was from the bottom-up; it was 
a movement party in that it was sponsored by social movements as their electoral vehicle 
(Ibid.: 23). Indeed, the MAS, at least up until the election of Morales as president, adhered 
to Roberts’ (1998: 75) “organic model” of party development in the sense that it engaged in 
electoral politics and competed for office, while at the same time it engaged in 
“noninstitutinal, contentious bargaining in the pursuit of programmatic goals” (Anria 2013: 
23).   
It is crucial to highlight however, that the MAS had both a core social coalition and a 
more autonomous bloc of movement organisations that engaged with it in a strategic 
alliance (Do Alto 2011; Salman 2011; Anria 2013). As Silva (2013: 59) points out, the core 
was composed of an “inner circle” that included the cocaleros and the Six Federations of the 
Tropics unions, the Bartolina Sisa National Confederation of Campesino, Indigenous, and 
Native Women of Bolivia (CNMCIOB-BS, Bartolina Sisas), and the CSUTCB. Evo Morales had 
tight, organic links with these organisations. The second autonomous-strategic bloc included 
the COB (especially the traditional, salaried miners); public sector unions; urban informal 
sector workers organised in neighbourhood associations - the Federaciones de Juntas de 
Vecinos (FEJUVE) - especially in El Alto; “non-salaried informal sector miners’ unions, the so-
called ‘cooperativistas’; the CONAMAQ16, which represents highland Aymara and Quechua 
who inhabit marginal largely pastoral lands and who are weakly integrated into markets, 
hence still attached to communal ways of production” (Silva 2013: 59).  
                                                          
16
 Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu). 
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The nature of how the MAS engaged with these strategic supporters, and in particular 
how it entered urban zones requires more explanation, as the evolution of urban-MAS 
relations would feedback on the democratisation process at a later stage. While from 1995-
2002 the MAS was a campesino party, from 2002 on, and particularly in the 2005 elections, 
the MAS underwent a series of changes (Zuaso 2010: 120). As Anria (2013: 26) discusses, the 
“electoral imperative” involved four shifts for the MAS:  
1) A territorial shift, from being a movement anchored in the coca-growing Chapare to a 
national movement with rural and urban social bases, as well as a growing presence in 
Bolivia’s largest cities, like La Paz and El Alto; 2) a shift in its class makeup from a 
resistance movement of coca producers and relocated miners to a catchall, multiclass 
movement that included urban and informal workers as well as middle classes, all of 
whom converged in their rejection of the political status quo; 3) an ethnic shift from 
being a largely indigenous movement to one that incorporated both indigenous and 
mestizo groups; and 4) a shift in terms of the organisations it comprised from a small 
group to an increasingly larger and heterogeneous group of base organisations. 
While the party-system breakdown and the deligitmation of the existing traditional parties 
described above left a vacuum for the MAS to fill in urban areas, the MAS  came as an 
outsider party (Anria 2013: 33). As such, to gain a foothold in the cities it often had to insert 
itself on top of pre-existing political parties and organisations which led to top-down co-
optation of urban movement leaders and politicians who were gatekeepers to grassroots 
electoral support (Ibid). 
 In the political vacuum that existed in terms of leaders with popular legitimacy, 
demands in both urban and rural settings were channelled through the figure of Evo 
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Morales who became the expression of popular demands and interests (Revilla 2014: 46). 
Furthermore, as Balderacchi (2015: 21) notes, Morales’ charisma played an important role 
in the efforts to attract non-indigenous voters, particularly in La Paz (Anria 2013). However, 
while Morales was crucial to the electoral outcomes of 2005, unlike the Ecuadorian or 
Venezuelan cases where the elections of Correa and Chávez can be ascribed in large part to 
their personal abilities to convince the electorate, Morales’ election in 2005 was 
“unequivocally linked to the constant rapid strengthening of the indigenous-peasant social 
movement” (Balderachi 2015: 21). Indeed, it was the associational power of core 
movements in conjunction with the collective and mobilisational power forged by the 
linking of multiple rural and urban movements in strategic alliance with the MAS that gave 
societal actors the power to remove sitting presidents and bring Morales to power. The 
election of Morales after 20 years of neo-liberal regimes thus represents “a critical break 
with the past” (Riggirozzi 2010: 74), and it is to the first phase of this post-inflection era 
encompassing the attempts to re-calibrate the constitution that I now turn. 
5. Post-Inflection Sequencing Phase 1: 2006-2009:  
The first administration of Morales from 2006-09 was marked by the Constituent Assembly 
process and the racialised class struggle between popular sectors and opposition from the 
media luna region (Errejón and Guijarro 2016: 46; Webber 2016). The protests leading up to 
the 2005 election had de facto outlined Morales’ mandate (Anria 2013: 36) in the October 
Agenda which called for reform of the state via nationalisations, agrarian reform, and a 
constituent assembly to decolonise the country (Errejón and Guijarro 2016: 46).  
5.1 The Constituent Assembly and Elite-backlash: 
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Morales sought to adhere closely to these demands to deepen and extend democracy, 
highlighting his “positive accountability to the MAS’s social base” (Anria 2013: 36). In June 
2006 the government outlined a roadmap in the Plan Nacional de Desarollo (National 
Development Plan; PND 2007). The plan offered an alternative vision to that of market 
democracy, and called for buen vivir, an indigenous vision based on communitarian forms of 
coviviencia, or living together (Goodale 2013: 34). The plan outlined that to achieve this 
target required the state to intervene as “promoter and protagonist of national 
development” (PND 2007: 4), whereby the state would act to transform society and the 
economy, but only if “all peoples and cultures are present in the economic and political 
decisions of the State” (Ibid.: 15). As Goodale (2013: 36) notes, “this meant that the 
people’s ‘capacity to decide’ would have to be recuperated within a new notion of the 
nation that recognised the pluriethnicity and multiculturality of the country, as well as the 
vitality of the social movements”. Finally, the PND “suggested that these newly empowered 
social actors would create a new state during democratic debate in the Constituent 
Assembly” (Ibid.). 
 Early in Morales’ first term, the Unity Pact, a coalition of popular movements, some 
of whom had organic links to the MAS, while others were more independent, was formed 
(Webber 2016). The Pact was formed by indigenous groups from both the east and west in 
order to fight firstly for the realisation of the Constituent Assembly, and after that process 
had begun, to articulate and promote campesino and indigenous interests in the assembly 
(Zuazo 2010: 129)17. The Unity Pact worked closely with MAS representatives in the 
                                                          
17
 Initial members of the Unity Pact included, amongst others, the CSUTCB; La Confederación de Pueblos 
indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia - CIDOB; CONAMAQ; La Confederación 
Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB); La Federación Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas, Originarias y 
Campesinas de Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS) (Zuazo 2010: 129). 
138 
 
Constituent Assembly (Silva 2015: 139), leading the drive for the radical plurinational 
reconstitution of the state (Webber 2016). Indeed, the Unity Pact represented a significant 
deepening of democracy as it acted as a space of corporative-collective deliberation and 
mobilisation for the campesino and indigenous sectors outside of the MAS (Zuazo 2010: 
129). 
However, the MAS was forced to engage with opponents of constitutional change, 
and the opening of the constituent process took place “through a pact with the regionalist 
right in the eastern part of the country, where the powerful business leaders of Santa Cruz 
had created grassroots political allegiances through the hegemonisation of a popular 
regional or camba identity associated with beauty, modernity, and prosperity in contrast to 
things Indian, backward, poor, and antidemocratic” (Errejón and Guijarro 2016: 46). This 
conservative regional opposition, comprised of both economic and political elites, was to 
play a key role, both in the direct outcomes of the constituent process, as well as feeding 
back onto the democratisation process at a later stage.  
 In response to Morales’ planned reforms, and making use of their political, 
economic, ideological, and military power, eastern lowland elites and the PODMEOS party 
began to struggle for regional autonomy in a bid to avoid the proposed changes to the 
status of private property rights, land reform and redistribution of state revenue (Silva 2009: 
144). For the elite, autonomy is understood as “regional control over natural resources (e.g. 
land, timber, gas, and oil); the right to retain control over two-thirds of all tax revenues 
generated in the department; and authority to set all policies other than defence, currency, 
tariffs and foreign relations” (Eaton 2007: 74). Elites in the media luna have a long history of 
“upholding regional oligarchy, such as evading the agrarian reform of 1953, obtaining land 
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grants and loans from military dictators between 1964 and 1982 in exchange for support, 
and maintaining semi-feudal structures in most rural areas” (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 
7; Kohl 2010: 109). The autonomist drive was a “program of the rich” (Felix Patzi quoted in 
Webber 2011: 94), in which the autonomists “effectively wielded popular social forces 
behind a bourgeois agenda during the first year of the Morales administration, primarily 
focusing on the process of the Constituent Assembly” (Webber 2011: 94). In response to the 
MAS declaring that rules governing the Constituent Assembly would be determined by a 
simple majority rather than by a two-thirds vote (the MAS enjoyed a majority, but not a 
super-majority of two-thirds), PODEMOS and the autonomist forces accused the MAS of 
attempting an autogolpe (self-coup) and subsequently boycotted the Constituent Assembly, 
sending it into indefinite recess (Webber 2011: 95). Furthermore, autonomist forces across 
the media luna engaged in massive demonstrations and a civic strike (Ibid.). 
In response to elite and conservative destabilising tactics, in 2007, and stemming 
from the Unity Pact, Morales organised supporters from the top down into the 
Coordinadora Nacional por el Cambio (CONALCAM) (de la Torre 2013: 35). Zuazo (2010: 
130) states that Morales’ creation of CONALCAM was part of a double strategy; on one side, 
to confront the opposition and to re-establish the power of the key movements from the 
anti-neoliberal protest era, “but this time under government direction”; and secondly, it was 
an attempt to give content to the idea of a “government of the social movements” by 
establishing social movement forms of action as a part of the government repertoire. 
Under the Unity Pact, the MAS was coordinated by the social movements. With the 
emergence of CONALCAM however, this relationship changed, as government leadership 
over rural and urban organisations emerged in order to confront the challenge of building a 
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process of change from the street (Zuaso: 130), indicating emerging centralisation and top-
down influencing of the base as a response to elite destabilisation tactics. However, as 
Zuazo (2010: 130) continues, government control over the direction of CONALCAM was only 
one side of the process; the other side was “the increase in its convocation in the most 
serious moments of conflict” thereby fostering the belief in the social movements that they 
were part of the government and that the government of the MAS was in fact “their” 
government. 
 Despite the mass popular mobilisations in defence of the government, in response to 
powerful elite opposition, the MAS offered to accept a mixed voting system in the 
Constituent Assembly whereby particularly contentious issues would require two-thirds 
support to pass; PODEMOS and the autonomist movements however rejected the offer and 
continued to mobilise. In the face of elite political power and their protests and threats to 
veto the entire process, Morales accepted that each article of the Constituent Assembly 
would require a two-third support, and with this compromise, the assembly ended its 
seven-month impasse (Postero 2010: 66). In December 2007 the Constituent Assembly 
approved a draft constitutional charter which, while favourable to government aspirations, 
was also more moderate (Silva 2009: 144) than the October Agenda called for (Webber 
2011: 98). Substantial concessions were made on land reform “grandfathering in existing 
large landholdings and limiting Morales’ ability to hold office indefinitely” (Postero 2010: 
60). 
 It is necessary to outline the power of the elite in order to explain why such 
compromise was accepted by the MAS. The extra-parliamentary activism of the autonomists 
influenced public perception of Morales, whose support fell from a high of 80 percent to 52 
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by the end of September 2006, while support for the Constituent Assembly declined from 
69 percent in August to 45 percent in September 2006 (Webber 2011: 96). The country’s 
wealthiest families with links to the traditional neoliberal parties own the major television 
networks and newspapers, capturing 70 percent of the TV audience, and 64 percent of print 
media circulation (Lupien 2013: 228). The families who dominate the private media are also 
major landholders in the eastern departments (Ibid.). Not surprisingly, the traditional 
media’s response to the MAS agenda was characterised by “disdain and fear”, painting 
ideological enemies as extremists, and focusing attention on disruptive actions by certain 
sectors of government supporters while downplaying similar actions by opposition groups 
(Ibid.: 236-7). 
 In conjunction with the ideological power of the elites, their political power was also 
boosted18. The political right was boosted by winning 6 out of 9 departmental prefectures in 
elections that occurred at the same time as the 2005 presidential elections (Webber 2011: 
54). The geographical concentration of elite opposition in the eastern lowlands allowed the 
formation of dense organisational networks, enabling governors to enlist societal support, 
including that of popular sectors, which paralysed the assembly for months (Eaton 2014). 
Furthermore, the elite opposition used their political control over the departmental 
governments, the judiciary, and the state bureaucracy to impede the government where 
possible (Madrid 2011: 257; Kohl and Farthing 2008).  
When the economic power of the Santa Cruz elites who maintained control over 
finance, and who had intimate ties with foreign capital (the department attracts more FDI 
than any other department) is considered in conjunction with the ideological and political 
                                                          
18
 While it is important not to conflate conservative politicians and right-wing parties such as PODEMOS with 
economic elites per se, there were tight relationships between the two in this period (Silva 2009).   
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power of the Bolivian elite, we can see that the MAS faced resistance from a powerful 
adversary (Morales and Conroy 2017: 32).   
5.2 The 2008 re-call referendum:  
In 2008, with the constitutional draft still being contested, and with the autonomist 
movement pushing further by carrying out an illegal referendum on autonomy, Morales 
“sought to break… the impasse that threatened his government, calling on all the prefects 
to run in recall referenda, including himself and his vice-president” (Errejón and Guijarro 
2016: 46). Morales easily won with 67 percent, up from the 54 percent of the 2005 elections 
(Silva 2009: 145), while the MAS recovered two of the regions from the opposition (Errejón 
and Guijarro 2016: 46). The autonomist movement’s response was to speed up its attempts 
to economically and politically disconnect from the Bolivian state, and “by August 2008 
there was an almost undeclared civil war in the east, especially in Santa Cruz” (Ibid.). 
However, the last resistance to the draft constitution rescinded in the face of the continued 
support of the armed forces for the government, the mobilisation of member organisations 
of CONALCAM19, and the Brazilian-led UNASUR intervention which stated that only 
electorally validated decisions would be recognised (Ibid.). 
5.3 Democratic Deepening and Extending in the constitution of 2009: 
In January 2009, “voters overwhelmingly approved the new Constitution by 61.4 percent to 
38.6 percent, although the opposition won” in the media luna (Silva 2009: 145). The 
Constitution outlines various mechanisms that seek to both deepen and extend democracy. 
Adhering to the Unity Pact demands, the Constitution redefined the nation as “plurinational 
                                                          
19
 The CONALCAM was expanded in 2008 with the addition of various urban social organisations such as the 
COB, neighbourhood associations, unions, students, and miners’ cooperatives (Zuaso 2010: 130). 
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and communitarian” (Mayorga 2011; de la Torre 2013: 34). Bolivia’s democracy is described 
in article 1.1 as “participatory, representative and communitarian” (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 
4). The “participatory form is associated with direct citizen participation in politics by means 
of mechanisms to include citizens’ decisions in legislation and/or public policy” (Arteaga 
2015: 579). In addition to standard liberal representative democracy, mechanisms of direct 
and participatory democracy include referendum, recall of public servants, prior 
consultation, and legislative initiatives of citizens. Furthermore, members of the judiciary, 
after pre-selection by the legislative, are to be elected by the populace (Art. 182, 188, 194, 
198 cited in Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 9). Organised civil society is to participate in the design 
of public politics, and to execute social control at all levels of the state (Art 240, 241 cited in 
Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 9). New spaces for participation are to be opened whereby 
organised civil society may impact on the policy-making regarding health, education, 
economic, and environmental issues (Art. 40, 78-93, 309, 343 cited in Schilling-Vacaflor 
2011: 9).  
Community democracy “grants legitimacy to the practices used by social collectives – 
especially indigenous groups – to elect, appoint or nominate their authorities and 
representatives by means of their own traditional procedures” (Arteaga 2015: 579). As 
Schilling-Vacaflor (2011: 9) explains, communitarian democracy “is supposed to be exercised 
in self-governed indigenous-campesino entities such as municipalities and indigenous-
campesino territories (TIOC)”. Elections of indigenous-campesino representatives “should 
take place according to the communities’ own norms and procedures” (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
regarding “the representation of indigenous-campesino peoples and communities in the 
legislative branch, Art. 147 stipulates ‘that the proportional participation of indigenous-
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campesino peoples and communities will be guaranteed’ and that quotas stipulating a 
certain number of indigenous representatives will be implemented” (Ibid.).  
 In terms of extending democracy, the 2009 Constitution supports economic, social, 
and cultural rights for underprivileged groups, proclaiming its primary goal is to achieve 
buen vivir, the good life (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 10). While the term remains vague, there is 
consensus that a “good life” contains human rights, political participation and pluralism, and 
a low degree of social inequality (Ibid.). To achieve this, the Constitution calls for 
“universalising access to the surplus generated by the use of non-renewable natural 
resources” (Arteaga 2015: 579). Hence, democratic expansion was to be funded by the 
“creation and/or strengthening of strategic state enterprises, the state’s appropriation of 
the revenue generated by the oil and gas industry, and the redistribution of this revenue 
through transfers and royalties to subnational governments and conditional cash transfers 
to vulnerable groups, as well as the exponential increase in public investment” (Arteaga 
2015: 573).  
5.4 Summary of 2006-09 and power relations: 
As Anria (2015) and Silva (2017) note, “in the opening phase of post neoliberalism the 
organic connection between the MAS and its social movement base ensured an alignment 
between them and Morales’ government” (Silva 2017: 100). Furthermore, elite resistance 
toward the MAS and the Constituent Assembly and the conflicts that emerged meant that a 
variety of non-core social forces strategically supported the governing party in order to fight 
against the conservative opposition (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 12). 
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 Aggressive elite responses to attempts to extend democracy during the 
constitutional change process fostered a centralisation of power in the executive to the 
exclusion of pluralism as the new government sought to overcome conservative and elite 
opposition (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 13). This centralisation was balanced however by a 
simultaneous deepening of democracy. Given Morales’ vulnerability to the mobilisation or 
defection of core indigenous-peasant movements, the state-society power balance rested 
with the indigenous-peasant movements, thereby ensuring that the government could not 
diverge from societal demands (Balderacchi 2015: 21). Furthermore, given the histories of 
mobilisation, and the increases in collective and associational power experienced during the 
anti-neoliberal protests, the social movements, both core and strategic, were at the height 
of their mobilisational capacity, and were thereby capable of both defending the 
government from oppositional destabilisation tactics, as well as holding the government to 
account (Silva 2017: 100). Hence, while elite opposition to attempts to deepen and extend 
democracy did foster a centralisation of power in the executive, given that the state-society 
power relations during this period of conflict favoured the organised popular base - thereby 
allowing them to exert great influence over the executive, centralised power was actually 
used to advance the demands of societal actors, thereby creating a paradoxical “progressive 
centralisation”, that is, a centralisation of power in the executive in order to deepen and 
extend democracy for those excluded under market democracy.  
The international sphere also provided opportunities for the development of a post-
neoliberal democracy. Thanks to the global commodities boom, which saw the price of 
Bolivia’s principal exports dramatically rise, Morales had the economic power to extend 
democracy, with public investment increasing from 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 10.5 per 
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cent in 2009 (Weisbrot 2009). Debt forgiveness under the IMF’s 2005 Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country’s (HIPC) initiative reduced the leverage of the financial institution over Morales’ 
government by releasing the country from rigid conditionalities (Silva 2009: 145; Webber 
2011: 35). Furthermore, the availability of financing from the ideologically-aligned Hugo 
Chávez-led Venezuela liberated Bolivia to experiment in alternatives to market democracy.  
Additionally, conditionality-free multi-billion dollar investment deals with Russia, Iran, Brazil, 
and Argentina boosted the capacity of Morales to radicalise the project. 
 Membership of several new regional organisations free from western leverage also 
gave Bolivia the ideological space and economic support to advance post-neoliberal 
democratisation. Bolivia joined the ALBA and the Banco del Sur, thereby reducing 
dependence on US-backed trade deals and international capitalism embodied in the World 
Bank and IMF (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 271). With US overreach in the Middle East, 
and the ideological rejection of neoliberalism across the Pink Tide countries, Bolivia was in a 
prime position to advance the post-neoliberal project and it is to Phase 2 of this process that 
I now turn. 
6. Post-Inflection Sequencing Phase 2: 2009-14:  
In the 2009 presidential elections Morales won in the first round, while the MAS obtained a 
majority in the congress. In the 2010 departmental elections for governors, mayors, and 
departmental assemblies, the MAS won six of nine governorships, up from three in the 2005 
election. With the solid support that societal movements had given the government in the 
conflict with the conservative elites, and with boosted political power for the government, 
the stage seemed set for Morales adhere more closely to the October Agenda and deliver 
on the new Constitution. However, the 2010-14 period witnessed increasing government-
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movement confrontations and divisions in the movement base that had brought Morales to 
power. Despite these issues, Morales and the MAS performed extraordinarily well in the 
2014 elections, winning the presidency and a supermajority in both legislative chambers, as 
well as winning eight of the nine departments, including three out of four in the media luna 
region (Achtenberg 2016: 374).  
To comprehend how and why Morales and the MAS continued to have such 
electoral success despite the breakdown of the collective and associational power of 
popular and indigenous social movements, we must understand how the post-neoliberal 
democratisation project has developed, evaluating if and for whom democracy has been 
deepened and extended, whether centralisation of power in the executive has occurred, 
and, crucially, how key power relationships between the government and society, economic 
elites, and international (f)actors have influenced proceedings. 
6.1 Extending Democracy: 
The commodities boom funded unprecedented amounts of public expenditure which 
increased by 500 percent between 2006 and 2013 (Arteaga 2015: 574), with significant 
investments in education and health, particularly in rural areas, while infrastructure projects 
across the country have led to improving human capital indicators, falling transport costs 
and increased domestic commerce (Faguet 2015). Bolivia’s build-up of international 
reserves, which topped 48 percent of GDP in 2013, acted as somewhat of a buffer against 
the global financial crisis while also allowing the country to avoid the restrictive 
conditionalities attached to IMF borrowing (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014). While the 
government has in fact spent moderately on social goods, with just 1.6 percent of GDP 
being spent on cash transfer programs (McNelly 2016), poverty was reduced between 2005 
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and 2011 from 59.6 percent to 45 percent, and extreme poverty fell from 36.7 percent to 
20.9 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014). The percentage of Bolivians living on less than USD 
2/day fell from 60 in 2006 to 30 in 2011 (CIA 2011 quoted in Kohl and Farthing 2012: 231).  
Transfers such as the Bono Juancito Pinto, which is aimed at incentivising school 
attendance, covers 1.8 million children; 100 percent of the population are eligible for Renta 
Dignidad, an old-age pension; and the Bono Juana Azurduy aims to lower maternal-infant 
mortality rates and chronic malnutrition of children under the age of two. Programs aimed 
at zero illiteracy, malnutrition, and eye health have also been introduced (Postero 2010: 41). 
From 1999 to 2011, average income rose 45 percent, and 182 percent among rural 
populations (ARU, as cited in Faguet 2015). The real minimum wage increased by 87.7 
percent from 2005-14 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014). Inequality has also decreased, with the 
income of poorer sectors of the population growing much faster since 2006 than that of the 
higher-income households (Ibid.). 
However, while the democratic extending offered under the Morales government 
assisted some of the most vulnerable sectors, the extent of changes to date have been 
questioned by some analysts. As Achtenberg (2013, citing the Fundación Jubileo) notes, in 
2012, more than 5 million Bolivians lived in poverty, with extreme poverty persisting in rural 
areas.  Meanwhile, Quiroga (2017: 13) notes that while cash transfers had a positive impact, 
their benefits were severely undercut by a regressive tax system, while property and wealth 
taxes were practically non-existent. Indeed, as Achtenberg (2013) notes, many people feel 
that, given the high levels of international reserves, changes to poverty and inequality 
should have been more dramatic.  
149 
 
The long-term sustainability of cash-transfers funded by booming resource prices has 
been called into question (Riggirozzi 2010; Schilling-Vacaflor 2017), while there is also 
concern as to how the extending of democracy has centred around Morales, such as via the 
“Bolivia Cambia, Evo Cumple” model of redistribution in which the central government 
directly finances both large and small scale projects (Revilla 2014: 59). The concern is that 
this model of redistribution opens the space for co-optation and hinders popular criticism of 
the maintenance of an elite-controlled primary-export model of capital accumulation that 
undergirds the structural conditions of inequality (Revilla 2014: 60; Webber 2016). The easy 
revenue from the commodities boom has meant that social and welfare spending could 
occur without any major redistribution of private property in what Riofrancos (Riofrancos 
and Farthing 2017) calls a “hydrocarbon-fuelled-social-democratic bargain”. As such, it is 
important to analyse why this reliance on primary commodities has been maintained and 
how it impacts the quality of democratic extending and deepening, centralisation, and the 
long-term outlook for efforts to build a post-neoliberal democracy. 
6.2 Funding Democratic Extending, National Development Plans, and Government-Elite 
Relations: 
While Morales and the MAS have presented their project as a radical alternative to 
neoliberalism which involves a diversification of the economy away from primary export-
based development (Andreucci and Radhuber 2015: 280) accompanied by a nationalisation 
of Bolivia’s natural resources (Schilling-Vacaflor 2017), neither of these goals have been fully 
achieved. The “Heroes of the Chaco” decree and the increasing share of state company 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) in gas activities and the establishing of 
new contracts regarding taxation with transnational companies (Schilling-Vacaflor 2017: 
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662) meant that the state received eight times more income from gas, increasing from $673 
million in 2005 to more than $5 billion in 2013 (Solón 2016).  However, Bolivia is more 
dependent today on primary exports than ever before, with primary goods increasing from 
89 percent of total export value in 200 to 95 percent in 2012 (ECLAC 2013: 111). 
Furthermore, the extent of nationalisation and state control over natural resources has in 
fact been limited (Andreucci and Radhuber 2015). PETROBRAS and REPSOL, two 
transnational companies retained control over 75 percent of natural gas production (Solón 
2016). In the mining sector, despite some nationalisations, private transnationals retained 
control over approximately 70 percent of exports (Ibid.). We need to understand why this is 
the case to grasp the realities of Bolivian democratisation. 
To fund programs that expand democracy and give the government legitimacy, the 
government had to maintain a healthy relationship with the agribusiness elites in the 
eastern lowlands (Wolff 2016: 129-131) and the transnational and domestic elites involved 
in mining and hydrocarbon extraction (Arteaga 2015: 575-6). The government is heavily 
dependent on transnational extraction firms to exploit the resources with which social-
economic policies are to be funded (Kaup 2013: 102). When Morales took power, “most 
transnational mining and hydrocarbon firms had twenty-year contracts giving them access 
to the mineral and hydrocarbon reserves that bi- and multilateral-trade agreements legally 
guaranteed” (Ibid.). As such, transnational capital “had successfully embedded itself in 
Bolivia’s natural resource sectors for decades to come” (Ibid.). Meanwhile, agro-industrial 
elites from Santa Cruz with support from the US government and Brazilian rural elites with 
ties to Sao Paulo and international financial capital maintained influence over politics in the 
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region, preventing plans to implement radical agrarian revolution where 90 percent of the 
land is owned by 1 percent of the population (Gustafson and Fabricant 2017). 
The development strategy of the government that relied on, and continues to rely on, 
redistribution of natural resource rents and agro-exports placed great power, both in the 
hands of the TNCs and the domestic economic elites who have links to foreign extracting 
companies and export markets (Kaup 2013: 102). Hence while Morales may be critiqued for 
failing to move beyond natural resource exporting, he was in a tough position whereby he 
had promised to boost the social and economic inclusion of vulnerable sectors, while the 
embedded power of elite actors ensured that he could not radically alter the nature of the 
extraction model. What is more, given the underdeveloped nature of the Bolivian economy 
and its basis on primary-commodity exports, Morales had to prevent a general deterioration 
in the business environment for exporting (Wolff 2016: 138), meaning that economic elites 
retained significant structural power, that is, capacity to influence government policy 
decisions due to control over vital investment funds (Fairfield 2015). The result is that 
progressive principles coexist with neoliberal continuities, favouring conditions for national 
elites and transnational investors, such as low tax and royalties20 (Andreucci and Radhuber 
2015: 283). 
Despite anti-neoliberal rhetoric from Morales regarding radical agrarian land reform, 
wholesale nationalisations, and the construction of an economic model less reliant on 
natural resources, government-elite relations have in fact become relatively stable. As noted 
earlier, from 2006-09 business groups took a fiercely confrontational stance toward the 
government, using their links to the conservative autonomist movement and their control of 
                                                          
20
 For an excellent discussion of the mining sector and neoliberal continuities see Andreucce and Radhuber 
(2015) 
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the media to attempt to destabilise Morales. These attempts failed, however, due to the 
governments’ domestic political strength (Wolff 2016: 137). Indeed, it is precisely because 
of the government’s domination of the political sphere following the 2009 and 2010 
elections that economic elites came to realise that relying solely on an alliance with right-
wing political parties to gain political leverage was futile (Ibid.). Hence, economic elites 
switched their tactics of dealing with the Morales government from confrontation to 
dialogue, and ultimately, outright cooperation (Solón 2016; Wolff 2016).  
The decline in the political power of right-wing parties, the continued power of TNCs 
and their links to domestic elites, and the rapprochement between the government and 
exporting elites had two important outcomes that would feedback onto the development of 
post-neoliberal democratisation. Firstly, weakened political opposition opened the space for 
greater centralisation of power in the executive. While this centralisation began in response 
to the elite destabilisation tactics during the process of forging the new constitution (García 
Linera 2010), it has advanced in the second and third legislatures during Morales’ time in 
office where the MAS party “has held a two-thirds majority within the legislative assembly, 
has selected all ministers and has pre-selected the highest tribunals’ judges” (Schilling-
Vacaflor 2017: 671).  
Secondly, given the reduction in government-elite confrontations, Morales is less 
reliant on the support of strategic movements to defend the post-neoliberal process, 
thereby weakening popular power. Indeed, given the power balance between the 
government and both the TNC and domestic elite, and his desire to economically advance 
Bolivia so as to have the capacity to engage in democratic extending, the second phase of 
the post-neoliberal democratisation project has witnessed elements of “exclusionary and 
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authoritarian tendencies…directed against ‘internal enemies’ and former allies” (Schilling-
Vacaflor 2011: 13).  
As  such, and returning to the central concerns of the project regarding how to move 
beyond the confines of market democracy and simultaneously deepen and extend 
democracy, the above discussion suggests that the relative power balance between the 
state, elites, international (f)actors , and popular sectors greatly influenced the Bolivian 
process between 2009 and 2014. Given the government-elite relations outlined above, and 
the fact that the popular sector is not simply a unified bloc but is rather comprised of both 
core- and strategic-groups who have varying levels of power vis-à-vis the government, to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of efforts to deepen and extend democracy, as well as 
the level and form of centralisation of power in the executive, we must examine the process 
via the lenses of the two popular blocs. It is also necessary to analyse if and how differing 
power relations between the government and the core-bloc impacts the nature of relations 
between the government and the strategic-bloc. 
6.3 Core-organic relations and democratisation: 
As discussed above, the core bloc is comprised of those organisations that Morales has 
organic links with such as the Chapare cocaleros and the CSUTCB. In return for their support, 
Morales gives core supporters privileged positions in ministries,  as well as power to 
nominate “personnel for positions of medium and low importance in the executive branch 
at the national, departmental, and local levels of government” (Silva 2013: 67). 
Furthermore, Morales regularly consults with CONALCAM, which from 2009 onwards was 
principally made up of organic supporters. The interactions between Morales and 
CONALCAM on policy decisions, laws, and long-term strategies gives the member 
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movements great power to influence decision-making processes (Balderacchi 2015; Silva 
2015). Once CONALCAM approves a proposed law, it is sent to the National Assembly where 
MAS representatives seek its approval (Balderacchi 2015: 18). Given the considerable 
presence of members of core social movements in both the National Assembly and the 
MAS, CONALCAM decisions are guaranteed to be taken into account by the legislative body 
(Ibid.). As Balderacchi (2015: 18) summarises, CONALCAM “can thus be viewed as an 
unofficial parallel legislative assembly, bridging the gap between state and civil society, 
where both laws and the most important sociopolitical events of the moment are discussed 
and examined”.  
While core movements have certainly achieved access to the political decision-
making channels, the nature of the relationship between Morales and the movements raises 
concerns. Given the economic power of the government to redistribute resources, some 
observers question whether autonomous deliberative and participatory space exists for core 
organisations members to challenge the government. For example, many observers state 
that the CONALCAM has in fact “primarily served to channel and constrain the autonomy of 
member groups and movements into support for the government” (Morales and Conroy 
2017: 33).  Schilling-Vacaflor meanwhile (2017: 665) describes how the unwavering support 
of leaders of the Six Federations coca-growers organisation for the government has 
inhibited the scope of the base to express grievances resulting from negative socio-
environmental impacts of hydrocarbon activities and the lack of mitigation measures. As 
Schilling-Vacaflor (Ibid: 666) states, “before Morales became president... protest activities, 
or at least the threat of blockades against the…extraction companies, were quite common”. 
However, today the cocaleros, the municipal government, and community members do not 
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wish to challenge “their” government, even if government supported extraction policies 
negatively impact the well-being of some of the base (Ibid). The organic nature of the 
relations between government and the core organisations has thus hindered democratic 
deepening in some instances. 
In 2013, the Law of Participation and Social Control was passed and the government 
created the National Mechanism for Participation and Social Control as part of the Ministry 
of Transparency. The law states that “participation is a right, condition, and fundamental 
element of democracy” and that as such, social organisations (not movements) should 
oversee the functioning of state organs and politicians, formulate and elaborate public 
policies and laws, and have independence to take decisions. As Farthing (2017) states, 
“ostensibly, grassroots organisations would now have more influence than the 1994 LPP 
since social control would expand to cover all three levels of government (municipal, 
departmental, and national)”. However, as Revilla (2014: 53) suggests, while the law 
contains “good intentions”, its actual application has been questionable. The state 
determines which organised sectors should be recognised, and each government ministry 
convokes meetings with a pre-established agenda (Zuazo 2010: 134; Farthing 2017). 
Furthermore, the organisations that do participate do so in a fragmented manner (Zuazo 
2010: 134). 
However, while there certainly appears to have been some instances of co-optation 
of organic movements, given the associational and collective power of core supporters, they 
have at times shown sufficient autonomy to critique and mobilise against Morales when 
they are not included in decision-making processes that have an impact on their livelihoods 
(Balderacchi 2015; Anria 2013: 37). For example, after the decree to cancel fuel subsidies in 
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December 2010 that led to an estimated 83 percent increase in fuel prices (Anria 2013: 37), 
popular revolts against the policy that came to be known as the gasolinazo forced the 
government to backtrack. As Balderacchi (2015: 23) notes, what was interesting about the 
protests is that core support groups including the cocaleros and CSUTCB leaders were 
involved. It was not simply the increase in gas prices that upset core supporters. It was the 
exclusionary method of decision-making that irked these groups (Mayorga 2011a).  
In sum, core-movement opportunity and agency to influence a range of issues that 
resonate with movement demands was built, albeit through informal, un-institutionalised 
channels in return for active government support. As such, core movement-government 
relations exhibited characteristics of simultaneous deepening in conjunction with co-
optation and centralisation. The organisational composition of CONALCAM – it is comprised 
almost entirely of organic movements supportive of the government - and its privileged 
position in accessing political decision-making channels raises a further fundamental 
concern regarding the deepening of democracy in Bolivia’s post-neoliberal process. While 
the power of organic groups has prevented centralisation by holding the government to 
account, their very power protects Morales from having to engage fully with opponents of 
his regime, be they conservative opposition or former supporters, thereby actually opening 
opportunities for centralisation. An analysis of the relationship between the government 
and these former strategic supporters is thus required to identify if such centralisation has 
occurred.  
6.4 Strategic-government relations and democratisation:  
Relations between the central government and strategic organisations have tended to 
follow one of two paths; either they have been co-opted and become supportive allies, or 
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they have sought to retain autonomy and faced exclusion from participation. To fully 
comprehend such developments we must return to examine how elite forces have retained 
power over Morales as he seeks to develop an economy capable of supporting moderate 
democratic expansion.  
The power of national and international elites to influence government policy has 
ensured that elite economic privilege is protected, thereby limiting the possibility of 
adhering to the October Agenda. This has resulted in disillusionment and anger amongst 
many strategic popular organisations who had demanded the industrialisation and complete 
nationalisation of Bolivia’s natural gas resources so as to create jobs and boost state 
capacity to increase spending on welfare, education, and health needs (Iamamoto 2015: 
35). Furthermore, the decision by the government to maintain an economy based on 
neoliberal relations of extracting where transnational and domestic elites dictate the 
process has led to confrontations between the government and strategic organisations due 
to a failure to engage in meaningful prior consultation with affected, predominantly 
indigenous, groups (see for example Schilling Vacaflor 2017). Ultimately what we see here is 
the MAS government caught between demands of strategic popular organisations and an 
elite whose power to dictate policy has not been broken. In response, the government has 
sought to weaken contestatory organisations via a divide-and conquer strategy. 
This process has developed over time, beginning with the MAS insertion into areas 
where it had no organic base, but required electoral support, particularly in urban areas (see 
Anria 2013 for a detailed discussion). By incorporating militant leaders into the party 
structure, the MAS managed to ensure that they could count on the electoral support of 
popular organisations and their base members, as well as ensuring a docile society. As Tapia 
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(2011) notes, co-opted organisation leaders are required to show unwavering political 
loyalty if they wish to receive a cut of the public funds which they require in order to 
respond to the demands of their base. The result of this co-optation of erstwhile 
contestatory organisations, which originated in 2005 but deepened post 2009, is a 
monopolisation of power in the MAS to the “detriment of the exercise of concurrent and 
progressive powers of citizens with levels of autonomy and independent decision-making”, 
whereby participation that aims to transform living conditions “has been reduced to simple 
and uncritical support of the government” (Arteaga 2015: 583). 
In conjunction with co-opting, the government has fostered paralelismo, that is, the 
creating of parallel organisations to existing contestatory organisations. The government 
divides existing organisations by identifying sectors who will support the MAS and uses its 
economic power to direct funding to this “loyal” section, while using its ideological power 
and media influence to side-line elements of the organisation who seek to retain autonomy 
(Morales and Conroy 2017; Arteaga 2015). The outcome is a divided and confused base 
whose associational and collective power is diminished, while social movements, indigenous 
communities, and former allies are turned against each other (Morales and Conroy 2017: 
30). As a result, radical popular demands for a drastic overhaul of the structure of the 
economy and the nature of government-elite relations are greatly weakened.  There are 
numerous examples of such government tactics toward strategic organisations, both urban 
and rural, where there now exist multiple versions of an organisation, one controlled and 
recognised by the MAS, and others which either claim autonomy or which have been co-
opted by opposition parties, and which are not recognised by the central government. 
These processes of co-optation, division, and paralelismo are evidenced, amongst others, in 
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the cases of the CONAMAQ, CIDOB, the Central Obrera Departmental La Paz, urban popular 
organisations such as the FEJUVEs, and the Assembly of Guaraní People (APG)21.  
6.5 A summary of democratic deepening: Self-reinforcing and Reactive Sequences: 
In terms of deepening democracy, the outcomes of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal 
democratisation process to date have been mixed. The MAS-societal relations fit neither a 
bottom-up nor a top-down schema (Disney and Williams 2014: 22; Azzellini 2010) “but a 
complex combination of both” (Anria 2010: 102). Wolff (2013: 56) notes that “participation 
by popular organisations remains largely informal and is shaped, at least in part, by 
attempts to co-opt and control social movements from above. At the same time, horizontal 
accountability continues to be weak. The result is a concentration of political power in the 
government, even if important formal and informal checks on executive power exist”. What 
we witness is an almost paradoxical state of affairs whereby centralisation of power in the 
executive is accompanied by a deepening of democracy for some groups. As Schilling-
Vacaflor (2011: 12) summarises, “we can argue that civil society participation in Bolivia has 
been strengthened under Morales since representatives of hitherto marginalised groups 
now play an important role in Bolivian politics. Nevertheless, certain sectors of society have 
been included to a far greater extent than others. Moreover, the decision-making power of 
society is being limited by the homogenizing and partly authoritarian tendencies of the 
current government”. 
                                                          
21
 The nature of co-optation, divisions, and paralelismo differ from case to case, requiring in depth analysis to 
comprehend outcomes. I offer such analysis from the urban perspective of El Alto in the next chapter; for an 
excellent analysis of divide and conquer processes in rural areas see Schilling-Vacaflor (2017) on the APG 
struggles; analysis of the TIPNIS conflict by Morales (2013) highlights the divisions forged in the CONAMAQ and 
CIDOB. 
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A partially self-reinforcing sequence emerged whereby organic movements that 
helped bring Morales and the MAS to power have maintained influence over government 
policy regarding redistribution of resources to their base, while at the same time, this very 
redistribution of resources ensures near unequivocal support for the government. The 
nature of the relationship between Morales and the organic groups and the power these 
movements retain due to their capacity to influence the electorate as witnessed in the 2009 
elections, to mobilise in defence of the government – against elite opposition from 2006-09, 
and against former allies post-2009 - or to mobilise against Morales as witnessed during the 
gasolinazo, has ensured that early experiences of bottom-up participation have been 
reinforced over the duration of the democratisation project thereby preventing a full 
centralisation of power in the executive. On the other hand, the economic power wielded 
by the government has meant that core-group leaders have at times been co-opted, thereby 
allowing government interests, which are often set by powerful elite interests, to trump the 
concerns of base community members. 
Democratic deepening for strategic organisations however has followed a more 
reactive sequence. While strategic organisations were included during the Constituent 
Assembly battle against the autonomist movement, once economic elites and the MAS 
government ended their stand-off, the influence of strategic sectors diminished. Elite-
government relations and the economic plan of the MAS government has meant that some 
strategic movements have seen their demands side-lined, and ultimately, they have either 
been co-opted or ostracised. The result of such strategic-government relations limits  
The proposals that can be put forward by the representatives of civil society 
organisations and inhibit their criticism of the government, making dialogue 
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between grassroots sectors of society and state institutions conditional on serving 
the government’s interests, and thus depriving society of its prerogative to 
participate and/or influence proposed legislation and/or the development of public 
policies (Arteaga 2015: 573).  
6.6 2014 Presidential elections: 
In the 2014 presidential elections Morales won 61 percent of the vote, the MAS won a two-
thirds supermajority in both houses, while also winning eight of the nine provinces, 
including “three of four in the eastern lowlands—leading him to proclaim the ‘defeat’ of the 
political Right, and the replacement of the ‘media luna’ by the ‘luna llena’ (full moon) of a 
united Bolivia” (Achtenberg 2016: 374). How Morales achieved these results offers some 
light as to changes in the democratisation process post 2009. 
MAS gained support in the media luna, but lost ground in Andean strongholds like La 
Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, highlighting how Morales has tried to woo voters in erstwhile enemy 
territory, while also highlighting the rural nature of his continuing support coupled with a 
declining urban support (Centellas 2015). The use of core movements to mobilise electoral 
support sparked controversy amongst opposition politicians. CSUTCB leaders openly 
admitted that communities would be sanctioned according to the “norms of community 
justice” if they failed to support the MAS (Achtenberg 2014) while in the Chapare 
municipalities, over 95 percent voted for Morales (Schilling-Vacaflor 2017: 663). 
Apart from maintaining its tight links to its core support who mobilise the electorate for 
the party, the MAS and Morales have expanded to the eastern lowlands, reflecting in part 
“the rapprochement between the government and the (agri-) business sectors (in Santa 
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Cruz, in particular)” (BTI 2016). Furthermore, “600 militants from the conservative 
Democratic National Action Party (ADN) of Santa Cruz, formed by ex-military dictator Hugo 
Banzer” were “welcomed by the MAS leadership after renouncing their party affiliations” 
(Achtenberg 2014). Indeed, several conservative leaders from the old neoliberal parties 
“reinvented themselves as MAS legislative candidates” leading to frustration amongst many 
long-time progressive constituents who feel unrepresented by them (Ibid.). As Achtenberg 
(2014) astutely noted, “while this strategy may further fracture the right, and may deliver 
more MAS votes on balance, these benefits may come at the cost of impeding more 
progressive policies in the Plurinational Assembly and diluting Bolivia’s so-called ‘process of 
change’”. In conjunction with the support of the core movements and the agri-elites, the co-
opting of strategic sectors and paralelismo has also ensured that the MAS retains the 
support of some strategic organisations, while the continuance of cash transfers secures the 
votes of many of the most vulnerable sectors (Morales and Conroy 2017).  
7. Post-inflection sequencing phase 3: 2015-present: 
While the 2014 elections appeared to show that the MAS’s political power was continuing 
to grow, key events in 2015 and 2016 such as defeats in urban zones in local elections, a 
defeat in the referendum on presidential re-election for Morales, and the first impacts of 
the end of the resource boom on government economic power suggest that Bolivia’s post-
neoliberal democratisation may be entering a new phase, the outcomes of which will 
depend on the balance of forces between the government, elites, various societal actors, 
and the international sphere.  
7.1 Declining urban support for the MAS: 
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The 2015 subnational elections continued the trend of the 2014 elections, with the MAS 
consolidating its electoral power, but losing ground in the urban zones where it lost in eight 
of the ten principal cities, the departmental capitals, along with El Alto (Alberti 2016). Vice-
president García Linera’s observation that “the population accompany the project, but they 
were not in agreement with the candidates we selected” (as quoted in Molina 2015) 
highlights how the centralised selection of candidates without respecting the preferences of 
the base cost the MAS electorally in the cities. Clearly a gap has emerged in the original 
support bloc that brought Morales to power in 2005. Those core movements who have 
been included in decision-making retain, for the most part, support, though Nelson Condori, 
the Aymara representative on the executive of the CSUTCB, warned that “we will continue 
to support Evo only for as long as he listens to our demands” (interview with author). 
However, the government tactics of courting conservatives and elites and moderating the 
extent of the democratisation project, combined with the co-opting and creation of parallel 
organisations appears to have cost the government legitimacy amongst urban popular 
voters (see next chapter for detailed discussion of this phenomenon in El Alto).  
7.2 Rescinding re-election restrictions: 
The referendum on presidential re-election in 2016 also highlights the changing nature of 
support for a MAS-Morales-led project. As Acthenberg (2016) describes, at the inauguration 
of Morales’ third term he outlined an ambitious 10-year development plan – “the ‘Agenda 
Patriótica 2025’ (Patriotic Agenda 2025) - to be financed by continued expansion of the gas-
fuelled economy. With no other strong national leadership in the wings, MAS party logic 
held that a fourth presidential term for Morales was critical to accomplish this mission”. 
Morales sought a referendum on modifying the Constitution so as to allow a third re-
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election of the president and vice-president, drawing a varied response. A “No” coalition 
formed around traditional right-wing politicians, along with the new mayor of El Alto, 
Soledad Chapetón of the Unidad Nacional party, and the mayor of La Paz Luis Revilla of the 
Soberanía y Libertad Bolivia (Sovereignty and Liberty Bolivia-Sol.Bo) party (Achtenberg 2016: 
375), a moderate social democratic party. Completing the coalition “were ex-MASistas and 
representatives of alienated Left-popular sectors seeking to rehabilitate what they perceive 
as a stagnating ‘process of change’, who constituted themselves as the ‘popular No’ bloc” 
(Ibid.). The “No” coalition focused media attention on a series of scandals22, challenging the 
credibility of Morales and MAS (Alberti 2016; Achtenberg 2016: 375).  
The referendum was narrowly defeated by 51.3 percent, thereby blocking the 
possibility of re-election for Morales. However, in September, the MAS asked the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which is an “old friend” of the president (Vaca Villa 2017) to rescind 
limits on elected authorities seeking re-election indefinitely, arguing that they violate 
human rights (Reuters 2017). On November 28th, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that all 
elected officials could run for office indefinitely (Farthing 2017a), with Macario Lahor Cortez, 
the head of the court, stating that “all people that were limited by the law and the 
constitution are hereby able to run for office, because it is up to the Bolivian people to 
decide” (as cited in Reuters 2017). 
On December 3rd, judicial elections were held which “became a litmus test of the 
country’s political climate…due to an effort spearheaded by a coalition of former presidents, 
                                                          
22
 For a discussion of allegations against high-ranking MAS politicians of mismanagement and corruption of the 
public funds see Alberti (2016); See Achtenberg (2016: 373) for overview of the “Zapata” affair in which 
allegations emerged regarding Morales and Gabriela Zapata and an allegedly still-living “love-child”, as well as 
the directing of multi-million dollar no-bid contracts from the MAS government to the Chinese company in 
which Zapata held a high-level post. Furthermore, an arson attack on the El Alto municipal building by MAS 
party militants which left 6 dead further eroded support for the re-election campaign. 
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vice-presidents, governors, and political party leaders to urge Bolivians to cast null votes ” 
(Farthing 2017a). While 84 per cent of the electorate voted, “51 per cent of the ballots cast 
were nullified leading the right-wing opposition to declare a victory and declare the result as 
evidence that support for Evo Morales is declining” (Ibid.). The ultimate outcome of the 
decision to allow re-election remains to be seen, but it has seriously damaged the image of 
Morales in the international sphere, while it is likely to galvanise the divided opposition 
(Vaca Villa 2017). Furthermore, responding to the Constitutional Tribunal’s finding to allow 
re-election, political analyst David Smilde posted on his Twitter feed that “as happened with 
Chavismo after 2009, this virtually guarantees an internal atrophy of the MAS. Lower and 
mid-level leaders now realise their political lives are tied to Evo, and critical feedback and 
independent thinking are not in their interest” (Smilde 2017b). 
7.3 Changing international (f)actors: 
The changing international market for Bolivia’s commodities adds to the likely fluctuations 
in Bolivia’s democratisation project. 2015 witnessed a steep fall in prices for Bolivia’s 
primary commodity exports, signalling an end to the resource-boom that fuelled Morales’ 
democratic extending programmes since the mid-2000s. From April 2014 to April 2015, the 
collection of Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons take had decreased by 16 percent (Alonso 2015). 
As such, during 2015 Morales began to prepare to adopt austerity measures (Alberti 2016: 
33), although prudent economic management during the boom provided a safety net that 
has prevented social spending from coming to a complete stop (Achtenberg 2016: 373).  
The Patriotic Agenda 2025 and the Economic and Social Development Plan 2016-20 
both outline the plans to continue using extraction to finance development. As vice-
president García-Linera stated in August 2016, “we are going to use extractivism, for at least 
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two decades more” in order to develop and protect society.  As Farthing notes, the 
continued focus on expanding extraction as the easiest way to boost infrastructure and 
services has meant that the government’s alliance with the traditional elites has steadily 
tightened (Riofrancos and Farthing 2017). By 2017, “the government had replaced its 
original discourse of societal transformation with one focused on the newfound economic 
stability it had delivered to the country, which has long been notoriously unstable. In the 
process, its political agenda became far more centrist; it moved away from its older 
commitment to communitarian socialism and towards policies that encourage capitalist 
growth that fuels government re-distribution” (Ibid).  However, looking to the future, it 
remains to be seen how the government, elites, and the MAS support base, will respond to 
continued declines in the price of its principle exports. 
The regional scenario has also fundamentally shifted since Morales took power, with 
the return of neoliberal presidents in Argentina and Brazil reducing ideological support for a 
post-neoliberal project in regional organisations such as the Mercado Común del Sur 
(Common Market of the South – MERCOSUR). Crucially, core ideological and economic ally 
Venezuela is mired in a deep economic and political crisis that threatens to result in 
dramatically reduced funding scenario for Bolivia (López Segrera 2016).  
Meanwhile, Bolivia’s growing relationship with China provides both opportunities 
and challenges. Bilateral trade between the two countries increased from $75.3 million 
dollars in 2000 by a factor of six by 2014 (Ellis 2016: 5), and China has become the fifth 
largest market for Bolivian exports, mostly raw materials such as minerals, hydrocarbons, 
wood, and soybeans (Achtenberg 2017). China has also become Bolivia’s chief bilateral 
creditor, accounting for 9.2 percent of the country’s foreign debt, much of which has been 
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used to purchase “a vast array of goods and services produced by Chinese companies 
(public and private) for the Bolivian state and its various enterprises, including roads, 
bridges, railways, hydroelectric plants, and mining facilities” (Ibid.). According to official 
rhetoric, Bolivia and China work together in a cooperative horizontal relationship, with 
Morales stating that the relationship has reduced Western leverage as “Bolivia has achieved 
independence from U.S.-dominated financial institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, whose onerous lending conditions in the 1980s and ‘90s 
undermined the country’s economic and political sovereignty”. 
However, critics argue that Bolivia’s relationship with China serves Chinese 
expansionary interests rather than Bolivia’s productive capacity, and that in fact there is an 
increasing dependency on extractivism and foreign capital (Acthenberg 2017), with Rafael 
Puente (2017) suggesting that Bolivia is “substituting one imperialism for another”. As 
Achtenberg (2017) summarises,  
For Bolivia, the relationship has deepened its dependency not only on China, but on a 
mode of development centred on megaworks and extractivism, that has led to growing 
social and political unrest. A significant portion of the country’s (current and future) 
resources are now pledged to outsized projects tailored to the interests and capacities 
of transnational conglomerates. In this sense, China’s presence in Bolivia has helped to 
foreclose opportunities for alternative development grounded in local and regionally-
based sustainable production that could point towards resolution of the country’s deep-
seated economic, social, and political conflicts. 
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8. Summary, issues, and questions going forward:  
The historical development of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal democratisation process detailed in 
this chapter has identified how the balance of power between government, and popular 
society, elites, and the international sphere has had a crucial impact on determining the 
outcomes to date. Indeed, it is the conflux of these various relationships that holds the 
current conjuncture together, offering both opportunities and pitfalls for the future of the 
project. 
Fundamentally, the exclusion of popular groups who critique the government 
coupled with a moderated deepening of democracy that sees deep access for organic 
groups and a co-opted inclusion for some strategic organisations has stunted the Bolivian 
post-neoliberal democratisation process. By failing to foster  self-reflexive dialectical flows 
of information that allow for popular concerns from the base to reach the upper echelon of 
government, the process led by Morales which promised to both extend and deepen 
democracy fails to respond to citizens’ demands, loses legitimacy, and worryingly, leaves the 
door ajar for right-wing political actors to channel popular discontent. Furthermore, the 
commodity boom that has maintained the social pact in Bolivia in recent years has 
rescinded. 
Several fundamental questions thus emerge regarding the next phase and the legacy 
of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal process; will the government favour a deepening of austerity 
rather than challenge elite interests, and if so, what will the popular response to austerity 
be; will a popular political alternative to the MAS emerge; will right-wing parties re-emerge 
at a local and national level; have popular actors been too weakened to defend the process 
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meaning elite demands will dominate causing a reversal and return to full market 
democracy? The answers to these questions may well rest on whether popular actors can 
overcome the problems of centralisation, divisions, and paralelismo, re-forge autonomy 
from the government and re-build the associational and collective power that was prevalent 
in the run-up to Morales’ initial election. Indeed, given the current balance of power 
between government, elites, and the international sphere, I suggest that if the project is to 
be radicalised, popular power must explode once more. To offer some response to these 
issues and identify what the lessons and legacies of Bolivia’s attempt to deliver a post-
neoliberal democracy are, I now offer an in depth analysis of the process to date in the 
urban centre of El Alto.  
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Chapter 5: The view from above: 
Democratisation in El Alto 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter examines Bolivia’s attempts to engage in a post-neoliberal democratisation 
process from the perspective of urban strategic groups in the city of El Alto, an indigenous-
migrant city that looks down upon La Paz, to which it is connected via a spiralling 30 minute 
drive. The previous chapter detailed how the relative balance of power between the state, 
domestic and transnational elites, and popular society – both core and strategic groups – 
influenced the democratisation sequencing and outcomes in terms of deepening, extending 
and centralisation of power. By examining the process via an appraisal of state-strategic 
group relations in El Alto, this chapter aims to offer a more  nuanced understanding not only 
of the actually existing outcomes of the process to date, but also of the legacy, dangers, and 
difficulties of efforts to construct a post-neoliberal democracy in Bolivia. 
El Alto offers a key site for analysis, firstly given the vital role its residents played in 
the anti-neoliberal protests that precipitated the election of Evo Morales, and secondly, 
because it has experienced, and continues to experience, the contradictions of the post-
neoliberal process detailed in the previous chapter which many citizens across the country 
face. As such, the experience of El Alto residents offers a rich site to identify the lessons and 
legacies of the democratisation process in Bolivia more generally. While I focus 
predominantly on local experiences in El Alto, I also include analysis of departmental and 
national organisations in which El Alto organisations are members.  
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The TGPT framework developed in chapter 2 calls for an examination of the 
antecedent conditions that influence both the point of inflection – that is, the election of a 
progressive president – as well the aftermath sequencing, suggesting that the relative 
balance of power between the state, organised popular society, economic elites, and 
international (f)actors are key variables influencing the pathways and outcomes of the 
democratisation process. As such, a brief history of the city is offered, highlighting the 
building of militant popular power and the explosion of anti-neoliberal protest, particularly 
between 2003 and 2005. Based on four months field research in 2017 where I completed 
thirty interviews with key actors in El Alto, as well as attending multiple protests and 
political meetings and engaging in ethnographic data collection, the chapter then examines 
the evolving relationship between the MAS government and popular organisations, in 
particular the Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighbourhood Associations; 
FEJUVE) and the Central Obrero Regional-El Alto (Regional Workers Union of El Alto; COR), 
detailing how co-optation and centralisation  have impacted on societal power, how the 
emergence of the phenomenon of paralelismo is impacting democratic outcomes, and what 
the role of opposition parties and economic elites has been on the process in El Alto. Next, a 
discussion regarding if and how societal power in El Alto prevalent before the election of 
Morales is likely to re-emerge and act as a counterweight to centralisation tendencies, 
thereby fostering the possibility of a “progressive centralisation”. Such analysis sheds light 
on the how and why questions regarding El Alto’s democratisation process. The chapter 
finishes by placing the El Alto analysis into the national context, thereby helping us to draw 
lessons from the city’s and Bolivia’s experiences for democratisation theory in general 
regarding how to move beyond the confines of market democracy toward a post-neoliberal 
model. 
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2. Antecedent Conditions: 
2.1 El Alto’s Militant History: 
El Alto has a long history of community organising which stems partly from the rural Andean 
community traditions brought by the migrants who make up the majority of the population 
(Crabtree and Chaplin 2013: 67). In addition, neoliberal structural adjustment during the 
1980s fostered the closure of many of the country’s mines, resulting in mass migration of 
Quechuan miners, many to El Alto, who brought with them Marxist traditions of organising 
(Albo 2006a; Silva 2009; Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Lazar 2008). The city is, then, a space 
with a rich experience of social organisation (Deledicque and Contartese 2010: 138), which 
over thirty years has “developed a dense, close-knit system of community associations 
organised mainly along territorial and geographic lines (district and neighbourhood) to meet 
basic needs in the face of government neglect” (Silva 2009: 135). In the 1980s, these local 
communities organised to demand access to basic services such as electricity, education, 
and street paving  with the Central Obrera Regional-El Alto, infused with militancy from the 
miners, and the juntas vecinales, local neighbourhood councils who joined together to form 
the FEJUVE, playing leading roles (Silva 2009: 136-7). Women’s’ groups, students, gremiales 
– organisations of informal street traders, cultural groups and others have also developed in 
the city (Deledicque and Contartese 2010). This chapter focuses predominantly on the 
experiences of the FEJUVE and the COR as these were the most prominent popular 
organisations in the wave of anti-neoliberal protests that brought Morales to power. During 
the early stages of the development of the city, and during the anti-neoliberal protests of 
2003-2005, these organisations offered an alternative mobilisation vehicle to traditional 
parties, and indeed, in moments where political parties failed to respond to citizens, they 
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filled this vacuum (Deledicque and Contartese 2010: 142). Furthermore, understanding the 
changing nature of the relationship between these popular organisations and representative 
institutions in the aftermath sequencing offers fundamental lessons for post-neoliberal 
democratisation theory.   
The FEJUVE El Alto can be traced to 1957 when the first inhabitants of the then 
seven zones of El Alto formed a neighbourhood council to protest against discrimination 
faced by Alteños (residents of El Alto) at the hands of the leaders of the Federación 
Departmental de Juntas Vecinales de la Paz and to demand the state provide basic services 
such as water and electricity23. Daniel Gutiérrez, the press officer for the FEJUVE located on 
the 6 de Marzo Avenue of El Alto, highlights how the FEJUVE has developed over time from 
a social movement that appeared at specific moments to focus on specific grievances, into a 
social organisation with much more general demands regarding the development of the city 
and the country (interview with author). It has grown to today encompass approximately 
800 local neighbourhood zones organised into fourteen districts (Mancilla 2016: 65). The 
FEJUVE statute, forged during the Statute Congress in 2001, adopts elements of ayllu logic 
such as communitarianism and the notion of rotatividad whereby dirigentes (leaders 
selected by the base of the organisation) are to be replaced every two years (Ibid: 66-7; D. 
Gutiérrez, interview with author). Furthermore, article 1 states that the FEJUVE El Alto is a 
civic, democratic, participative, and apolitical institution. As such the organisation must 
prioritise the interests of the city’s residents above serving any political party (Mancilla 
2016: 68). The statute also enforces the point that the community must be the priority 
above any personal interests (Ibid.: 69). 
                                                          
23
 See Mancilla (2016: 63-70) for in depth discussion of the history of the FEJUVE El Alto. 
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In terms of structure, local barrios organise at the district level in which all of the 
juntas vecinales of the base of the district decide on and coordinate actions, while above the 
district level is the executive branch of the organisation, that is, the FEJUVE. The members 
of the executive are selected by the 14 district-level organisations (D. Gutiérrez interview 
with author). Fluid relations between the base and upper levels seek to provide a 
counterweight toward any tendency of top-down decision-making (Espósito and Arteaga 
2006: 63). As discussed below, the nature of the structure gave the FEJUVE the capacity to 
mobilise enormous numbers during moments of resistance (Ibid.). Indeed, writing in 2013, 
Crabtree and Chaplin (2013: 69) stated that the FEJUVE had become the principle institution 
representing Alteños’ interests, more so than the mayor or the elected city councillors.  
The COR meanwhile was originally founded in 1985 to represent the demands of El 
Alto’s workers and street traders (Mancilla 2016: 71). In fact, the “COR was paradoxically a 
result of the neoliberal adjustment package implemented in 1985, because as more 
unemployed workers turned to the informal sector, guilds grew exponentially and founded 
the organisation” (Albó 2006a). It was founded on the principles that it must retain 
autonomy and independence from all political parties. Indeed its purpose was to perform a 
contestatory role representing worker demands in front of the state. Furthermore, Article 5 
of the organisation’s statute highlights the Trotskyist traditions of the COR, stating that the 
organisation is antiimperialist and that it seeks the social and national liberation of Bolivia, 
and that it is to do so via direct action of the masses and hunger strikes (Mancilla 2016: 77). 
Article 25 of the statute states that members of the executive committee are elected for 
two year periods.  
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2.2 Party-society relations in the Antecedent Era: 
The Law of Popular Participation (LPP)24 introduced in 1994 meant that municipal 
governments assumed greater roles and responsibilities, while also empowering the 
neighbourhood committees because they were charged with overseeing municipal spending  
via “comités de vigilancia”(Silva 2009: 136; Crabtree and Chaplin 2013: 71). However, the 
LPP also divided communities along territorial lines with local groups battling for their 
portion of the budget (Revilla 2007: 19), thereby weakening the class consciousness which 
had been fomenting in El Alto (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013: 71). The neoliberal 
informalisation of labour transformed relations between workers, with competition rather 
than unity developing in the labour market (Ibid.: 72). As Crabtree  and Chaplin (2013: 72) 
state, “in this context, the neighbourhood associations became key mediators between the 
state and society, and increasingly formed a clientelistic relation” whereby political parties  
offered public works contracts in return for the political support of the leaders of popular 
organisations (Revilla 2007: 19). As such, while these organisations represented their base, 
there has always been a tendency for local political parties to control them from above (A. 
Cahuaya, interview with author), be that the right-wing MNR, the populist Conciencia de 
Patria (CONDEPA), or centre-Left Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) under the 
guidance of José Luis “Pepelucho” Paredes (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013: 71; Quispe 2003).  
2.3 2002-05: Popular power, autonomy, unity, and anti-neoliberal contestation: 
The period of 2002-05 witnessed a fundamental reformation of how popular organisations 
engaged with the municipal state and political parties. The divisions in El Alto’s social 
organisations that had been fomented from above and re-enforced by neoliberal policies 
                                                          
24
 See page 114 for more on the LPP. 
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were to be overcome, paradoxically, in response to neoliberal policies. The announcement 
in mid-2003 by the mayor of El Alto, José Luis Paredes, to introduce a land registry system to 
regulate transactions in real estate in El Alto irked Alteños who saw the proposed 
regulations as a new tax to extract more money from the poor (Arbona 2008: 36). Locals 
argued that they had already paid property tax, labelling the new payment as “Maya Paya”, 
an Aymara term meaning “once and twice”. Sentiment amongst indignant locals that they 
had already too much in property charges was captured by the commonly heard slogan “it is 
impossible that they demand us to pay taxes even on our dog’s kennels” (A. Cahuaya, 
interview with author).  
The proposed tax led to local forums and debates centred on the notion of Alteño 
dignity, particularly in District 4 of the city (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). Initially, the 
FEJUVE, led by Mauricio Cori, did not support the District 4 calls for a forum due to the 
traditional prebendalismo (political parties giving perks to organisation leaders) and party-
FEJUVE links that still existed at that time. However, local leaders in District 4 contacted 
dirigentes across the city without the support of the FEJUVE executive, rejecting the Maya 
Paya and calling for all Alteños to challenge the tax. A forum was organised and in the face 
of widespread rejection of the tax, the FEJUVE accepted that all of the districts should 
protest until the proposed tax was completely rescinded (the above discussion of the Maya 
Paya tax and protest is based on an interview with A. Cahuaya).  
 With the FEJUVE organising massive protests, and despite the mayor’s heavy-handed 
repressive tactics, the Maya Paya tax proposal was rescinded in September 2003 (Arbona 
2008: 36). Meanwhile, state violence in Warisata in response to peasant roadblocks 
organised by Felipe Quispe and the CSUTCB indigenous peasants which led to the deaths of 
177 
 
six peasants25 united the Aymara of the altiplano and set off a wave of peasant mobilisation 
across the country calling for the president’s resignation (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 174; Silva 
2009: 139). Many of the Aymaras of the highlands who supported Felipe Quispe and the 
Katarista ideals were “peasants with one foot in the countryside and one foot in the city of 
El Alto…El Alto was the bedroom of the migrants” who came to the city to sell their produce 
(C. Arze, interview with author). As such, the government response to the Warisata incident 
resonated deeply with the city’s populace. Furthermore, with El Alto’s neighbourhood 
organisations already mobilised against the proposed Maya Paya tax (Espósito and Arteaga 
2006: 3), President Lozada’s proposals to sell Bolivian gas to the United States via Chile was 
a catalyst that sparked a massive Alteño uprising in October 2003 that came to be known as 
the Gas War. 
On October 8th, the FEJUVE-El Alto called for an indefinite “paro cívico” (general civil 
strike) (Lazar 2006: 184). Meanwhile, miners from Huanuni marched to El Alto to join the 
struggle (Spronk and Webber 2007: 36).The COR-El Alto also played a central role in the 
2003 Gas War, in particular the gremialista sector of street traders who closed markets in 
concert with the general strikes called for by the FEJUVE and the COB (Lazar 2006: 192). The 
students of the public university of El Alto, the UPEA also joined the protests (A. Cahuaya, 
interview with author).  
The exact role of the FEJUVE and COR leaderships in organising the Gas War 
mobilisations is however somewhat disputed. While Mauricio Cori, then president of the 
FEJUVE, maintained that that the organisation was always in control of the protests (as cited 
in Lazar 2006: 193), others suggest that it was the pueblo that revolted whereby the 
                                                          
25
 See section 3.4 of chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of the events in Bolivia in general at this time. 
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neighbourhood organisation leaders had to follow the will of the grassroots base (Lazar 
2006: 193). It is necessary to emphasise here the nature of the relations between the base, 
neighbourhood organisations’ leaderships, and the government before the Gas War of 
2003. In many ways, “democracy had reached its limits in 2003 whereby the people, instead 
of being incorporated or included in the plans for the development of the city, they had 
been excluded” and the dirigencia (of the FEJUVE and COR) simply towed the political party 
line (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). It was in this scenario, whereby regular citizens 
were becoming increasingly agitated regarding the economic and political scenario in the 
country, yet where the organisations charged with defending their interests failed to offer a 
response that reflected the sentiment in the city that the base sought to rejuvenate the COR 
and the FEJUVE.  
Emanating from the successful Maya Paya resistance, there was “a thirst, a desire to 
analyse and comprehend the issues” that impeded the popular organisations from 
defending the needs of the base all of the time (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). There 
were local meetings that culminated in a conscientisation (Freire 1970) of the base, whereby 
the people realised that they must “oblige their dirigentes to respond to the needs of the 
barrio, and not to the political parties” (A. Cahuaya,interview with author). As Luis Flores 
highlighted (interview with author), the head of the FEJUVE, Mauricio Cori, faced threats 
from the municipal government to quell the rising protests against the government and the 
selling of gas, but at the same time, Cori was facing threats from the FEJUVE dirigencia to 
listen to the base.  
 There was a change in mentality, both of the base and of their dirigentes, in terms of 
how the FEJUVE should interact with the government (L. Flores, interview with author). 
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They emphasised that dirigentes must be clean, that they must not be corrupted by the 
parties and that they must not “extend their hand looking for presents” (L.Flores, interview 
with author). As Alfredo Cahuaya (interview with author) states, “if ever there was a 
moment, it was in 2003 when the El Alto dirigencia didn’t belong to any political party”. The 
dirigentes were “completely united around one mission whose objective was to improve El 
Alto” (C. Barrera, interview with author). Furthermore, the dirigentes of the FEJUVE in 2003 
held strong Left-wing beliefs that had been formed over many years, and they ensured that 
the top-level of the FEJUVE was held to account (L. Flores, interview with author). Indeed, 
with the dirigentes from district 4 leading the way, all of the districts united behind the idea 
of re-taking the FEJUVE from the parties and restoring it to a popular organisation that 
would no longer fall prey to political co-optation (L. Flores, interview with author). The 
FEJUVE even replaced the secretary and the doorman that were paid for by the municipal 
government so that the organisation could ask “Well, what are we going to rely on the 
municipal government or the central government for…For nothing!” (L. Flores, interview 
with author).  
Indiviudal juntas vecinales organised communal cooking as food shortages became more 
acute (Lazar 2006: 193). They “organised defence committees to go round people's houses 
and make them join the demonstrations, telling them 'todos o nadies (sic) vamos a salir' 
('either everyone or no-one goes out [to march]')” (Ibid.: 194). As Carlos Arze states, in 
these two or three weeks in El Alto, “the authority, the state for the people was their juntas 
vecinales (neighbourhood councils). They controlled the traffic, the markets, what to sell 
and when, where to organise the barricades….They brought their memories of worker’s 
democracy…along with communitarian ideas from the indigenous and campesino Katarista 
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movements” to organise the city’s defence as well as to help with day to day running of the 
city (interview with author).  
Webber (2012: 185-6) summarises the dialectic relationship between the grassroots 
base and the formal infrastructure and leadership of the FEJUVE and the COR, noting that,  
Without the formal structures, the rank and file base would have been unable to 
coordinate their actions at a higher scale than their local neighbourhoods, while without 
the self-activity, self-organisation and radical push from the grassroots, the executive 
leadership of both El Alto organisations would have been more likely to engage in the 
normal processes of negotiation with the state, moderation of demands, and eventual 
fracturing and demobilisation of the rebellious movements. 
The government sent the military in to quell the El Alto uprising, leading to the 
deaths of scores of residents (Postero 2010: 61). However, the aggressive actions of the 
state backfired with mass protests erupting across the country demanding the ouster of the 
president (Silva 2009: 142), and with an estimated half a million people (Hylton 2003) taking 
over the streets of La Paz and El Alto, de Lozada fled for exile in the US, with vice-president 
Carlos Mesa taking over (Spronk and Webber 2007: 36). The Gas War protest which 
originated in El Alto due to a unified base re-taking control of their erstwhile co-opted 
neighbourhood organisations had thus erupted into a national level movement which 
successfully removed a sitting neoliberal president. 
2.4 El Alto’s Water War: 
With World Bank support, “the municipal water utility that served the neighbouring cities of 
La Paz and El Alto was granted in a 1997 concession to Aguas del Illimani, a consortium 
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controlled by the French multinational Suez” (Spronk and Webber 207: 39). Over the 
duration of the concession, the company continuously complained that it could not make 
enough money selling water to poor people in El Alto, and in 2002 the company lobbied the 
government regulator to approve increases in its charging structures (Ibid.: 41). The 
company managed to reduce the number of new connections it was obliged to make, 
eventually reducing this to zero, thereby leaving 200,000 people without access because 
they lived outside the “service zone” agreed between the government and the company 
(Spronk 2007: 20; Spronk and Webber 2007: 42). As Spronk (2007: 20) notes, “an additional 
70,000 people without water and sewage lived within the served area but could not afford 
the US $445 connection fees, the equivalent of almost nine monthly salaries”. This scenario 
led to Bolivia’s second Water War in January 2005. 
 At the head of the conflict was the FEJUVE led by Abel Mamani (who would go on to 
be named Minister for Water in the first Morales administration). While the FEJUVE had 
begun negotiating with the government in mid-2004, all out strikes were called with the 
FEJUVE mobilising its grassroots base (Laurie and Crespo 2007: 844) on January 9th 2005. 
The FEJUVE had built its legitimacy as a true representative of the popular sectors during the 
2003 Gas War due to its autonomous stance from the political parties and the traditional 
clientelistic structures (Crespo 2005). Thousands “of citizens took to the streets yelling the 
slogan popularised during the Gas War, ‘El Alto on its feet, never on its knees!’” (Spronk 
2007: 20). On January 11th, Mesa sent a letter to the FEJUVE stating that he was beginning 
the actions necessary to terminate the contract with Illimani (Ibid.). In response, the FEJUVE 
“gave Mesa's government twenty-four hours to promulgate a decree immediately cancelling 
the contract with the water company or protestors would seise the company's central 
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offices in El Alto” (Ibid.). The following day, Mesa formalised the cancellation of the contract 
via presidential decree and, after consulting with the local juntas vecinales, the FEJUVE 
called an end to the strike (Ibid.). 
2.5 The second Gas War 2005: 
The new leadership of the FEJUVE following the 2003 Gas War took on the mandate to 
advance the October Agenda, and the Water War against Illimani was perceived by FEJUVE 
members “as part of a much broader political project to restore Bolivia's economic 
sovereignty” (Spronk 2007: 19). As Spronk (Ibid.) states, “suddenly, not only was the FEJUVE 
working on local issues, but also on national political demands such as the call for a 
Constitutional Assembly and the nationalisation of natural resources”. Such a stance was 
considered vital because the Gas War of 2003 had “not lead to a revolutionary break with 
neoliberal capitalism” with Carlos Mesa adopting “a neoliberal reformist style of 
governance” (Spronk and Webber2007: 37). As Webber (2010: 55) summarises, “his 
administration reached agreements with the IMF to guarantee the continuity of the 
neoliberal model, to respect the sanctity of the privatisations of state-owned enterprises 
that had been implemented by Sánchez de Lozada in the late 1990s, and to persist in paying 
back the crushing external debt of the country”. 
Mesa’s framing of the questions in the July 2004 referendum on the issue of 
hydrocarbons offered a diluted response to demands of the social organisations in El Alto 
who had called for complete nationalisation of the country’s resources, and not simply a 
change to the levels of taxation and royalties paid by the TNCs (Webber 2010). With the 
FEJUVE already mobilised in response to the Water War, “Roberto de la Cruz of the radically 
anticapitalist social movement M-17 in El Alto and Jaime Solares of the COB were attending 
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meetings of FEJUVE–El Alto in an attempt to build solidarity across different sectors of the 
working class and peasantry” (Webber 2010: 61) in order to boost resistance to Mesa’s 
continuation of the neoliberal model. However, even the moderate changes advocated by 
Mesa were considered too much by the elites who organised counter-mobilisations to 
popular protests (Webber 2010: 54), ramping up the pressure on Mesa. Mesa, 
“underestimating the strength of the left-indigenous bloc, opted for an open realignment 
with the eastern-bourgeois bloc” (Webber 2010: 54). The response by the popular sectors, 
whose associational and collective power was at its zenith, witnessed hundreds of 
thousands of protesters taking to the streets, effectively shutting down the cities of La Paz 
and El Alto, thereby forcing Mesa to resign (Spronk and Webber 2007: 38; Webber 2010: 
67). 
2.6 Outcomes of anti-neoliberal mobilisation and the Election of Evo Morales: 
Despite the collective and associational power that was built during the Gas Wars and the 
Water War, El Alto lacked a leader capable of harnessing the popular energy to take political 
power at the national level. While there was a fundamental questioning of the role and 
capacity of the existing state and model of democracy, the popular sectors were “not 
organised politically around a program or project that would allow us the possibility of truly 
taking power” (C. Rojas, interview with author). Furthermore, maintaining radical protest 
following the Gas War in the face of military and police repression and food shortages was 
impossible (C. Arze, interview with author). The demands of the radical actors of the Gas 
War - Felipe Quispe and the Kataristas, the miners, and the COR and FEJUVE of El Alto - for a 
fundamental transformation of the state were thus relegated to the side-lines (C. Arze, 
interview with author). 
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In a scenario of severe desgaste (exhaustion) with the traditional parties, protester 
fatigue, and with a lack of local alternatives, the MAS and Evo Morales came to fill the 
vacuum in El Alto. When the MAS initially expanded from its rural base in El Chapare, it 
faced resistance from Alteños who associated the party with drug-trafficking (Anria 2013: 
32). However, with existing parties such as CONDEPA losing legitimacy amongst the popular 
base, and Morales emphasising his indigenous rather than his cocalero background (Revilla 
2014: 58), initial rejection of the MAS softened. As such, the MAS and Morales gained 
ground in the city based on identity politics, not necessarily on ideological grounds (C. Arze, 
interview with author). Indeed, according to Carlos Arze (interview with author), while the 
MAS was certainly distinct from the traditional Right-wing parties, it did not differ from 
them greatly in terms of its conception of the state and democracy.  
The Gas War and the Water War of 2004-05 helped the fragmented and co-opted 
neighbourhood organisations to unify and to forge an Alteño identity. Meanwhile, the 
removal of de Lozada, and later Carlos Mesa, from the presidency demonstrated what was 
achievable when the city’s residents worked together, focused on a single objective, 
(Crabtree and Chaplain 2013: 21; Deledicque and Contartese 2010: 141), and retained 
autonomy from the political parties (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). However, the 
2003-05 period represents a high-watermark concerning popular power in El Alto, and from 
2005 onwards, there was a return to the traditional co-opting of the COR and FEJUVE. 
A strategic alliance between the MAS and the FEJUVE and the COR began to forge 
around the 2005 elections (Anria 2013: 33). Local organisation leaders saw in the MAS an 
opportunity to gain access to the state and push toward achieving the October Agenda. The 
MAS meanwhile managed to infiltrate and co-opt the leadership of these two organisations 
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so as “to extend its influence and control throughout the territory and to recruit leaders 
who mobilise large numbers of voters” (Anria 2013: 33). As a result, Morales won the 2005 
election with massive Alteño support (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013: 72). 
3. Post-inflection sequencing: 
3.1 2006-10: Co-opting and Quietening of El Alto’s radical voice: 
The process of co-optation by the MAS of neighbourhood organisations in El Alto that had 
already begun before the 2005 elections deepened in the years that followed. As a central 
actor in the FEJUVE 2003 leadership notes, “from the moment the government of Evo 
Morales was elected, the FEJUVE, the social organisations, the gremiales, the COR…they 
became corrupted…the new dirigencias just entered the organisations to rob. And they 
didn’t even rob for the benefit of El Alto, but for their own personal benefit” (anonymous 
interview with author). The MAS captured neighbourhood organisation leaders into the 
state apparatus by offering jobs to those who supported them, as well as by offering to 
complete public works in the zones of leaders who remained loyal to the party (Lazar 2008; 
Anria 2013).  
The international environment and booming gas and oil prices meant that President 
Morales had enormous economic power in his hands with which he could co-opt erstwhile 
autonomous, contestatory organisations that were demanding a radical overhaul of the 
Bolivian state and economic system. Having witnessed the power El Alto’s organisations had 
during the 2003-05 period and their capacity to force sitting presidents to resign or flee the 
country, Morales wanted to be sure that he could control the leaders of the COR, the 
FEJUVE and other popular organisations (Anria 2013: 33). Alfredo Cahuaya summarises the 
situation succinctly when he notes that “the dirigencia were disloyal to their own 
186 
 
neighbourhood organisations…and as a result the organisations became instrumentalised by 
the MAS and by the corrupt dirigentes”, just like in the pre-2003 era (interview with author). 
In sum, following the 2005 election of Morales, the autonomy of societal organisations and 
their capacity to control and manage the government from below, as democratisation calls 
for, was severely reduced, and indeed participation was “instrumentalised”, and popular 
sectors, particularly those with “radical” demands were “shut out of strategic decision-
making about state policies” (Arteaga 2015: 580).  
3.2 2010-2014: Deepening co-optation and corruption, weak democratic extending: 
From 2010 onward, the centralised and top-down control by the MAS hierarchy and Evo 
Morales of El Alto’s popular organisations intensified, strangling their capacity to hold the 
government to account and demand adherence to the October Agenda. A leading MAS 
politican in El Alto admitted that the MAS had “committed many errors” regarding 
corruption, co-opting and controlling of the COR, FEJUVE and other organisations 
(anonymous interview with author). The MAS politican highlighted the case of Edgar Patana, 
the mayor of El Alto from 2010-14, elected on the MAS ticket. Patana was sentenced to four 
years in prison for using vehicles, which had been presented to him by the central 
government for public use in the city, to co-opt and control FEJUVE dirigentes (Correo del 
Sur 2015). The MAS politician concedes that the MAS made serious errors by not rooting out 
Patana before, but highlights that the MAS did not support such co-optive behaviour 
(interview with author). Indeed, the politican suggests that Patana and others have simply 
abused the MAS to enrich themselves, and that they should not be conflated with Evo 
Morales or the MAS as a whole. While it is plausible that Evo Morales and the MAS 
hierarchy were not supportive or aware of the behaviour of Patana, the fact that there were 
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continuous attempts to control the FEJUVE and the COR from as early as 2005 (Anria 2013) 
makes the claims that the MAS hierarchy did not support co-optive practices difficult to 
believe. 
At the same time as popular organisations were losing their autonomy and capacity 
to direct and control the government from below, elite economic actors were tightening 
their links with, and control over, the central government26.  Indeed, in 2013, ten years after 
the Gas War, many Alteños argued that the government had failed to adhere to the October 
Agenda, and had instead capitulated to the demands of national and transnational elites 
(Achtenberg 2013a). As Luis Flores (interview with author) states, 
The October Agenda demanded complete nationalisation, not a negotiation on the 
price of gas like the government has done…It has not demanded that the TNCs leave. 
This is not nationalisation. All the TNCs and businesses have actually been given even 
more help by the government. The October Agenda has revolutionary tendencies.  
And this is why the elites, now more than ever, have grabbed hold of the 
government, they have it in their hands, it is simply at the service of the TNCs and 
elites. 
3.3 2014-Present: Castigating the MAS and the emergence of Unidad Nacional and 
paralelismo: 
In frustration at the failure of Morales and the MAS to adhere to promises to boost 
economic and political inclusion, El Alto’s popular sectors elected Soldedad Chapetón from 
the right-wing Unidad Nacional (UN) party as mayor in 2015, while six of the eleven city 
councillors elected were also from UN. The party was formed in 2003 by Samuel Doria 
                                                          
26
 See previous chapter for a detailed discussion of this process. 
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Medina, a businessman educated in economics in the US and the UK who owns the 
franchise rights for all of Bolivia to Burger King and Subway amongst other ventures. Medina 
formed the party after breaking from the MIR. While UN proclaim to be a social democratic 
party, and joined the Socialist International in 2017, the fact that the party receives the 
majority of its funding from Medina’s SOBOCE cement company, along with Medina’s status 
as one of the country’s wealthiest businessmen, has meant that many Bolivians view UN as 
a business-party, and not a moderate Leftist party as Medina insists (Aguilar Argramont 
2013).  
The electoral results however should not necessarily be read as support for UN, but 
rather as a castigating vote against the MAS. Indeed, discussing Alteños voting trends in 
2006, Xavier Albó noted that “when push comes to shove…people make decisions with a 
pragmatic attitude, and ideology becomes a rhetorical ornament. This would explain why in 
the 15 elections since the onset of democracy, Alteños have opted for six different parties, 
zigzagging through the entire political spectrum”. In light of the perceived failure of the MAS 
to adhere, at the national and local level, to the October Agenda, combined with a 
corruption case against former mayor Edgar Patana who “failed to provide works...or 
projects for the base” Alteños decided that they wanted a change (D. Ramos, interview with 
author). Soledad Chapetón thus took advantage of the desgaste with both Patana’s 
corruption and co-optive practices (D. Gutiérrez, interview with author), as well as MAS co-
opting tactics in general which fomented divisions in the FEJUVE and the COR leaderships 
regarding how the organisations should relate with the state, at local, regional and national 
levels (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). In this light, some dirigentes began to ask 
themselves “why am I obeying this person if they are corrupt” (D. Gutiérrez, interview with 
author).  
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3.4 Cracks in the FEJUVE and the COR and the emergence of paralelismo: 
Up until 2016 there was one FEJUVE in El Alto, though it was functioning poorly due to MAS 
co-opting tactics (L. Flores, interview with author). The co-optive and clientelistic nature of 
the relationship between the MAS and some FEJUVE leaders caused divisions in the 
organisation’s executive, and two congresses were organised simultaneously to select new 
leaders. One congress and its emergent executive committee was recognised by the central 
government and the MAS, while the other executive committee was backed by Soledad 
Chapetón and the UN (L. Flores, interview with author). For some, the blame for the 
creation of a parallel FEJUVE lies with the MAS government and Evo Morales (Carlos Rojas of 
the FEJUVE-organico27, interview with author), while for others, it is the act of a Right-wing 
party seeking to divide and control a powerful popular organisation (Sandro Ramires of the 
FEJUVE-original, interview with author). 
Sandro Ramirez, the current head of the FEJUVE-original states that the phenomenon of 
paralelismo originated when Chapetón was elected mayor and Rolando Huanca, who at that 
time was the chief dirigente of the FEJUVE, began to work in tandem with her and UN 
(interview with author). Other FEJUVE dirigentes stated that Huanca had broken with the 
FEJUVE statute by meeting with the mayor without first informing the executive committee 
of the FEJUVE, as well as by putting personal interests ahead of the city’s requirements 
(Renán Cabezas quoted in hoybolivia.com). A portion of the FEJUVE executive therefore 
dismissed Huanca and selected Franklin Machaca as the new leader. However, Huanca and 
others maintained that he was the legitimate head of the FEJUVE, and it was from this 
                                                          
27
 I use the term “organico” to describe the FEJUVE located in Villa Dolores and “original” to denote the 
FEJUVE of Avenida 6 de Marzo. As will be discussed below, which FEJUVE should be recognized as the official 
organization is source of great contention. As such, I label each FEJUVE according to its geographic location 
rather than its historical status, ideological outlook, or party-affiliation.  
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moment that the FEJUVE divided in two, one located in the original 6 de Marzo site, and a 
second in Villa Dolores. 
Which FEJUVE should be considered legitimate is the source of much debate in the city. 
For Daniel Ramos, the regional head of the MAS, Soledad Chapetón divided and fractured 
the FEJUVE for her own benefit, and the only officially recognised FEJUVE is that located on 
the original 6 de Marzo site headed by Sandro Ramires (interview with author). On the other 
hand, the FEJUVE-organico located in Villa Dolores claims that it should be the only 
recognised FEJUVE. Benigno Siñani, head of the Villa Dolores FEJUVE-organico states that 
“we succeeded Rolando Huanca, who was selected legitimately in a congress, we are the 
ones that come from the legitimate path…We respect the statute, we were recognised by 
CONALJUVE28, not by a political party, the other FEJUVE leadership was handed over by a 
MAS senator” (interview with author). Furthermore, Carlos Rojas, a long-time activist in El 
Alto and active participant in the 2003 Gas War, former dirigente of the FEJUVE 6 de Marzo, 
and later dirigente of the FEJUVE Villa Dolores, stated that the MAS had captured leaders of 
the FEJUVE-original by offering money and personal gifts (interview with author) thereby 
breaking fundamental statute rules regarding organisational autonomy from political parties 
and the placing of personal gains ahead of the city’s needs. Benigno Siñani states that due to 
the economic power of the central government it can “make and unmake” societal 
organisations whereby the government simply says to the dirigencias “take this money and 
stay quiet” (interview with author). As such Rojas states that the true FEJUVE is the 
“contestatory, combative, organic” organisation located in Villa Dolores which called for an 
autonomous space that could challenge the government, and not be controlled from above 
by it. Siñani claims that “we leave politics in the house and we enter the FEJUVE to work 
                                                          
28
 The National Federation of Juntas Vecinales 
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cívicamente (with no political allegiances)…but unfortunately the central government labels 
us as being right-wing…Any type of organisation that is not supporting the government, they 
always label them as derechistas (right-wingers)” (interview with author). 
However, Daniel Gutiérrez, international press officer for the FEJUVE-original questions 
the actual contestatory nature of the FEJUVE established by Carlos Rojas and Benigno 
Siñani. Gutiérrez highlights that at the initial congress establishing the FEJUVE-organico and 
the new executive committee, members of Soledad Chapeton’s team were present, 
congratulating the new dirigentes and drinking beer with them (interview with author). A 
photograph of the event was released “and this was proof for us and for the population to 
identify that the mayor was interfering in this FEJUVE…and that it was not autonomous or 
independent like the new dirigentes said” (D. Gutiérrez, interview with author). Gutiérrez 
continues, stating that “we call it the yellow FEJUVE29…a FEJUVE created by Soledad 
Chapetón, it obeys the mayor and thus it obeys Samuel Dorian Medina, the leader of the 
clearly right-wing UN party…There is an ideological battle here, between Left and Right”. 
Despite denials by both Benigno Siñani and Carlos Rojas regarding possible co-optive 
practices by the UN of the FEJUVE-organico, a key FEJUVE diregente during the Gas War 
stated that “Carlos Rojas was  a great dirigente…he is my compañero, but he has been 
corrupted” (interview with author, anonymous) by working with UN. Furthermore, a city-
councillor in El Alto who stated that they have tight links with the FEJUVE-organico 
leadership, stated that they had been asked specifically by Soledad Chapetón to take their 
role in the municipal government as part of the UN party (anonymous interview with 
author). 
                                                          
29
 In reference to the traditional yellow party colours of the Unidad Nacional. 
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The nature of the relationship between both the FEJUVES and political parties raise 
fundamental questions. Considering that the statute of the FEJUVE states that the 
organisation must have political autonomy from any political party, irrespective of party 
ideology, it appears that both the original and organico FEJUVES have broken from their 
own founding principles. When I discussed accusations that the FEJUVE-organico was a 
“yellow FEJUVE” with a leading politician in the city council they stated that “it is true that 
Soledad Chapetón asked me personally to take my role as concejal for UN…While you are 
correct to ask about autonomy and my links to the FEJUVE-leadership in Villa Dolores and 
the UN, you need to understand that political parties will come and go, and so they can be 
used to achieve the goals and demands of the base” (anonymous interview with author). 
Daniel Gutiérrez of the FEJUVE-original meanwhile states that “we support the initiatives 
and the social programs advanced by the MAS, and we participate in the political events 
organised by the MAS, and this has led to confusion” regarding the MAS-FEJUVE relationship 
(interview with author). However, Sandro Ramires head of the FEJUVE-original says that 
“just because we support the government does not mean that we are the MAS, but rather 
that the government has opened doors for the benefit of El Alto. The process of change that 
we are looking for, that there is a transformation of the city…Look, if the mayor (Chapetón) 
invites me tomorrow to do something that will benefit the city and I have to work with her 
in return, I would do it, because it is for the benefit of the neighbourhood base that we must 
work” (interview with author). 
While the sentiment of dirigentes of both FEJUVES that they must work with and take 
advantage of whichever political party offers them resources is understandable, and likely a 
political reality, the tight relations between the FEJUVE-original and the MAS and FEJUVE-
organico and UN dismantle the scope for autonomous popular control of political decision-
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making processes. The loss of autonomy and the divisions with the FEJUVE means that “El 
Alto’s organizations are pawns between political parties…co-opted and useless, incapable of 
defending our radical 2003 agenda” (C. Barrera, interview with author).  As Carlos Calle, 
head of the Central Obrero Departmental-La Paz (Departmental Workers’ Union of La Paz, 
COD), states, popular organisation-political party interactions, and the interactions between 
the base and their organisation leaders, are guided by money and political favours, whereby 
dirigentes now ask “What party are you with? If you are of this party I will listen to your 
demands, if you are of the other party, I won’t” (interview with author). El Alto city 
councillor for the Sol.Bo party Javier Tarqui echoes such sentiments, stating that “what the 
city needs is a political party that understands the importance of an autonomous COR and 
FEJUVE” (interview with author). Abraham Paco, spokesperson for the Comité de Defensa 
de La Paz (Defence Committe for La Paz, CODELPA), though talking primarily about the MAS, 
notes how parties tell popular organisations that “if you support me, I will finance you, I will 
give you power. They (popular organisations) have been co-opted, for me, they have been 
extorted. Both the government and the dirigentes have become delinquents” (interview 
with author). 
The COR-El Alto has also suffered from the issues of co-optation, corruption, and 
paralelismo. According to Franklin Troche, the international press officer for the COR 
located on Avenida 6 de Marzo30, the original site of the COR, “the right, and the mayor 
have created their own COR with their own people” (interview with author). Martha Yujra 
meanwhile, the head of this alternate COR, highlights that it was Evo Morales who divided 
the organisation so as to control the popular forces of the city (interview with author). 
                                                          
30
 For the purposes of distinguishing between the two existing CORs today in El Alto, I label the COR located on 
Avenida 6 de Marzo as the COR-original, and the alternate COR headed my Martha Yujra as the COR-
contestario. 
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 The COR-original has no relationship with the municipality and mayor Chapetón of 
the Unidad Nacional. In February 2016 there was a fire in the city hall in which six people 
died31. The mayor blamed radical sectors of the COR-original for the incident, which they 
vehemently deny, and since then all links between the municipal government and the COR-
original have been severed (F. Troche, interview with author). The COR-original does 
however have “very good relations with the central government ever since the Gas War of 
2003. We supported the government in the Constituent Assembly, we supported them in 
Sucre against the autonomists. The government and the COR, we were very close.” (F. 
Troche, interview with author). Troche continues, stating that “as an organisation for the 
workers, we cannot align with governments or parties of the right. We did not have any 
relationship with Tuto Quiroga, Doria Medina or any of the right-wing parties…We are 
leftists, and so we have to continue on the side of Evo Morales because the MAS is a party of 
the left”. 
 While Troche emphasises that it is normal for the COR-original to work with a left-
wing party, the nature of the relationship between the COR-original and the MAS has raised 
serious concerns amongst some sectors in El Alto. Martha Yujra notes that when she was 
part of the COR executive in 2005, “we weren’t part of any political party, we were 
contestatory. We served the base, the proletariat, the workers, the family of gremiales” 
(interview with author). However, from 2007 onwards, with the election of Edgar Patana as 
the executive of the COR, the organisation “never defended El Alto” (M. Yujra, interview with 
author.). Patana was accused by some sectors of the gremialistas of working too closely with 
the MAS (NoticiasFides.com 2007). For Irene Mamani, part of the FEJUVE dirigencia during 
the Gas War, due to MAS co-optive tactics, dirigentes of the COR and FEJUVE use the 
                                                          
31
 For a discussion of the events surrounding the fire see Mancilla (2016). 
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popular organisations as “trampolines to become deputies, senators, city-councillors, to run 
for mayor like Edgar Patana…This was the beginning of a fault-line in the COR, FEJUVE, the 
organisation of the gremiales…They split them all” (interview with author). Mamani 
continues, stating that the MAS “divided the organisations that had been united in 2003 
because they could have risen up to topple even Evo Morales. So, what suited Evo? To divide 
them”. According to Martha Yujra the COR became servile to the MAS and failed to defend 
the base of the organisation; “people were fired, and the COR said nothing. There were 
gremiales that were flattened by the mayor, nobody said anything. There was harassment of 
women in the workplace. And this COR led by Patana said nothing” (interview with author).  
 A central concern regarding the COR-original has been the lack of rotividad, or 
rotation, of leadership which the statute calls for every two years, leading to the issue of 
prorroguismo, or “extensioning” (Mancilla 2016: 77).  In terms of “the duration of executives 
in their roles, the situation is chronic, because some dirigentes have held their positions for 
more than fifteen years, and in some cases, even twenty. For example Remigio Condori and 
Sebastián Condori, who since 2000 have continued to be dirigentes in the COR” (Ibid.). For 
critics, these leaders simply do what the MAS and Morales tell them to, “they are servants 
of Morales…They don’t have the force to defend the workers” (M. Yujra, interview with 
author). Indeed, a central figure in the FEJUVE-original noted that “the COR has been 
completely co-opted by the government. The dirigentes who now seek roles in the 
organisation all have the notion that when they finish their time as a COR dirigente they will 
become a senator or deputy, or minister or vice-minister” (anonymous interview with 
author).  Edgar Patana “left as executive of the COR and became the mayor of El Alto (under 
the MAS banner)…Remigio Condori was a COR dirigente and he became a MAS city-
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councillor in El Alto. Sebastián Condori too” (M. Yujra, interview with author). After Remigio 
Condori relinquished his position as secretary-general of the COR so as to take up his 
position as city-councillor, he was replaced by Eliseo Suxo who had been the first secretary 
of the COR (Rivas 2015). Suxo was a MAS deputy for the La Paz department before returning 
to head the COR, again highlighting “how the statute is written but not respected” 
(anonymous dirigente from the FEJUVE-original executive, interview with author). Indeed a 
member of the COR-original executive committee told me, under the condition of 
anonymity, that Suxo was deeply damaging the organisation because  
one minute he is openly supporting Evo Morales, the next he is not. The COR has 
been sullied and dirtied, and it must be purged, but this could take a generation. We 
should have kept our autonomy. I do not agree with how the COR has been directed. 
We have lost all legitimacy. We are working on the problem that is Eliseo Suxo. 
Perhaps after supporting the government during the constituent assembly, we got 
too close to be critical. 
The issue of autonomy and scope to critique the government is at the centre of the demise 
in legitimacy of the COR. In conversations with Alteños during fieldwork I heard complaints 
on a daily basis from a range of citizens regarding the COR who felt that “it is nothing but a 
space for the swapping of political favours” (anonymous bus driver in El Alto)... “Those guys 
don’t want change, they are happy so long as the government keeps paying them to be 
happy” (anonymous tea-stall owner, El Alto).  Even Daniel Ramos, the regional director of 
the MAS, highlighted the issue of Eliseo Suxo having been a MAS deputy, stating that  
When you have occupied a political position, you do not have credibility before the 
population. And I could talk of other organisations here in El Alto where ex-deputies, ex-
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councillors have taken over. It gives a bad signal. I have said many times that there must 
be a renovation of these organisations. But the issue is that these people are old and 
astute, they are cunning and they do not allow new leaders to emerge. This is the issue 
facing us today, and this error has been taken advantage of by the right (interview with 
author).  
The result of the MAS co-optive tactics and their support for COR dirigentes who do not 
adhere to their own statues has fostered a schism in the organisation, and the Unidad 
Nacional party has, just as in the case of the FEJUVE, encouraged these divisions and 
supported and financed the development of a parallel COR (D. Gutiérrez, interview with 
author).  
The result is confusion and division amongst the many sectors and unions who are 
now aligned with one or other COR. Indeed, the relationship between the COR-original and 
the COD, and the COB highlights the confusion and division32. The COR-original is aligned 
with the COB, headed by Guido Mitma, and the COD headed by Carlos Calle. While the COR-
original has been co-opted by the MAS, both the COD and the COB have been extremely 
critical of the MAS government for interfering in popular organisations. At the end of a 
massive march from El Alto to La Paz organised by the COD and the COB on June 12th 2017 
in response to the government’s plans to raise the electricity tariff by 3 percent, Guido 
Mitma, leader of the COB, shouted to the crowd that “we cannot allow the government to 
continue with these neoliberal policies. We cannot continue with this dictatorship of a 
government who make decisions that affect workers without even engaging with the COB 
                                                          
32
 The COB is the national body of the union. Below this level there is a COD for each department, while below 
the departmental level, there are numerous CORs at a more local level. 
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and the base. With paralelismo they have tried to fracture the COB. The entire proceso de 
cambio has been a betrayal”.  
 The relationship between the COR-original and the union hierarchy, the COD and 
COB, on one hand, and the central government and the MAS on the other seems to leave 
the COR in an awkward position. Franklin Troche of the COR-original states however that “it 
is not the case that we are in the middle, and when we want to we support the government. 
We have our own line of thinking and we are going to keep this” (interview with author). As 
Troche explains, “we have to do what our base tells us to. They didn’t like the increase in 
electricity prices, and so we had to take the streets to block it”. Indeed, the COR-original has 
in some instances confronted the central government. For example, Eliseo Suxo stated that 
the COR would join the marches organised by the COB due to the lack of government 
engagement with the unions regarding the retirement fund for workers, modification to the 
Pensions Law, and the increases in electricity and gas prices (Sarsuri 2017). However, the 
COR-original has generally sought to avoid open criticism of Evo Morales as they are 
concerned as to who would be in a position to replace him as president. As a central figure 
in the COR-original leadership explains,  
What would happen if we were to push Evo and he was to fall? …The liberal right 
would return, the military governments would return. As such, this must be part of 
our thinking. We can, and do, critique the government. But there must be a 
successor. A leftist successor from the pueblo. Someone who is with the workers. But 
at the moment, such a person does not exist. So for the moment, we cannot push 
too quickly (anonymous, interview with author). 
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Such a sentiment highlights the difficult tightrope balancing act facing popular organisations 
regarding how to critique a progressive leader from a Leftist position without opening space 
for the opposition to take advantage. However, while limiting critique to internal discussions 
may be necessary, it is essential that popular organisations do not lose their capacity to 
engage in autonomous constructive critique of government performance. As is discussed 
below, failure to maintain such a position severely debilitates efforts to construct an 
alternative to market democracy.  
3.5 Outcomes of co-optation and paralelismo:  
The central government and the MAS, the municipal government and the UN, and self-
serving neighbourhood organisation dirigentes must all take a share of the blame for the 
phenomenon of co-optation and paralelismo, which have had a number of debilitating 
effects on the capacity to develop a post-neoliberal democracy.  
a. Weakened societal power: 
The “problem with the divisions in the FEJUVES is that the government is not adhering to its 
promises because today in El Alto there is no popular force…What can the organisations do 
when they are in the service of the parties…Nothing…What are they going to 
demand…Nothing!” (L. Flores, interview with author). There is a sense that the popular 
power of El Alto so prevalent in the 2003-05 period has been debilitated, and that as a 
result, the government has bowed to the demands of elite sectors and cocaleros. Alteños 
“have given our lives for the proceso de cambio, but what have we received in turn? The 
East, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, they received strong investment. But El Alto, what did we 
get?” (B. Signañi, interview with author).  
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Co-opted organisations must walk a tightrope between responding to popular needs, 
while avoiding open confrontation with their benefactor parties. Signañi of the Villa Dolores 
FEJUVE says that the FEJUVE of 6 de Marzo has entered into pacts with the MAS, and as 
such, while they receive economic rewards, they have to “keep their mouths shut, they 
cannot say anything” about issues facing the city (interview with author). For example, 
Signañi states that El Alto’s organisations must not accept the planned electricity tariff 
increase, but that the FEJUVE 6 de Marzo cannot say anything as the government has 
bought them off (interview with author). Some members of the FEJUVE-original agree with 
such sentiments, with a central figure in leadership stating that; “we are not in agreement 
with the tariff increase. But neither can we organise a big mobilisation against it because 
this would mean that we would no longer receive support (from the central government) for 
other projects. Unfortunately this is how politics works. If you go against the party, the 
government doesn’t help you” (anonymous FEJUVE-original dirigente, interview with 
author). Furthermore, the FEJUVE associated with the MAS has been blocked by the UN and 
the mayor from receiving municipal funding (D. Gutiérrez interview with author). As such, 
the FEJUVE-original has no choice but to maintain good relations with the MAS in order to 
receive funding which the municipality is unwilling to provide. The outcome of such pact-
making is diminished capacity for the base to hold the state to account, be that at municipal, 
regional, or national level. 
b. Fragmenting of Demands: 
Paralelismo also fragments the social demands “into a multiplicity of small claims, which 
state institutions can deal with by offering clientelist special benefits” (Arteaga 2015: 581). 
The result is that in place of a coherent overarching development plan that responds to the 
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fundamental requirements of the city, white elephant projects are offered in tandem with 
small local works projects. For critics of Evo Morales and the MAS, the centralisation of 
decision-making in the executive and central government regarding the development of El 
Alto means that local demands are not met. On the other hand, “now that the mayor has 
her own FEJUVE and COR, she prefers to work just with them…there is no co-ordination 
between the FEJUVE 6 de Marzo and the mayor” (D. Gutiérrez, interview with author). 
With no unified popular voice, and no coherent development plan for the city as a 
whole, the provision of services that should be the duty of the state are instead used as 
political bargaining chips by politicians and corrupt neighbourhood organisation leaders 
alike. Politicians dictate to organisation leaders what project they must support. Dirigentes 
then tell the base that they should accept the proposals and funding of the political parties, 
presenting it as the best deal available. Due to the poverty and lack of services in the city, 
combined with the lack of a coherent and unified popular organisation to represent the 
base, the general population are left in no position to turn down the funding or projects, 
which they do require, but which may not represent their most pressing needs. In sum, the 
very nature of state-society relations and the role of popular organisations that would 
signify a deepening of democratisation has been flipped on its head in El Alto. Instead of 
demands flowing from below through the conduit of a neighbourhood organisation to the 
state to demand what the city requires, decision-making flows from top to bottom, with 
divided and co-opted neighbourhood organisations acting as pawns for the political parties 
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whose “public works are disconnected from any overall development plan and designed 
mainly to garner more votes in the next election” (Farthing 201733).  
c. Erosion of former alliances  
Perhaps the saddest outcome of paralelismo is that erstwhile allies now see each other as 
an enemy to be overcome. Dirigentes of the 2003 Gas War have been co-opted by one or 
other political party. As such, rather than focusing a unified popular movement toward 
achieving fundamental transformation of the city, El Alto’s popular organisations are 
engaged in a spiral of accusations, further eroding their capacity to lead a democratisation 
process.  As a key dirigente n the FEJUVE-original admits, “all of the organisations interpret 
their statutes as it suits them, and when we see an adversary breaking their statute we 
confront them. But when we infringe on the norms, we say nothing” (anonymous FEJUVE-
original dirgente, interview with author). Associational and collective power, as well as the 
unity of purpose of societal demands - the factors that give society power over the state - 
have thus been greatly damaged. The outcome is that movements become depoliticised and 
focus simply on sectoral demands, avoiding issues of a city-wide or national nature (Revilla 
2014: 60).  
The processes of co-optation, prebendalismo, and paralelismo have delegitimised not 
only the political parties, but also the COR and the FEJUVE. Leaders are seen as corrupt, 
simply serving either personal interests, the interest of only a segment of the social 
organisation members, or the interests of a political party.  In 2003, the organisation leaders 
“were selected by the base according to their abilities and their connection to the residents 
of each district…today to be a dirigente of the FEJUVE you just get selected by a political 
                                                          
33
 While Farthing (2017) is discussing the MAS and Bolivia as a whole, the same actions can be witnessed in El 
Alto, by both the MAS and the UN. 
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party” (L. Flores, interview with author). There is “desgaste with the social organisations, 
such a change from October 2003 when everyone was unified” (D. Gutiérrez, interview with 
author). The leaders today have no legitimacy (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). The 
“pueblo is sick, its leaders are sick and are simply ambitious for power, and so the 
organisations are also sick” (L. Flores interview with author). Furthermore, the co-opting of 
the organisations has blocked the path for clean, new leaders to emerge as the old 
dirigentes retain power with the aid of the parties (A. Cahuaya, interview with author). 
The above discussion of the impacts of co-optation and paralelismo highlight how 
popular society has been weakened, and how ultimately, power rests with the state. Before 
El Alto’s popular organisations were divided and co-opted, they had enormous power to 
frame and influence not only local development plans, but also those of the entire country. 
The COR and the FEJUVE used to function as a conduit between the base and the state, 
allowing for a bottom-up flow of demands to direct and influence political decision-making. 
However, the co-opting of the leaders of these organisations leads to a blockage in this 
system. Without a critical feedback loop from the bottom-up that acts as a control over 
state decision-making, the deepening of democracy is obstructed, and ultimately the post-
neoliberal process enters the risk of atrophying. The decapitation and division of 
movements that helped gain El Alto’s reputation as the “Ciudad Rebelde”, in conjunction 
with the “the integration of significant portions of the eastern lowlands agribusiness and 
conservative political elite into the MAS project” has fostered the “political and social 
realignment of the MAS - and its transformation from a ‘government of the social 
movements’ to a ‘big tent’ hegemonic power” (Achtenberg 2016: 374). Radical demands 
contained in the October Agenda for a fundamental transformation of Bolivian society have 
204 
 
been ignored and “not even a pencil belonging to the multinationals has been 
expropriated…The revolutionary project of the FEJUVE of 2003 has been destroyed” (C. 
Rojas, interview with author). Morales has become “partners” with transnational exporting 
firms (J.L Álvarez, dirigente with the La Paz Federation of Educational Workers, FDTEULP, 
interview with author). In sum, co-optive practices meant that popular sector voices had no 
democratic space to truly hold the government to a radical agenda, and without such a 
counter-balancing force against elite and transnational pressure, the government adopted a 
diluted October Agenda that failed to fundamentally address the structural sources of 
poverty and inequality in El Alto, and Bolivia as a whole.  
4. Collective memories of popular power: Waking the “sleeping lion” 
The above discussion regarding issues of co-optation and paralelismo raise concerns 
regarding the legacy of Bolivia’s experiment in delivering a post-neoliberal democracy. 
Unfortunately, such practices are not contained to El Alto. Indeed, the city reflects realities 
across much of the country regarding state-society relations. Farthing (Riofranco and 
Farthing 2017) states that  
The weakening of the social movements in a place like Bolivia, given its political 
culture of the streets, has been devastating. Social movements still aligned with the 
government have been coopted, in the process losing the ability to launch any sort 
of viable progressive challenge…Today, the country is characterised by an 
overdependence on a charismatic leader controlling a weak party: the classic Latin 
American caudillo. 
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As such, Farthing suggests that the opportunity for progressive change once hinted at by 
powerful social movements has been compromised. The divide and conquer tactics by both 
government and opposition parties and the phenomenon of paralelismo appears to have 
left societal actors in a weakened position to challenge the centralisation of decision-making 
power in the executive, and, subsequently, policy decisions that harm their well-being. 
 While Farthing’s concerns regarding a missed opportunity are certainly prudent, El 
Alto does offer some hope for the possibility of a long-term legacy of the post-neoliberal 
democratisation process. The theoretical framework detailed in chapter 2 suggests that 
centralisation of power in the executive in response to elite resistance to redistribution 
must be counter-balanced from below by powerful popular actors if it is to become 
“progressive centralisation” – that is, used to redistribute resources and boost popular 
control over decision-making . Furthermore, the framework suggests that the history of 
popular sector organising may feed back onto the process, thereby ensuring that the 
president is controlled from below.  
At present it appears that El Alto’s historical experiences of collective organisation 
and mobilisation have failed to prevent a co-optive centralisation of power in the 
presidency. However, key popular actors in the city suggest that memories of past 
mobilisations and collectivist organising traditions may in fact act as the springboard for a 
popular response to the disappointing capitulation of the “progressive” government of Evo 
Morales to elite and transnational interests, and the failure to adhere to constitutional 
guarantees regarding democratic deepening. As (now ex-) FEJUVE-organico leader Benigno 
Signañi states, “we need to take a cold bath and begin to react” to what the central 
government has done to the city’s popular organisations (interview with author). While Luis 
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Flores admits that the co-opting of organisations and the “disinformation” that dirigentes 
tell their bases makes it difficult for a unified popular movement to re-emerge in the city, he 
believes that compared to two years ago, the situation is changing. Before, people did not 
want to criticise the government of Morales because the base felt that “it is from our class, 
it is of our people”, but people are now realising that the government of the MAS has failed 
to adhere to grassroots demands (L. Flores, interview with author). Flores predicts a new 
phase of popular mobilisation will erupt within two years, so long as “clean” voices emerge 
“waving the flag of October 2003” as a reminder of what the popular actors in the city are 
capable of when they are united (interview with author). Alfredo Cahuaya does not believe 
that this next mobilisation can be led by the FEJUVE(s) or the COR(s), but given the conflux 
of campesinos, miners, and workers residing in El Alto who all have a long tradition of 
resistance in Bolivia, he does foresee a new wave of popular mobilisation in the city 
rejecting the centralist and moderate outcomes to date of the proceso de cambio. Daniel 
Ramos describes El Alto as “a sleeping lion” (interview with author) whose rebellious spirit 
will erupt once the pueblo feel that they are being ignored. Indeed, El Alto reflects Bolivia’s 
traditions of Left-wing organisation as a whole. As Carlos Arze states (interview with author) 
We have a proletariat that comes from communitarian and socialist traditions…Take 
for example a young guy working in the mines, twenty years old. He does not know 
that there were coups in Bolivia. He has lived most of his life under Evo. But it is in 
the subconscious, you inherit it, because here in Bolivia, in the home, the collective 
sentiment is fostered. Neoliberalism proffered individualism, and it has continued 
with this regime. But it did not succeed in eradicating the collective mind-set.  
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 Austerity and poor economic conditions may act as the spark which could awake the 
“sleeping lion”. The worsening possibilities of finding employment, “just like we had in 2003 
causes people to mobilise and to rebel…We are not far away from this situation again 
because the government does not have a real economic plan for the country” (C. Rojas, 
interview with author). The “thirst, hunger, lack of security, lack of work, the lack of a roof, 
of a house, of bread, of clothes…these are why the base are rebelling against this 
government…The pueblo is angry. While some dirigentes have been co-opted, we are 
already changing, we are going to re-connect and organise ourselves…Not necessarily to 
overthrow the president, but so that he stops with the politiquería (political manoeuvring)” 
(A. Paco, interview with author). 
While the global commodities boom was in full swing, the government had sufficient 
resources to maintain social spending and to “co-opt the leaders of allied groups with 
patronage and the provision of public services” while “clientelistic ties with urban-popular 
organisations (the most electorally crucial of all MAS allies) were cemented, and the 
governing coalition held together” (Anria 2016: 105). As Webber (2016) details, Bolivia’s gas 
export deals to Brazil and Argentina in recent years have been at locked-in prices, and so the 
“the fall-out of the global crisis has not yet fully registered in the Bolivian economy”. 
However, once the full effects of the end of the boom and the global financial crisis hit 
Bolivia, the prospect of deepening austerity under the watch of Morales is likely to rear its 
head (Ibid.). As Alfredo Cahuaya (interview with author) states, “the fight will begin first in 
the local arena as the people become conscious again of the realities in their city, that in ten 
years nothing has really changed for them, despite some mega projects that have been left 
as white elephants…the wallet of the poor has not been bolstered”. 
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As witnessed in countries across the region, including in countries with remaining or 
recently departed centre Left or Left governments, the decline in state revenues following 
the end of the boom has witnessed the retraction of social programs that were extended 
during the “lush years…rather than sustaining those social programs through aggressive 
taxation of the rich, expropriations, socialisation of key economic sectors, and so on” 
(Webber 2016).  For Alfredo Cahuaya, the moment that the government is forced (due to 
declining hydrocarbon prices) to reduce the bonos that the Morales government has 
delivered to date, people will say to themselves “we have been cheated” by this 
government (interview with author).  
 Indeed during fieldwork I witnessed almost daily protests from miners, doctors, 
street cleaners, gremiales and others regarding the standard of living. While most of the 
protests remained relatively small and isolated, on the 12th of June 2017, the COB organised 
a mass protest from El Alto to La Paz in reaction to government proposals to increase the 
electricity tariff by 3 per cent. Guido Mitma, head of the COB, chanted to thousands of 
supporters in the Plaza San Francisco in La Paz that “we cannot allow the government to 
continue with these neoliberal policies, this tarifazo of a 3 percent rise” (fieldnotes, June 
12th, 2017, El Alto and La Paz). Carlos Calle of the COD suggests that this protest is 
important, as it shows that the base is “waking up…it has been asleep while it received some 
crumbs of benefit. Seven years ago, to come out and protest against this government was a 
big deal because everybody would whistle at you, you couldn’t protest. But now we are 
seeing the reality, and the new perspective of the people” (interview with author). Indeed, 
as the march wound its way down from El Alto to the city of La Paz below, I spoke to dozens 
of protesters from students groups, neighbourhood councils, and unions. While the 
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proposed tariff increase was the frame for the protest, a more general sense of frustration 
with the government was apparent, with many protesters expressing the belief that the 
government had forgotten about El Alto despite “the vital role we played and the blood we 
shed so that all of Bolivia could be free” (anonymous female protester from district 4 of El 
Alto). The sentiment that insufficient change had been achieved under Morales was tied to 
the issue of co-optation and paralelismo. During the protest and amidst the near constant 
cacophony of exploding homemade fireworks I interviewed Jaime Solares, ex-leader of the 
COB and central figure in the 2003-05 anti-neoliberal protests. Solares emphasised that the 
“COB lost its way, it became servile to the Morales government. The COB must be 
contestatory. It is time for all our popular organisations to re-claim their autonomy from the 
government”. Echoing Solares’ sentiments, a protester chanted over a megaphone “this is a 
demonstration against this government, this lying government which has tried to undermine 
the workers’ protests”. As the protest reached a conclusion in the Plaza San Francisco in the 
heart of La Paz, an effigy of Evo Morales was set alight to chants of “Fuerza fuerza fuerza, 
fuerza compan̄eros, que la lucha es dura, pero venceremos (Don’t give up comrades, though 
the struggle is tough, we will overcome)”. 
As the economic power of the government wanes, simmering popular discontent is 
beginning to bubble over, opening a great opportunity for popular actors to re-forge the 
collective and associational power required to re-ignite the battle for a post-neoliberal 
democracy. As Luís Álvarez (interview with author) highlights, 
When the government had the economic capacity, it offered palliative responses to 
the country’s issues, but it never resolved the problems of unemployment or (lack 
of) industrialisation. Obviously, when there are resources to give out, the base is 
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slower to break from the politics of Evo Morales. But now that this moment of high 
incomes from natural resources is over, the process of breaking from the 
government will accelerate. 
Indeed, while in the waves of anti-neoliberal protests from 2000-05 the miners and 
organised working class played a moderate role, some analysts suggest that these two 
sectors will be key in the next step moment of post-neoliberal democratisation. There “is 
still a strong workers and revolutionary tradition, a communitarian tradition” in El Alto, and 
Bolivia in general (C. Arze, interview with author) and the “miners, the proletariat will not 
put up with the continual golpes that the government is imposing…In fact, we are already at 
the entrance to this conjuncture” (L.  Álvarez, interview with author). There is a key 
difference between Bolivia and Venezuela in this sense; “In Venezuela there is no real 
history of Trotskyism…this tradition of popular movements, of the miner’s movement, of 
the worker’s movement is going to reappear because popular struggles never begin from 
zero, they always begin from accumulated experience, from the collective memory. This is 
the big advantage we have here in Bolivia” (L. Álvarez, interview with author). As Luis 
Álvarez (interview with author) summarises, “the unions and organisations that were 
controlled by the MAS and that fought for the MAS are now breaking with the politics of the 
MAS…the notion of paralelismo will not bear fruit…Those who engaged in parallel 
organisations will be isolated from the popular rebellion of the workers against the politics 
of the government”. Álvarez continues, stating that “the time of believing that the politics of  
‘indigenismo’ and of Evo Morales would resolve the issues of free-market economics and 
guarantee employment is over…The rebellion that is coming, this moment of discontent is 
going to be led by the physical presence of the proletariat”. 
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5. Lessons and legacies of democratisation in El Alto and Bolivia: 
Returning to the central concerns of this thesis regarding how an alternative to market 
democracy may emerge, develop and sustain itself, El Alto’s experience has several lessons, 
both for Bolivia and for democratisation theory more generally. To contextualise the 
critique outlined above regarding the government’s failure to adhere to the October Agenda 
developed during El Alto’s waves of anti-neoliberal protest, why it engaged in to co-optation 
and fostered paralelismo, and what the impacts on the long-term legacy of Bolivia’s 
democratisation process under Evo Morales are likely to be, it is important to return to 
framework detailed in chapter 2. Moving beyond the confines of market democracy toward 
a post-neoliberal model that simultaneously deepens and extends democratic inclusion, 
thereby threatening entrenched elite interests – both domestic and international – is an 
extremely arduous process that is bound to encounter barriers. To overcome elite 
destabilisation efforts, the framework identified that centralisation of power in the 
executive may be a necessary condition of building a post-neoliberal democracy. However, if 
such centralisation is to be used progressively, and to avoid the pitfalls of sliding toward 
“despotic” centralisation or of ceding too much ground to elite forces, executive power 
must be counterbalanced by autonomous popular power. That is, autonomous popular 
power must be capable of engaging in mobilisation that is disruptive, is on a mass scale, can 
last for long periods of time, and can frequently and rapidly convene. As Fairfield (2015: 
426) notes, “popular mobilization can counterbalance or even overwhelm business power, 
as policymakers struggle to restore order and governability or even remain in power”. In 
moments where popular power is strong, governments are more likely to adhere to popular 
demands for inclusion, even if this involves challenging elite demands. As such, the 
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framework suggested that to understand the sequencing of efforts to build a radical 
substantive democracy, analysis must account for the relative power of four key sectors, 
namely the Left-led state, the organised popular sectors, domestic elites, and international 
(f)actors. It is the continual dialectical push-and-pull of these forces that influence the 
outcomes of the process in terms of the quality and extent of deepening and extending, the 
scale and form of centralisation, and its long-term legacy.  
The complexities and paradoxical outcomes of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal democratisation 
process must be understood in reference to the nature of the underlying development plan 
of the government which revolves around social welfarism funded by natural resource 
extraction. Vice-president García Linera (2017) highlights that for a poor developing country 
like Bolivia to build an emancipatory project, it must first create the material conditions to 
satisfy the basic needs of the population, to build wealth, and to redistribute it with justice. 
As such, he sees extractivism not as an end point in the process of building a radical 
substantive democracy, but rather a jumping off point from which to construct a new 
material base that boosts the benefits of the working population (Ibid.). Hence, from the 
outset the government sought to recuperate greater levels of rents from natural resources 
so as to re-found and strengthen the state after the disastrous neoliberal years (Andreucci 
2015). Indeed, doing so was one of the central demands of the October Agenda. 
To fund redistributive policies the government entered a pact with both domestic and 
transnational elites whose control over resource extraction and agribusiness – the prime 
sources of wealth in the country – was extensive34. The compromise reached between the 
elites and the government meant that both indigenous demands for control over extractive 
                                                          
34
 See section 6.2 of chapter 4 for discussion. 
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policies and October Agenda demands for wholesale nationalisation of resources were not 
achieved. While in the following analysis the nature of the government-elite pact is 
critiqued, one must consider that Bolivia was an economically weak, socially divided, and 
geographically marginal country (Andreucci 2015), and as such its scope to engage in more 
radical change was limited by the extensive power of domestic elites and transnational 
(f)actors. 
Clearly any process that seeks to challenge market democracy faces a difficult balancing 
act between responding to popular demands for increased political and economic inclusion, 
while at the same time maintaining policies that powerful domestic and transnational elites 
are willing to accept. In the Bolivian case, it is the pace of change and the scale of 
concessions to elites that must be questioned. Over the course of Morales’ time in charge, 
early plans for societal transformation were side-lined and economic stability underpinned 
by capitalist growth to fund moderate, but essential, social welfare spending became the 
aim of government policy (Farthing in Riofrancos and Farthing 2017). Without diminishing 
the realities of the global capitalist system and the extensive power of elites in Bolivia, after 
more than a decade of MAS rule, the nature of employment in Bolivia was not improved, 
with informal, precarious employment the norm; the “great industrial leap” that was 
supposed to occur was limited to exporting primary commodities; while indigenous 
communities’ economies were “systematically sacrificed for the expansion of…the frontiers 
of resource extraction and agri-business” (Andreucci 2015).  
Kaup (2010) describes the reform of control of the gas sector as “neoliberal 
nationalisation” whereby despite the increased share of rents for the state, there was no 
complete nationalisation accompanied by expropriation. While one must recognise that 
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state gas company YPFB had been destroyed due to decades of irresponsible neoliberal 
policies, “it is clear that YPFB should have much more state support so as to be able to play 
an important role in the productive chain” (Andreucci 2015). Instead, transnationals like 
Repsol and Petrobras have consolidated their dominant position in the sector (Ibid.). Even in 
the mining industry where Bolivia has sufficient capacity so as to not rely on transnational 
technology or expertise, there were limited nationalisations and the most profitable 
deposits were granted to transnationals under very favourable conditions (Ibid.). The new 
arrangements in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors “favoured strong growth in production 
and exports. At the same time, plans to use recovered rents from ‘nationalised’ 
hydrocarbons to diversify the economy and promote ‘plurinationality’ were not translated 
into concrete policies, thereby deepening dependence on gas exports” (Kaup 2017: 175). 
Furthermore, while the pace and scope of the proceso de cambio failed to match 
popular demands to reclaim full control over resources and to engage in a much more 
profound restructuring of the economy (Iamamoto 2015: 35), the preceding analysis of co-
opting and paralelsimo in El Alto raises a further issue with democratisation process. García 
Linera (2017) states that “extractivism does not link us to capitalism, nor does non-
extractivism lead us directly to socialism. Everything depends on political power, of the 
social mobilisation capable of guiding the productive processes – extractivist or not – 
toward ever increasing communitarian control over their operation and of the redistribution 
of the wealth earned”. However, given the government’s failure to wholly nationalise the 
most important sectors of the economy, promises to increase bottom-up influence and 
control over policy and agenda setting fell short, while dissenting voices who challenged the 
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underlying agreement with elites and transnationals were side-lined via co-optation or 
paralelismo. 
While this chapter detailed the restrictions on participation for urban strategic groups in 
El Alto who sought to hold the government to the October Agenda demands, Andreucci 
(2017: 174) details how “as indigenous demands for territorial self-government appeared 
increasingly incompatible with the government's developmentalist policies, the MAS 
strengthened its alliance with the campesino leadership and isolated the indigenous 
movement”.  Much like with El Alto’s popular organisations, the government co-opted and 
divided the two principle national indigenous federations, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, creating 
parallel organisations loyal to the government while at the same time repressing and 
marginalising those who refused to be co-opted (Ibid.). 
In such a scenario where strategic groups who sought to challenge the nature of 
government-elite relations were divided and/or co-opted, the balance of power between 
government, popular society, elites, and transnational forces shifted so that the state 
became “less open to progressive demands” (Andreucci 2017: 175) from either the 
indigenous or popular-urban groups, with the focus instead shifting to “securing resource-
based accumulation and control over hydrocarbon rents” (Ibid.). In sum, while García Linera 
cogently outlines why Bolivia must make use of natural resources to build an emancipatory 
project, and while he states that such a process must be accompanied by, and indeed 
guided by, organised popular forces, actual outcomes to date do not match his aspirations, 
with natural resource control remaining outside state hands, while democratic deepening 
has in fact veered toward “despotic” centralisation. Indeed, while the “main justification for 
the all-encompassing power of the national executive…is that it guarantees the political-
216 
 
party unity essential for confronting powerful and aggressive adversaries” (Ellner, 2013: 13), 
there has been a shift in focus on who these “powerful and aggressive adversaries” are, with 
strategic urban and indigenous groups replacing domestic and transnational elites. Indeed, 
the Bolivian case raises fundamental concerns as to whether real democratic deepening that 
delivers autonomous bottom-up control over policy-making is possible in a scenario where 
state autonomy is limited by the power of domestic and transnational elites.  
In sum, democracy has been deepened, with indigenous and popular sector recognition 
and inclusion drastically increased from the era of market-democracy. Democracy has been 
extended, and the redistribution of taxes earned from hydrocarbon sales act as a crucial 
bulwark against extreme poverty for Bolivia’s most vulnerable citizens. However, once 
hydrocarbon prices decline and elite actors seek to maintain their profit levels, further 
pressurising Morales to adhere to their demands, serious questions regarding the long-term 
legacy of the proceso de cambio are likely to emerge.  
 While Morales had to respond to the appalling levels of poverty facing the country 
when he came to power, and while this entailed entering a Faustian pact with domestic and 
international elites, the decision to undercut contestatory popular organisations was a grave 
error. A powerful popular sector with high levels of associational and collective power is the 
best defence against elite destabilisation tactics. Furthermore, given the possibility of a 
return of the Right to state power, a powerful popular base is vital to ensure that wholesale 
backsliding to the days of market democracy does not occur. Indeed, it is central to radical 
processes of change that both the Left-led state and the constituent-base increase their 
powers in tandem vis-à-vis domestic and transnational elite forces. While such a re-dressing 
of power requires an extremely difficult balancing act, any process of change that fails to 
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achieve this will tend toward “despotic” centralisation, re-constitued neoliberalism (Webber 
2011), and, as witnessed in the case of El Alto, a fracturing of the state-popular society 
relations that opens space for Right-wing actors to (re)emerge. 
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Chapter 6: Venezuelan democratisation in 
historical context  
1. Overview: 
Following the TGPT framework outlined in chapter 2, this chapter offers a historical analysis 
of the key moments of recent attempts to construct a post-neoliberal democracy in 
Venezuela. The TGPT outlines how the relational power balance between the government, 
organised popular sectors, economic elites, and international (f)actors impacts on the 
emergence, development, and outcomes – understood as the quality of democratic 
deepening and extending, the nature and extent of centralisation of power in the executive, 
and the long-term legacy - of the democratisation process. The TGPT framework suggests 
that antecedent conditions and the history and nature of popular sector organisation and 
mobilisation influences not only the point of inflection, that is, the election of the new-Left 
president, but also feeds back onto the process at various stages, influencing the 
democratisation trajectory and outcomes. Given the varied nature of the antecedent 
conditions in Bolivia and Venezuela, as well as the different relative power between key 
actors in both cases, the analysis in this chapter helps to set up a comparative discussion 
(see chapter 8) from which lessons for radical-substantive democratisation can be drawn.  
As such, in order to properly gauge the successes and failures of recent attempts by the 
Left in Venezuela to deepen and extend the quality of democracy, it is necessary to root 
such assessment in “the legacy of the illiberal Punto Fijo democracy” which began in 1958 
(Buxton 2011: xiii). The theory-guided framework therefore examines the emergence of this 
Punto Fijo democracy; the rise and fall of the import-substitution industrialisation period; 
the adoption of neoliberalism; the mass protests against neoliberal political and economic 
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exclusion, detailing the histories of societal mobilisation in Venezuela; the emergence of 
contemporary Bolivarianism and the “inflection point” of the election of outsider candidate 
Hugo Chávez;  and the self-reinforcing and reactive sequences of the democratisation 
process. A weak history of popular organising in the antecedent era fostered a vanguard 
relationship to emerge between the new president Chávez and popular sectors. As the 
process radicalised and sought to extend democracy, economic elites responded 
aggressively to protect their entrenched interests. In response to elite destabilisation 
efforts, power became centralised in the executive. While this centralisation was 
counterbalanced by attempts to construct from the top-down a grassroots inclusionary 
democracy, over time, particularly since the election of Chávez’s successor, Nicolas Maduro, 
the balance of power between state and society has ultimately culminated in a 
centralisation spiral which became despotic with internal debate and popular deliberation 
side-lined. With international conditions becoming less favourable to the construction of an 
alternative to market democracy in the region, the long term legacy of the process remains 
uncertain.  
2. Introduction: 
Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 1998 until his death in 2013, and the continuation of the 
“Bolivarian revolution” by his successor Nicolás Maduro, fostered a process of controversial 
political and economic change in the country. The Venezuelan government was transformed 
by the drafting of a new constitution in 1999, the structure of the economy has been 
transformed via a program of renationalisation, popular participation has become an 
integral part of state policy, and in the geopolitical sphere Venezuela has taken a leading 
role in new regional movements that seek autonomy from, and sometimes openly criticise, 
the United States (Smilde 2011: 1). The Bolivarian process has challenged the neoliberal 
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fundamentals of free markets and liberal democracy, with state-sponsored avenues of 
participatory democracy opening “new dimensions in debates on citizenship, civil society, 
and the meaning of democracy” (Buxton 2011: x, xii). As Duffy (2015: 1475) outlines, 
“Venezuela has pursued a political project that aims to expand the scope of democratic 
engagement by complementing representative democracy with constitutionally guaranteed 
avenues for the exercise of participatory and direct democracy”. Furthermore, there have 
been extensive attempts to extend democracy via state provision of subsidised housing, 
education and health care, along with efforts to redistribute land (Yates and Bakker 2014: 
7).  
While promoting new forms of democratic engagement, this Bolivarian process did not 
eschew liberal democratic mechanisms such as elections, constitutionalism, and the 
legitimacy of formal institutions (Buxton 2011: xv), at least until more recent times since the 
election of Maduro to the presidency which  has witnessed a sharp increase in centralisation 
of power in the executive. Indeed, from about 2006 on, liberal critics of Venezuelan 
democratisation have described the government as competitive authoritarian or electoral 
authoritarian (see for example Corrales & Penfold 2010, Hidalgo 2009, Kornblith 2013, 
Levitsky & Loxton 2013, Mainwaring 2012), while in the international sphere, various 
organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) have suggested that 
Venezuela has broken from democracy (as cited in Cannon and Brown 2017). Furthermore, 
those from the radical Left within Venezuela itself have attacked the government for 
hoarding too much power in the executive, while at the same time successes in extending 
democracy are being eroded due to falling oil prices and economic crises. In order to gain a 
nuanced understanding of the regarding the outcomes of Venezuela’s process to date, the 
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next section offers an examination of the antecedent conditions beginning with the 
emergence of the Punto Fijo era pacted-democracy. 
3. Antecedent Conditions:   
3.1 Punto Fijoism, market democracy and exclusion: 
In the context of the Cold War, Rómulo Betancourt’s Acción Democrática (AD) party was 
ousted from government in a coup, leading to the instalment of a military regime between 
1948 and 1958 (Helllinger 2012: 139). When General Marcos Pérez Jiménez fell in 1958, elite 
leaders of the main party groupings – Betancourt of AD, Rafael Caldera of the Christian 
Democratic Party (COPEI), and leaders of other non-communist parties, agreed to a power-
sharing pact in Caldera’s home, the villa “Punto Fijo” in Caracas (Ibid.). This pact, while 
guaranteeing the signatories’ influence over the new government after presidential 
elections, which were won by Betancourt, also excluded the Communist Party. Other elite 
pacts ensured that the post-1958 regime “would not challenge fundamental interests of 
domestic businessmen, the military, and the Church” (Ibid.). This “pacted democracy” (Karl 
1990) set the scene for “a political condominium, mainly between AD and COPEI, under 
which the two parties competed for influence not only in government…but throughout 
various social and economic sectors – including unions, professional associations, business 
confederations, student organisations etc.” (Hellinger 2012: 140).  
The Punto Fijo pact provided for competition between AD and COPEI for access to oil 
rents, which were used to legitimise the regime via the provision of economic well-being 
and the promotion of societal development (Smilde 2011: 3). The state, using the vast oil 
wealth at its disposal, “was able to attend simultaneously to the demands of private capital 
for accumulation and to the majority’s demands for social and economic well-being” (Ibid.). 
As Smilde (2011: 3) notes, many political scientists considered Venezuela to be a model of 
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democratic stability. However, while democracy may have been stable, Hellinger (2012: 
140) highlights that the pact increasingly divorced parties from representation of the social 
sectors and there was little room for national social movements to emerge, as happened 
elsewhere in Latin America in the struggles against military or other authoritarian regimes. 
While elections were held, freedoms and collective well-being were restricted as a result of 
massive inequality and exclusion, with little popular input in decision-making, a narrow 
choice of political candidates, clientelistic networks based around oil wealth, and often 
violent repression of dissent (Duffy 2015: 1476). 
The Punto Fijo pact was based upon oil revenues and generous social spending, but 
by the 1980s, falling oil prices and the Latin American debt crisis “exposed the material and 
political limits of this system” (Hetland 2014: 376). A fiscal and current account crisis and the 
subsequent currency devaluation in 1983 broke the basis of Punto Fijo social pact (Hellinger 
2012: 140). During the 1988 presidential campaign, neither major candidate – Eduardo 
Fernández of COPEI or Carlos Andrés Pérez of AD – prepared the electorate for the 
“economic shock treatment that lay just around the corner” (Roberts 2014: 217). Indeed, 
Pérez fostered the belief that his election would allow for a return to the “generalised 
affluence of his first presidential term of the 1970s” (Ibid.). Despite such promises, in 
February 1989, Pérez, who had been elected on a centre-left, social-democratic platform, 
implemented a severe structural adjustment package known as the gran viraje – “the great 
turnaround” - under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in a classic 
example of “bait and switch” electoral politics (Ibid.).  
The structural adjustment package emphasised deep cuts in public spending, 
deregulation of prices including on food and transport, deregulation of interest rates, 
devaluation of the national currency and the introduction of a unitary foreign exchange 
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rate, the introduction of a value-added tax, restructuring of the foreign debt, privatisation of 
banks, airlines, telecommunications, ports, and other activities, while trade liberalisation 
was called for (Silva 2009: 200-01). Decisions regarding the adoption of these neoliberal 
policies were taken by a closed group of free-market technocrats and business people who 
were given top cabinet positions (Ibid.). These technocratic decision-makers were schooled 
in the private business school Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) and, 
in analogy to Chile’s Chicago Boys, they were known as the IESA Boys (Fernandes 2010: 22-
3). Silva (2009: 201) highlights that such decision-making procedures represented a first step 
in restructuring the state so as to separate politics from economic policy making. 
3.2 The Caracazo: 
Eleven days after announcing the structural adjustment measures, on February 27, 1989, a 
100-percent increase in bus fares sparked a spontaneous “five day rebellion known as the 
Caracazo” (Roberts 2014: 218) which resulted in the deaths of between 246 and 1500 
people in riots and military responses, while thousands were arrested in popular 
neighbourhoods, particularly those that had histories of Left-wing guerrilla activity (Silva 
2009: 204; Roberts 2014: 218; Ciccariello-Maher 2013). The “floodgates to anti-neoliberal 
contentious politics opened after the Caracazo with some 5,000 protests recorded in the 
three years that followed” (Silva 2009: 205). However, as De La Torre (2013: 30) highlights, 
“social movements were relatively weak and lacked the organisational strength to engage in 
sustained mobilisations”. The Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV), the 
principle labour confederation at the time, despite calling several general strikes at crucial 
moments, never sustained leadership or coordination of anti-neoliberal mobilisation35 (Silva 
2009: 195). Rather, uncoordinated strikes, marches and demonstrations in which each 
                                                          
35
 For a detailed discussion of the CTV’s declining role in organising protest, see Silva 2009, Chapter 7 
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group focused on its own specific grievances, occurred almost daily (Ibid.: 209). With no 
central, guiding force, these protests “did not generate more coordinated efforts that built 
into larger waves of contention over time” (Ibid.).  
3.3 More neoliberalism, more exclusion, popular-military movements and the emergence of 
Hugo Chávez: 
The Caracazo was followed by two coup attempts in 1992 against Andrés Pérez, the first of 
which was led by Hugo Chávez (Hetland 2014: 376). The Bolivarian Revolutionary 
Movement-200 (MBR-200) led by Chávez began as a clandestine group of officers seeking 
reform of the armed forces (Smilde 2011: 7; López Maya 2003). The waves of protests 
following the Caracazo, though they failed to deliver a political alternative, did manage to 
block the realignment of the dominant political forces. It was in this unstable situation 
where power from the top was unable to govern, while power from the bottom was unable 
to offer a valid alternative (Antillano 2010), that popular protesters galvanised behind “a 
military-led political opposition committed to profound institutional change and revenge 
against a rapacious ruling class” (Hellinger 2012: 143). The MBR-200 officers, who followed 
the ideals of Simón Bolívar and his continental project for democracy, felt the Venezuelan 
oligarchy had betrayed the country (Smilde 2011: 7) and that the Punto Fijo pact had 
become corrupted and “significantly excluded the interests of the popular sectors” (Silva 
2009: 215). Following the attempted coup, the MBR officers, including Chávez, were jailed.  
 It is important to highlight that, as in Bolivia, the neoliberal calls for decentralised 
government had an important influence in generating space for new parties and Leftist 
organisations to emerge. In 1984, “the Presidential Commission for Reform of the State 
(COPRE) proposed a slate of reforms, that in addition to transference of powers from the 
central government to regional and municipal levels, sought reforms of the judicial system, 
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the electoral system political parties, and the civil service” (Fernandes 2010: 59). 
Furthermore, in 1989 the organic Law of Municipal Regimes gave greater fiscal 
independence to municipalities (Ibid.). The greater focus on local and regional units of 
government “marked a shift away from traditional corporatist structures of mediation and 
allowed new power bases to emerge” (Ibid.). Following the unsuccessful coup attempts 
launched by Chavez in 1992, “the proposal by COPRE to replace centrally appointed regional 
officials with directly elected ones was finally passed”…strengthening the position of mayors 
and governors and alternative political parties” (Ibid.). In the 1992 gubernatorial and 
mayoral elections, alternative Leftist parties including the Causa R (Radical Cause) and the 
Movimiento al Socialismo or MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) won heavily (Ibid.).  
In May 1993, the president was impeached on corruption charges and Rafael Caldera 
became the first elected president not to come from AD or COPEI (Smilde 2011: 6). Caldera 
had broken with COPEI and forged a makeshift coalition which included the small leftist 
party MAS. Caldera had stridently opposed the neoliberal model in the campaign, even 
going so far as to rationalise the 1992 coup as “an expression of outrage at Perez’s reforms” 
(Roberts 2014: 221). Indeed, in an attempt to stabilise civil-military relations, in 1994 
Caldera pardoned the rebellious junior officers of the coup, including Hugo Chávez (Silva 
2009: 221). However, following the collapse of several banks which the state placed in 
receivership in 1994, with mounting outlays for subsidies and price controls, and in the 
context of low international oil prices, the fiscal deficit and inflation far exceeded 
government targets (Ibid.). In 1996, Caldera announced an agreement with the IMF on a 
$3.3 billion structural adjustment package in a “sweeping turnaround” (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
the tranche of reforms relating to currency rates and controls, gasoline prices, interest 
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rates, sales taxes, and increased commitment to privatisation had been devised by Teodoro 
Petkoff, the historic leader of the leftist MAS (Roberts 2014: 222). 
Market democracy faced a growing legitimacy deficit. In economic terms, poverty 
increased from 36 percent in 1984 to 60 percent in 1991, while extreme poverty increased 
from 11 percent to 35 percent by 1993 (Coker 2014: 101). Between 1981 and 1997 
unemployment almost doubled, with massive increases in numbers working in in the 
informal sector, with the poorest of society bearing the brunt of a 37 percent decrease in 
average wages (Smilde 2011: 5). Inequality spiked, with the poorest 40 percent of the 
population earning less than half of what the top 10 percent earned (Ocampo and Martín 
2003: 236). The continuing economic decline, and the second packet of severe structural 
adjustments called for by the IMF in 1996 had “consequences that went beyond class 
polarisation. It spurred a fundamental realignment in social-class identity and political 
cleavages. In effect, Venezuela moved from a modern conflict between Right and Left, to a 
postmodern clash between those with a place in organised, formal society, and those 
without” (Smilde 2011: 5; Castells 1997).  
 A second wave of anti-neoliberal protests developed during Caldera’s presidency, 
the characteristics of which were very similar to earlier moments of contention (Silva 2009: 
221). Public sector unions, teachers, students, transport workers, and neighbourhood 
protests dominated this second wave, while oil workers occasionally joined in, as did 
militant unions controlled by the Causa R party (Ibid.). The CTV even staged a second strike 
(Ibid.). Like the previous wave, protests were decentralised, with no group framing 
mobilisation around larger strategic objectives (Ibid.: 222).  
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4. Point of inflection:  
4.1 The election of outsider-candidate Hugo Chávez: 
The “two bait-and-switch processes of market reform had produced an overarching pattern 
of neoliberal convergence, one that encompassed Caldera and MAS as well as AD and COPEI 
– thus demonstrating the failure of partisan electoral competition to generate policy 
alternatives that accurately mapped onto the programmatic divide in Venezuelan society” 
(Roberts 2014: 223). Indeed, the decline in social-democratic discourse throughout the 
1980s and 1990s witnessed the institutionalised, electoral Left “move to the right and 
become indistinguishable from it” (Smilde 2011: 6). An abrupt fall in oil prices in 1998 led to 
an economic and fiscal disaster in Venezuela; “oil prices hit a historical low, provoking an 
acute sense of frustration among Venezuelans and reinforcing their repudiation of 
traditional elites, the parties, and moderate proposals” (Lopez-Maya 2011: 219). The divide 
in Venezuelan society became “superimposed on an establishment/anti-establishment 
political cleavage, allowing outsiders to politicise inequalities and mobilise the popular 
constituencies that consistently opposed the neoliberal model” (Roberts 2014: 223).  
It is in this setting that Chávez and the Bolivarian Movement emerged as an electoral 
force, “a context in which the majority were experiencing ever-decreasing socioeconomic 
prospects and enjoying virtually no political representation, but were increasingly literate 
and informed” (Smilde 2011: 6). Following the failed coup of 1992, the leaders of MBR-200 
spent two years in jail, during which time they developed their plans and ideology, and once 
out of prison they began forming a “civic-military” movement based on popular 
organisations like the Bolivarian Circles36 (Ibid.: 7). The waves of protest “encouraged 
                                                          
36
 The Bolivarian Circles were popular organisations formed in the 1990s to act as the organised expression of 
civilian support for the MBR (Hellinger 2012: 145). These small cells of up to eleven individuals swore to 
defend the Bolivarian Constitution and its principles (Hawkins and Hansen 2006: 102-3; Rhodes-Purdy 2015: 5). 
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former MBR-200 putchists to form a political party to take advantage of expanding electoral 
volatility and party system change” (Silva 2009: 220). In 1997, the MBR changed its name to 
the Movimiento V República (MVR) as Chávez decided to directly seek the presidency. When 
Chávez announced his candidacy for the presidential elections of 1998, he was “a marginal 
figure with popularity in the single digits”, but as Venezuela’s economy declined and the 
party-system continued to self-destruct, his candidacy surged (Smilde 2011: 8). Chávez 
“adopted a radical and polarizing anti-neoliberal discourse that offered to ‘fry the heads’ of 
the corrupt traditional elites and get Venezuela out of the crisis situation through deep 
social and political change” (Lopez-Maya 2011: 219). The centrepiece of his campaign “was 
a pledge to convoke a constituent assembly and re-found the republic, promising an 
institutional rupture with the post-1958 political order that AD and COPEI had so thoroughly 
dominated” (Roberts 2014: 224). 
In a last-ditch attempt to constrain Chávez, AD and COPEI abandoned their original 
presidential candidates, instead backing “the most viable anti-Chávez independent, Salas 
Römer as the candidate of the establishment” (Roberts 2014: 224). The move backfired, 
tainting Römer and crystallising “the outsider/establishment cleavage that separated 
Chávez from the field” (Ibid.), leading to the election of Chávez “with 56 percent of the vote 
and a clear mandate for his overtly anti-neoliberal platform and critique of neoliberal 
representative democracy as a barrier to protagonist participation” (Duffy 2015: 1476).  
4.2 Government-societal power relations at the Point of Inflection: 
Unlike Bolivia or Ecuador, Venezuela did not have a mass-based indigenous movement, and 
the national labour confederation, the CTV was too closely intertwined with AD to channel 
popular social resistance to market democracy (Roberts 2014: 218; Silva 2009: 195). The 
lack of popular organisations preceding the election of Chávez “determined a different 
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relationship between mobilisation and governance” than was the case in other Pink Tide 
countries such as Argentina or Brazil (Hanson and Lapenga 2017: 180). Chávez “tapped on 
the opportunity to organise and to mobilise the excluded understood as those without work 
in the formal economy, the poor, and those without formal education” (de la Torre 2013: 
40). He “drew on a discourse appealing to popular sectors and his administration 
encouraged popular mobilisation—disruptive or otherwise—in support of the ‘Bolivarian 
revolution’” (Hanson and Lapenga 2017: 180). As such, Chávez came to power “with strong 
emotional and symbolic identification but with a fragile organisational base” (Gómez 
Calcaño 2009: 70; de la Torre 2013: 31). As Collier and Handlin (2009: 318) emphasise, 
“understanding this demobilised and fractured starting point is crucial for thinking about 
how the Chavista project has unfolded”. 
However, while it is certainly true that protests were in general disorganised and 
uncoordinated, some mobilisations were co-ordinated by popular movements evidencing 
strong associational and collective power. In some popular barrios, for example El 23 de 
Enero, popular organisations and collectives with strong histories of mobilisation and 
organisation exist (Ciccariello-Maher 2013). Such movements had their origins in the 
clandestine movement against the 1950s military regime, the post-transition era of guerrilla 
struggle in the 1960s, as well as in the cultural activism and urban committees of the 1980s 
(Fernandes 2010: 5, 6; Velasco 2015). The years of intense armed struggle during the 1960s 
were formative for many of the contemporary leaders of organisations from some popular 
barrios (Fernandes 2010: 48). As established corporatist institutions such as trade unions 
and political parties lost power, and as neoliberal reforms created deep unrest in popular 
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areas, greater space emerged for unaffiliated barrio-based organisations, with their roots in 
longer-term social movements, to build their bases (Ibid.: 59, 69).  
While there were key pockets of well organised popular society at the moment of 
Chávez’s election, and, as will be discussed, these movements have played a powerful role 
in the development of Chavismo, in general, popular society was fractured and Chávez 
played a crucial role in providing a point of reference (Balderacchi 2015: 11; Wilpert 2007). 
As López Maya and Lander (2011: 75) state, the popular movement “lacked an organic base, 
tradition, and networks which might have given it the strength and autonomy to take action 
vis-à-vis the state”. In this context, with the Punto Fijo political parties and the neoliberal 
development model discredited, Chávez called for a Constituent Assembly to begin the 
process of forging a new constitution, and it is to the 1999 Constitution that I now turn.  
5. The 1999 Constitution: 
Chávez immediately organised a constituent assembly to begin drafting a new constitution. 
The process was not simply dictated by Chávez; it had input from women’s movements, 
indigenous groups, Afro-Venezuelans, human rights groups and others (Hellinger 2012: 
145). However, the president did exert “strong and decisive influence over much of its 
content” (Ibid.). As Hellinger (2011: 28) notes, the traditional liberal system of checks and 
balances based on the separation of powers was considered to be insufficient to prevent the 
“the iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1915). Instead, new participatory institutions were 
included in the constitution to prevent the pacted Punto Fijo democracy from occurring 
again (Hellinger 2011: 28).  
With the aim of reaching a social equilibrium, the Constitution Guidelines “present 
three foci around which politics should revolve, each one pertaining to a distinct and crucial 
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dimension of the structural condition of exclusion, and all promoting popular organisation 
and mobilisation” (López Maya and Lander 2011: 64). The first area focuses on “the 
correction of the unjust distribution of income and wealth”; the second focuses on 
“overcoming discrimination in access to fundamental human rights such as nutrition, health, 
housing, and education”; and the third focus is the “development of full citizenship, which is 
characterised by members of society possessing attributes such as solidarity, responsibility, 
and participatory and democratic attitudes” (Ibid.). 
The preamble of the Constitution in its “Exposition of Motives” states that the 
Bolivarian Republic will have a government whose political organs “shall always be 
democratic, participatory, elective, decentralised, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with 
revocable mandates” (CRBV 1999 as cited in Hellinger 2011: 28). The Constitution sought to 
deepen democracy by guaranteeing citizens’ rights to direct, semi-direct, and indirect 
participation, not only via the vote, but also via the “formulation, execution, and control of 
public administration” (CRBV 1999; López Maya and Hetland 2011: 59). 
The Constitution also called for an extending of democracy. The Exposition of 
Motives of the Constitution claims that the Republic has been “refounded” so as to create 
“a more democratic society. Not only is it the state that should now be more democratic, 
but also society” (CRBV 1999). Democracy, therefore should not be limited to the political 
sphere, but should “impregnate all the spaces of social life” (López Maya and Lander 2011: 
58). The second article states that “Venezuela is constituted as a Democratic and Social 
State of Law and Justice which in its legal order and actions holds as highest values life, 
liberty, justice, equality, solidarity, democracy, social responsibility and in general, the pre-
eminence of human rights, ethics, and political pluralism” (CRBV 1999). Indeed, social 
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inequality is considered social exclusion, and the objective of the state’s social-policy must 
therefore be to build inclusion and deliver social rights (López Maya and Lander 2011: 63).  
The Guidelines of the constitution identify both the state and society (citizens, 
families, and organised communities) as the key actors in social transformation, with the 
goal being the creation of substantive citizenship; the state is seen as a “facilitator of 
empowerment for those who ought to make decisions and control public administration” 
(López Maya and Lander 2011: 64). This differs from previous administrations where an 
interventionist state was the main actor involved in delivering citizenship (Ibid.). Article 62 
states that “the participation of the people in the formation, execution and control of public 
matters is the means necessary to accomplish the protagonism (protagonismo) that will 
guarantee their complete development, both as individuals and as well as the collective” 
(CRBV 1999). Articles 326, 70, and 184 call for “co-responsibility” where society is to play a 
“protagonist” role via participation in public affairs via “elections, petitioning, recall 
referendum, and public consultation” along with “the execution of welfare service projects 
at decentralised levels of government in which service delivery may be transferred to 
organised groups of society” (McCarthy 2012: 130).  
To examine and explain the successes and failures of efforts to deliver on the goals 
of the 1999 constitution, the rest of this chapter evaluates how government, popular 
society, economic elites, and international (f)actors have influenced the democratisation 
process through several periods. Phase 1 of the post-inflection era encompasses the 
moderate stage of 1999-2001 and the period of elite resistance of 2001-04. Phase 2 includes 
the radicalisation period of 2004-07, and the period from 2007-13 which witnessed 
attempts to construct 21st Century socialism and the communal state. Phase 3 examines 
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2013-present, reviewing the Maduro era and the creeping authoritarianism associated with 
it.  
6. Post-Inflection Sequencing Phase 1: 
6.1 Moderate Beginnings: 1999-2001: 
When Chávez first came to power, he was oriented toward a “Third Way” strategy like that 
espoused by Tony Blair (Buxton 2016: 9). He saw himself as a democratic socialist “who 
wanted to build a participatory democracy, institute a basic welfare system, and address 
Venezuela’s chronic social problems” (Ibid.). However, the ratification of the 1999 
Constitution strengthened presidential powers, and by the end of 1999, “Chávez had 
weakened institutional checks and balances on executive authority and set the stage for 
new elections in 2000 under the terms of his Bolivarian constitution” (Roberts 2014: 259). 
While in the 1998 campaign, the MVR was primarily an electoral structure that allowed the 
MBR-200 party to establish alliances with groups of different ideological inspiration that 
nevertheless supported Chávez’s candidacy”, the “successive electoral triumphs of the MVR 
between 1998 and 2000 led to the replacement of the MBR-200 by the MVR as the 
movement’s party” (López Maya 2011: 217). The MVR, unlike the MBR-200, was a “vertical, 
centralised electoral structure serving the Chávez candidacy, without internal debate or any 
pretensions of providing an ideological formation for its members” (Ibid.).  
In the 2000 elections, none of the traditional parties ran a candidate, and Chávez 
won the election with 59.8 percent of the vote (Roberts 2014: 259). The MVR captured 46.7 
percent of the seats in the new National Assembly, “while the MAS and other allied leftsist 
parties added another 15.1 percent, giving the president a strong legislative majority” 
(Ibid.). As such, Chávez had extensive political power over the fractious opposition, and, 
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given the de-legitimation of neoliberalism and Punto Fijo democracy, he also had the 
ideological space to begin to implement the new CRBV 1999.  
While the majority of Chávez’s support came from the popular classes, his electoral 
success did cross class lines and, although “much of the business community had opposed 
Chávez in the 1998 election, he successfully courted some business figures who sought 
access to state policymaking channels and resources” (Roberts 2014: 259).  As such, Chávez 
avoided sharp departures from the economic orthodoxy of his predecessor, Caldera. 
Furthermore, Chávez’s economic power was weak; he inherited an economy in recession, 
and oil-prices were at a low of $8-barrel. As such, he followed relatively austere fiscal 
policies and declined to control prices and interest rates (Ibid.: 260).  
Chávez did however call for a civilian-military anti-poverty agenda called Plan Bolivar 
2000 with each branch of the military devising programs that would benefit the poor 
(Wilpert 2003). Plan Bolivar 2000 repaired thousands of houses, schools, homes, parks and 
clinics while over two million people received medical treatment; two million children 
received vaccinations; while thousands of inexpensive markets were opened, to name but a 
few of the successes (Ibid.). However, the programs were criticised by some for being poorly 
managed and for lacking transparency, leading to charges of corruption (Ibid.), issues that 
would continue to be directed against military involvement in democracy expansion over 
the course of Venezuela’s post-neoliberal democratisation. 
6.2 Elite Destabilisation Efforts, Centralisation, Popular power and radicalisation: 2001-04: 
Despite the moderate economic policies, the new Constitution still provoked open 
opposition from business elites (Roberts 2014: 260). The focus on state provision of social 
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rights, the prohibition of privatisation of social security and the state oil company, increased 
job protection for workers, the incorporation of informal workers and housewives into the 
social security system, and allowing private property to be expropriated for social use led to 
criticism from Venezuela’s peak business association, Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones 
de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela (The Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Production – Fedecámaras) (Ibid.). The period from December 2001 to 
August 2004 “saw an intense and protracted struggle between the Chávez government and 
opposition political and economic forces” comprised “mainly of those who have (or at least 
had) a solid place in formal society” such as members of the “traditionally conservative 
Catholic Church, industry, commerce, and construction” (Smilde 2011: 9-10).  
Following the 2000 election, the National Assembly passed an enabling law, allowing 
Chávez to rule by decree for one year (Roberts 2014: 260). In November 2001, Chávez used 
this authority to issue 49 legislative decrees, including new laws that moved beyond political 
reform. They sought to democratise property and production (Lander 2017b) by allowing for 
the expropriation of unutilised farm lands, promoting and financing cooperative production, 
and reasserting executive control over Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) - the state oil 
company - and financial institutions, thereby challenging elite interests (Hellinger 2012: 260; 
Roberts 2014: 261; Lander 2017b). Indeed, the new laws were described by the elite 
business sector and their political wings as an attack on private property indicating a move 
toward communism (Lander 2017b).  
A “sense of urgency” emerged amongst the elite in response to the government’s 
attempts to alter the social and economic spheres (Smilde 2011: 9). Despite Chávez’s 
electoral victories, the elite still maintained multiple sources of economic, political, 
ideological, and military power. Indeed, the initial strategy to respond to the “attacks on 
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private property” was marked by the establishment of the Democratic Coordinator, “a 
heterogeneous grouping of political parties, NGOs, the business association Fedecámaras, 
the trade union confederation, and the CTV (Venezuelan Workers’ Confederation, 
Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela), with Catholic Church and media support” 
(Cannon 2014: 54). The traditional unions called a nationwide strike in December 2001 
(Smilde 2011: 9). In April 2002, a coalescence of dissident military members, sections of the 
Venezuelan business community, and opposition supporters “launched a coup d’état against 
the Chávez government with the support of several private media stations” (Gill 2016: 367). 
An interim government headed by business leader Pedro Carmona was installed (Smilde 
2011: 9). The US government supported the overthrow openly – via White House 
statements advocating dubious claims regarding government repression of opposition 
protests purported by the opposition controlled Venezuelan media (Martin, Young, Pilger 
2007) - and more covertly via funding from USAID and the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) for opposition parties (Cannon 2009: 191; Coker 2014: 92). However, a 
countercoup two days later, in conjunction with mass popular demonstrations, brought 
Chávez back to power (Smilde 2011: 9). 
In the period following the coup, elite-opposition forces in the form of the NED-
funded Súmate organisation pushed for a recall referendum (Cannon 2009: 191), but 
political deadlock led them to instead make use of their economic power by calling a 
national work stoppage in December 2002. The elites retained influence not only over the 
unions linked to the Punto Fijo parties, but the managers of PDVSA as well (Smilde 2011: 9.). 
The opposition tactics failed, however, as the government, making use of their political and 
ideological power, called in loyal and retired workers and asked for help from abroad, and 
fired about half of the 30,000 PDVSA employees (Ibid.). In the process, the government 
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boosted their economic power, while substantially weakening that of the elite by regaining 
control over the country’s primary source of revenue, oil (Ibid.). Furthermore, Chavista 
loyalists also replaced leading members of the army who had participated in attempts to 
overthrow the government, thereby augmenting the military power of Chávez (Ellner 2017).  
Other responses to efforts to extend democracy saw elites use their economic power 
“as they have done throughout history when they consider their interests threatened” to 
create a scarcity of important commodities (Ellner 2013: 67). Following the general strike, 
the government responded to scarcities (which pushed up prices) by implementing price 
and exchange controls in February 2003 (Ibid.). The private sector responded by reducing 
production and exporting more. To fill the gaps in the market (and to intimidate the private 
sector into maintaining production and distribution at normal levels) the government began 
expropriating companies (Ibid.).  
The reversed 2002 coup constitutes a fundamental turning point in the Bolivarian 
process (Cicariello-Maher 2014: 243). It was the mass street mobilisation by the 
“constituent masses” (Ibid.), and the interventions of more organised elements such as the 
Bolivarian Circles that played the key role in returning Chávez to power” (de la Torre 2013: 
31). The vulnerability of the Chávez government to elite opposition forces and their use of 
aggressive tactics to prevent attempts to extend democracy forced it to “be particularly 
responsive to the demands and aspirations of its movement’s rank-and-file members in 
order to count on their ongoing mobilisation” (Ellner 2013: 78). 
 The government’s perception of participation drastically changed; classic 
autonomous civil-society “became a formidable foe of the Chávez government” while “pro-
Chávez participatory groups provided key support during the struggle” (León and Smilde 
2009). The president maintained that he would “devote his remaining time in office to 
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enriching the lives of Venezuela’s popular classes who had saved Chávez from his deposal, 
or worse” (Gill 2016: 367). As such, Chavismo entered a new stage of radicalisation in 
response to the opposition tactics and the “massive spontaneous mobilisation that helped 
restore Chávez to power after the brief coup” (Hellinger 2011: 33).  
In early 2003, the government introduced the misiones, a series of state-sponsored 
programs aimed at delivering the socioeconomic goals of the new Constitution to popular 
communities in the areas of health, education, urban land reform, and nutrition (Hawkins, 
Rosas, and Johnson 2011: 190; Hellinger 2012: 146). The misiones are defined by the 
government as the “conjunction of constituted power and constituent power” (MINCI 2007: 
7, 12); their purpose “is not only to bring the benefits of the welfare state to the poor, 
especially those in the informal sector, but to alter the governance of the economy from 
one emphasizing atomistic participation in the market to one relying on cooperatives, state 
coordination, and local know-how – in a word, what the government celebrates as 
‘endogenous development’” (Hawkins et al. 2011: 190). Muhr (2012: 26) differentiates the 
misiones from conventional social welfare schemes found in social democracies as they seek 
to combine short-term poverty alleviation with long-term structural change.  
However, as Hellinger (2011: 33) explains, these new policies were not only designed 
to expand welfare and involve citizens in committees and popular organisations linked to 
the spending programs. They “were linked to a mobilisation strategy in anticipation of a 
possible recall referendum” (Ibid.) which the opposition did successfully convene in June 
2004. Chávez altered his campaign strategy for the 2004 revocatorio recall election by 
“reducing his reliance on the MVR politicians and successfully appealing to his supporters in 
the Circles to form ‘electoral battle units’ in support of a ‘No’” (Hellinger 2012: 146). Other 
organisations of state-sponsored participation such as Urban Land Committees (CTUs) and 
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Mesas Técnicas de Agua (Water Roundtables or MTAs), along with the Bolivarian Circles, 
provided Chávez with a more organised popular society that he could rely on to provide “a 
popular bulwark against…elite efforts to destabilise his administration” (Hetland 2017: 5). 
In a paradoxical process, the “shift from deepening democracy in the first couple of 
years of the Chávez government toward extending it to the social and economic realms” 
was “accompanied by a progressive centralisation of political and economic power in the 
executive branch” (Smilde 2011: 11) as Chávez sought to prevent elite destabilising tactics 
from impeding the democratisation process. Elite tactics meant that Chávez was heavily 
reliant on popular protests and mobilisation to drive the democratisation process forward, 
which should in theory place power with society over the government and foster 
“progressive centralisation”. Progressive centralisation occurs when increasing executive 
power is used to overcome elite opposition, while it is simultaneously counterbalanced from 
below by popular power, thereby fostering a dual process of democratic extending and 
deepening for popular sectors. However, the lack of associational and collective power and 
the weak organisational histories of popular actors meant that spaces of grassroots 
participation such as the Bolivarian Circles, CTUs, and MTAs were not autonomous from the 
central government. Rather, these state-sponsored spaces of participation were managed 
from the top-down toward “the defence of the revolution at times of serious threat” 
(García-Guadilla 2011: 94-98; Rhodes-Purdy 2015: 5). Indeed, citizens involved in these 
organisations “felt compelled, either by a sense of duty or direct pressure from Chavista 
elites, to do their part in defending the revolution in a time of peril” (Ibid.). While it must be 
stressed that many popular actors did want to support the revolution, the balance of power 
between the government and popular actors, in conjunction with elite destabilising tactics, 
fostered the emergence of a vanguardist state-society relationship. In sum, one of the key 
240 
 
elements of progressive centralisation, namely bottom-up oversight of executive power, 
existed, but in a somewhat contorted form that simultaneously combined bottom-up 
inclusion and top-down control. 
7. Post-Inflection Sequencing Phase 2: 2004-13: 
7.1 2004—07: Oil boom, changing international context, and debilitated opposition: Toward 
21st Century Socialism: 
Chávez’s sweeping victory in the 2004 recall with 58.3 percent of the vote (Roberts 2014: 
262) coupled with a strong increase in oil prices significantly boosted his political and 
economic power, putting  the government in a position to deliver real benefits to their core 
bloc of supporters (Buxton 2016: 9). A “demoralised opposition made little effort to contest 
local and gubernatorial elections later in 2004, allowing Chávez supporters to capture 
twenty-one out of twenty-three state governments and 90 percent of municipalities” 
(Roberts 2014: 262). Furthermore, the following year, the main opposition parties 
boycotted national legislative elections entirely, “giving Chávez’s MVR and allied leftist 
parties a complete lock on the national assembly” (Ibid.). In the 2006 presidential elections, 
the opposition coalesced behind Manuel Rosales of a new party, Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT), 
but Chávez again won with a record 62.8 percent of the vote (Ibid.).  
As oil prices rose in 2004, Western leverage over the Chávez government declined. 
The Bush administration was preoccupied with Iraq and the Middle East. Meanwhile, China 
and Russia, two countries who would not seek to restrict Chávez in an ideological sense, 
were seeking new trading partners in Latin America (Buxton 2016: 9). Furthermore, the 
“Pink Tide” – that is, the election of left-leaning presidents across much of the region such 
as Lula da Silva in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina, Morales in Bolivia, and Correa in Ecuador 
offered ideological and political support to the Venezuelan government (Buxton 2016: 9).  
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This conjuncture marks the beginning of a radicalisation that transformed the 
Bolivarian revolution from a “Third Way”, moderate government, to an anti-imperialist, 
openly socialist one that began to “experiment in all seriousness with direct democracy and 
non-capitalist relations, property, and production” (Cicariello-Maher 2014: 243). No longer 
facing a national referendum on his rule (Hellinger 2011: 34), Chávez announced on his 
weekly television program Aló Presidente that the Bolivarian revolution should construct a 
“new socialism of the 21st century” (Burbach and Piñeiro 2007: 183), distinct from the “real 
socialisms” of the 20th century where the “process of seeking and building is guided above 
all by values such as collectivity, equality, solidarity, freedom, and sovereignty” (Azzellini 
2013: 26). Chávez stated that “popular power is the soul, nerve, flesh and bone, and essence 
of Bolivarian democracy, of a true democracy” (quoted in Sosa 2007: 52). As de la Torre 
(2013: 31) delineates, unlike orthodox Marxist models, the proletariat is not the central 
subject of Venezuelan 21st Century Socialism; rather the subject is the pueblo understood as 
the huge mass made up of the “unemployed, the poor, and the excluded” (Álvarez 2011: 
113). The goal of 21st century socialism is the “construction of a revolutionary socialist 
democracy that will transcend representative liberal democracy” (de la Torre 2013: 31) with 
“real quotidian exercise of power by the great majority of common people” (Acosta 2007: 
22). According to Burbach and Piñeiro (2007: 181), the core difference of the Venezuelan 
attempt to deliver socialism and that of past experiences is the commitment to participatory 
democracy and the exercise of power from the community level. Socialism of the 21st 
century therefore calls for a bottom-up revolutionary movement to transform social, 
economic, and political relations (Harnecker 2010: 125; Salazar 2013: 5) in an attempt to 
advance the goals of the 1999 constitution by “reconfiguring institutions and thus 
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individuals’ activities according to the principles of equality and solidarity” (Burbach and 
Piñeiro 2007: 184).  
7.1a Consejo Comunales: 
One of the most important laws passed during the Chávez presidencies to promote the 
building of 21st century socialism was the 2006 Law of Communal Councils (Hellinger and 
Spanakos 2017: 8). Communal councils (CCs), initiated in part in response to existing 
practices of direct democracy among urban social movements (Fernandes 2010), “are based 
on the idea that local-level citizen participation in the planning, implementation, and 
maintenance of community development projects establishes a platform on which a new 
‘protagonist’ democracy can be built” (Wilde 2017: 141). Chávez saw the CCs as the 
cornerstone of the move toward 21st century socialism, claiming that their formation 
“marked the beginning of a transfer of political, economic, and administrative power from 
the ‘constituted power’ of the state to the ‘constituent power’ of civil society” (Ibid.). David 
Velasquez, who chaired the committee that authored the Communal Council law states that 
the CCs seek to “transfer power and democracy to organised communities to such a degree 
that the State apparatus would eventually be reduced to levels that it becomes 
unnecessary” (as cited in Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 245). The CCs, therefore, are seen by the 
government as “the vehicles to reach the full implementation of a system that aims to give a 
protagonist role to the citizens in the decision-making process” (Salazar 2013: 13). As Salazar 
goes on to describe, the CCs are “supposed to be autonomous, flexible and self-ruling 
community entities, ready for the proposition and execution of projects led by their 
members in their geographical spaces”. The hope is that they will become “incubators” of 
self-managing critical citizens who will be leaders in their community, leading to the 
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formation of “self-sustainable economic units which trigger the transition to new 
structures” (Ibid.). 
Although funds for projects may come from several sources including municipal and 
regional governments, the majority of funding comes from the national government (Wilde 
2017: 142). In a 2006 speech, president Chávez called for the CCs to “be built as a subsystem 
of decision making and avoid becoming only adjuncts to the mayors, governors, or political 
parties” (cited in Motta 2011: 37). As such, the CCs represent attempts to “create a new set 
of state institutions that bypass the traditional state and distribute power in a democratic 
and participatory manner” (Motta 2011: 37)37. 
As Strønen (2017: 161) notes, the communal councils have received considerable 
attention from the academic community in recent years (see, e.g., Álvarez and García-
Guadilla 2011; García-Guadilla 2008; León and Smilde 2009; López Maya 2011; Machado 
2008, 2009), receiving both praise and criticism. For some the CCs are not autonomous 
spaces for participation, but rather state-dominated institutions. Financial dependence on a 
rentier state and regulation by a charismatic president who centralises decisions in the 
executive are said to neutralise grassroots actors’ ability to articulate independent political 
claims and impact political decision-making (Wilpert 2007; Uzcátegui 2010; Garcia-Guadilla 
and Mallen 2013). While acknowledging the “rough edges” of CCs, other analysts have 
highlighted the potential benefits of increasing state funding to historically excluded sectors 
of society (Ellner 2009). As Wilde (2017) details, another strand of scholarship suggest that 
the CCs “subject constituted power to constant constituent pressure, binding the two in a 
dialectical chain toward ever more radical and direct representation” (Ciccariello-Maher 
2013a: 129). In such perceptions, the CCs offer the possibility of decentralizing power away 
                                                          
37
 For a technical discussion of the process of establishing a CC and the internal structuring of a CC see Motta 
(2011) and Salazar (2013). 
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from the state toward empowered publics (Azzellini 2010).  As will be discussed shortly, the 
divergent opinions on the role and potential of the CCs reflect the wider debate surrounding 
Chavismo and the nature of state-society relations in deepening and extending democracy. 
7.1b The PSUV: 
Following the series of elite efforts to remove Chávez from power between 2002 and 2004, 
and following his landslide victory in the 2006 election which “provided him with significant 
political capital not only with respect to the opposition but vis-à-vis his allies and supporters 
as well” (Hetland 2017: 22), Chávez initiated the process of forming the Partido Socialista 
Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela—PSUV), thereby bringing together 
the majority of political parties that supported him under one umbrella (Ibid.: 2). In fact, 
from the outset Chávez maintained that if any existing progressive parties did not join the 
PSUV then they would have to leave the government (Cannon 2009: 59).  
The formation of the PSUV offered Chávez the opportunity to clarify the political-
ideological objectives of his project of developing 21st century socialism (Hetland 2017: 21). 
Indeed, its creation “represented another of Chávez’s efforts to organise the popular sectors 
and, in particular, to do so by constructing a political organisation that would be more solid 
and cohesive—and thus more strategically useful—than the MVR” (Hetland 2017: 21). The 
PSUV members are “drawn from the popular movement in the barrios and show resistance 
to slavish adherence to the oficialista line” (Hellinger 2012: 160). The aim was to provide 
opportunity for grassroots input in policy formation, uniting leadership and base into one 
single body (Cannon 2009: 60). It was hoped such a move could counteract 
bureaucratisation and attendant issues of clientelism and corruption and ultimately foster 
an independent popular movement that was not dependent on the president or any one 
figure for its survival (Ibid.). 
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However, as Hellinger continues, the “PSUV has yet to show a willingness or ability 
to say ‘no’ to its charismatic leader”. Indeed, according to Webber (2016), the PSUV, despite 
initially generating enthusiasm and millions of new members, “never realised its potential 
due to its rigid verticalism, lack of internal debate, and the generalised absence of 
participatory democracy within the party”.  As a result, the PSUV became a top-down 
structure (Gonzalez 2017) which proved slow in responding to grassroots demands, while 
those social movements that did not align themselves with the PSUV were sidelined 
(Velasco 2017).  
7.1c New Regional Organisations:   
Venezuela played a key role in developing new regionalist projects such as UNASUR and 
ALBA which promote “new geographical and ideological boundaries while fostering new 
consensuses that are defined regionally, not globally”, and which are “supported by the 
mainly state-led practices, institutions and funding mechanisms in new social fields such as 
education, health, employment, energy, infrastructure and security” thereby “setting new 
regional boundaries beyond the historical hub of what defined US and market-led 
regionalism” (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012: 6). In 2004, Venezuela led the process of 
establishing the Boliviarian Alliance for the peoples of our America (ALBA). ALBA rejects the 
logic of 1990s regionalism that was based on Latin American countries competing to lock-in 
deregulation and attract foreign investment; rather, ALBA seeks, in direct opposition to 
neoliberalism, to extend 21st century socialism into a regional integration scheme (Riggirozzi 
2011: 434). ALBA proposed an “alternative model of development and accumulation 
underpinned by new principles of solidarity and complementarities” (Ibid.). UNASUR 
meanwhile sought to develop an autonomous space for South American nations vis-à-vis 
Western leverage (Ibid.: 432) allowing for a “normative re-engineering and debate in 
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relation to the purpose of regional integration beyond trade policy” (Riggirozzi and Tussie 
2017: 17) into the spheres of democratisation, inclusion, social development, physical 
integration, defence and identity (Riggirozzi 2011: 432). 
TeleSur, a pan-Latin American satellite television station sponsored by the governments 
of Venezuela, Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Bolivia was established 
with the goal of providing a “counterweight to the ‘imperialist’ information provided by the 
regular television channels” (López Maya 2011: 225). Furthermore, Venezuelan-led energy 
integration projects such as PetroCaribe have developed bilateral trade agreements to 
provide subsidised oil to Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay, as well as joint ventures for exploration 
with Argentina and Uruguay (Riggirozzi 2011: 432). Banco del Sur meanwhile was 
established to offer loans to member countries for the construction of infrastructure and 
social programs, reducing the influence of IFI institutions such as the IMF.  
The new regional agenda opened debates over how best to serve participatory and 
redistributive democracy as well as how to boost regional autonomy redefining the Latin 
American regional agenda (Riggirozzi 2011: 423). Reclaiming the region  “became not only a 
way of resisting US power but a genuine reflection of what Latin American should mean in 
the face of the crisis of neoliberalism” (Ibid.: 426). The new regional environment reduced 
US economic and ideological leverage over Chávez, and the region, as Venezuela actively 
replaced the USA in terms of under-writing debt and offering strategic injections of capital 
to regional allies (Ibid.: 434). In this scenario, regional space and support for a post-
neoliberal democratisation process was boosted (López Maya 2011: 25).  
With such a favourable conjuncture in terms of the relative balance of power – 
extremely high levels of political, ideological, and economic power for the government vis-à-
vis a discredited and debilitated elite opposition, coupled with reduced Western leverage 
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over the government – Chávez sought to radicalise the process of constructing an organised 
popular base. 
7.2 Constructing the communal state: 2007-2010: 
In 2007, Chávez announced “five motors”38 needed to accelerate the path to socialism, 
calling for the “revolutionary explosion of communal power” (López Maya 2011: 227). 
Chávez argued that the CCs, as the instruments of constituent power, should face no 
restrictions (Ibid.). As such, he proposed a constitutional reform that would build a “Popular 
Power” which would act as a new layer to the government (León and Smilde 2009: 5). The 
proposal called for a new hierarchy of communal power that would be “brought under the 
power of the executive branch instead of local governments as previously formulated” 
(Smilde n.d: 27) with funding for participatory initiatives to come directly from the central 
government rather than through municipalities as the 1999 constitution states (León and 
Smilde 2009: 5). This “popular power would not be elected but somehow emerge directly 
from ‘the people’ which, in practice, would mean that its functionaries would be selected by 
the executive branch” (Ibid.).  
The proposed reform however was narrowly rejected by the electorate. Smilde (León 
and Smilde 2009: 5) highlights that the reform failed due to resistance by numerous sectors 
that had previously been sympathetic or at least neutral regarding the Chávez government. 
It is important here to highlight that the Bolivarian movement is comprised of a number of 
competing ideological and organisational tendencies (Wilde 2017; Ellner 2013). Radical 
Venezuelan intellectual Roland Denis  suggests that the “bureaucratic-corporatist republic” 
in the form of the Bolivarian government seeks to lead the popular movements that give it 
legitimacy, while a second current, the “self-governing socialist body”, possesses an 
                                                          
38
 See Lopez Maya (2011) and Smilde (n.d.) for overview. 
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“entirely different logic, based in self-government of land, social spaces, and spaces of 
production” (Denis cited in Spronk et al. 2011: 247-248). Indeed, these divisions can be seen 
within the PSUV which Hetland (2017: 12) classifies into right, left, and moderate wings. 
Hetland (Ibid.: 28) contends that “the popular sectors, particularly those organised into 
grassroots movements, tend to favour the party’s left while the generals, the state 
bureaucracy, and the boliburguesía39 favour its right and moderate wings”.  Indeed, the 
moderate and the right Chavista forces dominate the upper echelons of the PSUV (Hetland 
2017: 31).  
There are clear ideological and strategic differences among these wings regarding 
“extending vs. restraining popular power, confronting vs. accommodating issues of 
bureaucratisation and corruption within the state (and the military), and achieving 
ideological clarity vs. maintaining unity” (Hetland 2017: 28). The “endogenous right”  “is 
characterised by accommodation with capital, rejection of any serious attempt to move 
toward socialism or infringe upon property rights, opposition to worker control and to 
participatory democratic control over state decision making, and a preference for 
managerial/technocratic decision making” (Ibid.).  The endogenous right, in particular some 
army generals, have engaged in corrupt practices for personal gain. However, because of his 
desire to maintain party unity, Chávez, and later Maduro, was tolerant of this wing of 
Chavismo and the PSUV (Ibid.). Within the PSUV the Left wing of the party advocated a 
more confrontational attitude toward capital and the party’s right wing, highlighting 
bureaucracy and corruption as the main obstacles to the advancement of the revolution, 
                                                          
39 As the government side-lined Fedecámaras businesspeople involved in attempts to topple Chávez, a new 
economic class emerged in their stead, many of whom have grown rich through government contracts, while 
others have profited illicitly from their positions within the state bureaucracy (Ellner 2017; Hetland 2017). 
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while also advocating greater participatory measures and worker-control of the economic 
sphere. (Hetland 2017: 29).  
Smilde (n.d.: 27) states that while the original goal of Chavismo “was simply to empower 
civil participation on the assumption that this would lead to the emergence of a general 
societal consensus, the government has progressively moved towards seeking to control 
participation in order to defend and further it’s interests (which it assumes are the true 
interests of the collectivity)”. Webber (2016) points out that the defeat of the 2007 
referendum, the first electoral defeat for Chavismo, was a “product of top-down decision 
making in the lead up to the referendum and skepticism about the bureaucratizing direction 
of the Bolivarian process” indicating popular dissatisfaction with increasing vanguardisation 
and centralisation of the process of change. Smilde (n.d.: 20) suggests however that while 
this defeat temporarily set back the centralizing tendencies of the government, the rejected 
reforms have in fact been adopted “piece by piece through the 2009 referendum abolishing 
term limits, the 2010 passage of a package of laws creating the ‘communal state’, and the 
decree of various laws through the Enabling law in 2011 and 2012.”  
In July 2008, with a presidential enabling law placing extensive political power in his 
hands, Chávez announced twenty-six laws by executive decree. These laws contained 
significant elements of the failed 2007 reform, and sought to bypass governors and mayors 
and give extensive new duties to the Communal Councils in issues regarding “national 
defence, agro-industrial policy, and the formation of the ‘popular economy’” (León and 
Smilde 2009: 5). From 2009, several new laws were introduced which sought to reformulate 
the role of popular participation and the idea of the state because, as Azzellini (2013: 29) 
states, since 2007 “the government’s ability to reform has increasingly clashed with the 
limitations inherent in the bourgeois state and the capitalist system”. In his inauguration 
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speech in January 2007, Chávez stated that he hoped that the CCs would develop 
sufficiently to allow for the emergence of “communal territories”, and that by 2010 a 
“communal power” would develop via a national confederation of CCs, leading to the 
gradual replacement of municipal and provincial governments (Burbach and Piñeiro 2007: 
191-2). However, for Chávez it became increasingly clear that capitalism was a “monster” 
that would swallow up any local initiatives, and as such “a radical leap toward socialism was 
needed if the Bolivarian process was not to come to an abrupt halt” (Ciccariello-Maher 
2016: 16).  
As such, the 2009 Law of Communal Councils, an organic law that sought to place 
the CCs on a par with any other form of public power, was adopted (Ciccariello-Maher 2013: 
246). Furthermore, new laws in 2010 including the Ley Orgánica de las Comunas (Organic 
Law of the Communes), the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Económico Comunal (Organic Law of 
the System of Communal Economy), and the Ley Orgánica del Poder Popular (Organic Law of 
Popular Power) were established. The aim was to increase popular power by allowing 
autonomous development and decision-making along with the production, distribution, 
exchange, and consumption of goods and services via the grouping together of multiple 
communal councils into comunas (communes). The comunas were envisioned as 
“representing a fourth level of government” allowing project design on “a wider scale in 
accordance with state planning” (Ellner 2013: 76), with decision-making retained at local-
levels in CC assemblies (Azzellini 2013). 
The attempts to broaden the consejo coumales into a system of comunas so as to 
simultaneously allow for greater deepening and extending of democracy “brings an increase 
in the conflicts between the state and its popular base…as well as within the state itself, 
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which becomes a site of class conflict” (Azzellini 2013: 29). As Azzellini (Ibid.) cogently 
summarises,  
Not surprisingly, the deepening of social transformation multiplies the points of 
confrontation between top-down and bottom-up strategies. But simultaneously, 
because of the expansion of state institutions’ work along with the consolidation of 
the Bolivarian process and growing resources, state institutions have been generally 
strengthened and have become more bureaucratised. Institutions of constituted 
power aim at controlling social processes and reproducing themselves. Since the 
institutions of constituted power are at the same time strengthening and limiting 
constituent power, the transformation process is very complex and contradictory.  
We can see here the scope for a simultaneous deepening-centralisation scenario 
whereby top-down creation of spaces for popular participation certainly boosts popular 
power, but at the same time, given that the new spaces for participation are so tightly 
linked to the central state and reliant on it for resources, these spaces may lack sufficient 
autonomy to criticise the government. Furthermore, by seeking to construct parallel state 
institutions so as to bypass local levels of government, Chávez radically opened the space 
for real democratic deepening. However, given that state-society and government-
opposition power relations were heavily tilted toward Chávez, such a process also opened 
the possibility for a centralisation of power in the executive. Indeed writing in 2009, Smilde 
(León and Smilde: 2009: 7) suggested that government appeared to be “in a strong position 
to build a hegemonic regime that mobilises citizen participation but progressively 
neutralises its independence and autonomy”. The sequencing of the process and whether 
centralised power was used progressively – that is, to overcome elite destabilisation tactics 
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while simultaneously deepening democracy - or in despotic manner – whereby popular is 
co-opted - is discussed below.  
 
7.3 2010-13: The electoral emergence of the MUD, “Comuna o Nada”, and the death of 
Chávez: 
As described earlier, from 1998 to 2006, elite opposition to Chavismo, buoyed by financial 
and political support from the US, USAID and the NED, relied on extra-constitutional means 
such as economic blockades, lockouts, a coup, street demonstrations, and media 
disinformation campaigns (Buxton 2017a: 5). However, as Chávez survived such 
destabilisation efforts, elite opposition abandoned such confrontational strategies and 
“embarked on a process of ‘partidization’ through the MUD (Mesa de Unidad Democrática, 
Democratic Unity Coalition), featuring a return to predominance of politics and political 
parties, a privileging of electoralism, and a unification of policy platforms and electoral 
strategies” (Cannon 2014: 49).  
The MUD was composed of multiple parties across the political spectrum, but was 
dominated by Primero Justicia (Justice First, PJ), Acción Democrática (AD), Voluntad Popular 
(Popular Will, VP), and Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Era, UNT) (Sonneland 2017). The 
leadership of these parties was comprised of individuals with links to the traditional political 
establishment (Buxton 2017: 6), while AD was one of the signatory parties of the Punto Fijo 
Pact. For example, Henrique Capriles, head of PJ, has links to the old political and economic 
elite of the Fourth Republic and ran his first electoral campaign for COPEI, (Cyr 2013: 377) 
the other Punto Fijo party. Leopoldo López broke from PJ to form the radical-Right wing VP. 
López was a “highly visible figure” during the 2002 coup (Wilpert 2011: 31-2), signing the 
“infamous Carmona Decree, which during the short-lived coup suspended the Constitution 
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and dissolved the National Assembly and the Supreme Court” (Ibid.). According to 
sociologist Ociel López (2016), VP has ties to billionaire Lorenzo Mendoza, the CEO of 
Empresas Polar, Venezuela’s largest food company, and long-time critic of Chavismo (Forbes 
2016). Indeed, Ociel López describes VP as a “Mendoza family franchise” (2016). UNT 
meanwhile was founded by 2006 opposition presidential candidate Manuel Rosales. 
Another prominent voice of the radical-Right wing opposition was María Corina Machado, 
who also had links to the traditional elites (Cyr 2013: 377), and who founded the Súmate 
organisation which aimed to promote the 2004 re-call of Chávez. In 2005, Machado was 
photographed smiling and shaking hands with president George Bush following her 
invitation to the White House to discuss the “perspective of civil society about democratic 
values and the spread of democracy in particular in my country, Venezuela” (Machado 
cited in Gindlin 2005). 
The Venezuelan elites and their political vehicles are a representation of 
Mantuanaje, the name given to “the sectors that occupied the peak of the social pyramid 
since they arrived by European military invasion” (López 2015: 104). Many opposition 
parties are linked to the notion of what Ociel López describes as “lineage” (Ibid.), an 
“inherited nobility limited to the handful of elite Spanish-descended families from which 
opposition leaders like Machado, López, and Capriles are drawn” (Ciccariello-Maher 2016: 
56). During colonialism these families fortified their commercial power by inter-marrying 
with others who shared the “mantuado lineage” (López 2015: 104). These elites are guided 
by an attitude of sifrinaje- snobbishness – and whose historic control over importations has 
facilitated a “natural” alliance with sectors of US power, especially with Republicans (Ibid.: 
105). 
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While the parties comprising the MUD followed different strategies, from the outset 
their common goal was to “re-establish the elite coalition that governed Venezuela during 
its pre-Chávez history, forcibly destabilising the regime that excluded them from the state’s 
redistribution of wealth and power” (Boccardo, Caviedes, and Contreras Kallens 2017). In 
sum, the MUD’s core commitments were a return to market democracy, that is,  liberal 
democracy underpinned by market economics (Buxton 2017: 6; Cannon 2014). 
In the lead up to the 2010 legislative elections, a unified candidate system was 
adopted in an attempt to end tendencies to diffusion amongst MUD members (Cannon 
2014: 54). As Roberts (2014: 263) notes, by winning 47.2 percent of the vote compared to 
48.3 percent for the PSUV, and despite the PSUV winning a legislative majority of 55.8 
percent of the seats, “the combined opposition forces made their strongest electoral 
showing and achieved their highest level of representation since the dissolution of the 1998 
congress”. Consequently, in the face of increasing popular discontent over crime, 
corruption, and government inefficiency, and with Chávez battling against cancer, the 2012 
presidential elections witnessed an increasingly competitive electoral arena (Roberts 2014: 
263). The opposition coalition unified behind Henrique Capriles of PJ. However, despite the 
strengthened political power of the elite opposition, following a massive electoral 
mobilisation campaign, Chávez captured 55.1 percent of the vote to Capriles’ 44.3 percent. 
Less than two weeks after his victory, Chávez delivered his Golpe de Timón (Strike at 
the Helm) speech to the first meeting of his ministers (Bellamy-Foster 2015: 1). Chávez 
called on his ministers to make rapid changes to the upper echelons of the Bolivarian 
movement in order to promote the creation of the “communal state” requiring a 
fundamental transfer of power to the people via the creation of the comunas (Ibid. 1,3). 
What Chávez called for in the speech was the realisation that a transition to socialism could 
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not be achieved without first creating an alternative popular, participatory, protagonist base 
(Bellamy-Foster 2015: 3). In sum, Chávez insisted that the future of the Revolution 
depended on the comunas, stating that it was “comuna o nada” - either the commune or 
nothing.  
8. Post-Inflection Sequencing Phase 3: 2013-Present: 
8.1 Maduro, radical elite destabilisation and “despotic” centralisation: 
Chávez succumbed to cancer shortly after the Golpe de Timón speech, opening a range of 
new power struggles in the development of a post-neoliberal democracy. Nicolas Maduro, 
Chávez’s handpicked successor, narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles with 50.6 percent of 
the vote to 49.1 percent in the April 2013 election. From the moment of his election, “the 
political and economic pressures imposed on Venezuela have been relentless” (Bellamy-
Foster 2015: 12). Nearly victorious in the 2013 election, “the opposition swarmed at the 
sight of fresh blood” (Ciccariello-Maher 2016: 77). They failed to recognise the election 
results, despite the fact that the international community, with the notable single exception 
of the US, did so almost immediately (Hetland 2017: 16). Furthermore, the radical end of 
the elite opposition coalition used their ideological and political power to call for protests 
which quickly turned violent, a tactic that would be used extensively over the coming years 
to destabilise the government. 
The opposition turned its attention to the December 2013 municipal elections, 
framing them as a referendum on Maduro (Hetland 2017: 16). They were confident that 
they could build on the gains made in the April presidential election. However, the PSUV 
won 49.24 percent compared to the opposition’s 42.72 (Ibid.).  Meanwhile, the PSUV and its 
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allies won 76 percent of the mayoral elections and 14 of the 24 gubernatorial elections 
(Ibid.).  
However, 2013 witnessed the beginning of an economic slide for Venezuela. By April, 
month on month inflation had reached 6 percent (Sagarzazu 2014: 322). While the economy 
struggled, the country began to witness scarcities of basic products. Furthermore, violent 
crime levels rose alarmingly (Ibid.). Under these conditions where the government’s 
economic power was weak but their political power remained relatively high, and, following 
their electoral defeat in the December elections, where the political power of elites was 
weak, the radical opposition parties began to turn away from an electoral strategy toward 
one of destabilising street protests to remove Maduro from power.  
In 2014, sections of the MUD headed by María Corina Machado of Vente Venezuela 
and Leopoldo López of Voluntad Popular instigated a campaign via social, private domestic, 
and international media to instigate “La Salida”, or “The Exit”, calling for massive protests to 
“ignite the streets with struggle” and make the country ungovernable for Maduro (Bellamy-
Foster 2015: 12; Ciccariello-Maher 2016: 52). The protests rapidly turned violent, and 43 
people were killed, approximately half being opposition activists, and half being government 
supporters and security forces (Hetland 2017: 16). Responsibility for the deaths has been 
heavily debated, though it would appear that while heavy-handed state repression was 
certainly a factor (Ibid.), the “dominant narrative of government repression” in the 
mainstream and social media provides only part of the reality (Ciccariello-Maher 2016: 53). 
Meanwhile, the jailing of leading opposition politicians Antonio Ledezma and Leopoldo 
López on charges of fomenting a coup against the government, sparked “an international 
outcry and condemnations from organisations accusing Maduro of political repression” 
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(Hetland 2017: 18). While Maduro managed to survive the protests, his international image 
was badly damaged via the elite manufactured media campaign. 
Oil prices fell by 50 percent from June to December 2014 (Smilde 2015: 49). With oil 
revenues accounting for “approximately 95 percent of export earnings, 60 percent of 
budget revenues, and 12 percent of GDP” (Buxton 2016: 7), the economic power of the 
government was hobbled. The pressure on the government was “further intensified with 
widespread hoarding of imported goods - a form of economic corruption introduced by 
vested interests of the rentier-importer economy, directed at thwarting price controls 
introduced to regulate the growing inflation” (Bellamy-Foster 2015: 12). In addition, foods 
sold at government regulated prices were also hoarded and transported across the 
Colombian border where they were sold for extensive profits (Ibid.). Disturbingly, it was not 
simply the traditional elites who engaged in such practices, with widespread accusations 
that government and military elites charged with managing the supply of US dollars for 
purchasing price controlled goods, as well as the supply of food and medicines, were heavily 
involved in corruption (Gonzalez 2017). Meanwhile, the US, seeing Maduro’s vulnerability, 
introduced a range of sanctions thereby discouraging Western banks and investors from 
doing business in Venezuela at a time when the country was in desperate need of dollars 
(Hetland 2016a).  
In the December 2015 legislative elections, the PSUV was “trounced in the urban 
barrios” (Hellinger and Spanakos 2017: 2) whose residents were “sending a powerful 
signal—either by abstaining or voting for the opposition—of their displeasure with the 
government” (Velasco 2016). The PSUV were punished for the endless lines found around 
the country as people queued for scarce goods, for inflation levels that had reached 100 
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percent, and for rising poverty levels (Hetland 2017: 17). The opposition gained a two-thirds 
supermajority in the National Assembly giving them substantial legislative power, the first 
time the opposition achieved such a position since Hugo Chávez arrived to power in 1999 
(Cannon and Brown 2017: 614). However, the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) reduced the 
opposition’s number of elected deputies by three due to irregularities in their elections. As 
Cannon and Brown (2017: 616) note, “this prompted the National Assembly to unilaterally 
reincorporate the suspended deputies in July leading the TSJ to ‘declare congress 
illegitimate’, effectively neutering that body and any legislation it may pass”. 2016 
witnessed a deepening of the economic and social crisis. Oil prices dipped to $34/barrel, 
GDP declined by 25 percent between 2013 and 2016, inflation was estimated at 720 
percent, with food inflation reaching 1,400 percent (Santos 2017: 58-61). In this scenario, 
and with capital flight and debt repayments further reducing available dollars, food imports 
fell 40 percent in the first half of 2016 alone (Hetland 2016a). With little domestic 
production, scarcities of vital goods, medicines, and food soared. While falling oil prices and 
elite tactics certainly worsened the crisis, the single greatest cause was government 
mismanagement of its currency (see Weisbrot 2016 for detailed overview). In 2017, the 
economic scenario worsened as inflation rose, while the black market exchange rate for 
dollars in August 2017 stood at 16,280bolivares/US$1, up from a rate of 18bs/US$1 in 2013 
(based on author’s own observations). 
The economic and social crisis has been accompanied by a political crisis and 
deepening control of state bodies by the executive. In February 2016, the MUD announced 
three parallel strategies to remove Maduro from power including “wide national popular 
mobilisation” demanding the President’s resignation; the passing of a Constitutional 
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Amendment “voted for and defended by the people” (although by which means is not 
specified) to shorten the presidential mandate and hold elections in 2016; and the initiation 
of a Recall Referendum (Cannon and Brown 2017: 625). However, the government 
controlled national electoral council, the CNE, claimed there were irregularities in the 
signature collection process, and suspended the recall process40. The CNE also postponed 
regional and municipal elections due to take place in December 2016, violating Chávez’s 
proclamation that Venezuela’s process of building socialism differed from the Soviet Union 
due to its adherence to electoral democracy (Hetland and Ciccariello-Maher 2017). In March 
2017 the government controlled “Supreme Court stripped the National Assembly, the only 
opposition-led government body, of its authority to legislate, temporarily taking that power 
for itself” (Hellinger 2017). While Maduro back-tracked on this position and the Supreme 
Court rescinded the decision a few days later, and while the National Assembly had clearly 
taken unconstitutional measures, such as to “snap their fingers and grant amnesty to all so-
called political prisoners, some of whom had engaged in very violent actions” (Hetland and 
Ciccariello-Maher 2017), the initial move  was heavily critiqued, even by Chavista 
sympathisers such as attorney general Louisa Ortega Díaz who decried it as a “rupture with 
the constitutional order” (Hellinger 2017). Furthermore, in April 2017 the government 
prohibited opposition leader Henrique Capriles from participating in elections for fifteen 
years on “dubious” accusations of corruption (Hetland and Ciccariello-Maher 2017).  
By “closing off constitutional avenues for opposition, the government has played 
into the hands of the more radical sectors of the MUD and reduced the influence of those 
who had hoped to use the recall and the electoral process to end the Bolivarian era” 
(Hellinger 2017a). The result was a wave of almost constant street protests for three 
                                                          
40
 See Cannon and Brown (2017) for detailed discussion. 
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months. While it would be erroneous to suggest that all of these protests incited violence, in 
many of the mobilisations there have been attacks on public buildings (Hellinger 2017a), 
lynching and burning alive by right-wing activists of brown and black men “just for looking 
like Chavistas” (Atenea Jiménez of the National Network of Comuneros, interview with 
author), and the use of guarimbas –violent protests that involved the barricading of streets 
with burning tyres and the hanging of galvanised wire across intersections to decapitate 
motorcyclists (Hetland and Ciccariello-Maher 2017).  
International media coverage, especially in the US, ignored much of this violence 
(Hellinger 2017a) instead highlighting incidences of violence carried out by state forces and 
government supporters. The so-called colectivos of armed government supporters have 
been blamed for inciting violence, and while there is no doubt that some colectivos have 
killed protesters, “reporters unfailingly use the term colectivos indiscriminately, suggesting 
that all are violent” with coverage eliding “the fact that most colectivos are mainly 
dedicated to government-supported projects in poor communities” (Hellinger 2017). While 
colectivos certainly were/are partisan, “working to support the Chavista cause in elections, 
most are not involved in paramilitary organisations” (Ibid.). Over one-hundred people died 
in the street protests, yet as Wilpert (2017) notes, a “follower of CNN or the New York Times 
would not know that” of the deaths, “27 were the direct or indirect result of the protesters 
themselves”, “fourteen were the result of lootings”, a further fourteen “are attributable to 
the actions of state authorities”, while forty-four “are still under investigation or in dispute” 
(Ibid.). 
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8.2 National Constituent Assembly: 
In the midst of protests Maduro “doubled down on the loyalty of the security forces and the 
risk of alienating even his Chavista supporters by calling for a constituent assembly to 
rewrite the 1999 constitution” (Hellinger 2017a). Without holding a consultative 
referendum in advance – unlike in 1999 when Chávez relied on popular support to convene 
a constituent assembly -  on June 30th a vote was held to elect the 545 member assembly 
(Smilde and Ramsey 2017; Hellinger 2017a). The electoral process faced accusations of bias 
to guarantee that, in spite of the majority of the population not supporting either the 
constituent process or the Maduro government, “Madurismo wins a majority” (Lander 
2017). The election of the 545 delegates was split between 181 “sectoral” and 364 
“territorial” representatives, with sectoral members chosen by members of communal 
councils, labour, peasant organisations, students, pensioners and other groups who must 
first be selected by the government controlled CNE (Hellinger 2017a). Given “the fact that 
many of these…come from government-affiliated organisations that make up the PSUV base 
gives Chavismo a clear advantage” (Smilde and Ramsey 2017). Furthermore, the division of 
territorial representatives also favoured the government with outsized weight given to 
government supporting, low-population, rural municipalities, while opposition dominated 
densely-populated urban areas were under-represented (Ibid.). The opposition decried the 
move as an attempt to avoid facing presidential elections in 2018, and declined to 
participate (Smilde and Ramsey 2017).  
Maduro claimed that the forming of the ANC was necessary to overcome the 
political impasse and violence in the country and to advance the country’s revolution, but 
many observers questioned the timing of the process, suggesting that it was “the initiative 
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of an unpopular leader avoiding fair elections at all cost”, paralleling previous moves to 
suspend the recall referendum and postpone regional elections (Smilde and Ramsey 2017). 
Lander (2017) concurs, stating that the government recognised that it could not win in 
universal, direct, secret elections and so designed a new system to maintain control. Once 
convened, the ANC quickly moved to remove attorney general Ortega Días from office due 
to “serious failures in the exercise of her role” (as cited in Aporrea 2017), and replaced her 
with Tarek William Saab, a close ally of Maduro. Ortega Díaz stated that her removal was 
due to her investigations into corruption and abuses of human-rights cases against high-
ranking government officials and members of the ANC (Aporrea 2017). The series of events 
since the opposition won the December 2015 legislative elections has been described, even 
by progressive analysts, as “creeping authoritarianism” (Hetland in Hetland and Ciccariello-
Maher 2017). 
International condemnation of the process has been severe. With the Right-ward shift in 
several key South American nations including Brazil and Argentina, the Venezuelan 
opposition’s analysis of the political and economic context was supported by Merrcosur 
who suspended Venezuela, while Luis Almagro of the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
called for the organisation’s democratic charter to be invoked against Venezuela (Cannon 
and Brown 2017: 617; Hellinger 2017).  Florida Senator Marco Rubio openly threatened the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Haiti with punishment if they failed to cooperate with 
Washington’s plans to “delegitimise the government of Venezuela” (Weisbrot 2017). Mike 
Pompeo, director of the CIA, admitted to coordinating with the Mexican and Colombian 
governments to overthrow the Maduro government (cited in Aporrea 2017a). The Trump 
administration and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson openly called for regime change, which 
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emboldened the radical sectors of the opposition who did not seek a negotiated or peaceful 
solution to the political impasse (Weisbrot 2017a), and whose aim  was “not only to get rid 
of Maduro, but to destroy Chavismo itself” (Gonzalez 2017). Furthermore, US sanctions 
against Venezuela, and the threat of further sanctions, led to investors withdrawing money, 
and the black market dollar exchange rate falling 45 percent in just four days (in the first 
weeks of August 2017) (Ibid.). As Weisbrot (2017a) emphasises, there was a real attempt on 
the part of the US to further destroy an economy which was already a wreck so as to force 
the government from power. 
8.3 Increasing Militarisation: 
This scenario fueled an entrenched attitude on behalf of the government (Velasco 2017a) 
with an increasing militarisation of the upper echelons of Chavismo. Maduro, whose control 
over the military was always more tenuous than that of Chavez’s, strove to cultivate a “loyal 
core among security officials” (Smilde 2016a). Of the 32 ministers of Maduro’s cabinet in 
2017, 12 were from the armed forces (Reyes 2017). Between 2013 and 2017, fourteen new 
military-run companies in key areas of the economy such as construction, transport, 
finance, oil, agriculture, manufacturing, and communications were established (Armas 
2017). In Defense Minister General Vladimir Padrino López took over as head of the “Grand 
Supply Mission”, thereby taking control of Venezuela’s entire food supply system.  Since 
then, the Armed Forces (FANB) were charged with “regulating food and medicine 
distribution and overseeing all major ports across the country” (Ramsey 2017). Both Ramsey 
(2017) and Smilde (2016a) raised concerns that by allowing the military to oversee food 
production, Maduro “made the armed forces a direct stakeholder in the permanence of the 
regime” whereby military officials had such capacity for economic gain that they would side 
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with the government instead of the people if there was social upheaval (Ramsey 2017). 
Furthermore, Smilde (2016a) highlighted how Maduro appointed military personnel facing 
charges in the US, thereby raising the exit costs of the government losing power and 
ensuring the loyalty of high-ranking officers. Major General Manuel Quevedo, who had 
initially been named on US senator Marco Rubio’s 2014 list of Venezuelan officials who 
should be sanctioned but who did not appear on the final Treasury Department list, was 
appointed by Maduro to head the state oil company PDVSA (Ulmer and Buitrago 2017). 
While Maduro stated Quevedo’s appointment was to root out corruption, sources within 
the company suggest this was a front to allow Maduro to sideline rivals and deepen control 
of the industry by appointing a military-ally (Ibid.). 
Opposition leaders Julio Borges and Leopoldo López openly called for the military to 
revolt (Weisbrot 2017a), and while the political and economic power granted to the FANB 
by Maduro helped maintain their loyalty, there were signs of unrest. General Baduel, a 
former close associate of Chávez was arrested in 2017 for supposedly plotting against the 
government, while in August 2017 a group of military personnel attacked the Paramacay 
military base.  
Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear that the military elites “were openly 
involved in corruption, especially in trafficking medicine, food, and foreign currency, which 
directly affects popular sectors” (Velasco 2017a). While currency manipulation was first 
undertaken as an emergency response to the oil industry strike of 2002, by 2017 it had 
become a byzantine three-tiered currency control system with enormous gulfs between 
official and black market rates. This created serious incentives for corruption whereby 
state/military officials with access to dollars at the lower official rate can then resell them at 
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black market rates, making enormous profits (Cannon and Brown 2017: 619). The outcome 
was a shortage of dollars for food imports, lengthy queues for the little food that was 
available, and a greatly inflated black market for those same goods (Ibid.).  
8.4 Rising popular discontent: 
2017 witnessed an increase in popular protest, not against the government per se, but 
against poverty and corruption (Velasco 2017). In the barrios “the government is not only 
weakened, but discredited, even among the most committed Chavistas, for whom the 
government reacts with timidity and incoherence against what they perceive as a violent 
opposition” (Velasco 2017a). As Velasco (2017) notes, popular sectors felt abandoned by the 
government. Figures suggest that by mid-2017, 13 percent supported Maduro, 37 percent 
supported the moderate opposition, 25 percent the radical opposition, and crucially, 
disaffected Chavistas represented 25 percent of the population (CEP-UCAB 2017).  
A growing “Chavismo-no-Madurista” movement emerged made up of “critical 
Chavistas” such as the Marea Socialista group who claimed to represent a critical-Left voice 
distinct from the PSUV and the MUD (Marea Socialista 2017). Marea Socialista denounced 
lack of universal citizen participation in the formation of the ANC, which Art. 71 of the 1999 
Constitution had guaranteed (Aporrea 2017b). Indeed, the group stated that the ANC was 
formed via co-optive state practices which fundamentally rupture with the goals of 
Chavismo (Ibid.). 
In August, deputies Eustoquio Contreras, Germán Ferrer and Ivone Tellez separated 
from the PSUV to form an alternative Left bloc in the National Assembly (PuntoDecorte 
2017). UPP 89, a new political party comprised of Leftist-groups emerged in opposition to 
the PSUV, claiming to represent and adhere to the ideals set out in Chávez’s “Golpe de 
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Timón” speech (PuntoDecorte 2017a). Furthermore, the Communist Party and the Patria 
Para Todos party sought to construct a space for a leftist critique within Chavismo (Eduardo 
Samán cited in Aporrea tvi 2017). In sum, the political power of the government was 
challenged, not only by elites and opposition parties, but also from some popular sectors 
and Leftist groups.  
8.5 Maduro’s staying power and the MUD in disarray: 
In October 2017 gubernatorial elections, despite popular discontent, elite pressure, and 
transnational efforts to destabilise Maduro, the PSUV trounced the MUD, winning 18 of the 
23 states. Making use of its ideological power, the MUD rapidly contested the shock results 
through its social and international media connections, claiming fraud and that it had been 
robbed (Boothroyd-Rojas 2017b). However, while the government certainly engaged in 
efforts to hinder the MUD, such as via the CNE’s refusal to substitute candidates after the 
opposition’s primaries as well as its decision to move the electoral centres of 700,000 voters 
72 hours before the election (Smilde 2017), it was declines in voter turnout in opposition 
strongholds from the 2015 electoral victory that was “by far the biggest driver of change in 
vote share” (Kronick and Rodríguez 2017). The shock results and lack of opposition turnout 
may be partially explained by the divisions in MUD strategy, with Corina Machado calling for 
abstention of the elections, while other parties of the coalition advocated it would be better 
to confront the government (Ibid.). However, the principal cause for low opposition-voter 
turnout appears to have been the lack of policy proposals that respond to actual voter 
concerns, with efforts simply aimed at regime change (Ibid.).  
Following the MUDs incapacity to offer a coherent program other than “the negative 
appeal of a generic anti-government position” (Buxton 2017: 6), the October election results 
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“practically destroyed” the opposition bloc, with the rifts that had always existed in the bloc 
coming to the fore in the aftermath of the defeat (Straka 2017). With “the opposition more 
divided than ever, the government…wasted no time in capitalizing on the moment to 
announce plans for municipal elections” (Ramsey 2017a) in December. In disarray, the MUD 
called for an electoral boycott, which the main constituent parties adhered to, but other 
parties did not (Smilde 2017a). The PSUV and allies won 308 of the 335 municipalities 
(teleSur 2017), which are important given their capacity to raise their own funds through 
taxation, manage their own police forces, and police protest which is likely to see pro-
government mayors more hostile to opposition street mobilisations (Smilde 2017a). The 
divided political power of the opposition meant that they were unable to mobilise their base 
in October elections, and they were unable to pull off a boycott in December indicating a 
“worst-case scenario” for the opposition (Ibid.) whereby they ceded entirely the 
municipalities to the government, thereby significantly boosting the political, economic, and 
military power of the government at the local level. 
8.6 International response to the “wrong” election results: 
In response to the October elections, the US added ten more Venezuelan officials to its 
sanctions list, stating that the elections “were marked by numerous irregularities that 
strongly suggest fraud helped the ruling party unexpectedly win a majority of 
governorships” (US Department of Treasury 2017). Furthermore, the sanctions were placed 
on individuals supposedly involved in “undermining electoral processes, media censorship, 
or corruption in government-administered food programs in Venezuela” (Ibid.).  These 
sanctions were a response both to election results which boosted the political power of the 
government, as well to Maduro’s efforts to boost his economic power via a proposed 
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meeting with creditors to discuss a restructuring of Venezuelan debt; the Trump 
administration warned that “US bondholders that attended this meeting could put them in 
violation of US economic sanctions against Venezuela” (Weisbrot 2017b) which could lead 
to penalties of 30 years in prison and up to $10 million dollars in fines for businesses (Ibid.).  
Supporting US efforts at regime change, Argentina’s neoliberal president Mauricio Macri 
stated that the Trump administration “should dramatically tighten its sanctions on 
Venezuela by imposing a full embargo on its oil exports to the US” (Financial Times 2017). 
Indeed US secretary of state Rex Tillerson engaged in a Latin America trip in early 2018 
visiting conservatively-led Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Jamaica seeking to drum up support 
for an escalation of sanctions to include restrictions on the oil industry (Cohen 2018). 
Tillerson went so far as to suggest that Maduro could be toppled by his own military, while 
stating that “we are looking at options and we are looking at how to mitigate the impacts on 
US business interests” (as quoted in Cohen 20018). Considering that over 95 percent of 
Venezuela’s export revenue comes from oil sales, “cutting off the government’s access to 
dollars will leave the economy without the hard currency needed to pay for imports of food 
and medicine” (Rodríguez 2018). The Trump strategy appeared “to be to prevent an 
economic recovery and to worsen the shortages (which include essential medicines and 
food) so that Venezuelans will get back in the streets and overthrow the government” 
(Weisbrot 2017b). As Weisbrot (2017b) summarises, “this is what regime change efforts are 
all about: delegitimation ― if the election results don’t concur, they must be declared 
fraudulent ― and economic strangulation”.  
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8.7 Leverage and Linkage: The role of Russia and China: 
The international environment became less favourable for the government from 2014 on. 
Despite maintaining support from Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba and El Salvador, the economic 
and political weight of these countries in comparison to regional powers Brazil, Argentina, 
Colombia, and Mexico, not to mention the US, all of whom had conservative-Rightist 
governments, meant the Venezuelan government was virtually isolated in the Americas.  
Meanwhile, declining oil prices, apart from contributing to the economic crisis, further 
weakened the government’s capacity to adequately invest in the productive capacity of 
PDVSA, the state oil company (Hellinger 2017). In 2001, more than 3 million barrels/day 
were pumped, but by October 2017, crude production had fallen to 1.95 million (Nussbaum 
and Kassai 2017). As PDVSA sold less oil, it fell behind on debt repayments, increasing the 
possibility of a Venezuelan default (Semple and Krauss 2017). Consequently, Venezuela was 
“more dependent than ever on foreign investment” (Hellinger 2017). Goldman-Sachs 
bought $2.8 billion of PDVSA bonds at deeply discounted prices, while the government 
offered bonds worth $5 billion for just $1 billion through a Chinese brokerage (Ibid.) in what 
came to be known as “hunger bonds” (Hellinger 2017a).  
It is estimated that Russia and China loaned more than $60 billion to boost oil 
production, prepaying for more than a billion barrels (Nussbaum and Kassai 2017). 
Furthermore, Russia announced plans to restructure roughly $3 billion in Kremlin loans to 
ease the pressure on Maduro in November 2017 (Krauss 2017). However, Russia’s economic 
support was not unlimited, and “while the Russian government has been willing to accept 
higher risks in backing Maduro, they do not appear to have the resources to provide an 
indefinite lifeline” (Ramsey 2017b). China on the other hand had greater economic capacity 
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to maintain support, “but appears to have more interest in looking beyond the Maduro 
government than its Russian counterparts” (Ibid.). China lent far more to Venezuela than 
Russia and as such had more to lose from a potential default. While China allowed 
Venezuela to fall behind on payments so as to avoid default, it stopped issuing new loans in 
2016 and in 2017 “PetroChina announced that its US affiliate would respect the US debt 
sanctions announced by the White House in August” (Ibid.). 
8.8 Power relations in early 2018: 
The political power of the government was boosted by election results in the latter part of 
2017, while the placing of military and ex-military members to positions of strategic 
importance in the running of the economy has ensured that the military retianed support 
for the government. There were some signs of strain within the military however, with the 
emergence of the “4F group” who protested that Maduro had relinquished the 
revolutionary project of Chavismo (Boccardo et al. 2017). Despite such critiques, to date 
Maduro has managed to maintain the support of most high-ranking military figures. 
However, despite increasing its control over the oil company, the economic power of the 
government fell sharply following the collapse in oil prices. Combined with staggering 
external debt and transnational efforts to encircle and topple the government, Maduro 
entered 2018 facing serious challenges. 
 The political power of domestic elites meanwhile was greatly debilitated with the 
ANC sidelining of the opposition-controlled AN. Furthermore, divisions in the MUD’s 
leadership regarding strategies to overthrow the government, alongside an incoherent 
policy agenda, greatly debilitated both the political and ideological power of the opposition 
who were discredited in the eyes of many Venezuelans.  
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While a critical, dissident, Leftist-wing of Chavismo, centred around Marea Socialista, 
and comprised of former secretaries of Chávez and Maduro, academics, and social and 
political leaders, was beginning to emerge in 2017 and 2018, “this wing lacks development 
and does not have enough power to significantly influence the political scenario. Thus, the 
main actor in the resolution of the crisis of Chavismo remains the military, whose general 
support for Maduro greatly explains why he remains in power” (Boccardo et al. 2017).  
9. Summary, issues, and questions going forward: 
The election of Hugo Chávez in 1999 at the head of a vanguardist-progressive movement 
that sought to construct a post-neoliberal democracy set in motion a complex, and at times 
paradoxical, process, the outcomes of which have been profoundly influenced by the 
relative power of the government, economic elites, popular sectors, and the international 
sphere. The political and economic exclusion of popular sectors under market democracy 
sparked a wave of protests through the 1980s and 1990s. With both Right- and (supposed) 
Left parties converging on neoliberalism, the protests opened the door for the election of 
outsider-candidate Hugo Chávez who headed a state-led process of democratisation that 
sought to both deepen and extend democracy (Silva 2017: 108). While in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, the leading edges of anti-neoliberal mobilisation were well organised, in Venezuela 
they were not; as such, “Chávez focused on organizing the unorganised or weakly organised 
into self-help associations” (Ibid.). 
In terms of extending democracy, the process had, at least initially, very positive 
outcomes on the quality of social citizenship. By taking control of the country’s oil reserves, 
and with booming prices, social spending approached 70 per cent of the national budget 
(Lander in Lang and Lander 2018). Public spending on health, education, food, housing and 
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security effectively transformed the living conditions of the majority of the population 
(Ibid.). Illiteracy was drastically reduced, while medical access and public education was 
extended to all the population (Boron in Chavez, Ouviña and Thwaites Rey 2017: 34). There 
was a drastic reduction in poverty, nutritional improvements for popular sectors, declining 
infant mortality rates, and a closing of the inequality gap (Lander in Chavez et al. 2017: 36).  
However, despite the impressive gains in extending democracy, there was little 
effort to fundamentally alter the productive model of the country (Lander 2017a), while 
government plans to overcome the recent economic crisis called for a deepening of the 
extractive model (oil and mining41) (Svampa in Chavez et al. 2017). Meanwhile, attempts to 
build a communal economy were in reality minor (Lander 2017a), with 70 percent of the 
economy remaining privately owned (Ellner 2016). By continuing the tradition of financing 
social protection with volatile oil export revenue, efforts at extending democracy were thus 
unstable (Buxton 2017), while the structural power of domestic and transnational elites to 
moderate policy making was not broken (Ramírez 2017). Successive governments failed to 
create a reserve for when oil prices fell, and when the inevitable happened and oil prices 
collapsed, the economy entered a profound recession (Lander 2016). Soaring inflation, of 
food and medicine prices in particular, have eaten away at many of the social citizenship 
gains from earlier stages of Chavismo, with malnutrition rising and more half of all homes 
living in extreme poverty in 2016 (Boccardo et al. 2017). 
While the Bolivarian process did not entirely transform the structure of the 
economy, Chávez’ efforts to extend democracy and rollback neoliberal policies did foster an 
aggressive, antidemocratic response from elites and international actors who had “the 
                                                          
41
 In 2016 Maduro decreed that 12 percent of the entire national territory centred  around the Arco Minero de 
Orinoco  would be opened to mining companies, including transnationals (Lander 2017b). 
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organisational strength and the perception that the stakes were serious enough to use 
collective action to defy and even to try to topple Chávez” (de la Torre 2013: 28). Elite 
destabilisation efforts in response to efforts to extend democracy fostered a centralisation 
of power in the executive, raising the question of whether “revolutionary change, insofar as 
it directly challenges the interests of entrenched elites, [is] compatible with liberal 
democracy?” (Velasco 2016a). 
While elite destabilisation efforts fostered a centralisation of power, they also 
highlighted Chávez’ reliance on the popular sectors to act as bulwark against such forces. 
There was an active effort from the government to foster the development of an organised 
popular society capable of driving the democratisation process from below. As such, while 
power was centralised in order to overcome elite blockages, this power was used 
progressively, both to extend democracy via the redistribution of booming oil rents, as well 
as to deepen democracy by boosting popular power and its access to decision-making 
channels.  
There is however an inherent risk in such a strategy of boosting democracy; by tying 
spaces of inclusion to the state and redistribution, opportunities for clientelism emerge 
raising concerns over autonomy of, and scope for, popular control and critique of the 
process. Following elite destabilisation and the defence of the process by the popular 
sectors, and with oil prices booming, popular sectors began demanding something more 
concrete from their efforts to defend the government (Velasco 2017). Up until this moment, 
there had been a “tremendously popular movement based on popular participation and 
protagonism in the state” (Velasco 2017), but with the emergence of the misiones in 
response to popular demands for economic inclusion, according to Velasco (2017), at this 
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moment something was lost. When the oil boom hit, concentration of power in the 
executive at the expense of organised popular sectors increased (Velasco 2016). There were 
“contradictions between the discourse and the logic regarding organisation of the base, 
popular mobilisation, and participative democracy on the one hand, and a verticalist and 
statist logic on the other” (Lander in Chavez et al. 2017: 42). As López Maya and Lander 
(2011: 74) state, “it is obvious that the relation between the two subjects of social 
transformation, that is, the state and the organised citizenry, is unequal. The Venezuelan 
state can count on financial, institutional, and organisational resources that give it political 
and economic advantages with respect to the popular sectors. And the initiatives and 
pressures of the state endanger the autonomy of civic and community organisations”. As 
Hellinger (2012: 157-8) notes, the direct provision of resources from central government to 
organised society, for example via the communal councils, creates new avenues for 
clientelism and vote buying. 
A crucial question thus emerges from the current moment regarding the future 
pathways of the process. Given the antecedent conditions of weak societal power, first 
Chávez and later Maduro operated as a central hub that filled the gaps between 
disconnected, disenfranchised “micropublics” (Spanakos 2011: 19). The democratic legacy 
rests on whether or not this vanguarist, top-down building of popular power has succeeded 
in fostering a popular sector capable not only of guarding the process against elite 
destabilisation efforts, but also of ensuring that centralisation of power in the executive is 
used progressively rather than despotically. Given the disorganised nature of the popular 
sector in the antecedent era, such a scenario would suggest that the vanguard-stage of 
Chavismo was a necessary stepping-stone toward preparing the base to lead an organic 
bottom-up democratisation process. Conversely, we must ask if the vanguard state-society 
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relations have instead fostered a co-opted popular sector incapable of defending their rights 
and of holding the government to account, suggesting a weak legacy of the process. To 
respond to such concerns, in the next chapter I examine the Bolivarian process via a local 
lens in two popular Caracas barrios, Petare and El 23 de Enero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
276 
 
Chapter 7: View from the barrios: 
Democratisation in Petare and El 23 de 
Enero 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter examines Venezuela’s efforts to forge a post-neoliberal democracy from the 
perspective of urban dwellers in two of Caracas’s most emblematic popular barrios, Petare 
and El 23 de Enero.  While the parroquia of Petare is comprised of a middle-class and 
historic zone, this research centred on the third sector, comprised of the popular ranchos 
(rickety homes built by the residents themselves) which make up the largest barrio in Latin 
America. In particular, research focused on popular organisations that emerged since the 
election of Chávez in 1998 in and around the Jose Félix Rivas zone of the barrio. The second 
site of analysis, the paroquia of El 23 de Enero has been at the centre of the Chavista 
process since its beginnings. As Velasco (2017c) summarises, it was in El 23 where the army 
entered in 1989 to repress the Caracazo, and where in 1992 Chávez launched his failed coup 
against President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-79 and 1989-93). It was here too that the first 
misiones were established. Chávez used to cast his ballot in the neighbourhood, and the 
paroquia consistently had one of the three highest levels of support for Chavismo in 
Caracas. Chávez’ tomb is also located in the heart of the neighbourhood. In comparison to 
Petare, El 23 de Enero has a deeper history of popular protest and left-wing guerrilla urban 
warfare. As such, the two sites offer a rich array of voices who faced exclusion under market 
democracy, who have been both the drivers and recipients of change, and who are thus in a 
position to offer a nuanced critique of the Bolivarian process. While research centres on 
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these two locations, it is supplemented with discussions of urban popular organisations 
which are located both inside and outside Petare and El 23 de Enero. 
Research focuses on consejo comunal and comuna members, as well as popular social 
movement leaders, detailing how top-down efforts to build associational and collective 
power for the base have proceeded, while identifying successes and challenges in the 
process. While the chapter traces the evolution of efforts to boost political inclusion since 
the beginning of the Bolivarian process, given the current crisis facing Venezuela, analysis 
focuses predominantly on the actually existing state-society relations so as to highlight the 
legacies of the process as well as its possible future pathways. The chapter seeks to examine 
if and how earlier experiences or lack of experience in organising influenced the 
democratisation process, and whether centralisation of power in the executive in response 
to elite and international destabilisation efforts has been counter-balanced by popular 
power from below. As such, the chapter examines the extent to which centralisation has 
been “progressive” – that is, that it has overcome elite opposition while simultaneously 
opening space for popular sector control of the decision-making process – as well as the 
scope of “despotic” centralisation whereby poplar sector voices have been side-lined and/or 
co-opted. Furthermore, analysis seeks to identify if, despite the top-down nature of building 
popular power, the Bolivarian process has fostered a more organised and politically literate 
popular sector capable of defending and advancing the democratisation process in the face 
of both elite destabilisation as well as rising levels of “despotic” centralisation.  On the other 
hand, analysis examines whether vanguardist state-society relations have fostered a co-
opted and clientelistic relationship between the base and the executive, thereby stymying   
popular society’s capacity to defend their rights, influence the pathways and speed of the 
278 
 
democratisation process, or critique the reform process. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the lessons from Venezuela regarding state-society relations in processes of 
radical and substantive democratisation.  
2. Building bottom-up participation from above: successes and issues: 
2.1 Chávez and popular participation: 
The efforts from above to guide and construct a popular power from below were crucial 
given the general lack of associational and collective popular power before the election of 
Hugo Chávez in 1998. Even in El 23 de Enero where there was a long history of left-wing 
mobilisation, the links to other barrios within Caracas, let alone with popular actors outside 
of Caracas, were weak. Indeed, not only was the collective and associational power of the 
popular base weak, there was a general lack of popular engagement with the political 
system. As Erika Escalona, a UBCh42 member in Petare, emphasises, “before Chávez, when I 
was younger and saw someone talking about the constitution we turned off the television 
because we felt that politics did not matter for us, it was only for ‘them’” (interview with 
author). However, as Escalona continues, “When Chávez came he asked us ‘Do you know 
what this constitution says? Do you agree with what this says?’ He encouraged us to ask 
questions”. For Betty Lugo, comuna member and resident of the Zone 10 in Petare, “Chávez 
awoke us, he ingrained strength in us so that even in bad times we would not lose our 
direction, that we would continue to struggle…This is the legacy of Chávez…the awakening 
of our consciousness. To see a leader who actually lived by his ideals awoke the 
consciousness of the pueblo” (interview with author). This conscientisation of the popular 
                                                          
42
 The UBCh, or Unidades de Batalla Bolívar-Chávez (Battle units of Bolívar and Chávez) are grassroots activists 
linked to the PSUV, and whose task is to study and spread Chavista doctrine, defend the revolution’s gains, to 
organise sectors before elections, and to act as a conduit between the base and the party. 
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sectors, the sentiment of being turned on to politics and the belief that the state and the 
political system could in fact be used to improve the livelihoods of the poor is a view that I 
heard throughout my fieldwork in the popular barrios of Caracas. 
Whilst popular actors had discussed building socialism before Chávez’ election, 
Atenea Jiménez states that such discussions “were mainly theoretical…they were not 
attached to anything concrete, anything real. It was an airy debate of what we could do. We 
used to read, to debate. We didn’t have a solid foundation. Chávez’ biggest contribution, 
regarding true democracy, was the revitalisation, the redefinition, the deepening of the 
concepts, the radicalisation of our thinking” (interview with author). Chávez helped the 
popular base to “see clearly how to create what we had read in books. He helped us discover 
how to put socialism into practice and make it part of our daily routine, of giving it flesh and 
bones” (A. Jiménez, interview with author). Indeed, before Chávez, “the state persecuted 
and tortured the poor…We couldn’t say anything against the government, that the president 
was a thief for example. We have family and neighbours who ended up disappeared because 
of their ideas” (B. Lugo, interview with author). However, “now we can talk freely, even to 
the media. Although the traditional private media have never interviewed us about our past 
(relating to the torture and disappearing of people)” (B. Lugo, interview with author). 
Dayelin Quevedo, spokesperson for the Comuna Símon Bolivar concurs, stating that “I used 
to live in fear because I was living in a family that supports the Left. It has a very hard time. 
When we talk of the past of the Caracazo, my daughter reminds me ‘Well Mom, thank God 
we live in the Chávez era and those things don’t happen anymore’. It is good to remember 
the past so that we can understand what we are living in the present, and what we want 
from the future” (interview with author).  Luis Isturiz, PSUV delegate and member of the 
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Símon Bolivar comuna in El 23, highlights that before Chávez, “in the IV Republic, you 
couldn’t meet up to discuss Left-wing politics, they took you prisoner, they disappeared you, 
they murdered you. With the new Bolivarian Constitution we have assemblies of 300, 400 
people talking and proposing how to improve the community, or how to strengthen the 
revolution. Chávez changed everything, he brought the sky to the earth” (interview with 
author). Atenea Jiménez summarises the crucial role Cházez played in helping to organise 
the popular base, stating that 
Before Chávez, through the history of Venezuela, there have been ebbs and flows of 
popular movements; there's a background of guerillas, of strong social movement. In 
the 80s and 90s these organisations focussed on solving the problems afflicting 
Venezuelans, such as water supply to the barrios of the big cities. It was an issue that 
mobilised people and brought them together.  Like with the explosion, the Caracazo 
in 1989. But, what is the difference after the arrival of Chavez? The capacity of 
people to organise themselves, to improve our organisational processes. Before we 
had explosions but then we would lose the capacity to organise the people as a 
whole in order to achieve a change. Until the arrival of President Chavez. He gave us 
strength; he activated the process of organised participation and actually unleashed 
new elements of social participation. 
As Erika Escalona notes, “there was a before and an after Chávez. In terms of formation, 
Chávez left us the power to be able to defend ourselves” (interview with author). As such, 
while “there was a centralisation and a cult around the figure of Chávez, he sought  to use 
the state apparatus to repeatedly stimulate popular organising from below” (G. Hetland, 
interview with author). While there are inherent risks in such a process of building a 
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connected and conscientious popular base, it is questionable “whether there was an 
alternative” and indeed without “a strong leader” it is unclear how the process would have 
survived the early stages of its development and the elite aggression from 2001 onwards (G. 
interview with author). 
2.2 Grassroots independence from the state: 
Even though Chávez sought to boost popular sector organising – especially after the elite 
destabilisation efforts during the 2001-04 period43 - analyses which suggest that this top-
down building of popular power completely blocked the scope for autonomous participation 
vis-à-vis the state is incorrect. One example is the National Network of Comuneros and 
Comuneras (NNCC) which was established in 2009 with the aim of promoting and linking 
communal councils (CCs) and comunas in both urban and rural environments. While the CCs 
and comunas were promoted by Chávez and the central state as a means of building 
popular power, the NNCC sought to use the state-sponsored framework to link diverse 
popular organisations “without the mediation of the state” (A. Jiménez, interview with 
author). Spokesperson for the NNCC Atenea Jiménez states that the decision to maintain 
autonomy from the state was key because “we considered that the Minister for the 
Communes would change all the time. Given that the comuna is fundamental to our form of 
socialism, we could not depend on bureaucratic fluctuations, we had to maintain 
independence”. The Red Nacional grew to encompass diverse social, cultural and artistic 
groups, farmer, fisherman, and worker movements, as well as CCs and comunas. By 2017, 
the Red Nacional “had a presence in 20 states, linking about 500 comunas and 100 social 
movements” (Ibid.). Jiménez continues, stating that other groups like the Corriente Bolivar 
                                                          
43
 See section 6.2 of Chapter 6 for discussion.  
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and Zamora (CRBZ) also have ideas for promoting socialism that are autonomous from the 
state. The CRBZ is comprised of the peasant organisation, the Ezequiel Zamora National 
Campesino Front (FNCEZ) and the Simón Bolivar National Communal Front (FNCSB) which 
links together communal councils and comunas. The CRBZ represents one of the largest 
radical currents within Chavismo with a presence in 14 out of 23 states. As Azzellini (2016: 
71) states, the establishment of the CRBZ was the result of “an autonomous focus of the 
FNCEZ that postulates the building of a revolutionary current with organisational autonomy 
within the Bolivarian movement”. The CRBZ is a member of the PSUV  but has “always had a 
critical position, a position of disagreement regarding certain practices we have questioned, 
a position that involves questioning corruption, bureaucratism and reformism” (Rangel 
2018). Organisations such as the CRBZ and the NNCC and their constituent comunas do 
receive some state funding for their projects, “but this has not prevented us from being 
critical of, or supporting different projects to the government” (A. Jiménez interview with 
author). As such, although they collaborate with the government, “the focus…is the 
autonomous creation of a project for a socialist society” (Azzellini 2016: 72). 
2.3 Lack of grassroots autonomy, elite and international pressure, and side-lining internal 
critique: 
At the same time that there are examples of popular sectors whose associational and 
collective power has been boosted via state-led schemes and who have maintained 
autonomy from the state, the Chavismo model for deepening democracy has also fostered 
tensions between the state and the base. The central issue relates to the nexus between the 
state and society, namely the principle Chavista party, the PSUV. While the party was forged 
by Chávez to help organise the popular sectors and to construct a cohesive political 
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organisation, rifts have emerged between the CCs and comunas on the one hand and the 
PSUV on the other. A central figure in the Comuna Rogelio Castillo Gamarra in Petare’s José 
Filax Ribas barrio states that while the base and the comunas work every day of the year to 
develop the local community, the party “only becomes active in neighbourhood 6 months or 
3 months before an election. The party dictates what has to be done, when they come to 
the barrio they want to take control of what we do every day” (anonymous interview with 
author). There is “a division between what people bring up in the CCs and the comunas and 
the decisions taken by the Government” (A. Jiménez, interview with author). As such, while 
“the comunas are an institution and we take our decisions independently while maintaining 
links with the government” (E. Guilarte of the Comuna Rogelio Castillo Gamarra, interview 
with author), there is “dissatisfaction regarding Chavismo for all those struggles that never 
achieve a conclusion  due to bureaucratic blockages and corruption” (A. Jiménez, interview 
with author). While presidents Chávez and Maduro were not deemed to be at fault, issues 
of bureaucracy and a lack of engagement with the base on the part of mid-level PSUV 
functionaries were common complaints raised during research, even amongst ardent 
supporters of the process, in communal councils and comunas in both Petare and 23 de 
Enero. In sum, the principle critique emanating from the popular base regarding state-
sponsored spaces for participation centred on the lack of a “link to allow communication 
between the party and the popular movements” (A. Jiménez, interview with author).  
In a polarised scenario with an aggressive opposition ready to pounce on any 
divisions within the rank and file of Chavismo, the rupture between the party and the base 
places popular Chavista actors in a difficult position. Elite destabilisation efforts led the 
government to overemphasise loyalty, foment intolerance, and allow political fealty to serve 
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as a cover for corruption (Ellner 2017a). As Ellner (2017a) notes, “a favourite slogan of both 
Chávez and Maduro, ‘Unity, unity and more unity’ is often used to exhort followers to close 
ranks and set aside internal criticism to focus on facing down a ruthless enemy”. As one 
comuna leader in Petare stated, “the problems regarding how the comunas interact with 
the state are discussed amongst Chavistas, but at a public level, the comunas go hand in 
hand with the party…We stand by our political party in the face of the MUD”.  
However, this lack of space for criticism has greatly debilitated the democratisation 
process. Chávez was “willing to overlook military corruption, total inefficiency, and 
ineptitude on the part of people who showed loyalty” (G. Hetland, interview with author). 
Furthermore, the lack of space for leftist critique of the project has allowed “a bureaucracy 
of the Right to be replaced by a bureaucracy of the Left” (anonymous comuna and UBCh 
member in Petare, interview with author) whereby PSUV inefficiencies and corrupt practices 
go unpunished, fomenting desgaste (exhaustion) with the process amongst many popular 
sectors, even in the Chavista heartland of El 23 (Velasco 2016). As an anonymous comuna 
member from Petare highlights, “the people leading the government entities and the party 
have turned everything into a bureaucracy; you now need to have a palanca (a contact or 
influence) just to speak with them. These people are backed by the party, but not by the 
people like it was supposed to be. And what happens? I am stuck if I don’t have a contact to 
receive my complaint” (interview with author). Such concerns regarding the process are 
common, even amongst the Chavista base, which debilitates willingness to participate in 
state-sponsored spaces of participation. Like in “the Soviet Union and other countries 
seeking to develop socialism, initiatives have been bureaucratised. People don’t want to 
participate in such a scenario; they don’t see any change, it seems to just be more of the 
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same, and in the end, the popular movements just remain entrenched in their own spaces” 
(A. Jiménez, interview with author).  
While there was discontent amongst the Chavista base, and despite the 
deterioration of the economy to the point where there was mass migration out of 
Venezuela, overt anti-government protests or critique was generally limited, at least until 
the latter part of 2017. Several factors appear to explain the reluctance of the popular base 
to protest. The nature of the relationship between sectors of the popular base and the 
government limit the likelihood of bottom-up critique. It is important here to re-emphasise 
that the Chavista base should not be understood as one monolithic bloc. It is comprised of 
various groups with distinct histories and relations to the state. For popular sectors who had 
limited organising and mobilising outside of and against the state before Chávez’ election, 
critiquing Maduro - who was Chavez’ hand-picked successor - is understood as counter-
revolutionary. While Chavismo had always relied on a centralised power in the executive, 
popular sectors had maintained support for the government because there was a sense that 
the power was being centralised in “their” government. A common sentiment heard in the 
José Felix Rivas barrio in Petare is that “the government is ours, we chose it, and we voted 
for it. They are like a part of us” (B. Lugo, interview with author). Furthermore, popular 
actors who had never participated in the political process before the 1998 election of 
Chávez not only began voting, but were incorporated as citizens, both in a political and 
social sense as they engaged in state-sponsored participative and deliberative spaces such 
as the CCs, misiones, and comunas. When one considers that the Chavista governments 
fundamentally transformed the quality of citizenship of the popular sectors who for decades 
had been excluded from society it should not be wholly surprising that overt anti-
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government critiques were somewhat muted. What is more, given the common sentiment 
in the barrios that the opposition parties “are part of a continuation of the war against the 
pueblo” (B. Lugo, interview with author) and that if they were to replace Maduro there 
would be a return to the exclusion experienced under market democracy – both political 
and economic- popular protests against government failings that could be of benefit to the 
opposition are thus restricted.  
At the same time that Chavismo boosted popular incorporation, the top-down 
building of popular power and the tying of participatory spaces to resources from the 
central government also had a deleterious impact on the ability of the popular base to 
challenge the government. The most obvious example of this emerged during the economic 
crisis. The severe food shortages following the economic collapse hit popular sectors 
hardest and as such they were deeply dependent on the government providing subsidised 
food bags via the Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción or CLAPs program. The 
CLAPs originated in April 2016 as partnerships between grassroots organisations and the 
government to provide an alternative food distribution network in all 24 states (Schiavoni 
and Camcarro 2016). The objective of these is to curb the black market and to get food 
items directly into people’s homes at government regulated prices. However, the program 
has been heavily criticised as being a “cynical form of political patronage…rife with 
corruption” (Henri Falcón, presidential candidate in the 2018 elections, cited in Aponte and 
Martinez 2018). McCoy (2018) states that the CLAPs are part of a system of “social control 
and intimidation” whereby “political party check-in booths near voting centres” require 
“hungry voters to register with the party’s card and show that they voted in order to get a 
bag of subsidised food”. While it is extremely difficult to confirm the extent of such “social 
control and intimidation”, my fieldwork in 2016 identified competing stories from voices in 
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the barrios. Some respondents stated that the CLAPs were delivered to all poor houses 
irrespective of political colours, while others stated that as opposition supporters, despite 
being poor, they had failed to receive any government assistance. Furthermore, when I sent 
questions via e-mail to Chavistas in Petare and El 23 de Enero in 2018 about issues of 
clientelism and patronage in the delivery of CLAPs, they avoided responding to them. 
Indeed, there was a reluctance to engage in any criticism of the government, and the only 
questions that garnered a response were those centred around their efforts to mobilise the 
base for upcoming presidential elections. Such responses are representative of a more 
general trend amongst Chavistas whereby internal critique of the process is permitted, but 
openly chastising the government is generally restricted. There is widespread - and not 
wholly unjustified sentiment, amongst the support base of Chavismo that any popular 
critique of the government will be misrepresented by media sources beholden to traditional 
elites and forces of imperialism.  
However, while popular critique of the shortcomings of the process remained 
generally subdued, especially while Chávez was president, under Maduro there have been 
some more overt critiques of the process, particularly from the radical sectors of Chavismo. 
With the economy in tatters, due to both government ineptitude and elite and international 
efforts to cripple the government44, the government had to develop pacts with historical 
enemies of the process. While in many regards Maduro has simply followed Chávez’ 
relationship with business45, the economic crisis has drawn popular critiques of 
government-business relations into the open. While Chávez and Maduro sought to forge a 
tactical arrangement with “friendly” businesspeople over those represented by 
Fedecámaras (Ellner 2017), whose involvement in the 2002 coup was detailed in the 
                                                          
44
 See section 8, Chapter 6 for discussion. 
45
 See Ellner (2017) for a discussion of business relations under Chávez. 
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previous chapter, corruption has festered under both presidents. While Maduro did offer 
some resistance, his actions “have done little to contain corruption, which has become 
routine and highly visible” (Ellner 2017). Meanwhile, the economic and political crisis forced 
the government to engage in negotiations with the opposition MUD coalition46. Such 
negotiations with the political opposition and local capitalists “required unquestioning 
obedience” and as such the government decided that the more radical sectors of Chavismo 
that demanded a deepening turn toward socialism as the way out of the crisis had to be 
silenced (Gilbert 2017).  
Such divisions between the government and the radical base are centred around 
differing conceptions of how to achieve a truly radical-substantive democracy. For the 
government, alliances with some members of the private sector are considered a tactical 
necessity to secure “enough political and economic stability to sustain the process of 
change” (Ellner 2017), especially given the near-constant efforts of domestic and 
international elite forces to remove the government from power. However, for radical 
sectors of Chavismo, such alliances are seen as impediments to the process of change, and 
that “at the earliest sign of the possibility of regime change, pro-government 
businesspeople would be the first to abandon ship” (Ellner 2017). While such concerns are 
real, as Ellner (2017) cogently highlights 
It is clear that objective conditions have not allowed for mass expropriations or all-
out confrontation with capitalists. If capitalism in Chavista Venezuela will remain a 
reality for some time, the government has two options: ignore distinctions among 
                                                          
46
 The negotiations were hosted by the Dominican Republic. However, negotiations broke down due to the 
government’s refusal to meet opposition demands regarding electoral conditions as well as US pressure on the 
opposition not to sign an agreement with the government. For a discussion, see Ramsey (2018) and Weisbrot 
(2018).  
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the capitalists and treat them as one and the same, or take advantage of fissures 
within the business class. Given Fedecámaras’s sudden switch—from decades as a 
supposedly apolitical body to a staunch enemy of Chávez, even before his 1998 
election—the government would be foolish not to cultivate relations with those 
businesspeople who reject the organisation’s hostile line. 
While the government cannot ignore the realities of power and the fact that the 
domestic and international economic spheres are dominated by capital, the failure to deal 
with festering corruption and its treatment of internal critique from radical sectors of 
Chavismo has debilitated the process of change and should be challenged. In fact, Maduro 
has used centralised power in a despotic manner to ensure that critical voices or those 
demanding a radicalisation of the process are side-lined. During the Maduro government 
“the comuna project has been overlooked…In the face of economic warfare he chose to 
make an alliance with the bourgeoisie. But we feel this was an error; if we are talking about 
economic warfare, about class struggle, then you should be behind the people in order to 
confront the enemy of the popular sectors” (long-time political activist, Chavista, and 
member of the National Network of Comuneros and Comuneras, anonymous interview with 
author). Left-wing group Marea Socialista critique both the direction of the process and the 
despotic centralisation in response to elite and international destabilisation efforts, 
highlighting that “the Madurista bureaucracy with its pro-neoliberal, authoritarian and anti-
popular politics…have demoralised the very social base necessary to face such aggression” 
(Marea Socialista 2018).  
Such Chavistas to the Left of the government and who oppose ceding any ground to 
the opposition and business sectors are in an extremely difficult position. As Gilbert (2017) 
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suggests, “Chavistas who want to oppose this kind of pact and preserve the original 
socialist project will need a great deal of political shrewdness. Contradictions with the 
governing group need to be downplayed, since this group has Chávez' mark of approval 
and is also a bulwark against imperialism”. While radical sectors have generally 
maintained a critical support for the government in the face of elite and international 
pressures, the government has largely accepted the support while challenging the critique, 
labelling those who question the process in this time of difficulty as anti-revolutionaries or 
derechistas (Right-wingers) (Y. Vargas, spokesperson for Comuna Rogelio Castillo Gamarra, 
interview with author, August 1st, 2016).  
While many sectors of the Chavista base had in general refrained from protesting or 
publicly voicing their discontent with the government, a furthering of despotic centralisation 
in 2017 increased tensions between the radical base and the government. While elite and 
international efforts to achieve “regime change” were certainly a reality, Maduro used such 
pressures to justify the silencing of internal critique from radical Chavistas, thereby sliding 
toward despotic centralisation. The emergence of the government-sponsored National 
Constituent Assembly (ANC) did foster a spike in popular mobilisation as some grassroots 
Chavista organisations, particularly those that came into existence after the election of 
Chávez, actively mobilised the base to participate in the election process (anonymous UBCh 
member in the José Felix Rivas barrio, Petare, interview with author). However, while the 
ANC may have acted as a mobilisational tool for some, for many Chavista sympathisers the 
ANC damaged the move toward radical democracy while the election process of candidates 
“made it clear that Maduro would sooner steal than lose an election if his political survival 
was at stake” (Velasco 2018: 74-5). While the process clearly hindered opposition 
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participation, Leftist-candidates who sought to run on an alternate ticket to that of the 
PSUV were also side-lined (Lander in Lang and Lander 2018). In El 23 de Enero for example, 
exclusion of local Chavistas from the ANC led to protests, highlighting a widening gap 
between the government and the PSUV on the one hand, and the popular base on the 
other. On the 30th of June 2017, the announcement of the ANC election results which 
showed that the slate of representatives from El 23 was going to be comprised entirely of 
PSUV candidates led to protest with local colectivos – armed civil groups in popular barrios 
who have been key supporters of the Bolivarian process – crying fraud (Velasco 2017b; 
Velasco 2017c: 6). As Velasco (2017c: 6) notes, Valentín Santana, leader of La Piedrita - one 
of the longest-serving colectivos – had been postulated for the ANC by a coalition of local 
groups, independent of the PSUV. His proposals had included “absolute loyalty to Chávez; 
complete power for the comunas; dissolution of intermediary institutions; war without 
imprisonment against bureaucracy; and maximum penalties for corrupt traitors” (Ibid.). The 
exclusion of Santana and other local independent candidates and the subsequent protests 
highlighted the sense that true revolutionaries were being excluded in the government-
controlled ANC.  
 The elections for mayors in December 2017 saw the PSUV win an astonishing 308 
out of 335 municipalities, despite the severity of the economic crisis facing the country. 
While such results helped stem elite destabilisation efforts by boosting the political power 
of the government, the centralised, top-down nature of candidate selection further stoked 
the growing rifts between the radical popular base of Chavismo and the state. In several 
states in the run up to the elections, allies of the PSUV in the Gran Polo Patriótico – the 
coalition of Chavista parties – sought to select their own candidates rather than allowing the 
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PSUV to determine the entire ticket (Rodríguez Rosas 2017).  The case of Angel Prado, a 
commune leader in the El Maizal commune in the state of Lara, is emblematic of base-state 
tensions.  A press release signed by dozens of Venezuelan intellectuals and social movement 
activists describes how the government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) sought 
to block Prado’s candidacy (Boothroyd Rojas 2017b outlines the statement). However Prado 
overcame the CNE efforts to prevent his name appearing on the electoral ticket and ran as a 
candidate for popular Patria Para Todos party. Furthermore, despite Prado gaining 57.45 per 
cent of the vote compared to the PSUV candidate Jean Ortiz’ 34.07, the CNE awarded 
Prado’s votes to Ortiz due to alleged irregularities. The following quote from the press 
release (as cited in Boothroyd Rojas 2017b) highlights the growing tension between the 
base and the government; 
This conflict between the constituent power of the communal people of Simón 
Planas and the bureaucracy clearly expresses a revolutionary disjuncture. If the 
state (the CNE and the ANC presidency) and a part of the ruling elite continue to 
deepen the decisions they have been making, they will be moving away from 
democratic legality and their commitment to socialism.  
While the government dominated the municipal elections, the growing critical Chavista 
bloc did gain some electoral success, with 500,000 votes cast across the country for the 
PPT and Communist parties, creating a “leftist reference point within Chavismo” (Samán 
2017). 
In early 2018, Maduro and the CNE announced that presidential elections were to 
be held in April, though following sustained pressure from international observers, the 
date was pushed back to May. While the majority of the MUD opposition coalition 
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decided to boycott the elections, apart from ex-Chavista Henri Falcón, some radical 
Chavistas also rejected the elections. Marea Socialista for example stated that “regime 
has engaged in electoral window-dressing beginning with the fraudulent Constituent 
Assembly. The elections for governors and mayors, and now with the ‘presidential’, they 
are attempting to maintain a democratic appearance where in fact there is only a state-
led politics of repression, intimidation, and terror toward a population exhausted from 
the economic crisis and the social disaster” (Marea Socialista 2018). However, despite the 
widening rift between radical Chavistas and the moderate bloc headed by Maduro and 
Diosdado Cabello, the Communist Party (PCV) and the Left-wing PPT party backed 
Maduro’s candidacy for the elections (Boothroyd Rojas 2018). The “move was announced 
after both parties had previously indicated that they would not automatically throw their 
weight behind Maduro due to concerns over his handling of the country’s ongoing deep 
economic crisis and what they describe as a failure to adopt revolutionary measures” 
(Ibid.). The PCV gave their support as they recognised that “the growing immoral, illegal, 
and criminal interventionist aggression from US imperialism and its allies in Europe 
against the Bolivarian process puts at the risk the national liberation” project set in 
motion by Chávez (PCV as cited in Boothroyd Rojas 2018). Similarly, the PPT stated that 
despite issues of “sectarianism, bureaucracy and corruption” in the government, it was 
necessary to defend Maduro against “imperialism” and the “unconventional warfare” 
being waged against the country (PPT as cited in Boothroyd Rojas 2018). The radical CRBZ 
group also backed Maduro, stating that “beyond any internal contradictions there may be 
in regards to methods and practices, we understand that the current moment demands 
that we close ranks because there is a greater contradiction to resolve: the confrontation 
with imperialism” (Rangel 2018). 
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2.4 How long can the breach hold? Legacies and the future of Chavismo: 
The discussion above highlights the variance in the make-up of the Chavista base in terms 
of radical sectors who are more ready to critique the government and whose 
organisational histories tend to pre-date the election of Chávez, and the “regular” base 
whose engagement with the political system began in earnest with the election of Chávez  
and who are more reluctant to openly critique the government. In the midst of the worst 
economic crisis the country has ever experienced, Maduro has managed to prevent a full -
scale popular mobilisation by pointing the finger at imperialist and elite forces. Indeed, in 
some regards the only thing holding the coalition of Chavista forces together is the 
shared anti-imperial, anti-elite agendas of the government and the base. 
Popular sectors are in a tough position; “on the one hand, there’s a sense that the 
government has completely forsaken them, even in some cases actively turned against 
them. (For instance by stoking and feeding corruption and lack of accountability by the 
military)…On the other hand, there’s the paralysis that comes with a lack of alternatives. As 
bad as things are, the opposition in power would be an even worse option” (Velasco 2016). 
Furthermore, with the dramatic decline in the quality of living for poor Chavistas, while 
many still support the government in a defensive manner, they “simply don't have the time 
or the energy or the fighting spirit that they had a decade ago. The willingness to not only 
defend the government but to go on the offensive and say, ‘okay, this is the kind of 
government we really want; here’s a government that we can push in the directions that we 
want them to move’— that has all but disappeared” (Ciccariello-Maher in Hetland and 
Ciccariello-Maher 2017). While radical groups have offered their backing to Maduro for 
the presidential elections, it is clear that the rift between the Maduro government and 
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the radical base has widened. In the early stages of the process, centralisation of power 
in response to elite and international pressure was accepted by the base once it was used 
progressively to redistribute economic resources and to boost political participation for 
popular sectors. However, the current despotic centralisation in response to elite and 
international pressure which entrenches the upper echelons of the PSUV in power while 
side-lining popular voices who seek a more radical response to the economic crisis is 
unlikely to retain the support of the base. If such a critical popular bloc within Chavismo 
is to have any success in influencing the government and guiding the process in a more 
democratic manner, they must continue to build their associational and collective power 
by organising “across Venezuela’s vast territory” (Gilbert 2017) so as to “build a solid 
alliance between both urban and rural revolutionary Chavismo” (Ibid.). Indeed, the 
principle challenge for these radical edges of Chavismo may be to offer concrete 
solutions to the issues facing the “regular” popular base who have become disillusioned 
with the Chavista project.  
While the current juncture represents an extremely difficult moment for Chavismo, 
it is important to remember just how far the process has come. The initial promise of the 
process was to boost the political and economic inclusion of Venezuelans who had been 
excluded and repressed by market democracy. Despite the current crisis, communal 
councils are still actively meeting to discuss solutions to issues of food and cash shortages 
while in some comunas there are discussions regarding methods of connecting with other 
comunas that do not rely on the state as the central binding glue (personal observations in 
2016, and personal communication with actors in Petare and El 23 de Enero, April 2018). As 
such, while centralisation certainly moved in a more despotic manner over time whereby 
popular voices demanding a radicalisation of the process were side-lined, “the Bolivarian 
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Revolution offered both a mandate to mobilise and a tool to do so, and that remains” 
(Velasco 2016), albeit in a more limited form at present, thereby representing a spectacular 
change from the Punto Fijo era. Indeed, while the scope for critiquing the government from 
a popular-Leftist position has been narrowed by government actions, the above discussion 
regarding the top-down selection of candidates for the ANC and municipal elections in 2017 
and the subsequent popular protests led by comuna and local leaders, both in barrios with 
long histories of autonomous organising and those without, highlight that there is a 
(re)emerging popular voice that is willing to challenge state decisions. As a result of 
Chavismo, popular sectors have developed self-respect (Zibechi in Chávez et al. 2017: 35), 
understood that they too have a right to inclusion, and have forged new links that have 
boosted their associational and collective power. Whatever happens next in Venezuela, the 
stability of any “project that emerges from this moment of intense crisis, will depend on the 
ability of those sectors to understand that it’s impossible to side-line or marginalise the 
demands — especially for participation — not for handouts, not for immediate goods or 
services, but for participation of popular sectors” (Velasco 2017b).  
3. Conclusion and Lessons from Venezuela’s democratisation process: 
Returning to the central issues of this thesis regarding how an alternative to market 
democracy is likely to emerge, develop and leave a lasting legacy, the above discussion of 
popular actors’ experiences under Chavismo highlight lessons for Venezuelan 
democratisation, and for democratisation theory more generally. To contextualise and 
evaluate popular experiences and understandings of the process to date, we must place 
discussions within the framework developed in chapter 2. Progressive presidents or 
governments who attempt to extend democracy and boost the social citizenship of excluded 
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sectors of society is likely to lead to confrontations with economic elites and their allies, 
both domestic and transnational, who seek to defend entrenched privileges. As such, 
progressive leaders may feel compelled to centralise power in the executive so as to 
overcome and weaken elite destabilisation efforts and to push through reforms that boost 
the socio-economic inclusion of popular sectors. While such a strategy may be necessary in 
the face of a recalcitrant elite, it contains inherent dangers for democratisation processes. 
To avoid centralisation becoming “despotic”, it is vital that executive power is tied to a 
radical deepening process whereby the power of the executive is counterbalanced by an 
autonomous popular power from below.  
The experiences and views of popular actors in El 23 de Enero and Petare highlight 
both the potentialities and risks of the Venezuelan efforts to deepen and extend democracy. 
While Chávez sought to use centralised power to overcome elite impediments to 
democratic extending, this centralised power was combined with efforts to deepen the 
quality of democracy whereby organised popular actors could directly influence the 
decision-making process. Like Chávez, Maduro has faced near constant elite and 
international efforts to topple the government. However, while centralised power was used 
to act as a defence against domestic and international elite destabilisation efforts, it was 
also used to side-line critical popular voices who questioned the increasing corruption, 
bureaucratisation, and militarisation of the process. Furhtermore, while the radical edges of 
the popular base have confronted the government regarding the direction of the process, 
many sectors of the popular base were more reluctant to do.  
As such, a key issue emerging from the Venezuelan democratisation experiment 
relates to how to link a progressive government to the base via redistributive measures and 
298 
 
the top-down construction of spaces for participaton, while at the same time avoiding the 
pitfalls of a co-opted and docile popular sector incapable of critiquing and controlling “their” 
government.  Indeed, as Smilde (2011: 25) cogently notes, state efforts to mobilise popular 
sectors present a paradox as “on the one hand, in conditions of radical inequality, relying on 
autochthonous, independent participation in civil society simply perpetuates this inequality. 
On the other hand, mobilising popular sectors through the resources of the state 
undermines the autonomy that is at the heart of the role civil society is supposed to play”. 
Emerging from the above discussion of popular experiences in El 23 de Enero and Petare, a 
core lesson for radical-substantive democratisation processes is that “popular power, 
especially when it is tied to state resources, can fall prey to corruption or, worse, falta de 
compromiso—a lack of commitment, if there aren’t prior experiences of organizing outside 
the state underpinning them” (Velasco 2016a). As such, while redistributing resources via 
state-sponsored spaces of participation is essential to overcome entrenched poverty and to 
boost the capacity of popular actors to take part in the political process, it is necessary to 
first generate opportunities for local-level organisations to emerge independently of the 
state (Velasco 2016a). Without prior organisational capacity and autonomy, revolutionary 
processes that alter elite interests may fall into a “despotic” centralisation spiral as the 
executive reduces liberal separation of powers so as overcome elite obstacles, while also 
weakening the counterweight of popular power, thereby risking the erosion of earlier 
democratic accomplishments.  
A powerful autonomous popular base capable of critiquing and directing progressive 
governments is also vital to ensure that the political leaders of radical-substantive 
democratisation processes adhere to their mandate. Indeed, as Ellner (2016) states, while 
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“temporary ties between a socialist government and business groups may be inevitable in 
any prolonged process of bringing about socialism by democratic means…an internally 
democratic party with a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state is the best guarantee that 
such ties will not solidify in time, and that corruption is kept in check”. In the Venezuelan 
case, the lack of internal democracy in the PSUV is thus a fundamental  issue for the 
democratisation process because the specifics of a strategy of how to maintain socialist 
commitments while engaging in a world dominated by capitalism requires “input from those 
closest to the mood of the people. Decision-making cannot be the exclusive preserve of the 
party’s national leadership, still less of the president’s inner circle. A truly democratic party 
is essential in Venezuela not only as a matter of principle, but because the very survival of 
the country’s revolutionary process depends on it” (Ellner 2017a). 
While the current balance of powers between state, elites, transnational (f)actors 
and popular actors appears to impede the democratisation process, any process of 
profound change must proceed in stages, with ups and downs as power balances shift. 
Before Chávez’ election in 1998, the popular sectors were, with notable exceptions in El 23 
de Enero, lacking the associational and collective power necessary to guide any process of 
radical change from below. While the top-down efforts at constructing such popular power 
have turned more “despotic” in recent times, the guiding figure of Chávez to bind the 
popular sectors together following disconnected anti-market democracy protest was a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition to produce radical change.  
Collective and associational popular power was developed over the course of the 
project, and we are now witnessing the germination of a critical popular bloc that is 
connected via the CCs, comunas and popular parties across a broad geographical territory. 
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While there remains a large proportion of the popular Chavista base who retain uncritical 
support for the government, the growing popular calls for a radicalisation of the 
democratisation process led by an autonomous base highlights that the Bolivarian project is 
organically evolving. As Dayelin Quevedo states, “the process at the national level is like a 
child who hasn’t really learned how to walk, a child who still requires the indirect guidance 
of the father but who complains if the father tries to help, even if that help is necessary. In 
order to take the first steps, the father’s guidance is necessary. But we must learn how to 
take these steps ourselves and put aside the help, even if we make mistakes. We need to 
move away from the institutionalism because if we don’t, we will never be able to achieve 
our goals” (D. Quevedo, interview with author). The era of a top-down process aimed at 
constructing a popular power may thus be understood as a fundamental stepping-stone in 
the development of a post-neoliberal democracy.  
Chavismo fostered a more politically literate population, who until recently 
experienced improved living conditions thereby allowing them to actively engage in the 
political process of change. Crucially, the state-sponsored spaces of participation, while 
either co-opted or ignored at present, shed light on the possibilities of a democratisation 
process guided from below. The consejo comunales and the comunas offer a framework and 
a springboard for popular sectors to re-organise an organic, autonomous movement. The 
future of the revolution depends on the capacity of the critical popular Left to emerge from 
the shadow of the PSUV bureaucracy. This does not suggest that the process should 
abandon the state; rather, it calls for overcoming the “dual powers” of two Lefts (Poulantzas 
1978) that have emerged due to the divisions between the radical base and the governing 
party structure. Paradoxically, overcoming these divisions requires increasing the autonomy 
of the base from the state structure so that the organised movement has the space to 
301 
 
engage in constructive critique of the state reform process (Harnecker 2010a: 42). While 
this appears a daunting task, given the debilitated economic power of the central 
government to maintain clientelistic control over the base, coupled with the associational 
and collective popular power that was built over the course of Chavismo, the time may in 
fact be ripe for another explosion of popular power, that, unlike the uncoordinated protests 
of the Caracazo, will be guided from below by an interconnected and educated popular 
base. 
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Chapter 8: Bolivia and Venezuela in 
Comparison: Lessons for democratisation 
1. Introduction: 
This chapter compares and contrasts the outcomes and experiences of the Bolivian and 
Venezuelan efforts to move beyond the confines of market democracy by deepening and 
expanding participation in both a political and economic sense. In chapter 2 a theoretical 
framework was developed to identify the key events likely to influence radical-substantive 
democratisation processes. The framework suggests that for such a democratisation process 
to emerge, political and economic exclusion experienced under market democracy must 
foster mass popular protests. Such protests would then deliver a mandate to a progressive 
party or leader to boost citizenship. If elected, and if a progressive leader adheres to the 
mandate to boost social citizenship and extend democracy, the TGPT framework suggests 
that they will enter into conflict with elites who seek to protect their entrenched interests. 
The elite backlash will entail a destabilisation effort aimed at impeding the progressive 
government from altering the status quo. In response to this backlash, the government will 
be forced to centralise power in the executive if it is to adhere to the popular mandate to 
boost citizenship. As such, a balancing act emerges between centralisation so as to 
overcome elite obstacles while simultaneously deepening democracy by increasing 
grassroots control over decision-making processes. Centralisation should be understood as 
exisiting on a sliding scale, and the form that it takes is influenced by the context and 
configuration of the relative power between key actors. The centralisation scale runs from 
“progressive” – whereby it is used to push through redistributive reforms while also building 
spaces for popular political inclusion – to “despotic”– whereby it is used to maintain the 
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government in power while excluding popular sectors from decision-making channels. 
Indeed, the actual form that centralisation takes may simultaneously contain progressive 
and despotic elements. 
The framework also suggests that the antecedent conditions to the point of 
inflection – the election of a progressive leader - may also influence the process, both at the 
moment of election, as well as in the subsequent democratisation sequencing. Protest 
movements spearheaded by co-ordinated grassroots movements are more likely to foster 
an organic state-society link between the newly elected president and the base. Conversely, 
ad-hoc explosions of popular discontent are more likely to produce a vanguardist-type 
relationship between base and leader. Finally, the framework suggests that cases with long 
histories of co-ordinated popular movements are more likely to witness progressive 
centralisation, while cases that lack such a history of popular mobilisation vis-à-vis the state 
run a greater risk of sliding toward despotic centralisation.  
The framework outlines how the democratisation process will be affected by the 
relative power of four key sectors, namely the Left-led state, organised popular society, 
economic elites, and international (f)actors. The push-and-pull of these four groups and the 
constantly evolving power relationships between them open and close opportunities for 
democratisation, influencing the extent of democratic extending and deepening, the form of 
centralisation, and the legacy of the process. In the preceding chapters, this framework was 
applied to the Bolivian and Venezuelan processes. For the remainder of this chapter, the 
emergence, development, and outcomes of both processes are compared and contrasted, 
highlighting lessons for radical-substantive democratisation theory.   
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2. Comparison of democratisation outcomes:  
2.1 Extending democracy in Bolivia and Venezuela: 
Left-led governments in Bolivia and Venezuela sought to boost levels of social citizenship 
and economic inclusion for those most excluded under market democracy. In Bolivia, 
increased social spending and cash-transfers (bonos) boosted popular access to healthcare 
and education, infrastructure was enhanced, while pension and minimum wage levels 
increased47. In Venezuela meanwhile, social spending, often via the misiones, greatly 
boosted popular access to education, healthcare, housing and subsidised foodstuffs. While 
there were clear and successful efforts to extend democracy in both cases, some critiques 
have been levelled against the extent and durability of changes. In Bolivia, some of the 
benefits of the cash-transfers were undercut by a regressive taxation system while property 
and wealth taxes remained extremely limited. In Venezuela, the economic and political 
crises from 2014 on which witnessed disturbing levels of inflation and food and medicine 
shortages eroded many of the gains to social citizenship achieved in earlier years of the 
democratisation project. 
In both cases, extending democracy was financed by increasing state-control over 
natural resource rents. In Bolivia, the government applied the decision of a 2004 
referendum to increase taxation of transnational extractive companies while also increasing 
the share of state-owned companies in gas and oil extraction. However, despite such 
changes, transnational oil and gas companies retained significant control over extraction 
and production. In Venezuela, there was a more radical overhaul of the hydrocarbon sector, 
with the state reclaiming control over the country’s massive oil reserves. While both cases 
                                                          
47
 See chapters 4-8 for more comprehensive overview of democratic extending in both cases. 
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demonstrated a fundamental reliance on primary commodity exports to fund democratic 
extending, the Bolivian government struck a more moderate accord with elite and 
transnational sectors who maintained significant space for continued operation in the 
country, while in Venezuela transnational companies in the oil sector became more 
subordinate to the state.  
2.2 Deepening democracy and centralisation in Bolivia and Venezuela: 
The democratisation processes aimed at deepening popular political participation in Bolivia 
and Venezuela yielded complex, and at times paradoxical outcomes. In Bolivia, in 
comparison to the era of market democracy the quality of political citizenship for popular 
and indigenous sectors was certainly boosted, perhaps most emblematically during the 
constituent assembly process which allowed for the direct participation in the re-writing of 
the Constitution. Indeed, the 2009 Constitution, passed by referendum, recognised 
indigenous cultures, languages and norms, while social-movement actors were offered 
access to the state via appointment to ministry positions. While there were, at least initially, 
efforts to deepen democracy, they were accompanied by an increasing centralisation of 
power the executive in response to elite destabilisation efforts. The centralised power was 
used progressively whereby the core support base48 of the MAS government, in particular 
the cocaleros, were given direct access to the president, influencing state decision-making 
processes. However, the centralised power in the executive was also used in a despotic 
manner whereby popular sectors who grew critical of the government - particularly those 
who formed part of the strategic base of support for the MAS in the early stages of the 
                                                          
48
 See chapter 4 for detailed discussion of support base of the MAS. 
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democratisation project - were side-lined and debilitated via co-optation, clientelism, de-
legitimation, and paralelismo.  
Likewise in Venezuela, democracy was greatly deepened in comparison to Punto Fijo 
era market democracy. Efforts from above to construct a popular power from below, most 
emblematically via the misiones, consejo comunales, and the comunas, created new 
opportunities for popular sectors to interact with the government. Following elite 
destabilisation efforts, power was centralised in a progressive manner whereby it was used 
to attempt to construct a popular sector bulwark against further destabilisation. Funding 
flowed from the central state to new spaces of democratic inclusion in a process of state-
sponsored participation. However, over time centralisation simultaneously took on more 
despotic features whereby state resources were used to co-opt some popular sectors, while 
dissenting radical popular voices were quietened via top-down selection of “loyal” electoral 
candidates, by excluding small Leftist parties from inclusion in the political process, and by 
de-legitimising and labelling critical voices as enemies of the revolution.  
In both the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases, there were successful efforts to boost the 
political inclusion of the popular base. However, in both cases centralisation of power in the 
executive, despite being essential so as to protect the government and the democratisation 
process from elite destabilisation, took on despotic features. Ultimately, internal feedback 
loops from a supportive but critical popular base were blocked, meaning that while progress 
was certainly made, efforts at constructing a truly participatory and deliberative democracy 
that radically boosted the political citizenship of the base fell short of early aspirations. To 
gain a more nuanced understanding of why the processes unfolded as they did, as well as to 
delineate lessons from the Bolivian and Venezuelan experiences, the next section offers a 
307 
 
brief review and comparison of the varied antecedent conditions and power relations in 
both cases. 
3. Explaining outcomes: Antecedent variance and relational power analysis:  
 
Chapters 4-8 traced the development of the democratisation processes, highlighting how 
the antecedent conditions to the election of progressive presidents and the relative balance 
of power between the state, popular sectors, elites, and international (f)actors influenced 
the sequencing and pathways of Bolivia’s and Venezuela’s recent democratisation 
experiments. In both cases, the adoption of market democracy, at times by surprise, by both 
Right- and supposed-Left parties and the extreme political and economic exclusion 
experienced by large swathes of the population fostered eruptions of popular discontent 
and opened the door for radical-outsider candidates to be elected to the presidencies. 
However, variations between the cases regarding the nature of protest as well as their 
histories of organisation impacted both the point of inflection and the aftermath 
sequencing. As Silva (2017: 112) notes,  
During the neoliberal period the configuration of popular sector forces drive the 
process, primarily through mass mobilisation. This relationship changes when 
outsider left parties become government. Although the party hews to the project 
from below, it nonetheless adapts it, thus turning it into a project from above. How it 
does this depends in large measure on…the type of left party in office and its 
linkages to the configuration of popular forces forged during the neoliberal period. 
In Bolivia, which has a long history of popular sector organisation dating back to the 
Marxist-miners inspired 1952 Revolution, protests were led by powerful popular 
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organisations who built high levels of associational and collective power. Emerging from 
these waves of popular mobilisation, Evo Morales was elected president. Morales shared 
tight, organic links to some popular sectors, in particular the cocaleros, while he received 
the strategic support of other groups who had played a key role in the protests such as 
urban-popular and lowland indigenous groups. In Venezuela, where there was a general lack 
of a historically powerful and well organised popular base, anti-neoliberal protests were ad 
hoc with no central guiding force. In such a scenario, Hugo Chávez emerged as a binding 
figure and a vanguardist relationship developed between the base and the new president.  
The sequencing of Bolivia’s democratisation following the point of inflection, that is, 
the election of Evo Morales, was greatly impacted by the relative power of the state, 
popular sectors, elites and international (f)actors. Briefly summarising, following the 
organised popular anti-neoliberal protests Morales was given a clear mandate to deepen 
and extend democracy. However, efforts at extending democracy which would impact on 
entrenched elite interests witnessed a backlash from the political-wing of elite forces whose 
clamour for autonomy nearly brought the democratisation process to its knees. In the tug-
of-war between elite and popular demands, with the government located in between, the 
antecedent power of the base was key for Morales who relied on the support of both core 
and strategic groups to prevent elite destabilisation from succeeding. Power was centralised 
in a progressive manner whereby Morales overcame elite efforts to block reform, and 
despite moderations to the final draft, a new Constitution that promised to deepen and 
extend democracy was enshrined.  
The political power of the government resulting from the support of both core and 
organic sectors greatly debilitated the political power of the opposition, and economic elites 
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quickly recognised that they needed a new strategy to protect their interests. While the 
political power of the elites was debilitated, their structural power remained high because 
Morales relied on them to extract, produce or sell the primary commodities on which 
democratic extending was to be financed. In such a scenario, elites and Morales came to a 
compromise whereby partial nationalisations occurred which, while boosting government 
revenue, fell far short of the demands outlined in the protest waves.  
With booming natural resource prices, Morales initially managed to maintain this 
balance, whereby he deepened and extended democracy for powerful core supporters, 
while using resource redistribution to maintain support of or co-opt strategic sectors. 
However, over time elite interests increasingly clashed with strategic sectors who wanted 
full nationalisations and greater control over policy-making regarding primary commodities. 
Given that elite destabilisation efforts had ceased, Morales was no longer as reliant on 
strategic sectors for support. Furthermore, given their high levels of collective and 
associational power forged before and during the anti-neoliberal protests, these strategic 
groups increasingly came to be seen as an issue for Morales. They opposed the pact he had 
forged with elites to maintain funding for his redistributive polices, and upon which the 
support from his core base relied. Given the organisational and mobilisation power of 
strategic groups, Morales increasingly used centralised power in a despotic manner to 
debilitate these strategic sectors via co-optation, paralelismo, and de-legitimation.   
In Venezuela, following efforts to reclaim state control over land and oil, powerful 
elites aided by the US engaged in extensive efforts to impede the democratisation project. 
In response to such powerful adversaries, and in a scenario where the base lacked prior 
experience of organising and had weak levels of associational and collective power, Chávez 
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built from above a popular power capable of defending the process. More so than in Bolivia, 
the process challenged elite interests and so therefore the backlash was more powerful, as 
was the subsequent centralisation of power in the executive to overcome elite and 
international destabilisation efforts. With the support of the military and a loyal base 
headed by a vanguard political leader, power was centralised and the oil industry was 
brought under state control, thereby significantly boosting the power of the government. 
Unlike in the Bolivian case where Morales was forced to compromise with elite and 
international forces, Chávez’ capacity to control Venezuela’s oil gave the president greater 
autonomy to further radicalise the project. Unsurprisingly however, whereas the 
government-elite/TNC pact in Bolivia led to a lessening of tensions between Morales and 
business sectors, while fostering tensions between Morales and strategic supporters of the 
process, in Venezuela early efforts to radicalise the process fostered continuous elite and 
transnational destabilisation efforts, as well as building support from the base whose 
political and social citizenship were boosted. Furthermore, such destabilisation efforts 
allowed the government to justify centralising more power in the executive while still 
retaining the support of a base.  
However, given the top-down nature of building a popular base and the tying of 
spaces of popular participation to state resources, popular sectors were less likely than their 
Bolivian counterparts – both core and strategic - to challenge the government in the case of 
disagreements about the direction of the process, or to even identify that there were issues 
with the process. When oil prices crashed, and following the death of the vanguard-leader 
Chávez, the government’s power was significantly weakened. Elite and transnational forces 
increased efforts to topple the process, and combined with government ineptitude and 
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corruption, a severe economic crisis engulfed the country. Moreover, international and elite 
efforts to topple the government fostered an entrenched attitude in the upper echelons of 
the government who surrounded themselves with loyal military leaders. Cracks began to 
emerge in the support base of Chavismo as the newly enfranchised base sought a 
radicalisation of the process as a response to the crisis and a movement away from the 
centralised reform project which had become corrupted and militarised. However, rather 
than including and responding to such demands, centralised power instead became despotic 
and radical popular voices were shut out from participation. 
4. Legacies: 
The varied antecedent conditions and balances of power in each case also influenced the 
possible legacies of the democratisation sequences. Considering that the framework 
adopted here sees democratisation as an ever evolving process, with continuously ebbing-
and-flowing relative power relationships making and re-making different democratic 
“outcomes”, offering a comparison of the legacies of different processes is in some ways an 
impossible task. As such, rather than stating that a point has been reached where a path-
dependent future democratisation sequence must occur, analysis instead offers a discussion 
of the contemporary moment and the possible pathways forward toward a more radical and 
substantive democracy which did not exist before the election of Leftist presidents in Bolivia 
and Venezuela. Likewise, analysis assesses the possibilities of a de-democratisation process 
emerging whereby political and economic citizenship are weakened. As such, analysis 
compares the extent of “institutionalisation” of the democratisation processes whereby 
institutionalisation represents a measure of popular sector capacity to demand that a 
government, whether Left- or Right-led, guarantee social citizenship even in the face of elite 
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opposition to democratic extending. Furthermore, the existence of a progressive party that 
allows for bottom-up control and that is capable of competing electorally should signify that 
elite-controlled political parties would refrain from pushing for a wholesale return to market 
democracy. Legacy may also be associated with the capacity of popular sectors to overcome 
despotic centralisation. 
 In both cases, the pathway toward a more radical and substantive democracy was 
outlined in the new constitutions forged during the post-neoliberal era. Both documents, if 
they are fully adhered to, represent a fundamental overhaul of citizenship from the market 
democracy era. In both Bolivia and Venezuela, the processes have entailed a 
conscientisation of the base; in Bolivia, the first ever indigenous person was elected 
president and the constitution offered for the first time recognition to indigenous 
languages, cultures and customs. This break with the past political system which was 
dominated by elite-families linked to colonial forces encouraged indigenous people to 
participate politically and to believe that a different Bolivian citizenship model is possible, 
one where everyone is included. Similarly, in Venezuela the election of dark-skinned Hugo 
Chávez from a poor rural family broke with the Punto Fijo era politics which was dominated 
by the political parties of the traditional European-descended elite. Chávez fostered an 
enormous sense of pride in poor Venezuelans and encouraged them to engage with politics 
and to transform their own lives. Like Morales in Bolivia, one of the key legacies of the 
process was the emergence of a belief amongst long-time excluded sectors that a better life 
was possible and the state could be a partner rather than an oppressor in building a truly 
inclusive citizenship.  
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While concsientisation has evolved and while constitutions mapped out possible 
pathways toward liberation and inclusion, concerns over the legacies of the processes exist. 
In Bolivia, despite the organic-type MAS party which emerged out of popular protests, only 
core supporters have retained capacity to influence the government, and even amongst the 
core support base there are issues concerning co-optation and clientelism. Meanwhile, the 
strategic popular bloc has been considerably weakened via the processes of clientelism and 
paralelismo. However, while centralisation has increasingly moved in a more despotic 
manner, and despite divisions amongst the formerly united base, the long history of popular 
organisation outside and against the state has meant that there is in fact an emerging 
popular critique of the proceso de cambio and its lack of adherence to the 2009 
Constitution. A new power struggle in the democratisation process is emerging between 
core supporters of Morales and those sections of the strategic bloc who have been side-
lined. While the future impact of such struggles remains undecided, a divided popular base 
does open the door for a populist-Right party to emerge and capture popular discontent 
with the performance of Morales. 
In Venezuela, the PSUV and the central government have increasingly centralised 
power in a despotic manner. With international forces and domestic elites circling and 
fomenting “regime change”, the popular base is in an extremely tough position where they 
maintain support for a government who has diverged from the path toward deepened 
democracy, yet who act as the only force preventing a return of elite-parties. However, the 
vanguard-process of building popular power from above, while riddled with risks and which 
has led at times to a subservient rather than protagonisitc base, has also fostered the 
development of associational and collective popular power that did not exist before the 
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point of inflection. Indeed, there is an emerging, though still relatively small, popular bloc of 
critical Chavistas who seek to defend Chavismo and the 1999 Constitution. While many of 
the actors involved in this emerging movement come from areas that did have a history of 
popular organisation and mobilisation against the state such as El 23 de Enero, popular 
actors who did not participate in the political sphere before Chavismo are now offering a 
critique of “their” government. The popular protests against top-down candidate selection 
and the exclusion of “radical” Chavistas from spheres of participation, and the linkages 
between popular actors across geographical and sectoral boundaries should be understood 
as a positive sign that the democratisation process has fostered an awakened and 
connected base that did not exist during the Punto Fijo era. 
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5. Lessons for radical-substantive democratisation: 
The table and comparison of the processes in Bolivia and Venezuela highlights the 
complexities and multiple variables which influence the possibility of an alternative to 
market democracy emerging, developing, and leaving a lasting legacy. Differing 
combinations of antecedent conditions (such as the extent of political and economic 
exclusion under market democracy, what type of party applies neoliberal reforms, pre-
existing experiences of popular sector organising, and the type of protest movement that 
emerges) will impact the type of leader that is elected to power, what their mandate will be, 
and how they will relate to the base, at least in initial stages. Following a point of inflection 
where a Leftist is elected to state power, levels of antecedent popular power and histories 
may feedback onto the process at later stages. Adding to the complexity, varied and ever-
fluctuating combinations of relative power between the state, popular society, economic 
elites, and international (f)actors will influence the post-inflection point sequencing, leading 
to varied outcomes in terms of extending and deepening democracy, the extent and form 
centralisation of power takes, and the depth of institutionalisation of change.  
Given the complex nature of democratisation processes, drawing universal lessons from 
the comparison of the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases is a task fraught with dangers of over-
simplification and of making spurious claims49. However, if we proceed with caution, and 
identify key variations and similarities between cases in terms of antecedent conditions or 
power relations, as well as between outcomes, some more general lessons from the 
experiments can be gleaned.  
                                                          
49
 As highlighted in chapter 2, the focus in this thesis has been on cases where centralization of power in the 
executive is a possibility. Strongly institutionalised parliamentary systems would likely demonstrate varied 
pathways and outcomes to presidential systems. 
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Where a party-system breaks down due to universal convergence around neoliberalism, 
cases that exhibit prior histories of popular organising outside of and against the state, and 
where the associational and collective power of the popular base is high during periods of 
protest are likely to tend toward an organic state-society relationship, at least in the initial 
phase of democratisation. Furthermore, such antecedent conditions and early phase 
relations build collective memories regarding the power of an autonomous base to foster 
change. Such collective histories may feedback onto the sequencing at a later stage whereby 
impediments to the process due to despotic centralisation are more readily contested. 
Conversely, cases where there is a weak history of collective autonomous mobilisation and 
disorganised protest waves, state-society relations tend toward a vanguardist position. In 
such cases, popular defence of the process, in particular against corruption or clientelistic 
practices carried out by the vanguardist Left-led state, is less likely to emerge. In sum, 
outsider-party led radical substantive processes are more likely to avoid, or at least to 
challenge, despotic centralisation where prior experiences of popular associational and 
collective power building exist.  
While the antecedent conditions certainly influence early pathways and may feedback 
on to the process, they do not foster a path-dependent process with pre-ordained 
outcomes. Rather, the relational power between the Left-led state, elites, international 
(f)actors and the organised popular base may drive the democratisation process forward, 
impede its development, or even foster de-democratisation. Given that the balance of 
power is influenced by the collective and associational power of popular sectors, the 
leverage of western institutions over domestic governments, and the relative ideological, 
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military, economic and political power between Left-governments and elites, detailing the 
outcomes of every combination of power is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
However, the Bolivian and Venezuelan processes and outcomes do offer some 
generalisable guidelines. Higher levels of popular power drive radical-substantive 
democratisation processes forward and act as a counterweight to elite and international 
pressures on the Left-led government. Conversely, higher levels of elite power and western 
international leverage over the Left-led government act as impediments to democratisation. 
As such, the goal must be to limit the power of these groups, while boosting popular power. 
However, as was evidenced in both the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases, given the need for 
left-governments to boost the social citizenship of popular sectors in a domestic and global 
environment dominated by neoliberal capitalism, reducing elite and transnational power is 
a difficult task. Indeed, Left-governments will be pushed by popular sectors toward 
radicalising the process and extending democracy while at the same time it will be pulled 
back by elite and transnational powers demanding adherence to pro-market orthodoxy and 
protection of their interests. In general, the greater the power of elites and transnational 
forces to impede efforts to extend democracy, the greater the pressure on progressive 
leaders to centralise power in the executive will be. 
Indeed, the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases examined here raise the question of whether 
it is possible to “reach a cross-party or inter-elite consensus over some measure of social 
and economic redistribution or, whether on the contrary, an entrenchment of socio-
economic privilege is still the price that must be paid for liberal democracy” ( Grugel and 
Riggirozzi 2018: 561). In both cases, elite and transnational destabilisation efforts following 
attempts by the governments to extend democracy fostered a centralisation of power in the 
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executive which challenged the traditional liberal democratic separation of powers. Without 
such centralisation, it is questionable whether efforts to radically challenge entrenched 
economic exclusion and inequality could succeed in the face of destabilisation efforts on the 
part of economic elite and transnational forces. As such, somewhat paradoxically, in an 
environment dominated by economic elites and mobile transnational capital, centralisation 
of power in the executive may be a necessary, though not sufficient condition for 
democratisation to occur. 
To ensure that centralisation of power in the executive actually fosters democratisation 
rather than de-democratisation, it is essential that popular power from below is tethered to, 
and guides, the government/president. As witnessed in the Venezuelan case, while the top-
down vanguardist process certainly did encourage the deepening of democracy and the 
building of popular power, the lack of space for oversight from the popular base allowed for 
massive corruption to go unchallenged. Indeed, the gross levels of corruption committed by 
members of the government and the upper echelons of the military in combination with 
elite and international efforts to remove the government from power fostered an 
entrenched position within the party leadership of the PSUV. In this scenario, all critique 
came to be considered “derechista” – from right-wingers – even when it came from radical-
Left popular voices. Ultimately, a division emerged between the state-reform project 
centralised in the government and the PSUV hierarchy, and the radical popular base that 
had been fostered from above by Hugo Chávez.  
Furthermore, in the absence of a powerful autonomous popular base capable of 
directing the state actors, Left-government actors may be bought off by and cede too much 
ground to elites.  For example, where elite and transnational economic power and leverage 
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over a government is high, but where the government maintains strong political power in 
comparison to elites, a compromise between elites and the Left-led government is likely. 
Such a scenario occurred in Bolivia whereby Morales dominated the political sphere while 
elite parties were obliterated; yet his continual reliance on TNCs and elites to extract and 
sell gas gave them great economic power over the government.  The subsequent 
compromise however brought the government into confrontation with some sectors of the 
powerful popular base who saw the agreement as reneging on earlier promises. In this 
scenario, the government sought to use centralised power to weaken the contestatory 
sectors so as to maintain the pact with elite and transnational forces. In both the Bolivian 
and Venezuelan cases, elite power has ultimately fostered a division between the 
progressive-government and sectors of the popular base. 
The more general lesson from the two cases is that substantive democratisation that 
extends social and economic citizenship, thereby challenging entrenched elite interests, may 
require a centralisation of power in the executive to overcome elite barriers. The scale of 
the challenge to entrenched elite interests will dictate the extent of the elite-led 
destabilisation backlash, which in turn impacts the pressures on the progressive government 
to centralise power. Such centralisation bends the liberal democratic model, and while  it 
may be a necessary component of a radical-substantive democratisation process in a 
domestic and global order dominated by capital, it contains inherent risks, not only to the 
political and civil rights of elites, but more worryingly to those of the popular sectors whose 
political citizenship is supposed to be boosted. 
While centralisation of power may be necessary if a radical challenge to economic 
exclusion is to occur, making concessions to business so as to ensure capacity to socially 
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redistribute, even if more moderately than hoped for, may also be a necessary condition. 
The Bolivian and Venezuelan governments were initially elected to respond to both the 
political and economic exclusion of the popular sectors. As such, even in Venezuela where 
Chávez was more aggressive in recuperating full control of the oil reserves, they had to 
make some concessions to business elites so as to fund redistribution. Indeed, the heavy 
reliance on primary commodity exports in both cases ensured that efforts to extend 
democracy were reliant on domestic and global capital chains of extraction, distribution, 
and consumption. In conditions of extreme poverty and inequality, building social 
citizenship is essential. Indeed, extending democracy is not simply an outcome of 
democratisation, but is an essential component that allows popular sectors to take part in 
the democratisation process itself. As such, the use of primary commodities and of making 
deals with elites to ensure redistribution occurred in Bolivia and Venezuela was necessary.  
While centralisation of power and engaging in government-elite pacts may be necessary 
conditions for radical-substantive democratisation in the current conjuncture, the Bolivian 
and Venezuelan cases have failed to avoid the pitfalls of such a process. By ceding ground to 
elite forces and moderating the processes of change, governments irked radical sectors of 
the popular base. When these popular sectors confronted the government, rather than 
adhering to or responding to demands from below, the presidents used centralised power 
to weaken and side-line internal critique.  
Given the long-term nature of democratisation processes, risk-laden centralisation of 
power in the executive and engaging in deals with business elites to fund redistribution may 
be necessary components of radical-substantive democratisation. To avoid the pitfalls of 
such a process and to ensure that a despotic centralisation spiral is avoided, and despite the 
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difficulties involved in striking a balance between elite demands and popular needs, it is 
essential for processes seeking to move beyond the confines of market democracy that the 
necessary extending of democracy – and all that it entails – is accompanied by a real 
deepening of democracy.  
For Poulantzas (1978: 260), the only way to avoid centralisation becoming despotic and 
sliding to “authoritarian statism” is to combine the radical transformation of the state and 
representative democracy headed by a progressive government with the unfurling of forms 
of direct and participatory democracy that maintain autonomy from the state itself. An 
active, autonomous, powerful popular base capable of guiding the democratisation process 
from below acts as a protective buffer to ensure that centralised power is used 
progressively and not in a despotic manner.  
Furthermore,  an autonomous popular base also “constitutes a guarantee against the 
reaction of the enemy” (Poulantzas 1978: 263) so long as the process of change from above 
works in tandem with, and not in opposition to, the process of change from below. As such, 
centralisation in response to elite power must avoid leading to a “dual power” of two lefts 
(Poulantzas 1978: 263), whereby the Left party and government enter into confrontation 
with the popular base, with each bloc following its own specific course. Such a scenario 
greatly weakens the democratisation process, allowing elite and transnational power to take 
advantage. 
Unfortunately, the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases have failed to fully avoid such a 
scenario of dual powers of the Left. In Bolivia, elite power forced Morales to make pacts 
with business and TNCs, and the centralised power that had earlier been used to overcome 
conservative opposition to the democratisation process was instead used to weaken and 
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attack popular and indigenous actors who opposed the new state-elite relations. However, 
despite government efforts to weaken contestatory popular voices, given the long history of 
popular sector organising and mobilising, and the associational and collective power that 
was built during anti-neoliberal protest waves, a new phase of state-base conflict is 
emerging, although this time between two progressive forces. 
In Venezuela, elite and transnational destabilisation efforts and the “economic war” 
against the governments of Chávez and Maduro led to a scenario whereby loyalty to the 
party and the government above all else was promoted. Given the vanguardist nature of 
building popular power and the popular support for centralising power in the executive to 
overcome elite destabilisation, issues of corruption, government inefficiency, and 
bureacuratisation of the spaces of participation went unchallenged for too long by too many 
popular actors. When a tipping point was reached under Maduro during the economic crisis, 
and radical-popular critique of the government’s despotic control of the democratisation 
process became more overt, the government sought to silence contestatory voices coming 
from the base. Like Bolivia, a new phase of the democratisation process has opened, 
offering both possibilities and dangers. The popular critique of the progressive governments 
and the demands for a radicalisation of the process is in fact evidence that democratisation 
has occurred under the Left governments. The dangers, however, of having dual powers of 
the left is that they end up annihilating each other, opening the space for the Right to return 
and capture the state.  
While maintaining a united front between the base and the government is essential for 
democratisation processes that seek to challenge market democracy in a global and 
domestic setting dominated by neoliberal rationale, how the base interacts with the state is 
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equally important. In both cases, the moments of popular explosion that opened the space 
for outsider candidates to be elected tended toward “passive revolution” (Gramsci 2000: 
263-4) whereby demands for social change were diffused and absorbed into a statist reform 
project that ultimately maintained existing capital relations (Andreucci 2017: 172). While 
this thesis has sought to emphasis the difficulties of radical-substantive democratisation 
given the power of elite and transnational forces, the co-opting of the core support base in 
Bolivia and the clientelism in Venezuela seriously weakened the possibility of achieving 
radical change. While arguments can be made that the governments had to behave in a 
pragmatic manner so as to avoid full-on confrontation with elites and international actors, 
weakening rather than strengthening popular actors was a debilitating error.  
By blocking critical feedback loops from the base, either via the fomentation of a “dual 
power of the Left” scenario, or by encouraging the pacification of popular power, both 
experiments have achieved mixed results. The governments have acted “as if only they 
knew what the people needed…Political participation became a sort of acclamation of the 
executive” (Lang in Lang and Lander 2018). As Lang (Ibid.) continues, “if there is no 
corrective by a strong and organised society, one that can demand, correct, protest and also 
criticise, then the project will be diverted” from its transformative course. 
As Farthing (2017) cogently notes, “no matter how fractious social movements can be or 
how difficult government can find it to meet their demands…more radical social change will 
not happen unless these movements are active and independent”. This does not suggest a 
complete severing of relations between state and societal actors. If radical-substantive 
democratisation processes are to avoid the pitfalls outlined above, it is central that both the 
Left-led state and the constituent-base increase their powers in tandem vis-à-vis domestic 
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and transnational elite forces. Such a relationship entails tight links in terms of bottom-up 
influencing over government decision-making, while at the same time ensuring the space 
for popular organisations to engage in constructive criticism of the government without fear 
of reprisal or being labled a supporter of the Right. 
By co-opting, corrupting and destroying their Left-wing base, progressive governments 
seal their own doom, and that of the democratisation process too. Political leaders “must 
come to realise that their best defence lies in the organised rebelliousness of the popular 
masses” (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013a: 141) and that by “seeking refuge in the movements” the 
revolutionary process is safeguarded, “providing the best guarantee that they will quicken, 
radicalise, and deepen” (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013a: 141) in the face of elite resistance. While 
achieving such state-popular society relations whilst simultaneously confronting powerful 
elite and transnational forces requires an extremely difficult balancing act, any process of 
change that fails to do so will tend toward despotic centralisation, re-constitued 
neoliberalism (Webber, 2011), and a fracturing of the relationship between the popular 
base and the progressive government that opens space for Right-wing actors to (re)emerge.  
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Chapter 9:  Can democracy be saved? Time 
for a new research agenda  
This thesis opened with a discussion of the crisis of democracy engulfing the so-called 
“developed” democracies of the US and Western Europe. The dominant narrative in 
mainstream analyses of the contemporary state of democracy has centred on the 
emergence of extremist “populist” leaders and parties who have a weak commitment to 
democratic rules of the game, deny the legitimacy of their political opponents, tolerate or 
encourage violence, and who are willing to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including 
the media (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018: 23-4). If any such party or leader emerges as an 
“electoral threat”, the “gatekeepers” of democracy, the traditional political parties, must 
unite together to ensure the defeat of the “extremist” and thus save democracy (Ibid.: 20, 
26). The concerns of these authors is that the populist leaders will challenge the “guardrails 
of democracy” which are vital to ensure its survival, namely the constitution and courts, as 
well as the “unwritten rules of the game” – the norms relating to the shared conduct of 
behaviour (Ibid. 101). The norms include mutual toleration for opponents and institutional 
forbearance, that is, avoiding actions that while respecting the letter of the law violate its 
spirit (Ibid.: 102, 106). Without these guardrails, the result is a cycle of escalating 
brinksmanship, and in deeply polarised societies where parties become “wedded to 
incompatible worldviews, and especially when their members are so socially segregated 
that they rarely interact, stable partisan rivalries eventually give way to perceptions of 
mutual threat” (Ibid.: 116).  
 Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) concerns regarding the stability of liberal democracy, 
which echo Linz’ (1990) concerns relating to the perils of presidential systems and the risks 
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of allowing the executive branch to weaken other institutions of liberal democracy, are 
legitimate. Any analysis which seeks to offer solutions to the contemporary woes of 
democracy would therefore be well-advised to heed their warnings. There is a further 
component, however, that must be discussed relating to the crisis of democracy and its 
stability, namely why leaders and parties that critique liberal democratic norms and 
institutions have emerged.  
As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, while democratic stability and consolidation 
must be the focus of our attention, to achieve a stable democracy requires challenging the 
existing status quo. While extremist and outsider parties must be treated with caution, so 
too must those arguments that call for the blocking of any leader or party who wishes to 
challenge the existing form and content of democracy. In conditions of widening inequality 
and a democratic system that has been co-opted by economic elite forces and which blocks 
the possibilities of developing a more inclusive citizenship regime, democracy cannot be 
stable.  Indeed, as the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela discussed in this thesis highlight, a 
pacted-democracy in which there is Left-Right party convergence around market principles 
accompanied by the commodification of society is not a recipe for democratic stability, just 
as Karl Polanyi (1944) suggested many years ago. In the “developed” democracies of Europe 
and the US there has also been a capitulation of centre-left parties to neoliberal logic 
leading to a “consensus of the centre” (Mouffe 2018) with those sectors of society suffering 
from the worst effects of neoliberal globalisation effectively abandoned (Ibid.). As main-
stream parties of the Left and Right support the elite agenda that promotes state 
retrenchment and removes protection for citizens from the ravages of the “free” market, 
and as former rights that were once conceived of as fundamental components of citizenship 
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are commodified, swathes of the population have become disillusioned with the political 
system. As Rodrik (2018) states, “liberal democracy is…being undermined by a tendency to 
emphasise ‘liberal’ at the expense of ‘democracy’”, whereby “rulers are insulated from 
democratic accountability by a panoply of restraints that limit the range of policies they can 
deliver. Bureaucratic bodies, autonomous regulators, and independent courts set policies, 
or they are imposed from outside by the rules of the global economy” (Ibid.). As “we 
entered the era of globalisation, the key challenge for transnational elites was how to make 
the world safe for transnational capital (hence polyarchy) and available to transnational 
capital (hence neo-liberalism)” (Robinson 2013: 230). A “new global financial architecture 
was created to facilitate the easy international flow of liquid money capital to wherever it 
could be used most profitably” (Harvey 2010: 16)50. The “balance between the market and 
the state shifted to the disadvantage of the regulatory state and hence to the disadvantage 
of democracy” (Merkel 2014). Citizenship has been reduced to success in the market, 
irrespective of whether the individual has the means, or could ever hope to attain the 
means, to participate and compete for goods. Neoliberal ideology advocates a clear pattern 
of policy choices that entails reduced government spending on health care and pensions, 
increasing labour supply, reducing public sector employment, and flexibilisation of labour 
via a weakening of collective bargaining (Weisbrot 2017c).  
With economic and political exclusion for popular sectors now entrenched, and in the 
absence of any alternative offered by the Left, many working-class and popular sectors 
“have turned to parties proposing economic and cultural security through nationalism 
rather than social democracy” (Afonso and Rennwald 2017). The election of Donald Trump, 
the Brexit vote, and rising support for the National Front in France, among other cases, 
                                                          
50
 For excellent discussions of the financialisation of capital see Harvey (2010) and Merkel (2014). 
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should thus be understood as part of “a series of political uprisings that together signal a 
collapse of neoliberal hegemony” (Fraser 2017) whereby voters are rejecting “corporate 
globalisation, neoliberalism, and the political establishments that have promoted them” 
(Ibid.). The fact that democracy has been subsumed by neoliberalism and that the Left have 
failed to offer an alternative that protects vulnerable citizens, thereby opening the door for 
the far-Right to make political headway amongst disenfranchised citizens, should thus be 
considered the real crisis of democracy, a “crisis of too little democracy”. 
This combination of a technocratic, elitist, thin model of liberal democracy underpinned 
by a neoliberal logic has created a sense of political and economic exclusion for many 
citizens. In such a scenario, when an inevitable crisis of capitalism occurs (Harvey 2010), 
democracy will also enter into crisis. As such, seeking democratic stability by protecting 
liberal democracy in which the liberal component trumps the democratic component, and 
where liberal has come to mean neoliberal (Mouffe 2018a), is a Sisyphean task.  A critical 
paradox thus emerges. While Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) demonstrate how the erosion of 
the “guardrails” for democracy may cause democracies to “die”,if, as Crouch (2004), Harvey 
(2005, 2010) and Mouffe (2018a) amongst many others suggest, the norms of market 
democracy are set so as to provide the perfect environment for the protection of 
entrenched elite interests and the free mobility of capital, which in turn fosters inequalities, 
exclusion and recurring economic and environmental crises, how can democracy be saved? 
Hence, while Grugel and Riggirozzi’s (2018: 561) question as to whether entrenched socio-
economic inequality is the price that must be paid for liberal democracy is pertinent, in the 
long-run, this dichotomy must be overcome if democracy is to be saved. This then is the task 
for democratisation theorists and practitioners; we must begin to discuss how democracy 
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can simultaneously be deepened and extended, for this is the only long-term solution to the 
democratic crisis.  
Mouffe (2018a) calls for a Left-populism to counteract the “post-democratic”, “post-
political” neoliberal hegemony secured by the capitulation of the likes of Tony Blair and Bill 
Clinton to market rationale (Riofrancos 2018). Against “a regime that subordinates 
democratic sovereignty to the market, that appeals to bipartisan consensus and the rule of 
experts, Mouffe advocates for the construction of a unified popular will targeting the 
hegemonic order in all its instantiations” (Riofrancos 2018). Mouffe (2018, 2018a) highlights 
that as a result of financialised capital, wider sectors of society are affected by capitalism 
than under the Fordist model of capitalist logic. As such, the Left’s task according to Mouffe 
is to “establish a stark frontier between the people and the oligarchy, mobilize the 
heterogeneous masses under the banner of equality and social justice, wrest power from 
feckless elites, and radicalize democracy” (Riofrancos 2018).  
While Mouffe’s (2018a) argument that a radically distinct Left political leadership is 
required to broaden the scope of the political marketplace is certainly accurate, we must 
ask two further questions if we are to respond to the crisis of democracy; what would 
happen if such a party were elected to state power, and how would the party leadership 
interact with the base in such a scenario. The examination of the Bolivian and Venezuelan 
experiments to challenge the constraints of market democracy in this thesis sheds some 
light on these matters. While one must be careful to avoid conceptual stretching when 
seeking to draw universal lessons from specific cases, the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases do 
provide insight into the challenges and risks facing “post-neoliberal” democratisation 
processes. 
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Firstly, the framework developed in the thesis highlights how the push-and-pull of the 
progressive government, popular forces, economic elites, and international (f)actors and the 
constantly evolving power relationships between them open and close opportunities for 
democratisation. Building on Roberts (1998), a hypothetical causal mechanism was 
advanced which outlined that if attempts to deepen democracy are accompanied by efforts 
to extend democracy, a strong reaction from domestic and international economic elites 
who seek to defend their privileges is likely. This backlash may take multiple forms 
depending on the specifics of each case, for example via lobbying of government officials, 
threats to withdraw investment or lower credit-ratings, using political parties beholden to 
economic elites to block the legislative process, coups, economic blockades, smear 
campaigns.  Whatever the tactics used by elites, in all scenarios the goal will be the same; 
the protection of the current distribution of wealth and the impediment of any process or 
policy that seeks to redistribute political and economic power. As such, the extent of change 
that is possible, even if a progressive political leader captures state power,  must be placed 
within the relative power framework. 
 The cases studied in in this thesis demonstrated that economic elite and transnational 
actors’ power to use the liberal democratic system itself to impede the democratisation 
process fostered a belief on the part of the presidents that the only way to engage in 
radical-substantive democratisation, was, paradoxically, to strengthen executive power. 
While the scope of a progressive leader in a parliamentary system in a developed Western 
democracy to centralise power in a similar manner would be far more limited, the more 
general lesson remains;  progressive political leaders will face economic elite resistance to 
change, and adherence to liberal democratic standards while simultaneously overcoming 
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elite resistance to redistribution will likely be mutually exclusive. Some analysts may argue 
that the mechanism detailed here is overstated – namely that democratic extending fosters 
elite destabilisation. Such analysts may argue that Brazil under Lula da Silva, Uruguay under 
the Frente Amplio governments, or the European social democratic governments in the 
post-World War 2 era did achieve success in extending democracy without fostering elite 
destabilisation efforts. The question here is ultimately about scale; once the progressive 
governments do not push too far in seeking to extend democracy, elite resistance will be 
more moderate. However, should a progressive government call for a radical overhaul of 
political and socio-economic exclusion, the elite backlash is likely to be far more aggressive, 
as witnessed not only in the Venezuelan case examined here, but throughout Latin 
American history (Allende in Chile, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and even moderate social-
democratic reformer Dilma Rouseff in Brazil, amongst a litany of other examples). While in 
Europe and the US the elite backlash to progressive reforms may have been less overt than 
in Latin America, as Harvey (2005) stresses, the past four decades of neoliberal reform have 
ultimately been a class-based project to recuperate ground ceded during the Keynesian era. 
Furthermore, one may look to Greece’s efforts to challenge elite interests in the aftermath 
to the debt crisis of 2008 to witness that progressive leaders do not operate in a vacuum 
and that their policy autonomy is greatly constrained by domestic and transnational forces 
beholden to economic elites. As Weisbrot (2017c) highlights, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), the European Commission and the IMF,  along with the Eurogroup of finance 
ministers constrained the economic decision making of the elected Left-wing government 
and the economic policies set out by these bodies and actors “represent an elite consensus” 
which differs greatly from public opinion within individual countries (Ibid.). 
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The power-framework raises crucial questions for democratisation theory. In times of 
economic crisis and widening inequality levels, the tension between liberty and equality 
becomes more fraught. From below, popular sectors demand a response to socio-economic 
impoverishment. If and when a progressive leader is elected and seeks to adhere to their 
mandate, they face the constraints of a global system dominated by neoliberal rationale and 
economic elites who play by no rules of the game or democratic norms and who will resort 
to an array of tactics to maintain privilege. This is precisely what we witnessed in the 
Bolivian and Venezuelan cases, with the leaders determining that a strengthening of 
executive powers was required to push forward with reforms and to weaken the power of 
economic elites. Indeed, while protecting minority rights from the “tyranny of the majority” 
is an essential component of democracy, describing economic elites as minorities, despite 
the fact that they wield sufficient power to prohibit a more equitable distribution of political 
and economic resources, means that democracy in its market-liberal incarnation has come 
to be understood – at least by those excluded from participation - as a veil to maintain elite 
privilege. For leaders like Chávez, for theorists such as Colin Crouch (2004) and for swathes 
of disaffected citizens across the globe, market democracy has become a “tyranny of the 
elite minority”.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, centralisation of power in the executive did, at least 
for a period of time, follow a “progressive” path; executive power was used not only to 
overcome elite destabilisation, but also to promote a deepening of democracy whereby the 
office of the president was bound to spaces of participation from below. However, despite 
these initial efforts to adhere to Poulantzas’ calls (1978: 260) that the state reform project 
from above be guided from below via the unfurling of institutions of direct and participatory 
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democracy, the realities of operating with the bounds of a national, regional and global 
environment dominated by economic elites ultimately fostered tensions between the base 
and the leaders, and centralised power became increasingly despotic. In the end, 
particularly in reference to Venezuela under Maduro, the popular base was unable to 
prevent the leader from falling to the perils of presidentialism (Linz 1990). Such concerns 
point to the second issue regarding Mouffe’s (2018) call for a populist-Left in response to the 
crisis of democracy, namely the nature of the relationship between leader and base.  
Mouffe (2018) argues that in efforts to challenge the limits of market democracy, 
popular protests must be followed by an engagement with political institutions via a 
structured political movement (that is, political party) if they are to achieve significant 
results (Riofrancos 2018). Riofrancos (2018) takes issue with this notion, questioning “why is 
the choice movements or parties, or the implied sequence movements then parties?” 
Riofrancos (2018) suggests that if parties are “not accompanied by extra-electoral protest 
movements, then the former are unlikely to achieve…sweeping changes… After the left 
achieves power, rebellious grassroots activity is absolutely necessary to hold elected leaders 
to account”.  While the Bolivian and Venezuelan cases discussed support Riofrancos’ 
assessment, they also highlight the complexities and challenges of the relationships between 
Left-governments and the organised popular base. In the Venezuelan case, in the general 
absence of a well co-ordinated popular base, Chávez sought to build from above a popular 
power from below. While the process had many successes and should not be understood as 
a simple effort on the part of a leader to control an electorate, there were inherent tensions 
regarding the lack of autonomous spaces to critique the government and the only partial 
success in overcoming issues of top-down decision-making. However, echoing Mouffe 
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(2018), Chávez did serve as a “relay point of affective bonds among a…dispersed people” 
(cited in Riofrancos 2018). The challenge now for the Chavista base, and the more general 
lesson for any vanguard-type democratisation movement, is to maintain organisation around 
the ideals of the movement while engaging in critique of the political-wing of the process. 
However, this is clearly easier said than done. The realities of getting this balance right, 
between critical support for the government in times of open confrontation with economic 
elites and transnational forces, and protesting government decisions that cede too much 
ground to the interests of elites, is an extremely delicate balancing act.  
In Bolivia, where a powerful organised popular base pre-dated the election to power of 
Morales, achieving the perfect balance between working with the political leadership while 
maintaining sufficient autonomy to guide the process from below has also proven to be 
extremely difficult. Issues of government co-optation on the one hand, and government-led 
division and exclusion on the other remain real dangers for any democratisation process that 
involves a progressive movement from above and from below. Striking the balance between 
constructive criticism of the political leadership so as to demand adherence to the 
democratisation path, while avoiding a confrontational “dual power” of two lefts scenario 
(Poulantzas 1978) that opens space for the Right to benefit, while at all times working within 
the realities of a globalised world dominated by economic elite forces is the great challenge 
that any progressive movement seeking to escape the confines of market democracy must 
face.  
Future studies should therefore examine the form of market democracy in each case that 
fostered political and economic exclusion, the scale and organisation levels of popular 
protest movements, the type of Left-leader/party elected, the political, economic, military, 
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and ideological power of the progressive government vis-à-vis economic elites, the leverage 
of regional and international (f)actors over democratisation processes, and the capacity of 
popular movements to hold the government to a progressive agenda. Differences and 
similarities between these factors, as well as between the type of political system 
(presidential versus parliamentary) should be teased out so as to gain a nuanced 
understanding as to how to democratise democracy and overcome pressures to maintain the 
status quo, while simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls of despotic centralisation. For analysts 
who care about the actual lived experiences of all citizens under democracy and who seek to 
engage in fundamental discussions about how to recuperate democracy, this is the central 
task.  
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Appendix 1: Interviews 
Table of interviewees: 
NAME COUNTRY ORGANISATION/AFFILIATION 
AND ROLE 
GENDER PLACE OF 
INTERVIEW 
DATE OF 
INTERVIEW 
Álvarez, Jose 
Luis 
Bolivia FDTEULP, spokesperson Male La Paz July 2017 
Arcila, Sonia Venezuela Consejo Comunal Lomas del 
Ávila, member 
Female Petare, 
Caracas 
June 2016 
Arocha, 
Carlos 
Guillermo 
Venezuela Primero Justicia, City 
councillor for metropolitan 
area of Caracas 
Male Las 
Mercedes, 
Caracas 
June 2016 
Arze, Carlos Bolivia CEDLA, researcher Male La Paz August 
2017 
Barrerra, 
Carlos 
Bolivia FEJUVE member 2003 Male La Paz June 2017 
Barroso, 
Jorge 
Venezuela Primero Justicia, President  of 
the Sucre Municipal Council 
Male Petare, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Borges, 
Stevie 
Venezuela Consejo Comunal Bolivariano 
de Palo Verde, spokesperson 
Male Petare, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
Boyer, José Venezuela Comuna Rogelio Castillo 
Gamarra, spokesperson 
Male Petare 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Cahuaya, 
Alfredo 
Bolivia UNITAS, researcher Male La Paz August 
2017 
Calle, Carlos Bolivia COD—La Paz, executive Male La Paz July 2017 
Condori, 
Nelson 
Bolivia CSUTCB, executive Male La Paz July 2017 
Escalona, 
Erika  
Venezuela Consejo communal in zone 6 
of Petare member, Comuna 
Rogelio Castillo Gamarra 
member, and UBCh for zone 
6 
Female Petare, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Fernández, 
Silvia 
Bolivia Cabildeo Collective 
Foundation, executive 
Female La Paz June 2017 
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Fernández, 
Vicente 
Bolivia FEJUVE member 2003 Male El Alto July 2017 
Flores, Luis Bolivia FEJUVE member 2003 Male El Alto August 
2017 
Francisco  Venezuela UBCh for José Felix Rivas Male Petare, 
Caracas; 
Electronic 
interview 
August 
2016, 
February 
2018 
Gil, Marlene Venezuela Primero Justicia, consejo 
communal organiser 
Female Petare, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
González, 
Ybiskay 
Venezuela University of Newcastle, 
Australia, researcher 
Female Chacaito, 
Caracas 
June 2016 
Gutiérrez, 
Daniel 
Bolivia FEJUVE-original, press officer Male El Alto August 
2017 
Henry  Venezuela Comuna Hugo Chávez Frias, 
spokesperson 
Male 23 de 
Enero, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Hetland, 
Gabriel 
Venezuela University of Albany, 
assistant professor 
Male Electronic 
interview 
January 
2018 
Huanca, 
Oscar 
Bolivia Unidad Nacional, president of 
city council 
Male El Alto July 2017 
Isturiz, Luis Venezuela PSUV city councillor Male 23 de 
Enero, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Javier  Venezuela Comuna Rogelio Castillo 
Gamarra member 
Male Petare, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
 Jiménez, 
Atenea 
Venezuela National Network of 
Comuneros and Comuneras, 
director 
Female Centre, 
Caracas; 
Electronic 
interactions 
July 2016; 
multiple 
contacts 
throughout 
2017 and 
2018 
López Maya, 
Margarita 
Venezuela Central University Venezuela, 
professor 
Female Bello 
Monte, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Lugo, Betty  Venezuela Comuna Rogelio Castillo Female Petare, August 
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Gamarra member Caracas 2016 
Machado, 
Armado 
Venezuela Primero Justicia, city 
councillor for Baruta 
Male Baruta, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Mamani, 
Irene 
Bolivia FEJUVE 2003, member Female El Alto August 
2017 
Mijares, Juan 
Vicente 
Venezuela Primero Justicia, Director of 
Fundasucre 
Male Sucre, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Mitma, 
Guido 
Bolivia COB, secretary general Male La Paz June 2017 
Montilla, 
Napolean  
Venezuela Comuna Símon Bolivar 
member 
Male 23 de 
Enero, 
Caracas 
July 2016, 
multiple 
contacts 
throughout 
2017 and 
2018 
Navarro, 
César 
Bolivia MAS, Minister for Mining Male Electronic 
interview 
September 
2017 
Nina, Fany Bolivia Ex-leader of the FEJUVE-
original, current El Alto 
mayoral candidate for Sol.Bo 
Female El Alto June 2017 
Paco, 
Abraham 
Bolivia CODECPA, director Male La Paz August 
2017 
Palacios, 
José 
Venezuela Primero Justicia, city 
councillor for Petare 
Male Sucre, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Quevedo, 
Dayelin  
Venezuela Comuna Símon Bolivar 
spokesperson 
Female 23 de 
Enero, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
Ramos, 
Daniel 
Bolivia MAS, regional director for El 
Alto 
Male El Alto August 
2017 
Rangel, 
Jalexi 
Venezuela U.N.E.S (Experimental 
Security University) teacher; 
consejo communal 
spokesperson in Minas de 
Baruta 
Female Minas de 
Baruta, 
Caracas 
June 2016 
Revilla, 
Carlos 
Bolivia UNITAS, researcher Male La Paz July 2017 
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Rojas, Carlos Bolivia Ex-dirgente of FEJUVE-
original and later FEJUVE-
organico 
Male El Alto June 2017 
Serano, 
Legna  
Venezuela Comuna Símon Bolivar, 
spokesperson 
Female 23 de 
Enero, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
Siñani, 
Benigno 
Bolivia FEJUVE-organico, director Male El Alto June 2017 
Smilde, 
David 
Venezuela Tulane University, professor Male New 
Orleans, 
USA 
December 
2016 
Solares, 
Jaime 
Bolivia COB, ex-secretary general Male El Alto June 2017 
Trigo, Pedro Venezuela The Gumilla Centre, 
researcher 
Male Centre, 
Caracas 
July 2016 
Troche, 
Franklin 
Bolivia COR-original, international 
press officer 
Male El Alto July 2017 
Vargas, 
Marina 
Bolivia Sol.bo, office worker; El Alto 
resident for forty years with 
extensive knowledge of the 
city’s development 
Female El Alto July 2017 
Vargas, 
Yenni 
Venezuela Comuna Rogelio Castillo 
Gamarra spokesperson 
Female Petare, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
Vielma, 
Misael 
Venezuela Comuna Rogelio Castillo 
Gamarra member 
Male Petare, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
Wilmer Venezuela Comuna Rogelio Castillo 
Gamarra member 
Male Petare, 
Caracas 
August 
2016 
Yujra, Martha Bolivia COR-organico, director Female El Alto June 2016 
* Not every interviewee is cited in the main text. However, each of the interviews did inform my 
research and helped to shape the direction of the project. In some cases only the first name of the 
interview respondent is provided. This is due to interviewees choosing not to give their surnames. 
Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapter 3, I have chosen to anonymise some interviewees given the 
sensitive nature of the data provided. Anonymous interviewees are not included in the list above. 
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Indicative interview questions: 
1. Who are you, and have you any organisational affinities? 
2. Could you give an overview of the function of the organisation? 
3. When did the organisation originate, and what role has it played in organising the base? 
4. What is the relationship between the organisation and the government 
(local/regional/national)?  
5. How are decisions taken in the organisation? 
6. How has the relationship with the government changed? 
7. How has your locality developed in the past 15-20 years? Successes, issues? 
8. If you are unhappy with government performance, how do you engage in critique? 
9. Has the base made errors during the process of change? What lessons can be drawn from 
your experiences? 
10. Has the government made errors during the process? What lessons can be drawn? 
11. What are your views on the next phase and direction of the process? 
It must be noted that each individual interview was adapted to the interviewee depending on the 
organisational links, political affiliations, and history. 
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Appendix 2: Ethics 
Ethical Approval Application form: 
 
Maynooth University 
Social Research Ethics Sub-Committee 
  
Protocol for Tier 2-3 Ethical Review of a Research Project Involving Participation of 
Humans 
 
Please note the following: 
1. The ethics committee will review the protocol and have the final decision on Expedited Review 
submissions.  If the committee decides that this project is not eligible for expedited review you will be 
notified and the protocol will automatically be accessed by standard review. 
2. Before submitting this application, all researchers named within it should have read and agreed the 
contents. 
3. While attachments may be appended, it is important that you do not simply refer to them, but that you 
fully address all points in the text of this form. Please keep in mind that your application could be read 
by someone who is not a specialist in your field, so it is important to make your explanations as clear 
and thorough as possible. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Place your cursor inside the box that follows each question and begin to type – the 
box will expand as you type. Please submit this completed form, with all supporting documentation, to 
the Maynooth University Research Support Office Ethics Committee Secretariat.   Please include 
selected review level in the e-mail subject line: research.ethics@nuim.ie 
 
1. Select Review level 
Tier 2 Expedited Review             [ x  ]  
Tier 3 Standard Review           [    ] 
 
 
2. Specific criteria 
Please select the specific criteria, from the following 
https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/research/research-development-office/research-ethics list that 
entitles the project to be exempt from standard review. 
 
Tier 2, Select from Criteria Number 1 to 4  (if applicable) 
1 
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3. Information about the researcher(s), collaborator(s), and/or supervisor (if the researcher is 
a postgraduate student)  
Please include letter from the supervisor (see template at the end of this form) outlining how the 
student is suitably prepared/qualified and will have adequate support to carry out the type of research 
proposed. 
 
Name: 
 
Qualifications 
 or Student 
No: 
 
Address/Dept. 
 
Email:  
Provide Maynooth 
University contact 
details 
Telephone:   
Provide 
Maynooth 
University 
contact 
details 
Role in the 
project:  
John Brown 14250841 Sociology John.brown.2015@nu
im.ie 
- PhD student 
Dr. Barry 
Cannon 
PhD/ Lcturer in 
Politics 
Sociology, Auxilia 
House 
Barry.cannon@nuim.i
e 
(+353) 1 
708 7147 
Supervisor 
      
 
 
4. Previous ethical approval for this project (if applicable) 
(please attach a copy of your approval letter) 
 
Other Ethical Approval Reference 
Maynooth University Ethical Approval   [    ] Yes     [ x   ] No  SRESC-201x-xxxxx  
Other Institutions              N/A               
 
If you are carrying out research in collaboration with another organisation/group 
you might require ethical approval from this organisation/group as well as 
Maynooth University. It is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure such 
permissions are in place.  Please indicate whether or not such approval is 
required. Where applicable provide a copy of the application and letter of 
approval. 
Name and Address of 
organisation 
 
5. Title. Brief title of the research project: 
 
Democratisation and the radical-Left in Latin America: Towards a post-neoliberal citizenship 
regime? Lessons from Bolivia and Venezuela 
 
 
6. Research Objectives. Please summarize briefly the objective(s) of the research, including 
relevant details such as purpose, research question, hypothesis, etc. (about 150 words). 
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This project aims to analyze the political-economies of Venezuela and Bolivia to identify if alternatives to 
neoliberal policy application are being put in place. Firstly, the project aims to define the forms these post-
neoliberal movements are taking, and to assess if they represent a new distinct political-economy model. 
Political ideologies and actually applied policies of each government will be identified, and an analysis 
offered on how each of these interact and influence one another. Next the project will assess similarities 
and differences between post-neoliberalism and both the state-managed model of Import Substitution 
Industrialisation, and the market-managed model of neoliberalism. 
In phase 2 the project aims to identify if post-neoliberalism changes are sustainable.To answer this, the 
project seeks to identify the embededness of the new model, assessing if it offers simply a change in 
government discourse in response to crises of neoliberalism, or if post-neoliberalism represents a more 
profound structural change of the neoliberal political-economy model. Next, the project shall outline key 
barriers to the sustainability of post-neoliberalism -economic (overreliance on primary-commodity exports, 
little use of redistributive taxation, exclusion of informal workers), social (social polarization, cooptation of 
social-movements), and political (International Financial Institutions and TNC interference, domestic 
opposition, corruption/inefficiency, weak institutions and concentration of power in the executive)-and 
assess if and how governments are overcoming them.  Country-specific factors influencing the development 
of post-neoliberalism such as political-cultural history and resource endowment shall also be examined. 
 
 
7. Methodology.  
a. Where will the research be carried out? 
Location(s) 
 
Please describe the locations where the research will be carried out. If research will be 
carried out abroad illustrate how you have given due consideration to the ethical norms 
for the country/culture etc.  Note that when working with institutions abroad you might 
also require ethical approval from that institution/organisation (see Question 4 above).  
Research shall primarily be conducted in the office of the interviewee, as the majority of 
participants shall be elites (social movement leaders, trade union leaders, politicians 
etc). For interviews with informal workers and indigenous leaders, data would be 
collected in the home of the respondent or if they prefer, in a public location such as a 
café or restaurant. Direct observations shall be carried out at community councils (local 
group meetings on issues facing the locality) and in worker co-operatives (businesses 
run and operated by workers, with no single owner of resources). This will require 
research trips to Venezuela and Bolivia. 
 
In Venezuela, Article 60 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
protects the right to a private life and privacy. Article 48 establishes Habeas Data 
Protection and Article 28 guarantees the secrecy and confidentiality of private 
communications in all of its forms. Venezuela does not have a general privacy law but 
there are provisions dealing with privacy rights in various laws, including: the 
Telecommunications Privacy Protection Law; the Data Messages and Electronic 
Signatures Law; the Special Law on Computer Crimes; the Working  
Environment and Working Conditions Law and Regulations Concerning the Use of 
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Electronic Banking Services. (Source http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/global-
data-privacy-directory-52687.pdf ) 
 
 
To adhere to these laws when collecting personal data, I shall expressly and clearly 
inform data subjects, verbally and in written form, of the purpose for which the data is 
being collected, who may receive the data, the existence of a database, my and my 
supervisors contact and mail addresses, the consequences of providing the data, of 
refusing to do so, and the data subject’s access, rectification and suppression rights. Any 
data (manual/electronic) maintained by me shall be truthful, adequate, pertinent, and not 
excessive, be used exclusively for the purpose for which it was legally obtained and be 
deleted on completion of that purpose.  
 
 
 
Proposed  start 
date 
1-10-14 
Approx Duration 48 months 
 
b. Please describe briefly the overall methodological design of the project. 
Political ideologies of each government shall be assessed by analysing constitutional changes, party 
publications/discourse, and through party-member interviews. Social, political and economic policies shall 
be identified through analysis of policy publications, legislation, and previous empirical work. Comparison of 
ideologies and policies shall identify if policy application and outcomes match discourse. A macro-historical 
review of ISI and neoliberalism shall be completed and compared to post-neoliberalism, outlining cleavages 
and continuities between the models. 
How governments are embedding post-neoliberalism and overcoming the challenges to its sustainability 
will be analysed. Silva’s (2009) power-structure framework measuring economic/political/military/ 
transnational/and ideological power will be applied, identifying which institutions/actors are afforded space 
and power to obtain their goals. An examination of changes to laws and regional and foreign policy, direct 
observation of post-neoliberal structures (community councils, worker-cooperatives) and a series of semi-
structured interviews and focus groups with business and political elites, union leaders/informal workers, 
and social-movement members should shed light on the depth of changes and the strategies to overcome 
challenges. Discourse and policy application analysis in opposition-led sub-national regions should identify 
the goals and strength of opposition. 
 
c. Depending on the methods/techniques to be used, please elaborate upon the research context(s), 
potential questions / issues to be explored, tasks/tests/measures, frequency/duration of sessions, 
process of analysis to be used, as appropriate. 
 Relevant details regarding the procedures for data collection should be reflected in the content of the 
Information Sheet.  This project shall use semi-structured interviews and direct observation to record data. 
The purpose shall be to identify real changes to economic and social policy implemented by left-led 
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governments, to quantify how sustainable theses changes are, and to measure structural changes and power 
configurations in society. The project will also seek to identify opposition views to these changes. As such, 
interviews shall include; questions relating to trust/belief in government discourse; Questions to political party 
members identifying party ideology (and how ideology has shifted over time); questions to social movement 
leaders/business elites/trade union leaders as to the space their institutions are afforded and how 
relationships with the government, and other institutions in society, have changed; questions surrounding 
what are the greatest challenges facing current governments as they attempt to establish a new socio-
economic model (post-neoliberalism).  
Interviews and observations shall be one-time procedures, with an expected duration of 45 minutes. 
 
8. Participants.  
a. Who will the participants be? 
Research is to be carried out on political party members, trade-union leaders, social-movement leaders, indigenous 
community leaders, business elites,citizens from various class backgrounds and informal workers 
b. Approximately how many participants do you expect will be involved? 
70 
c. How will participants become involved in your project? If you have formal recruitment procedures, 
or criteria for inclusion/exclusion, please outline them here. 
Where gatekeepers are involved in the process of participant recruitment, please clearly outline procedures 
relating to their involvement. I shall contact all potential participants via email or telephone before leaving 
Ireland. I shall gain access to contact details for participants through the web pages of their university/political 
party/social movement etc. My supervisor also has many contacts in the region and he shall request that I be 
allowed to contact them in regards the project. I have also forged contacts in both focus countries during 
previous trips to the region. It is anticipated that new contacts will be established while in the field through 
recommendations from respondents. Participants shall be chosen due to their links to an institution /party or 
due to their position in their society (specifically for indigenous leaders). 
d. What will be the nature of their participation? (e.g. one-time/short-term contact, longer term 
involvement, collaborative involvement, etc.) 
One-time interviews are planned 
e. If participants will include those with whom the researcher engages in a relationship of power e.g. 
student/employee/employer/colleague, explain how the possibility of the power relationship and/or 
conflict of interest will be minimized. 
Such a relationship shall not arise 
f. Will the participants be remunerated, and if so, in what form? 
Participants shall not be remunerated 
 
9. Persons Under 18.  
a. Will the research be carried out with persons under age 18?          [    ] Yes     [  X  ] No 
Please see section Child Protection Policy (in particular section 5) 
http://foi.nuim.ie/section16/documents/ChildProtectionPolicyandGuidelines.pdf 
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b. If yes, will the sessions be supervised by a guardian or a person responsible for the individual(s)? 
                     [    ] Yes     [    ] No 
NOTE: If the sessions are to be unsupervised, you are required to undergo Garda vetting. Research 
cannot begin until Garda clearance has been completed. For Maynooth University researchers, this is 
facilitated by the Maynooth University Admissions Office (708-3822, admissions@nuim.ie).  
 
10. Vulnerable Persons.  
a. Will the research be carried out with persons who might be considered vulnerable in any way?  
                     [    ] Yes     [ X   ] No 
 
b. If yes, please describe the nature of the vulnerability and discuss special provisions/safeguards to 
be made for working with these persons. 
 
NOTE: Depending on the nature of the vulnerability, sessions may need to be supervised or the researcher 
may need to undergo Garda vetting as stated above under point 4. In such cases, the researcher must also 
be prepared to demonstrate how s/he is suitably qualified or trained to work with such persons. 
 
11. Risks.  
a. Please describe any possible risks or conflicts arising from the research techniques or procedures such 
as: power relationships or other conflict of interests i.e. supervisor-student relationship, physical 
stress/reactions or psychological emotional distress or reactions.   
 
Please consider any potential risks that may arise from the publication of results of this research.  It is 
important to note that power relationships may exist in situations other than supervisor-student relationships. 
Venezuela is polarized along political lines, and as such there is a low potential risk to respondents. 
However, given that questions in interviews shall not be of a sensitive nature, but rather shall be based 
primarily on economic issues and space for institutions to operate in, and the fact that information received 
from interviews shall not reveal any hidden sensitive data about participants, it is not anticipated that 
participating in the study should have any adverse consequences for the participants in their relations with 
the state or other entities.  
 
 
b. If you anticipate the possibility of risks, how will these potential risks be addressed and what 
measures have you put in place to minimize them?   
Please consider that issues may arise for participants following research participation.  Where 
appropriate, contact details for relevant sources of information and/or support should be included in 
the participant’s Information Sheet.  
 For participants who wish to remain anonymous, I shall strive for the greatest confidentiality possible 
under law. Participants will be informed of the limits to confidentiality as set out in the Data Protection Act 
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1988. Should participants choose to be identified, I shall obtain their explicit, unambiguous informed 
consent. However, if I feel that there is a risk in exposing a participant, I shall not disclose their identity. 
Respondents will be allowed to refuse the presence of recording devices. 
I shall inform participants of all aspects of research that might influence their willingness to participate, and 
I will indicate their right to withdraw at any point, without any negative consequences. I shall not provide 
any form of payment that is so attractive as to induce participants to undertake risk against their better 
judgement. Direct observations of worker co-operations and community councils will only be carried out in 
what would normally be considered a public space where those observed would normally expect to be 
observed by strangers. I shall also be considerate of the possibility of intruding upon personal privacy in 
situations where individuals, while in a public space, feel they are unobserved. 
 
It is unlikely that participants will be affected by stress or related factors after participating as questioning is 
not of a sensitive or personal nature 
 
 
12. Informed Consent.  
Please answer the following questions about how you inform participants about your research and 
then obtain their consent: 
NOTE: Please see the template at the end of this form showing standard information that must be 
included on all consent forms. 
 
a. Do research participants sign a written consent form and receive a copy for their records? If not, do 
they receive an information sheet that provides what they need to know before deciding to 
participate? 
Participants shall sign a written consent form, and a copy shall be presented for their own records. The 
consent form shall contain my name, address, and contact details, as well as those of my supervisor. For 
those interviewees who shall not remain anonymous, the consent form shall indicate their right to withdraw 
consent at any time up until publication, and that they may view their data at their discretion. The following 
shall also be included:  
 If during your participation in this study you feel the information and guidelines that you were given have 
been neglected or disregarded in any way, or if you are unhappy about the process, please contact the 
Secretary of the Maynooth University Ethics Committee at research.ethics@nuim.ie or +353 (0)1 708 6019. 
Please be assured that your concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner” 
 
Simple language shall be used (in both English and Spanish), with an outline of my PhD offered. The role of 
respondents in data collection shall be outlined, and I will explain how data is to be used to address the issue 
of the sustainability of post-neoliberalism. An outline of what the research is about, why it is being conducted, 
where the results will appear shall be given to participants. The consent form shall also outline the duration 
data is to be retained, how the data is to be stored, and when and how it shall be destroyed. For those 
respondents who wish to remain anonymous, the limits to confidentiality shall be outlined and the following 
statement included:  
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‘It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and records may be 
overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation by lawful authority. In such 
circumstances the University will take all reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is 
maintained to the greatest possible extent.’ 
 
 
 
 
b. When, where, and by whom is consent obtained?  
Where possible, consent of potential respondents shall be obtained in advance via electronic means. I shall 
personally contact all respondents in advance. If electronic confirmation is not possible, I will deliver a hard 
copy of the consent form to potential respondents in advance of data collection, giving sufficient time for 
respondents to read and comprehend details.  
c. If children or vulnerable persons are involved, please explain your procedure for obtaining their 
assent.  
N/A 
d. For projects in which participants will be involved over the long term, how will you ensure that 
participants have an ongoing opportunity to negotiate the terms of their consent? 
Please bear in mind that in order to negotiate further consent identifiers will have to be collected with the 
data. If data is completely anonymous please ensure that consent is sought from participants at the outset to 
maintain and re-use their data. 
N/A 
e. What will the participants be told about the study? 
Participants shall be told that the study is to help complete a PhD, and a full synopsis of the proposed 
research shall me made available in both Spanish and English, including dissemination plans, so as to fully 
inform the participants of the purpose of the project. 
f. What information, if any, will be withheld about the research procedure or the purposes of the 
investigation? Please explain your justification for withholding this information. If any deception will be 
involved, please be sure that the technique is explained above under methodology, and explain here 
why the deception is justified. 
No information about the project shall be withheld 
 
13. Follow-up. As appropriate, please explain what strategies you have in place to debrief or follow 
up with participants.  
Participants shall be offered an electronic version of the completed project should they wish.  
 
14. Confidentiality/Anonymity of Data.  
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Please consult Maynooth University data protection procedures: 
http://dataprotection.nuim.ie/protection_procedures.shtml 
 
a. Recording of personally identifiable information about research participants 
 
Identifier 
(Typically, by their very nature projects involving 
repeated contact with research participants require 
the collection and retention of identifiers) 
Y/ N (Select all those applicable) 
Name and Contact Details y 
Details regarding Geographical location, culture, 
ethnicity etc. 
y 
Video recording n 
Audio recording  y 
Other please specify  
Not applicable  
 
b. If yes, to any of the above please explain how confidentiality and/or anonymity are assured? 
 
Please ensure that participants are informed of the limits to confidentiality as outlined in section 3.3 of the 
ethics policy 
(http://research.nuim.ie/system/files/images/Ethics%20Policy%20Approved%20by%20AC%2012%2002%20
12.pdf) 
 
The following or similar text may be used in consent/information sheet. 
‘It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and records may be 
overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation by lawful authority. In such 
circumstances the University will take all reasonable steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is 
maintained to the greatest possible extent.’ 
All data shall be stored in a safe and secure manner (please see below for further details). All participants 
shall be informed of the limits to confidentiality. All participants shall be given the option to refuse the use of 
recording devices. Data included in published results shall in no way allow for respondents to be identified 
(should they wish for anonymity) – for example place names, personal data, role in an institution, ethnicity 
etc. 
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c. If yes, to any of the above please explain the following: how you will safeguard this information; if 
identifiers will be removed from the data, at what point will they be removed; if identifiers will not be 
removed, why they must be retained and who will retain the key to re-identify the data. 
If identifiers are collected they should be stored separately to the data.  
Please state who will have access to the identifiers and/or the data.  
Data should be encrypted and stored on campus either on a desktop computer or secure server 
Data should be removed from mobile devices as soon as possible following collection. (mobile devices 
should be either password protected or encrypted where possible). 
All data, manual or otherwise, shall be stored safely and securely. In the case of manual data, it will be stored 
in securely locked cabinets in a room with limited access. For electronic forms of data, it shall be protected 
through use of passwords, encryption, access logs and backup, while firewalls and up to date anit-virus 
software shall be employed. Data shall only be stored on a desktop computer with a secure server. 
Recording devices shall have password protection. Transcription of interview recordings shall be carried out 
as soon as feasible. Following transcription of interview recordings, the original taped transcript shall be 
erased and the transcribed version protected as outlined above. Once transcribed, the data shall be given 
identifiers which shall only be known and retained by me. Identifiers shall be stored separately from data, and 
shall be treated with the same level of protection and security as the data itself. As there shall be a large 
amount of data, identifiers shall be necessary to interpret the source of the data.  
d. After data analysis has taken place, will the data be  destroyed [    ]  or retained   [   x ] 
 
If the data will be retained, please explain for how long, for what purpose, and where it will be stored; 
if there is a key code connecting subjects' data to their identity, when will the link be destroyed?  
Please bear in mind that identifiable data cannot be retained in definitely.  
If data is to be retained consent must be sought before anonymisation 
If identifiers are to be retained then further consent must be sought for any subsequent use of data 
Data shall be stored for a period of 10 years following publication of findings so as to ensure possible future 
reassessment of data. Data shall not be used for any other purpose than outlined in the methodology of the 
project. All data, manual or otherwise, shall be stored safely and securely. In the case of manual data, it will 
be stored in securely locked cabinets in a room with limited access. For electronic forms of data, it shall be 
protected through use of passwords, encryption, access logs and backup, while firewalls and up to date anti-
virus software shall be employed. Data shall only be stored on a desktop computer with a secure server. 
Respondents shall be made aware of the storage of data before collection commences. The key code for 
identifying data shall be destroyed after the 10 year period elapses, and shall be stored separately from data. 
 
e. If the data will be destroyed, please explain how, when, and by whom?  
Electronic data should be overwritten 
Paper data should be destroyed by confidential shredding 
Paper data shall be destroyed by confidential shredding once the retention period has expired. I shall carry 
out this procedure. Electronic data shall be overwritten 3-5 times upon completion of the data retention 
415 
 
period. If changing PC, a member of NUIM’s IT staff shall be employed to clean the hard drive. Recorded 
interviews shall be destroyed as soon as they have been transcribed. Tapes shall be erased and overwritten. 
NOTE: Include this information in the consent form, information sheet, or consent script. 
 
15. Ethics in subsequent outputs. What are your plans for protecting the safety and integrity of 
research participants in publications, public presentations, or other outputs resulting from this 
research? How will subjects' permission for further use of their data be obtained?  
Data shall only be used for the purpose for which it was originally gathered, expressly agreed upon with 
research participants. All data shall be kept safe and secure. Only those participants who sign a consent form 
to waiver anonymity shall be mentioned by name in any publication or presentation. To provide anonymity to 
those who desire/require it, no mention of names, institutions or any information that would allow for identity 
of participants to be revealed shall be released in any form of publication or presentation. Any further use of 
data beyond than that which was originally agreed upon by participants shall be proceeded by the requisition 
of unambiguous written consent from the participants. 
NOTE: If the data is not anonymised, additional consent would have to be obtained before the data 
could be deposited in an archive such as the Irish Qualitative Data Archive (http://www.iqda.ie/) or the 
Irish Social Science Data Archive (http://issda.ucd.ie/). 
 
16. Professional Codes of Ethics. Please append a professional code of ethics governing research 
in your area to this protocol, and/or provide a link to the website where the code may be found.  
http://www.sociology.ie/docstore/dls/pages_list/3_sai_ethical_guidelines.pdf 
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Informed consent sheet: 
Informed consent form – please complete if you are 
happy to take part in the study. 
TITLE: Democratisation and the radical-Left in Latin America: Towards a post-
neoliberal citizenship regime? Lessons from Bolivia and Venezuela  
 
Name of Researcher: John Brown  e-mail: john.brown.2015@mumail.ie  Room 34, 
Sociology Department, Auxilia Building, NUIM, Kildare, Ireland 
 
Name Of Supervisor: Dr. Barry Cannon   e-mail: barry.cannon@nuim.ie Phone:  (01) 
7087147   Room 3.6, Sociolgoy Department, Auxilia Building, NUIM, Kildare   
 
Where participants do not choose anonymity, participants may remove their 
consent at any time up until the work is published, after which time consent may 
not be withdrawn. Such participants are entitled to access their data at their 
discretion. 
 
Please indicate by circling whether you wish to remain anonymous or not:   
  
YES, I wish to remain anonymous       
 
NO, I do not wish to remain anonymous 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the research information sheet 
for the above study. 
 
2. I have spoken to the above researcher and understand that my 
involvement will involve being interviewed at a time and place to suit me. I 
have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
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3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without my legal 
rights being affected. 
 
4. I understand that the above researcher from the Maynooth University who 
is working on the project will have access to my personal details.  
 
5. I understand that all data will be stored securely and is covered by the 
data protection act. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant  Date  Signature 
 
 
    
     
 
If during your participation in this study you feel the information and guidelines that you were 
given have been neglected or disregarded in any way, or if you are unhappy about the process, 
please contact the Secretary of the Maynooth University Ethics Committee at 
research.ethics@nuim.ie or +353 (0)1 708 6019. Please be assured that your concerns will be 
dealt with in a sensitive manner. 
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Project information sheet: 
PROJECT TITLE: Democratisation and the radical-Left in Latin America: Towards a post-
neoliberal citizenship regime? Lessons from Bolivia and Venezuela 
 
This project aims to map changes to economic and social policies of current and previous 
governments in Venezuela and Bolivia, and to identify attitudes of key members of society to 
said changes. This research project forms the basis of a PhD in Sociology from the National 
University of Ireland Maynooth (NUIM). It is a four year project and data generated shall be 
used to assist in the writing of academic literature to be published in journals or books. 
Participants involved in the project shall be interviewed so as to gather their opinions on a 
range of social, political, and economical issues. 
 
All data collected shall be stored safely and securely. Manual data shall be stored in 
securely locked cabinets in a room with limited access. Electronic data shall be protected 
through the use of passwords, encryption, access logs and backup, while firewalls and anti-
virus software shall also be employed. Transcription of recorded interviews shall be carried 
out promptly, and the recordings will then be erased. For participants who chose to waiver 
anonymity, any future use of data pertaining to them shall be preceded by the attainment of 
their explicit consent to do so on each occasion the data is to be used.  Data shall be kept 
for ten years from the date of first publication in order to allow for future reassessment of 
data. After this period, manual data shall be destroyed using confidential shredding, while 
electronic data will be overwritten, erased and wiped clean by a professional IT staff member 
from Maynooth University. 
 
It must be recognized that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and 
records may be overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation 
by lawful authority. In such circumstances the University will take all reasonable steps within 
law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest possible extent. 
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